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Media, politics and the Cyprus Problem are the 
main themes of the present study. Through  analy-
sis of Greek and Turkish Cypriot television news 
bulletins and newspaper editorials and leading arti-
cles, the study seeks to establish media approaches 
and positions on important issues so as to better 
understand their work, role and functions. The 
study analyses practices and positions related to the 
Cyprus Problem, the solution, matters of identity, 
the ‘others’ and the European Union, the authori-
ties and the political forces.  This attempt to ascer-
tain the underlying values that guide news selection 
and content will provide a clearer picture of how the 
media interacts with or influences society.
The study of sample data from late 2002, 2007 and 
July 2008 has revealed that, along with some dif-
ferences, the two communities’ media have com-
mon features and practices; these are sustained 
over time irrespective of the general context. While 
the media perspectives and positions of the two 
sides may differ, in many instances they all obey 
the same or similar principles. 
On most issues the media promote the official 
selection and interpretation of events or those of 
different elite groups, based on affinities with their 
own views and positions. High dependency on offi-
cial news sources, in particular of the Turkish Cyp-
riot media, leads to disseminating the content and 
structure of the official discourses. 
When reporting on core aspects of the Cyprus 
Problem and the status of the two sides there 
is little or no differentiation on either side; one-
sided legitimacy or status superiority, stereotypical 
positions of the own side’s good intentions and the 
other’s wrong doings dominate.
The mediated world is composed of various pairs 
of ‘us’ and the ‘other’, community or group in the 
other or the own community; there is an empha-
sis on dualities, with the ‘other’ being the prob-
lem because of its negative attributes. Most often, 
one side’s or a third party’s acts and decisions will 
be seen as simply connected to their good or evil 
nature, thus portraying it as an ally or as foe.
The framing of news and representations shows 
divergent perceptions of the core of the Cyprus 
Problem and consequently of how a solution can 
be reached. 
Changes in power or the general atmosphere have 
limited effect on media coverage and stances. On 
most issues media practices and positions feature 
stability and continuity. 
The question remains open; can the media articu-
late a discourse that deviates from the official or 
dominant discourses sustaining antagonism and 
conflict, in order to promote peace as a superior 
good?
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MEDIA AND POLITICS IN CYPRUS
Christophoros Christophorou
Media, politics and the Cyprus Problem are the main themes of the present study. Whileeach topic on its own occupies an important place in the islandʼs daily life, the three arevery closely interrelated; political actors are, by far, the most prominent if not the almost
exclusive group on the media stage, and the Cyprus Problem is the main topic of discourse. All
developments and any references, whether significant or minimal, to aspects of the Problem,
become news items and give political party leaders and others the opportunity to access the
media and present their views and comments. However, issues related to the media in Cyprus
have been very little researched.
Our study focuses on the analysis of media content and discourses on television and in
newspapers on both sides of the dividing line. The material studied is the main television news
bulletin on Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot channels, broadcast in the evening;1 in the case of
newspapers, the focus is on editorials and leading news articles in the Turkish and Greek
language dailies. We chose to leave out English language newspapers given that they address a
public that could hardly compare to the readers of the other dailies.
The aim of this research is to examine how the media cover issues related to aspects of the
Cyprus Problem and political actors, the authorities and political parties. The main subjects of
interest are the nature of the Cyprus Problem and the envisaged or preferred solution, matters of
identity, representations about the other parties engaged in the conflict, positions vis-à-vis the
European Union, and the relationship with the authorities and political forces on each side. We
sought answers to questions related to the approaches and positions the media adopt, and their
views as these are expressed in editorials and comments, or that transpire between the lines as
hidden or implied meaning. In addition to describing the main features of media treatment of the
respective issues, we felt it was important to delve deeper and attempt to ascertain the underlying
values guiding media choices and approaches. We are interested in features indicating continuity
or change rather than circumstantial positions or isolated phenom ena that may just be influenced
by conjuncture.
This research, through a systematic analysis of media content beyond pre-conceived ideas or
superficial and stereotypical approaches, will give us a better understanding of the media in
Cyprus, revealing its place and role in the society, and especially how it interacts or influences the
course of events, whether everyday politics or issues related to the Cyprus Problem. In this respect,
everyone, from ordinary citizens to policy makers and researchers, can use this information in a
way that enables a more informed, positive and constructive relation with the media. However, we
recognize that the above is an optimistic statement since the subject can only be fully addressed
through extended and systematic research over many years—not just one study.
Methodology and theoretical background
The object of our study is media content per se, both its direct and implied meaning. This we will
accomplish through an attempt to understand and analyse the practices implemented by media
professionals in their selection and presentation of news and ideas. Observations and analysis
are based solely on the actual material published–with no further research among professionals
1 News bulletins on Greek Cypriot channels start between 20:00 and 20:25 and last from 60 to 75 minutes including sports news, while on Turkish
Cypriot channels they start about 30 minutes earlier. 
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or any other parties. Furthermore, the content is examined to derive its substance and meaning,
which could enable us to anticipate or make inferences as to its effects. Thus, our research
applied media content analysis to a limited extent, and discourse analysis more thoroughly. This
emphasis on discourse rather than content enabled us to seek meaning through interpretation of
media texts. Because a given text is open to myriad interpretations, we can provide no definite
results here. 
We have conducted our analysis in line with Lasswelʼs well-known definition of news, which
stands out as the most illustrative statement2 on this subject: Thus, news is “Who says What,
through Which channel, to Whom, with What effect”.
The effects of news content could only be anticipated or inferred in our conclusions, since we
took no audience survey nor any related measurement. To Lasswelʼs model we also added ʻWhyʼ,
in an attempt to explore the reasons for the specific news selection and the choice to present
news and ideas in specific ways. Thus, we applied media analysis as a subset of content and
discourse analysis and in a qualitative perspective, with particular emphasis on discourse
analysis. Following on Berelsonʼs suggestions, we describe substance and form characteristics of
media content; we make inferences to producers and audiences of content, and attempt to
deduce the effects of content on audiences and society.3
With the goal of revealing underpinning values, continuity or change, we chose to study texts
from different periods in time. The initial plan was to randomly select newspaper and television
material from various dates in fall 2002 and in fall 2007. The first period included texts before and
after Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General, first presented his blueprint, the Annan
Plan I, to the Cypriot leaders and public, in 2002. It proved impossible to find copies of televised
news, and so only newspaper content could be studied for this first period. The second period
started with the meeting between Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat, in early September
2007 and covered news until January 2008. In each period, the study included data from three
different sets of dates for a total of 11 days. This choice aimed to examine the eventual impact on
the media of significant events, such as the failure of the UN settlement efforts, the relaxation of
movement restrictions across the dividing line, and accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the
European Union;  has  the media reacted to these significant changes? If so, in what way? If not,
can we explain why?
The change in power on the Greek Cypriot side in February 2008, with the election of Demetris
Christofias to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus, prompted the inclusion of additional data
for four days (30 June – 3 July 2008), that could highlight any effect on the media. This would
enable the study of three periods in the very recent history of the island, featuring substantially
different political atmospheres regarding intra- and inter-community relations, within a new
international context. We aimed to determine in what ways, if any, the handling of the Cyprus
Issue by two left-wing leaders and the small positive steps they have made, have changed media
practices, positions and orientations. The ultimate issue was about media responses to changes
in the political scene: was there any change or did they continue to act in accordance with long-
standing values and cultural orientations? 
Problems and limitations
One major problem inherent to media text studies relates to the volume of material both in terms
of what is available and what should be selected for research purposes. Given the large volume
of material that could be included in our analysis, we chose only those discourses and practices
that were most repeated. Despite the fact that the media content we studied amounted to
hundreds of pages for each newspaper and tens of hours of news for each television channel, this
2 J. Macnamara, Media Content Analysis: Uses, Benefits & Best Practice Methodology, Media Monitors Pty LTD, online:
http://www.mediamonitors.com.au/documents/Media%20Content%20Analysis%20Research%20Paper.pdf, accessed 28 March 2009.
3 B. Berelson, Content analysis in communication research, New York: Hafner, 1952.
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proved largely insufficient for an in-depth report. On the one hand, there were the many complex
issues that we sought to research and, on the other hand, there was the very lengthy period
(between 2002 and 2008) we originally wanted to consider. A detailed report would have neces -
sitated data from longer periods of time, and therefore a volume of material many times larger
than what we have analyzed, and much more time.
A major handicap is that it proved impossible to secure recorded television material for the
entire 2002 period, which limited the study of television news to 2007 and 2008. Thus, a
comparative study was possible only for two of the three time periods.
Radio texts are also missing from this research, a deliberate choice for two major reasons: first,
there was the question of what kind of material to study (i.e., which news bulletin or current affairs
programme) and, second, the impossibility of finding past material combined with the complex
technical problems posed by the need to record up to 20 different radio channels for the current
study. In addition, the volume and scope of study would have, again, dramatically increased the
workload much beyond our resources.
The choice of periods for study and the leap from December 2002 to September 2007 leave a
large time period unexamined, including the extremely important 2004 referenda and accession of
the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union. This impacted more on the capacity to reveal the
processes of eventual shifts and changes, but not on the potential to document continuity or
change in media positions and values, which constituted the goal of this research. 
Finally, the traditional methods for content and discourse analysis have their limitations, since
they are subject to subjective understandings and interpretations; thus any conclusions cannot be
definite, while the polysemic nature of texts makes it possible to challenge our reading. Nevertheless
the value of this research lies in the validity of the analysis as one of many possible interpretations
of media content.
Theories on media role and effects
The role and effects of the media have been extensively researched from many different
perspectives. A critical issue for researchers has been that of the power of the media. Much of the
public, and many politicians, justices,4 institutions and others continue to perceive media as a
source of evil –or at least as a bad influence– that needs to be controlled. Early research also
found the media to be very powerful, even claiming a direct cause-effect relation between media
consumption and behaviour, violent or otherwise. Contemporary theory, while dismissing the
direct cause-effect argument, nevertheless acknowledges a considerable influence, especially
regarding electronic media, but finds the influence more subtle and complex. Three factors form
the basis and determine the extent and nature of the influence: (a) the content; (b) the semiotic
complexity and efficacy of the medium; and (c) the meaning the reader attributes to the content.5
Many researchers have focused on the role of the reader, even going so far as to talk about ʻthe
death of the author  ʼ (Roland Barthes), or seeing the reader as an agent of the de-codification
process6 or active producer of meaning. In this respect, John Fiske considers the audience — not
the media— as having the most power.7 However, the readerʼs ability and will to react depend not
only on subjective factors, such as race, gender, education, concerns, etc., but on very objective
4 Quite often, politicians blame the media for bringing (undesirable) issues to the publicʼs attention and prompting debate on them, even though
they were the first to open the debate. Justice systems all over the world consider the media as a source of eventual problems in relation to a
fair trial. An illustrative example is the following: In an Assizes Court decision in the Republic of Cyprus that caused outrage not only to the
public, the acquittal of eleven policemen charged for ill-treating and brutally beating two young students was also founded on grounds related
to the coverage of the incident in the media: “…the attribution of criminal responsibility by the media to them in the manner it was done in the
present case… is unacceptable in a lawful society. Itʼs an interference in the work of justice and anticipates the outcome of the trial… it cancels
…in particular the carrying out of a fair trial of the accused…This constitute an additional reason for dismissal of the present case.” (Republic
of Cyprus, Supreme Court, Republic v. Efstathiou et al., Case 17179/06, decided 19.03.2009). Interestingly, the Courtʼs concern for a fair trial
completely disregarded the critical role of the media in disclosing the real events: The two students were initially charged for assault and injuries
to police members, but an amateur video released by the media showed that the two students were brutally beaten for several minutes while
handcuffed and immobilised.
5 Macnamara, 2006:9.
6 S. Hall, Encoding/Decoding. Reprinted in S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe, & P. Willis (Eds.), Culture, media, language (pp. 26-27). London:
Hutchinson, 1973.
7 D. Gauntlett, Media, Gender & Identity, London: Routledge, 2002:19. 
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factors related to the broader environment and context as well. The context or the social reality is,
among other factors, the product of the media, which leads to the question, ʻdo the media create
or do they reflect social reality?  ʼMany researchers believe that both are true: media is both a
creator and a reflection of what happens in society. This means that the perception of a one-way
action, of manipulation or brainwashing, as proposed by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer8
and others, cannot stand the test since audiences are not passive consumers.
In the framework of political economy and cultural studies views of the media, McCombs9
introduced his ʻagenda setting theoryʼ, arguing that the media sets the agenda regarding topics
for public debate. Through the selection of issues that become news, they ʻsuggest  ʼin a certain
way what people should think about and discuss. Furthermore, the choice of a specific
perspective, in other words, the ʻframing  ʼof news, places attention on specific aspects such that
the event takes on a specific meaning. This framing can shift attention from fundamental issues
to secondary ones. For example, the 2003 USA operation against Iraq was framed in most media
largely as an issue of defence and later as a rescue operation, rather than on the basis of ethical
questions, such as what was the moral ground for this action.10
Beyond its influence, other functions of the media have been considered, such as the use of a
specific language and vocabulary; the aggregation of interests; the demands and concerns of
certain groups of people, for example, are ways in which the media helps contribute to peopleʼs
awareness of belonging to and identification with a national or other entity.11 When people can
recognise themselves in the content they may see the medium as the reflection of a community
of all those that share common characteristics. The media can make people aware of their
belonging to a wider group. Without pretending any exclusive causal link, it is interesting to note
in this respect that the publication of the first newspapers in Cyprus in the late 19th century also
marks the beginning of a process of a clear differentiation of the two main communities on the
island. Thus, newspapers may have contributed to the consolidation of ethnic differences.
With Cyprus media operating in a society of long-standing differences and conflict between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots — put also in the broader perspective of Greece-Turkey relations —
our research must take into account theories related to media coverage of conflict. Research on
the subject includes issues related to the relations between government and media, and
journalists and their professional and broader social environment.
In a comprehensive review of literature on media and war and the more recent theme of peace
journalism, Susan Dente Ross asserts that media today are better than ever before, while also
noting that they are less (good) than they could be.12 She looks at research on the role of the
media in the dissemination of negative pictures of the ʻotherʼ, suggesting that this might be the
result of direct and other pressure by governments and politicians, which becomes stronger in
conflict zones, or perhaps it is simply because the media acts as a propaganda vehicle and
reinforces the power and positions of the elite. Studies have shown that in reports from conflict
areas pain and blood are differently valued,13 often with a distinction between worthy and unworthy
victims.14 Some argue that this media behaviour results from constraints imposed by internal
rules and the context in which the media industry operates, while others contend that media
positions are commanded by national identity and political ideology rather than government
influences. However, the media is not seen as uncritically disseminating government propaganda;
8 Cited in Gauntlett, 2002.
9 M. McCombs, The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion, online:
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/extra/McCombs.pdf, accessed 15.04.2009.
10 S. Kull, Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraqi War, 2003, online: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf, accessed
20 March 2010.
11 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso: New Left Books, 1991.
12 S. D. Ross, ʻ(De)Constructing Conflict: A Focused Review of War and Peace Journalismʼ, in Conflict and Communication online, Vol.5, No.2,
2006:2, online http://www.cco.regener-online.de, accessed 28 March 2009. 
13 E. Avraham, ʻPress, Politics and the coverage of minorities in divided societiesʼ: The case of Arab citizens in Israel, The Harvard Journal of
Press/Politics, 8:4, 2003:7-26.
14 Ross, 2006.
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rather, it simply falls short of becoming a mechanism for the distribution of minority or dissident
views and information.15
Beyond arguing for or against the role expected from the media or the need for an ideal media,
the critical question that we are attempting to answer in the present report is, ʻwhat conclusions
can one draw about the role of the Cyprus media vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem and other issues
on either side of the dividing line? Can the media contribute to understanding the fears, concerns
and pain of the other side and, ultimately, contribute to peace and reconciliation?ʼ
In Cyprus, media research remains very limited; the Greek Cypriot media has been studied by
Andreas Kl. Sophocleous, whose sizeable work focused on the history of the press, legal and
political aspects and notable figures; some limited-scope research has also been conducted by
others.16 Both Servet Dedeçay17 and Cemaletin Ünlü18 studied the history of the Turkish language
press in Cyprus. Dedeçayʼs work includes the development of broadcast media as well. 
The local press was born soon after Cyprus was leased by the Ottoman Empire to the British19
and developed in an environment of antagonism between Greek Cypriot irredentism and the
Turkish Cypriot search for securing their own interests. This period was marked by the conso -
lidation of identities across national lines and integration of people into communities.20 The
culmination of antagonism came in the 1950s with one community struggling for enosis, union
with Greece, and the other for taksim, partition of the island. Throughout the twentieth century and
beyond, each community was divided into two main groups, each time on different criteria, but
always directly linked to the future of the island and the parameters on which a solution to its
problem would be based.21 The core ideas gave precedence to Cyprus or one of the two mother -
lands and each group made its choices accordingly. The case of the 2004 referenda is a glaring
example of the effects of this polarisation, where only two options were available: join the camp of
the ʻpatriots  ʼor the ʻsurrendering  ʼones, labelled by some as ʻtraitorsʼ.
What, then, is the place and what are the characteristics of the media, under these conditions?
To what extent can the media play a role? 
Examining the role of media in Greece and Turkey in Greek-Turkish relations prior to 1999, K.
Hadjidimos suggested that negative approaches dominated over the very few positive
examples.22 Greek media projected the stereotype of the ʻ Barbarian Turkʼ, while the Turkish media
showed Greeks as followers of the ʻGreat Ideaʼ.23 Hadjidimos noted the existence of various
forms of hate speech and a selection of news that silenced certain views or items or that led to
auto-censorship for political or economic reasons.24 The author also noted some positive examples,
in particular joint efforts of media professionals aiming at a balanced reporting and cooperation.
In a study on the role and the evolution of the Greek Cypriot press from 1960 to 1985, C.
Christophorou concluded that the press did not fulfil its fourth estate functions; it proved dependent
on power holders and various pressure and other groups  ʼinterests. The main features of the press
in the above period were ʻintolerance, lack of will for dialogue, one-sided interpretations, the
intention to annihilate the opponents and, in some cases, intentional calumnyʼ. In the reports on
15 ibid.
16 For a list of Andreas Kl. Sophocleous books and monographs, see,
http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=au:Andreas+Kl+Sophokleous&qt=hot_author. 
17 S. S. Dedeçay, Kıbrısʼta Enformasyon veya Yazılı ve Sözlü Basın [Information or Print and Broadcast Media in Cyprus], Cilt:1,2, LÖTÜ Yayınları,
Lefkoşa, Nisan, 1988, 1989.
18 C. Ünlü, Kıbrısʼta Basın Olayı, 1878–1981 [The Story of the Press in Cyprus, 1878-1981]. Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, No Date.
19 The first newspaper, Κύπρος – Cyprus, was published in Larnaca, in August 1978, some weeks after the start of British rule.
20 For a brief account of Greek and Turkish Cypriot media antagonism and promotion of the positions of their respective communities, see, S.
Şahin, The Discursive Construction of National Identity by the Newspapers in North Cyprus, 2008, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of
Wesminster, pp. 64-70.
21 See, C. Christophorou, ʻThe vote for a united Cyprus deepens divisions – The 24 April 2004 Referenda in Cyprusʼ, in South European Society
& Politics, vol.10, no. 1, 2005: 85-104.
22 K. Hadjidimos, The Role of the Media in Greek-Turkish Relations –Co-production of a TV programme window by Greek and Turkish  journalists,
1999, Online http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/Greek-Turkish-Media.PDF, accessed 24 March 2010.
23 Megali Idea [Great Idea], an idea aiming at the revival of the Byzantine Empire.
24 A striking recent example of how media treat important issues, including that of Greek-Turkish relations, occurred on 21 June 2009; two
newspapers, Το Βήμα[To Vima] and Έθνος [Ethnos], reported on a summit meeting that never took place. The Turkish Prime-minister
cancelled his visit to Athens and the meeting with the Greek Premier on the occasion of the inauguration of the Acropolis Museum;
nevertheless, the papers reported on the ʻcold climate  ʼand enumerated the subjects that were raised or discussed.
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the events of 1963-1967, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leadership were labelled in very dark
colours, such as terrorists, gangsters and outlaws.25
Focusing on Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspaper headlines, M.Ersoy undertook a content
analysis of the coverage of the Cyprus Conflict, in an attempt to examine whether news selection
and coverage promoted peace. He concluded that ʻthe media structures and the structures of
journalism made it probable that peace journalism has a long way to goʼ.26 Ersoy noted that,
contrary to their Greek Cypriot counterparts, the Turkish Cypriot newspapers depended on news
agencies as sources of information.  He found that 31% and 25% of their headlines respectively
were negatively oriented towards the ʻotherʼ.
M.Bailie and B. Azgin. also examined the role of the press by focusing on reports on a more
specific subject, the attempts for the opening of the Ledra street barricade in the heart of Nicosia.27
They argued that Cypriot media over-relied on elite and socially privileged sources, while also
suggesting their own agendas through the selection and the perspective in which they present
selected official sources. The authors suggested the existence of ʻcarefully orchestrated “media
wars”  ʼand the re-presentation of ʻsocial, cultural, political and economic dynamics in and between
the two Cypriot communities in selective and ideological forms: as “win-lose” and “conflict driven”ʼ.
Media in Cyprus today
The press that emerged soon after the island came under British rule, in 1878, developed
throughout the 20th century into a pluralistic entity in both communities. Newspapers went
through radical changes in the 1980s, prompted, among other things, by phototypesetting and
computerisation. The main trends that characterised the press were:
■ The shrinking and disappearance of weeklies following the decision to produce dailies on
Mondays, the day traditionally reserved for weeklies, thus displacing them.
■ The decline of the partisan press, without however adopting a clear ideologically neutral
editorial line. However, ideology in connection to positions on the Cyprus Problem remains a
dominant feature of newspapers. In the Turkish Cypriot community, partisan newspapers
continue to exist, all dominated however by the commercial Kıbrıs.
■ The proliferation of specialised press, newspapers, magazines and free-press.
■ The transformation of family press businesses into large all-media enterprises was an ongoing
process in 2009, at a more advanced stage for Greek Cypriot than Turkish Cypriot media.
During the 1990s, the lifting of the monopoly on radio frequencies saw the increase in public service
radio and television channels and the proliferation of private operators in both communities. 
The multiplication of media outlets since the early 1990s led to a huge increase in the demand
for professional journalists. Given the rapid increase in the number of journalists, along with an
environment dominated by market forces and increased competition instead of traditional cultural
values, the question one may raise here is, ʻdo journalists function as advocates for the public
interest today, and if so, to what extentʼ?
Rossʼs argument that the media – big media also – cannot escape from the system and its
competitive values because of political, economic, institutional and other constraints, applies to a
much higher degree in Cyprus due to its limited output: The size of the market is small compared
to most countries in the world, and this has a direct effect on the size of media audiences and the
expected volume of income. Media can generate income which would be insufficient for
sustaining an important team of journalists and services, thus increasing dependency on official
resources or other mainstream forces. 
25 C. Christophorou, ʻΟ ρόλος και η εξέλιξη του Τύπου στην Κύπρο από την ανεξαρτησία μέχρι σήμερα [The role and development of the
press after independence]ʼ, in G. Ioannides (ed), Cyprus Life and Society, (1960-1985), Nicosia: Demos Lefkosias, 1993:183-213.
26 M. Ersoy, Peace Journalism and News Coverage on Cyprus Conflict in Cyprus Newspapers, 2007, online at
http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/ipraweb/papers/Peace%20Journalism%20and%20News%20Coverage%20on%20Cyprus%20Conflict%20in%20C
yprus%20Newspapers.pdf, accessed 24 March 2010.
27 M. Bailie & B. Azgin , A Barricade, a Bridge and a Wall: Cypriot Journalism and the Mediation of Conflict in Cyprus, in Cyprus Review, vol. 20:1,
2008 pp. 57-92.
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The present study reveals how highly dependent the Turkish Cypriot media is on external
sources, primarily the official news agency–which of course carries the risk of journalists being
turned into mere news processors and proponents of the government discourse. Their
differentiation, mainly through the selection of news and voices, does not stray far beyond the
boundaries of the elitist discourse. While most Greek Cypriot media rely more on their own
resources, they hardly escape from advocacy journalism, supporting mainstream views. When
the media reports on the ʻCyprus Problemʼ, there is little or no differentiation on either side;
stereotypical phrases, expressions, and the position that ʻour  ʼside is the good one who strives for
a solution, itʼs the ʻothers  ʼwho are negative, characterise both media.
The selection of news and voices on most issues, i.e., who is given access and whose views
are presented, is similar in both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot media. In addition to their own
public — readers and viewers— the media have favoured people and views enjoying a privileged
or preferential treatment. This is less accentuated or evident on television.
When comparing the periods studied, one may particularly note a more differentiated
landscape and more pluralistic approaches by some newspapers in fall 2002. One such case is
the way the Annan Plan was presented by some media, with both its good and bad points. While
the dichotomy between ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼwas not new, the Greek Cypriot media targeted Turkey, the
Turkish Army, the settlers and Rauf Denktaş; the Turkish Cypriots— with the exception of
conservative forces, which viewed the Plan as bringing losses and threats emanating from the
other side, the ʻenemy with persisting bad intentionsʼ— focused on the prospects the Plan could
open for them and for the island.
With the passage of time, intra- and inter-community polarisation appears to have deepened,
with a blame-game directed by some not only against the ʻother  ʼside but also against those with
different views as well. Any view diverging from the official line was sometimes seen as damaging
and undermining the communityʼs cause to the benefit of the ʻenemiesʼ; also, responsibility for
unfavourable developments in oneʼs own community was attributed to those with views different
from the official view. 
The structure of the book
There are a number of ways that we could present our media analysis, each approach with its
own advantages and disadvantages. For example, we could present separate analyses for each
communityʼs media, to give an overall picture for each side; in this case, there are still different
options, since the press and television analyses could be presented separately for all three
periods or alternately for each period. We have decided on a format that will give the reader an
overall picture for each of the three periods. To accomplish this, we analyze together the press
and television data for each community, which provides a comprehensive view of that communityʼs
media, and enables us to identify similarities and differences, common trends and divergences,
before we proceed to comparisons with media on the ʻother side  ʼof the dividing line.
We examine each timeframe to reveal the basic trends and features of media practices in news
selection and presentation; content, or rather, discourse analysis follows, targeting the specific
subjects on which this study focuses, i.e., positions on the Cyprus Problem and its solution,
stances towards the ʻothersʼ, persons and groups, treatment of the European Union, the political
parties and the authorities. Because we study the three periods separately, the analyses and
descriptions of trends and features have been repeated. We believe that this approach provides
a clearer picture, and at the same time will not pose obstacles to other comparisons that might be
made through a non-linear reading of the study.
Section one examines data solely from the newspapers, as there was no/insufficient recorded
television data. Synthia Pavlou analyses Greek Cypriot newspaper practices and discourses,
derived from 11 days data in October, November and December 2002. She focuses on practices
and tactics in the selection of events, views and other topics that are treated as news, as well as
of the persons or groups that were given coverage. Then she looks at the discourses related to
the Cyprus Problem, aspects of the Problem or its solution, the treatment of the EU, the political
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parties and leaders and the authorities, in order to reveal the trends and, most importantly, the
values underpinning the analysis. This part concludes with discussion of the main Greek Cypriot
newspaper practices and discourses for the 2002 period.
Then Sanem Şahin undertakes analysis of data drawn from the Turkish Cypriot newspapers for
the same time period. She also focuses on the main trends relating to journalistic practices and
tactics in selecting what becomes news and how it is projected. She notes the trends that are
common to all the newspapers, as well as the differences, and concludes with a discussion on
traits and features of news-writing and reporting in the Turkish Cypriot dailies.
The second section looks at newspaper and television data, from September 2007 and
January 2008, five years after the first period. The same format as section one is followed –
Synthia Pavlou first analyses the Greek Cypriot media, beginning with the newspapers, which are
examined as in 2002.  Next she examines television news selection and content, and analyses
TV practices and content in relation to the same issues as in the first section. This analysis is
followed by Sanem Şahinʼs report on the data for the Turkish Cypriot media drawn from the same
period, first from newspapers, followed by television news. She records and compares the main
features of news selection for the print media, revealing that despite the large number of dailies,
the news content is almost identical. Next she examines television and the extent to which TV is
effectively treated as a different medium, regarding both the selection and the presentation of
news stories. 
The last section focuses on the study of data from four days only, centered around 1 July 2008,
the date of an important meeting between the two community leaders. In the same way as in the
previous sections, the Greek Cypriot media are examined in the first part by Synthia Pavlou, with
newspapers preceding television news analysis; Sanem Şahin then focuses on the study of the
Turkish Cypriot media, newspapers and television news.
In the last section the two authors provide an overview and further analysis of both the
newspapers and television news of each community, examining the three periods together, from
2002 to 2008. First, Synthia Pavlou, and then Sanem Şahin present commonalities, differences
and the main trends characterising the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot media for the whole period
studied.
Finally, Christophoros Christophorou presents a synthesis of the results for all media, for both
communities, and for the entire period under study. He traces common practices and approaches as
well as differences, and the main features of journalistic discourses. The analysis further
examines audience understanding and possible interpretations of media content and activity, as
well as its effects on the audience. The main issue we are concerned with is whether the media
contribute to a better understanding between different groups within a community and, most
importantly, between the two communities.
Christophoros Christophorou
The year 2002 marked two major events in the history of Cyprus. The United Nations (UN)presented a plan, labelled the Annan Plan, for the solution of the Cyprus Problem and theEuropean Union decided in Copenhagen to include Cyprus in the forthcoming
enlargement. 
The UN plan was presented on 11 November 2002, following 60 meetings from January to
September 2002 in six rounds of talks between the leaders of the two communities, Glafcos
Clerides and Rauf Denktaş. The two also held meetings with the UN Secretary-General in New
York, in early October, when a health problem kept Mr Denktaş in hospital and away from action
for several weeks. The Plan was the first ever fully comprehensive proposal for a settlement.
In view of the Copenhagen European Summit of 12-13 December, final and intensive efforts
were deployed there aiming to convince the two Cypriot sides to accept the UN Plan as a basis
for negotiations. Mr Denktaş was at the time still hospitalized in Ankara. With no agreement
reached and the UN stating that negotiations had not collapsed, the EU leaders decided for
enlargement with ten new countries, including the unconditional access of the Republic of Cyprus.
In early November, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP)
won the general elections and a new team of politicians came to power in Turkey. For the first time
since 1974 they agreed that a solution should be found, as the Cyprus Problem was ʻnot solved
in 1974ʼ.
In Cyprus, many formal and informal Turkish Cypriot organizations had been coordinating their
actions since 2000, mobilizing the masses for a solution and EU accession. Mobilisation, with
massive rallies culminated in January 2003.
In the Greek Cypriot community, political forces were campaigning for the presidential elections
of February 2003. The alliance of the Progressive Party of the Working People (Ανορθωτικό
Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού - AKEL) and the Democratic Party (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα - DIKO)
that emerged in 2001 was consolidated with the support of the candidacy of Tassos
Papadopoulos to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus. DISY offered support to the candidacy
of the Social Democrats Movement (Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών - KISOS) leader, in an attempt
to avert the party from joining AKEL and DIKO. In view of the ongoing developments and
uncertainty about the future, the campaign was mostly on and off until early January.
The sample data examined in this section comes solely from newspapers, from late October
to 10 December 2002, just before the Copenhagen summit. Unfortunately it proved impossible to
secure recorded television news bulletins for the relevant dates.
WAITING FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
(October – December 2002)
The prevailing discourses during the period studied in this section were the document for aʻComprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problemʼ, most commonly known as the AnnanPlan, and the forthcoming Copenhagen European Summit on EU enlargement. These
issues, along with developments related to the Presidential elections of February 2003, were widely
covered by the press and seem to have influenced the way the news stories were presented.
The data
Six dailies, Phileleftheros, Politis, Simerini, Machi-Tharros, Haravgi and Alithia, are analyzed in
this part of the research. The data were drawn from editions of 28 to 31 October, 20 to 22
November and 7 to 10 December 2002. 
The main news story and what it will reveal
The UN Secretary-Generalʼs proposal was the most popular topic reported by the Greek Cypriot
newspapers. It was the cover story of the six dailies 59 times out of 66, during only 11 days.
Journalists gathered information for this subject mainly from diplomatic sources, personal
statements, press conferences and press releases. 
This topic and supplementary news stories are studied here to illustrate, 
a) How the press works (media practices);
b) Political/ideological stances of the Greek Cypriot newspapers regarding the solution sought, the
government, the parties, the European Union and the ʻother sideʼ; 
c) The means employed to promote these positions.
Information on the above will reveal whether the Greek Cypriot dailies provided fair coverage or
if they attempted to project their own views to the public. Our research will enable those interested
to read between the lines and behind the ʻconstructed  ʼinformation of the newspapers. 
Media Practices
To survive, newspapers must attract a loyal readership. To this end, then, newspapers will establish
certain practices and professional routines, which will naturally be affected by their financial and
personnel resources. Our research revealed several common practices and tactics used in the
Greek Cypriot press.
The hidden aces of the commercial newspapers
The dailies with no party or ideological links or affiliations struggled for exclusiveness. They had
to add extra information to their cover stories not only to substantiate their views but also to remain
competitive. They could not rely on statements from press conferences or press releases alone;
they had to offer information and stories that were different from the other dailies in order to ʻsellʼ
their own beliefs to the public and of course in order to sell more copies. Therefore, Phileleftheros
published front-page articles that were based on its editorsʼ ʻwell informed sourcesʼ,1 ʻcross
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Synthia Pavlou
1 Costas Venizelos, ʻΙθαγένεια: Μία δια δύο: ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΠΤΙΚΟ Νέες κι έντονες ανησυχίες της Λευκωσίας από λεπτομέρειες του
σχεδίου [Citizenship: One divided by two: REVEALING New and strong concerns of Nicosia deriving from details of the Plan]ʼ, Phileleftheros,
29.10.2002:1; Costas Venizelos. ʻΩμές συστάσεις Χάνεϊ: Σύγκρουση σε υψηλούς τόνους του Προέδρου με τον Βρετανό απεσταλμένο
[Bald recommendations from Hanney: High tension clash of the President with the British ambassador]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 22.11.2002:1.
examinedʼ 2 or ʻvalid informationʼ.3 These expressions were used to highlight the exclusivity of the
newspaperʼs information. This practice was also noted in Politis.4 The two dailies employed corre -
spondents around the world, in cities such as New York, Athens, Istanbul and Brussels, which enabled
them to avoid the use of copy-paste texts from news agencies and provide extra information.
Furthermore, after the Plan had been officially submitted, Phileleftheros added a new section
titled: ʻThe Cyprus Problem at a crucial crossroadʼ,5 which featured reports on this very important
and popular subject. Politis also gave wide coverage to the UN Plan, clearly under standing its
readers  ʼinterest in the matter. On 21 November Politis announced that it would publish translated
articles about the Annan Plan taken from the Turkish Cypriot press.6
The ʻfight  ʼin the name of a party and the ʻweapons  ʼused against low circulation numbers
The dailies with party or ideological links and affiliations, or those with low circulation figures and
therefore with limited resources, were often forced to depend on press conferences or externally
produced texts for their material. Even so, these stories were somehow changed in ways that ʻfitʼ
a newspaperʼs beliefs or served its interests. 
Alithia, for example, reproduced a text taken from the Cyprus News Agency (Κυπριακό
Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων - KYPE), but through its headline it highlighted a positive aspect of the
Annan Plan: ʻThere will be no negative consequences in the labour market from the solution of
the Cyprus Problem: Representatives of SEK 7 with D. Kittenis were briefed by the Presidentʼ.8
Machi published the same unedited news story, but with its headline negatively portrayed the UN
Plan: ʻSome provisions of the Plan are painful: Yesterdayʼs statements by D. Kittenis after a
meeting with the Presidentʼ.9
The press engaged in a number of other practices, promoting specific views and positions.
These are outlined in the following sections where the prevailing discourses are also presented. 
Different Discourses and Media Practices
The study of the positions of each newspaper in relation to several political issues shows that their
views play a very important role in the way a news story is changed, represented and projected. 
The form of solution
The newspapers reacted in various ways to the UN Plan, revealing their positions even before
the actual Plan was presented to the parties. 
The dailies  ʼanswers to Kofi Annanʼs call for peace were,
■ Loud ʻNO  ʼ(Simerini and Machi/Tharros10);
■ Strong rejection (Phileleftheros);
■ Dismissal of the Plan but not of the efforts for rapprochement between the two communities
(Politis);
■ ʻYES  ʼbut not under pressure and only after certain alterations (Haravgi);
■ ʻYES  ʼ(Alithia).
2 Anthos Lykavgis, ʻΝέα «Συμφωνία Κορυφής»: Ολοκληρώνεται και θα τεθεί στα μέρη ως οριστικό πλαίσιο τελικού πάρε δώσε [New
“High-Level agreement”: is concluded and will be presented to the parties as a definite framework for the give and take procedure]ʼ,
Phileleftheros, 31.10.2002:1.
3 Costas Venizelos. ʻΤελεσιγραφική προειδοποίηση: Οι μεσολαβητές θέτουν την 12/12 ως καταληκτικήν ημερομηνίαν [A warning in the
form of an ultimatum: The mediators set 12 December as the concluding day]ʼ, Philelftheros, 20.11.2002:1.
4 Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻΜοντέλο ΗΠΑ για Ιθαγένεια: Η κυβέρνηση απορρίπτει και ανησυχεί για τις προτάσεις Ντενκτας [A United States
model for citizenship: The government rejects it and worries about Denktaş; proposals]ʼ, Politis, , 30.10.2002:1; Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻ Στο τραπέζι
για λύση εδώ και τώρα: ΗΠΑ: Επιδιώκουν άμεση έναρξη διαπραγματεύσεων [Go right away to the negotiating table for a solution: United
States: They aim for the immediate beginning of the negotiating process]ʼ, Politis, 20.11.2002:3. 
5 See an example on 20.11.2002. This theme page was under the editorship of Androula Taramounta. 
6 No author, ʻΤι συζητούν στα κατεχόμενα για το σχέδιο [What do they say about the Plan in the occupied areas?]ʼ, Politis, 21.11.2002:1.
7 Cyprus Workers  ʼConfederation (Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Κύπρου - SEK).
8 KYPE , ʻΔεν θα υπάρξουν αρνητικές επιπτώσεις στην αγορά εργασίας από τη λύση του κυπριακού: Αντιπροσωπεία της ΣΕΚ υπό το
Δ. Κιττένη ενημερώθηκε από τον Πρόεδρο [There will be no negative consequences in the labour market from the solution of the Cyprus
Problem: Representatives of SEK with D. Kittenis were briefed by the President]ʼ, Alithia, 22.11.2002:2. 
9 No author, ʻΕπώδυνες μερικές πρόνοιες του σχεδίου: Χθεσινές δηλώσεις Κιττένη, ύστερα από συνάντηση με τον Πρόεδρο [Some
provisions of the Plan are painful: Yesterdayʼs statements by D. Kittenis after a meeting with the president]ʼ, Machi, 22.11.2002:6.
10 Tharros is the Monday sister edition of Machi.
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11 Nikos Zachariou, ʻΟι Νόμοι του Μέρφυ και η επερχόμενη καταστροφή της Κύπρου: Πως και γιατί με τίποτα δεν γλιτώνουμε [Murphyʼs
Law and the upcoming destruction of Cyprus: How and Why we will not be saved]ʼ, Simerini, 8.12.2002:3.
12 Machi, ʻΚύρια προτεραιότητα η επιβίωση μας [(Our) main priority is our survival]ʼ, 30.10.2002:1.
13 Phileleftheros, 29.10.2002:1.
14 Phileleftheros, ʻΤο χειρότερο που θα μας συνέβαινε [The worst (thing) that could happen to us]ʼ, 22.11.2002:3. 
15 Hasan Kahvecioglu. ʻΗ ειρήνη δεν είναι εύκολο πράγμα [Peace is not an easy thing]ʼ, Politis, 8.12.2002:18.
16 George Christodoulides, ʻΑπαιτούνται δραστικές βελτιώσεις [Drastic improvements are required]ʼ, Haravgi, 21.11.2002:1.
17 See this dailyʼs editorial: ʻΗ επίθεση Τάσου κατά του κ. Κληρίδη [Tasosʼs attack against Mr. Clerides]ʼ, Alithia, 21.11.2002:1. 
Simerini and Machi portrayed the Plan as catastrophic. They argued that it was a matter of
national interest to reject it, suggesting that if the Plan were endorsed, the Greek Cypriots would
soon face extinction. This was clearly put forward in the main news story (Το Θέμα) of Simerini
on 8 December: ʻMurphyʼs Law and the upcoming destruction of Cyprus: How and Why we will
not be savedʼ.11 There were other similarly dramatic scenarios published in Machi, with one of its
editorials titled, ʻ(Our) main priority is our survivalʼ.12
Phileleftheros was generally objective in its coverage of the UN Plan, although before the first
version of the Plan was officially submitted, some of the newspaperʼs editorials, headlines or
highlighted points stressed aspects of the Plan that could be negatively perceived by the Greek
Cypriots. For example, the 29 October cover story headline was, ʻCitizenship: One divided into
two: REVEALING Nicosiaʼs new and intense worries caused by the details of the Planʼ. In the
bullet points under this headline it was emphasized that the component states would be able to
grant citizenship and that Turkish visitors to the island would not need visas. The first two words
of the article reveal the paperʼs view of these possibilities: ʻAlarming scenariosʼ.13 Phileleftherosʼs
dissatisfaction with the Plan, after its release, was primarily revealed in its editorials; one stated
that the Plan constituted a violation of reason and principles and that it would lead the Greek
Cypriots to extreme compromises.14
Politis, which endorsed rapprochement, tried to remain loyal to its views. Therefore although the
newspaperʼs editorials reveal that it did not accept the Plan without changes, still, it did not
express its strong objection through its news stories. Politis even held an opinion poll in collaboration
with a Turkish Cypriot daily regarding the Plan; the results were published in an article by the chief
editor of the participating Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Ortam.15
Haravgi, the mouthpiece of the Progressive Party of the Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα
Εργαζόμενου Λαού – AKEL) traditionally supported reunification and rapprochement. It endorsed
the idea of a solution that would serve the interests of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
Therefore, it was cautious regarding the way it presented the Plan to its readers, trying not to betray
its beliefs with a loud rejection of the UN proposal for peace. It appears that the answer of the
newspaper to the Plan was ʻyesʼ…but not now. It was argued that the Plan had to be modified and
that the Greek Cypriot side should assert its demands during negotiations.16 This view was in line
with the position of AKEL since Haravgi echoed its views. 
Alithia seems to have considered the UN Plan as a compromise, but necessary to end the
partition in the country. This daily, through its articles and editorials, attempted to defend the
Annan Plan, saying it had ʻmany positive pointsʼ.17
Thus, it appears that the newspapers promoted, or presented favorably, specific positions in
regard to the Annan Plan by engaging in certain practices. We will examine these in more detail
below.
Over-representation
Data analysis confirmed that newspapers published more articles that supported their own stance
on the Annan Plan than stories with opposite views or irrelevant to the Plan. This practice was
most obvious in Machi, Alithia and Simerini. In its 22 November edition, Machi published only
negative articles about the UN Plan; there was not even one piece in favor of the proposed
settlement. In contrast, all articles on the Annan Plan in Alithia were positive. This strategy of over-
representation of specific news stories and, therefore, of certain views is apparent in the various
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newspapers  ʼpresentation of a demonstration organized by the ʻNo  ʼcamp. All the dailies that were
set against the Plan repeatedly covered this topic. Two especially stand out: Simerini, which on 7
December published an article about this subject on its front page and Machi, which covered this
same subject from 7-10 December when it was reported as the main story (Το Θέμα). Machi even
used numbers to show that the rejection of the Annan Plan was a popular demand, stating that
over 5000 people would participate in the protest.18 In this case, the numbers not only seem to
have been used to make a stronger argument, but to prove that there was harmony of views
among the Greek Cypriots regarding this matter. It appears that Machi believed that the unanimity
of opinions could substantiate a particular stance. Its cover story on 22 November reveals
an attempt to persuade its readers that everybody agreed that the Plan should be rejected:
ʻAn overwhelming no to the Annan Plan: Public opinion in Cyprus and Greece are set against
(the Plan)ʼ.19
The views of important people
Three dailies, Alithia, Machi and Simerini, reported or even highlighted the words of important
people, persons of authority, experts or groups who agreed with their positions on the UN Plan. 
For example, on 22 November Alithiaʼs lead story reported the views of a high-ranking church
official, the Metropolitan of Kitium. Yet, here we must note that the Holy Synod of Cyprusʼs
Orthodox Church had rejected the Plan, and the Metropolitan of Kitium was the only bishop out
of nine, who supported the proposed settlement.20
Sometimes even the opinions and stances of an international organization, a community or a
group were used, a means that could influence the public. Alithia, on 20 November 2002, stated
on its front page, ʻThe Europeans recommend that we grab the chanceʼ.21 In contrast, Simerini,
which was set against the UN Plan, published an article with the title, ʻThe Turkish Cypriots also
see negative (points): How they view the Annan Planʼ.22 Alithia seems to have used the will of this
community as an argument in favor of its own view on the Plan: More things unite us (than
separate us), letʼs go for a solution.23 Since the Turkish Cypriots were the other party of the
conflict, their thoughts might shift the Greek Cypriots  ʼ opinion. Moreover, Alithia employed an
apparently even stronger persuasion point by reporting that the Turks agreed to negotiate the
suggested settlement24 and that Denktaş, who had always been regarded as an intransigent
person, was going to discuss the UN proposal.25 On 22 November Simerini declared exactly the
opposite on its front page: ʻDenktaş will not signʼ;26 while Machiʼs headline was even harsher:
ʻRauf Denktaş rejects the Plan: He does not want the return of the refugeesʼ.27 Machi added
statements of the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων
Αγωνιστών - EOKA) veterans association that backed and even justified their position on the
Plan; the opinion of these people could be expected to move the public and awaken historical
memories that would lead to the dismissal of the UN Plan. 
18 No author, ʻΠαγκύπριο «ΟΧΙ» στο σχέδιο Ανάν: Πέραν των 5000 ατόμων σήμερα στην πλατεία ελευθερίας [Pan-Cypriot “NO” to the
Annan Plan: more that 5000 people will be today at Eleftherias square]ʼ, Machi, 8.12.2002:32.
19 No author, ʻΣυντριπτικό όχι στο σχέδιο Ανάν: Η κοινή γνώμη σε Κύπρο και Ελλάδα τάσσεται εναντίον [An overwhelming no to the Annan
Plan: Public opinion in Cyprus and Greece is set against (the Plan)]ʼ, Machi, 22.11.2002:1. 
20 Michalis Hadjistilianou, ʻΜητροπ. Κιτίου: Δεν μας συμφέρει η απόρριψη του Σχεδίου Ανάν [The metropolitan of Kitium: The rejection of
the Annan Plan is not in our best interest]ʼ, Alithia, 22.11.2002:1.
21 P. Charalambous, ʻΑρπάξτε την ευκαιρία, υποδεικνύουν οι Ευρωπαίοι: Σαφής ταύτιση της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής, της Προεδρίας και
του Ευρωκοινοβουλίου [The Europeans recommend, grab the chance: Clearly identical views between the European Commission, the
Presidency and the European Parliament]ʼ, Alithia, 20.11.2002:1.
22 Cornilios Hadjicostas, ʻΒλέπουν αρνητικά και οι Τ/κύπριοι: Πως σχολιάζουν το Σχέδιο Αναν [The T/Cypriots also see negative (points):
How they comment on the Annan Plan]ʼ, Simerini, 20.11.2002:4.
23 No author, ʻΜας ενώνουν περισσότερα, πάμε για λύση [More things unite us (than separate us), letʼs go for a solution]ʼ, Alithia, 9.12.2002:2.
24 P. Charalambous, ʻΝαι στην διαπραγμάτευση απαντούν κι οι Τούρκοι: Πιθανή η κατάληξη σε συμφωνία στο Σχέδιο Αναν, μέχρι τις 12
Δεκεμβρίου [The Turks answer yes to negotiations: It is possible to come to agreement on the Annan Plan by 12 December], Alithia,
22.11.2002:1.
25 No author, ʻΟ Ντενκτάς οδηγείται σε συνομιλίες [Denktaş is led to talks]ʼ, Alithia, 8.12.2002:1. 
26 No author, ʻΟ Ντενκτάς δεν θα υπογράψει [Denktaş will not sign]ʼ, Simerini, 22.11.2002:1. 
27 No author, ʻΑπορρίπτει το σχέδιο ο Ραούφ Ντενκτας: Δεν θέλει επιστροφή των προσφύγων [Rauf Denktaş rejects the Plan: He does not
want the return of the refugees]ʼ, Machi, 22.11.2002:1.
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The above examples expose the conflicting ways in which the Annan Plan was presented by
several newspapers, especially Alithia, Machi and Simerini, and reveal how this same subject was
portrayed differently in order to conform to each dailyʼs views.
The Government and the Parties
The first Annan Plan was presented three months before the presidential elections in 2003. It
appears that its representation by three dailies, Haravgi, Machi and Alithia, was directly connected
to their view on certain politicians. Articles on the UN Plan as well as some supplementary news
stories about other issues enabled us to uncover the trends and the stances of these newspapers
regarding the government and the parties. 
Wider coverage for a party or the government
Haravgi echoed the views of AKEL and its leader, Demetris Christofias, while it also dedicated
more space to articles reporting the views of Tassos Papadopoulos, whose candidacy for the
Presidential elections in 2003 was supported by AKEL. Alithia and Machi over-represented the
government, the ruling party, Democratic Rally (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός - DISY),28 and their
members. 
That Haravgi, Alithia and Machi selectively offered more coverage to a particular party or the
current government and their members, is revealed by the following practice. Any developments
related to the newspaperʼs favoured politician or party most often appeared as a separate news
story, not as part of an article, which also included extra information such as notions/ statements
of other people. 
On its 21 November front page, Alithia placed two different news stories reporting the opinions
of government members. The first reported nothing except the words of the government spokesman,
Michalis Papapetrou, who commented on statements made by presidential candidate Tassos
Papadopoulos;29 the second covered solely the view of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Kasoulides, regarding Turkeyʼs possible delay in answering whether it would agree to negotiate
the Plan.30 Phileleftheros and Politis did not cover these statements in separate articles, although
they did include, in a story on developments regarding the Cyprus Problem, the position of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.31 Haravgi not only did not publicize these persons  ʼstatements, but also
only reported the stance of Papadopoulos.32 The newspaper frequently published articles reporting
solely the views of Christofias or Papadopoulos, while its leading stories were usually connected
to either the General Secretary of AKEL or Tassos Papadopoulos.33
Machi dedicated a special section to DISY where it reported on the schedule of the partyʼs
leader, Nicos Anastasiades. Additionally, it often covered the views of Yiannakis Omirou, the
president of the Movement of Social Democrats (Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών - KISOS), whose
candidacy was at the time backed by DISY. An example of this is in the 10 December edition
which devoted a separate article to Omirouʼs statements rather than including them in a piece with
other politicians  ʼviews.34 Moreover, this daily often published news stories about the President,
along with articles reporting his views.35
28 In 2002 Glafkos Clerides was President of the Republic of Cyprus, and DISY the ruling party with Nicos Anastasiades as Chairman of the party.
29 Panikos Euripides, ʻΜ. Παπαπέτρου: « Πολιτικά ανήθικοι οι ισχυρισμοί Τάσου» [M. Papapetrou: “The allegations of Tasos are politically
immoral”]ʼ, Alithia, 21.11.2002:1.
30 No author, ʻΚασουλίδης: Να μην πληρώσει η ε/κ πλευρά την τουρκική καθυστέρηση [Kasoulides: The G/C side should not pay for the
Turkish delay]ʼ, Alithia, 21.11.2002:1. 
31 Costas Venizelos, ʻΣτην Κοπεγχάγη το τελικό παζάρι: Η Τουρκία παρελκύει σκόπιμα τις διαδικασίες μέχρι τέλους [In Copenhagen the
final bargain: Turkey deliberately defers the procedures until the end]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 21.11.2002:1; No author, ʻΣπρώχνουν τη λύση πιο κοντά
στην Κοπεγχάγη: Μπούς προς Σεζερ: Απαντήστε και θα σας βοηθήσουμε με την ΕΕ [They push the solution closer to Copenhagen: Bush
to Sezer: Answer and we will help you with EU], Politis, 21.11.2002:3. 
32 George Christodoulides, ʻΑπαιτούνται δραστικές βελτιώσεις [Drastic improvements are required]ʼ, Haravgi, 21.11.2002:1.
33 Examples of this can be found on 22.11.2002, in a piece about Christofias and 9.12.2002, in an article about Papadopoulos.
34 No author, ʻΓ. Ομήρου: Χρειάζεται σκληρή διαπραγμάτευση [Y. Omirou: Tough negotiations are required]ʼ, Machi, 10.12.2002:5.
35 See an example of this trend: No author, ʻΠήγαμε πολύ καλά στην Κοπεγχάγη: Δηλώσεις του Προέδρου Κληρίδη [(Things) went really
well in Copenhagen: Statements by President Clerides]ʼ, Machi, 30.10.2002:5. This news story was on the first page of Machi.
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Negative and positive representation of politicians, parties and the government
The Annan Plan proved to be the perfect vehicle for a few dailies to negatively or positively depict
certain politicians, depending on the newspaperʼs views. 
Haravgi often aimed its arrows at DISY, its leader and the government. One example refers to
an article reporting on supermarket openings on a national holiday, 28 October, in which it was
alleged that the government was once more indifferent to the laws: ʻThey break the law with the
blessings of the governmentʼ.36 Another example is the 31 October editorial, which found that the
expediencies of ʻthose who govern clouded their judgmentʼ.37 Sometimes the paper targeted the
president of the ruling party, DISY, picturing him as a disagreeable person who was often involved
in disputes: ʻAnastasiades tangled with de Soto38 and the Hierarchsʼ.39 The expression ʻtangled
withʼ (τα έβαλε) and the fact that the dispute involved highly respected clergy paint a negative
picture of the head of DISY. On other occasions, Haravgi compared DISY with AKEL in order to
highlight the advantages of the left-wing party and at the same time to unflatteringly represent its
opponents. On 20 November, the lead story in the paper pointed out that the Annan Plan had led
to serious inter-party troubles between DISY and KISOS, while the collaboration of AKEL with the
Democratic Party (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα - DIKO) demonstrated a noteworthy coherence and
unanimity.40 
In contrast, Machi and Alithia positively portrayed the government and the President of the
Republic of Cyprus. Alithia went even further, through its editorials, to negatively portray AKEL, its
leader and the presidential candidate they supported. 
In an editorial on 20 October, Machi reassured its readers that the President and the
government would not consent to a disastrous solution to the Cyprus problem,41 thus promoting
trust in the governmentʼs political decisions. Another example of a flattering depiction of Mr.
Clerides was the newspaperʼs 21 November 2002 cover story. The President was represented as
a dynamic as well as a capable negotiator who would not allow Turkey to delay the negotiations
after the Copenhagen Summit, therefore risking Cyprusʼs accession to the EU.42 He was often
pictured as a determined leader who was ready to resist all pressures in order to protect the
interests of his people.43 Alithia also seemed to trust the President and his government to handle
the negotiation of the Plan: its 22 October 2002 editorial characterized the ʻtacticʼ followed by
Nicosia in this matter as ʻmethodicalʼ. In contrast, in its editorial on the previous day, it negatively
portrayed Tassos Papadopoulos, accusing him, among other things, of ʻpolitical cowardice.44 On
30 October Alithia was set against AKEL and its general secretary, Demetris Christofias, accusing
the opposition of having hysterically misbehaved.45
The European Union
The first Annan Plan was submitted a month before the Copenhagen Summit, where the
negotiations for the Republic of Cyprusʼs accession to the EU were finalized. This fact generated
scenarios linking the proposed solution with the islandʼs admission into the EU. The newspapers
presented this development in three different ways. Simerini, Machi and Haravgi warned of the
danger in linking efforts for the reunification of the country and the Republic of Cyprus  ʼaccession
36 Eleni Constantinou, ʻΠαρανομούν με τις ευλογίες της κυβέρνησης [They break the law with the blessings of the government]ʼ, Haravgi,
29.10.2002:10.
37 Androulla Giourof, ʻΣτη θολούρα των σκοπιμοτήτων τους [In the haze of their expediencies]ʼ, Haravgi, 31.10.2002:1.
38 Alvaro de Soto was the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus, up to 2004. 
39 No author, ʻΤα έβαλε με Ντε Σότο και ιεράρχες ο Αναστασιάδης [Anastasiades tangled with de Soto and the Hierarchs]ʼ, Haravgi,
20.11.2002:3. 
40 George Christodoulides, ʻΔΗΣΥ: Αποστάσεις στελεχών από Αναστασιάδη [DISY: (Party) Officials  ʼdistance themselves from Anastasiades]ʼ,
Haravgi, 20.11.2002:1.
41 Machi, ʻΚύρια προτεραιότητα η επιβίωση μας [Our main priority is our survival]ʼ, Machi, 30.10.2002:1. 
42 No author, ʻΞεχάστε με μετά την Κοπεγχάγη [Forget me after Copenhagen]ʼ, Machi, 21.11.2002:1. 
43 No author, ʻΔεν υπογράφω λύση στριμωγμένος απαντά ο Κληρίδης στον Σημίτη [Clerides answers Simitis: I donʼt sign a solution under
pressure ]ʼ, Machi, 10.12.2002:1.
44 Alithia, ʻΗ επίθεση Τάσου κατά του κ. Κληρίδη [Tasosʼs attack against Mr. Clerides]ʼ, Alithia, 21.11.2002:1. 
45 Alithia, ʻΔιαψεύδονται, αλλά δεν παραδέχονται [They are being contradicted and yet they donʼt come clean]ʼ, Alithia, 30.10.2002:1.
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to the EU. Politis tried to detach the Annan Plan from Cyprusʼs admission into the EU but some
days before the Copenhagen Summit slightly changed its stance. Phileleftheros and Alithia
pictured the developments positively. 
It appears that the EU and its officials were perceived by the newspapers either as allies or as
enemies according to their stance towards the Plan, which at the time was the most important
political issue for the Republic of Cyprus. 
European Union as an enemy who exercised pressure
Not all newspapers favourably presented the EU and its officials; Simerini, Machi and Haravgi
portrayed them negatively because of their position on the Annan Plan. 
Simerini stressed that the EU was pressuring the Greek Cypriots into accepting a take-it-or-
leave-it-Plan. This is evident from an article published on 30 October with the headline, ʻAir of
accession from Poos46 and blackmailing scenarios for a solutionʼ.47 Simeriniʼs editorials show a
harsh stance towards the EU, which was variously depicted as an institution that would consent
to the extinction of the Republic of Cyprus;48 a union of states that could not protect the Greek
Cypriots;49 and an international organization that favoured Turkey.50 Tharrosʼs 9 December 2002
editorial stated that the Greek Cypriots would not survive because of the Annan Plan and that the
EU would not be able to save them.51 This newspaper presented the view that the EU had no
real power. Machi/Tharros also appears to have promoted the notion that the EU was not on the
Greek Cypriot side. On 22 November the title of its cover story was, ʻVerheugen: Solve this on
your own! Europe accepts violations of the acquis communautaireʼ.52
Haravgi also unflatteringly portrayed the EU, emphasizing that it would try to force the Greek
Cypriots to accept the UN proposal during the Copenhagen Summit. One editorial referred to
ʻunbearable pressuresʼ,53 and  its cover story on 20 November suggested that EU officials who
said that the Annan Plan should be accepted as a solution to the Cyprus problem, hinted at what
would follow in the Copenhagen Summit,54 implying that the Republic of Cyprus would be forced
to agree with the proposed settlement in Denmark. 
The representation of the EU as a blackmailing community perhaps exposes the Greek
Cypriot fears that they might be forced to give their consent to a damaging solution in exchange for
the islandʼs admission into the Union. 
A better image of the European Union
The above described worries were not detected in Politis, whose articles were mainly reassuring
and aimed to dissociate the Annan Plan from the countryʼs admission into the EU. The newspaper
argued that although the EU may have applauded the UN Plan it would not use it as a pre-
requisite for Cyprusʼs accession. On 20 November the lead article in Politis announced, ʻEurope
approves the solution without blocking the accession.ʼ 55 However, two days prior to the
Copenhagen Summit in December, the paper somewhat modified its stance by linking Cyprusʼs
chances for peace to the Summit. On 10 December, its message was even clearer, as it wrote
that everything indicated that the decision of the 15 member states on whether they would set a
46 Jacques Poos was the Rapporteur on Cyprusʼs accession to the EU.
47 G. Charalambides, ʻΑέρας ένταξης από τον Πόος και εκβιαστικά σενάρια λύσης [Wind of accession from Poos and blackmailing scenarios
for a solution]ʼ, Simerini, 30.10.2002:5. 
48 See this newspaperʼs editorials on 30.10, 21 and 22.11.2002.
49 See this dailyʼs editorial on 21.11.2002.
50 See the editorial on 22.11.2002. 
51 Tharros, Υπό την επικυριαρχία της Τουρκίας [Under Turkeyʼs suzerainty]ʼ, Tharros, 9.12.2002:1.
52 No author, ʻΦερχόϊγκεν: Βρέστε τα μόνοι σας! Η Ευρώπη δέχεται τις παραβιάσεις του κεκτημένου [Verheugen: Solve this on your own!
Europe accepts violations of the acquis communautaire]ʼ, Machi, 20.11.2002:1.
53 Haravgi, ʻΝαι στη διαπραγμάτευση – Όχι στους εκβιασμούς [Yes to the negotiation – No to blackmails]ʼ, Haravgi, 8.12.2002:1.
54 Costakis Constantinou, ʻΠεδίο Μάχης η Ε.Ε : Για την ένταξη της Κύπρου, για το Κυπριακό και για την ημερομηνία της Τουρκίας [The
EU is like a battlefield: For the accession of Cyprus, for the Cyprus Problem and for Turkeyʼs date (for accession)]ʼ, Haravgi, 20.11.2002:1.
55 Manolis Kalatzis, ʻΗ Ευρώπη εγκρίνει τη λύση, χωρίς να δεσμεύει την ένταξη [Europe approves the solution without blocking the
accession]ʼ, Politis, 20.11.2002:1, 4, 5.
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negotiating date for Turkey would open the door to the solution of the Cyprus Problem.56 Yet
despite its anxiety over this undesirable possibility, Politis never depicted the EU in a negative
way. On the contrary, an article on 10 December presented the EU as an organization that could
assist Cyprus, since in the case of a solution it would help the ʻoccupied areasʼ to adjust to the
acquis communautaire.57
The European Union as an ally 
In October, before the submission of the first UN Plan, Phileleftheros seems to have supported
the view that the EU would be used to pressure the Greek Cypriots into accepting the proposed
Plan.58 By November, however, it characterized Cyprusʼs admission to the EU as a ʻhistoric
chanceʼ, one that would help free the country from being ʻTurkeyʼs hostageʼ.59 This optimism
continued, as in an article published on 21 November that stated that the EU enlarge ment
Commissioner appeared to have said that Cyprus would enter into the community regardless of
the political developments.60
Alithiaʼs articles were also reassuring. One story reported that according to the Greek
government the decision for Cyprusʼs accession to the EU had already been taken and therefore
it was not linked to the Greek Cypriot position on the Annan Plan.61
ʻUs  ʼand the ʻother sideʼ
The expressions ʻour side  ʼ and the ʻother side  ʼ are often used in everyday conversations to
describe the Greeks/Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots/the Turks or Turkey. Below we
outline who or which country, according to the various press, was considered ʻusʼ, and who or
which country was described as the ʻ othersʼ, in 2002. We also reveal the image promoted for each
category. Once again, the examples derive mainly from news coverage of the Annan Plan. The
ideologies of the dailies about ʻus  ʼas well as those concerning the ʻother side  ʼand the practices
used to promote them are also presented. 
Each of these two categories is broken into subdivisions for a more thorough examination.  ʻOur
side  ʼmay be described according to,
a) The position of the newspapers on Greek Cypriot identity;
b) The positions of the newspapers on the Annan Plan.
The ʻother side  ʼ is also divided into several interconnected categories. The various groups that
have been depicted as the ʻother  ʼare the following:
a) The Turkish Cypriot community;
b) The Turkish Cypriot leadership;
c) The settlers;
d) The Turks and Turkey.
ʻUs  ʼand identity issues
Certain newspapers, e.g., Machi and Simerini, emphasized the Greek Cypriot bond with Greece. 
Machi/Tharros made their position clear on 28 October, the anniversary of ʻΟXI  ʼ(NO), the day
which marks the Greek victory of World War II against Italy.62 On the front page it was stated, ʻfor
us, the Greeksʼ. Another example of this perception of identity can be found in Tharrosʼs cover
56 Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻΜε το βλέμμα στραμμένο στη «Μεγάλη Παρασκευή»: Τουρκία: Θα πείσουν τον Ντενκτας αν πάρουν ημερομηνία
[(Everyoneʼs) look is turned to “Holy Friday”: Turkey: If they get a date, they will convince Denktaş]ʼ, Politis, 10.12.2002:3. 
57 No author, ʻΠακτωλοί χρημάτων με τη λύση: Διαβεβαιώσεις Ευρωπαίων αξιωματούχων [Big money with the solution: Reassurances by
European Officials]ʼ, Politis, 10.12.2002:7. 
58 Phileleftheros, ʻΘα περάσουμε από ιστορική δοκιμασία [We will get through a historic ordeal]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 28.10.2002:3.
59 Phileleftheros, ʻΤο χειρότερο που θα μας συνέβαινε [The worse thing that could happen to us]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 22.11.2002:3.
60 Costas Venizelos, ʻΒρυξέλλες: Ζητούν όπως η ένταξη μη συνδεθεί με το δημοψήφισμα [Brussels: They ask that the accession is not
linked to the referendum]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 21.11.2002:1.
61 APE, ʻΑθήνα: Ειλημμένη απόφαση η ένταξη [Athens: (Cyprusʼs) accession is a decision already taken]ʼ, Alithia, 22.11.2002:3.
62 This day is a public holiday and is celebrated in Greece and Cyprus with parades. 
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story for 9 December, where the common phrase, ʻthe Greek Cypriot side  ʼ (Ελληνοκυπριακή
πλευρά) was replaced with, ʻHellenic Cypriot side  ʼ(Ελληνική Κυπριακή πλευρά).63 This phrasing
suggests that Greek takes precedence over Cypriot. The editorial for the same date leaves no
doubt about the paperʼs identity views, as we see the island described as ʻa living part of
Hellenismʼ.64
Simeriniʼs December 8 coverage of the Annan Plan reveals that this daily held views similar to
those of Machi/Tharros regarding the Cyprus-Greece bond. The paper stated in an article that
Kyrenia along with other territories which ʻfor centuries have been Greek in every senseʼ would
be given to Turkey,65 clearly showing that it considered Cyprus to be part of Greece. The
newspaperʻs wide coverage of the anniversary of ʻΟΧΙ  ʼ (NO) also further supports this claim.
Besides articles and a special anniversary section, the next dayʼs cover story once again reported
on the ʻOXI  ʼ(NO) celebrations.66
Politis, Alithia and Phileleftheros also referred to the Hellenic identity of the Greek Cypriots, but
they did not constantly emphasize this issue. For the 28 October 2002 edition, Politis ran a picture
with the caption, ʻthen (1940) Hellenism measured its existence with its blood […] then, we could
still look ourselves in the mirrorʼ.67 The use of the first-person plural reveals that this newspaper
considered not only the Greeks but also the Greek Cypriots to have been an integral part of
Hellenism. Similarly, an editorial in Phileleftheros regarding the Annan Plan stated that ʻif we, as
a Hellenism in its whole, have the necessary unity and will, then we can choose more decisively
how to actʼ.68 Alithia, in its 28 October 2002 editorial, also referred to ʻCypriot Hellenismʼ.69 
Haravgi was the only daily that regularly referred to both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots as ʻCypriot peopleʼ. Its signed editorial on 28 October, for example, pointed out that the
solution to the countryʼs political problem should be in the best interest of the ʻCypriot peopleʼ, the
ʻG/Cs and the T/Csʼ.70
All the dailies, however, regardless of their identity views, promoted the idea of a close
connection between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. This can be clearly seen in the regular
reports in the Greek Cypriot press on the stances of the Greek government and Greek politicians
on political matters. For example, on 31 October, both Politis and Haravgi carried front-page
coverage of the Greek Prime Ministerʼs statements on political developments in Cyprus.71 The
views of Costas Simitis were also the cover stories in Machi and Alithia. On the previous day,
Phileleftherosʼs main story (Το Θέμα) reported the views of the Greek Prime Minister,72 and
Simeriniʼs cover story on 21 November recorded statements made by Greeceʼs Minister of
Foreign Affairs regarding Cyprusʼs accession to the EU.73
The Annan Plan divides the Greek Cypriots into two camps
While the ʻothers  ʼusually referred  to the Turkish side, two newspapers taking a strong stance on
the Annan Plan differentiated Greek Cypriots into ʻour sideʼ—those who followed the paperʼs
63 No author, ʻΚρίσιμα εικοσιτετράωρα: Στόχος των ξένων η υπογραφή της ιδρυτικής διακήρυξης [Critical hours: The foreigners aim for a
signature on the founding declaration]ʼ, Tharros, 9.12.2002:1.
64 Tharros, Υπό την επικυριαρχία της Τουρκίας [Under Turkeyʼs suzerainty]ʼ, Tharros, 9.12.2002:1.
65 Charalambos Charalambides, ʻΗ πικρή μοίρα της όμορφης Κερύνειας μας...[The bitter fate of our beautiful Kyrenia…]ʼ, Simerini,
8.12.2002:9. 
66 Pambos Vasilas, ʻΠαρέλαση με μηνύματα...[A Parade with messages…]ʼ, Simerini, 29.10.2002:3.
67 See the caption on 28.10.2002. 
68 Phileleftheros, ʻΜπροστά στη στυγνή αλήθεια [Faced with the cruel truth]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 20.11.2002:3.
69 Alithia, ʻΤο μεγαλείο του αντιστασιακού πνεύματος [The glory of the spirit of resistance]ʼ, Alithia, 28.10.2002:1.
70 Androulla Gkiourof, ʻΑπωθημένες ενοχές [Repressed feelings of culpability]ʼ, Haravgi, 22.11.2002:1.
71 Manolis Kalatzis, ʻΚρίσιμες επιλογές βλέπει ο Σημίτης [Simitis sees critical choices]ʼ, Politis, 31.10.2002:1; Costakis Constantinou, ʻΚ.
Σημίτης: Κρίσιμες επιλογές: θα κληθούμε να κάνουμε τις επόμενες εβδομάδες και μήνες [C. Simitis: We will be asked to make critical
choices in the next few weeks and months]ʼ, Haravgi, 31.10.2002:1.
72 No author, ʻΟ Γ.Γ. θα διαμορφώσει το τελικό σχέδιο και θα πάρει τις οριστικές του αποφάσεις: Αφού πάρει τις τελευταίες θέσεις από
επαφές του ντε Σότο [The Secretary General will form the final Plan and will take his definite decisions: After he is informed of the latest
positions (of the involved parties) from de Sotoʼs contacts]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 30.10.2002:11. 
73 Yiannos Charalambides,ʼΕκβιαστική φόρμουλα Χάνεϊ: Ενεργοποιεί την ουρά του Ελσίνκι και δένει τη λύση με την ένταξη [Blackmailing
formula of Hanney: He activates the Helsinki tail (authorʼs note: tail = disguised clause) and binds the solution to the accession]ʼ, Simerini,
21.11.2002:1. 
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stance, and the ʻ othersʼ—those who did not. Simerini and Alithia, more so than other dailies, seem
to have considered those who agreed with their own position on the proposed solution as ʻtheir
side  ʼand those who opposed it as the ʻothersʼ. These two papers viewed the ʻother  ʼas the enemy. 
Some politicians from the ʻother  ʼcamp were attacked more regularly than others; the Attorney
General of the Republic of Cyprus, Alecos Markides, was one.74 In its editorial on 10 December
2002, Simerini wrote that Markides ought to apologize to ʻCypriot Hellenism  ʼbecause he ʻplayed
a leading roleʼ in the ʻdestructionʼ of the country.75 Markides was criticised because of statements
he made about the need to ʻtake on and not to avoid the responsibilityʼ of a reply to the Plan. His
observation that the negotiations had a deadline and that it should be known whether the Cyprus
Problem would be solved before the Copenhagen Summit, was projected by Simerini as
threatening the public to accept the Plan. The headline read, ʻScent of blackmail and dilemmas,
because of the submission of the solution Planʼ.76 In contrast, Alithia, which did not oppose the
proposed settlement and had positively portrayed the government, did not express any
dissatisfaction with the Attorney Generalʻs words. It simply quoted what Mr. Markides said.77
Additionally, some of its editorials defended the people who were charged as traitors because
they did not agree with the dismissal of the Plan78 while at the same time it ʻattacked  ʼ the
opponents of the UN proposal for peace. On 8 December it argued that the international interest
regarding the Plan was polluted by ʻhysterical dismissive screamsʼ.79 Tassos Papadopoulos was
specifically targeted because of his views on the UN Plan, criticised by Alithia that he ʻprobably…
prefers to pose as an obdurate dismissive personʼ.80
The divisions in the Greek Cypriot community that were related to personal views and different
stances towards the Annan Plan did not prevent the press from presenting the Greek Cypriot
community as a homogeneous group of people with positive characteristics that were in contrast
with those of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the settlers, and Turkey. The only group of ʻothersʼ
that was not negatively depicted were the Turkish Cypriots.
The ʻother sideʼ and the image of the Turkish Cypriots
The Turkish Cypriot community was not negatively portrayed by the Greek Cypriot dailies. Our
data showed no cases where any paper viewed the Turkish Cypriots as the enemy, although
Simerini and Machi hardly referred to them. 
The Turkish Cypriots were often depicted as a community oppressed by Denktaş and his
regime.81 Examples of this representation were found in Politis, Phileleftheros and Alithia, all three
of which on 20 November published a news story about 25 Turkish Cypriot trade unionists and
journalists who were charged simply because they expressed their views.82 Haravgiʼs editorial on
22 November stated that the Turkish Cypriots were living under a regime of terrorism and
occupation.83 This daily also stressed that they longed for the reunification of the island. On 9
December one headline was, ʻThe Turkish Cypriots crave peaceʼ.84 Moreover, this newspaper
referred to a solution that would secure the ʻpeaceful co-existence  ʼof both communities85 and
74 The former President of the Republic of Cyprus, George Vasiliou, the Republic of Cyprusʼs government spokesman Michalis Papapetrou and
the leader of DISY Nicos Anastasiades have also been criticized because they had not objected to the Plan. See for example: Simerini, ʻΤο
μοιραίο λάθος του Προέδρου [Presidentʼs fatal mistake]ʼ, Simerini, 9.12.2002:1; Simerini, ʻΚατάντημα… [Wretchedness…]ʼ, Simerini,
20.11.2002:1. 
75 Simerini, ʻΣυγχυσμένος ο Μαρκίδης: Απειλεί με αγωγές [Markides is confused: He threatens to sue]ʼ, Simerini, 10.12.2002:1. 
76 Yiannos Charalambides, ʻΆρωμα εκβιασμών και διλημμάτων: Από την υποβολή σχεδίου λύσης [Scent of blackmail and threats because of
the submission of the solution Plan]ʼ, Simerini, 29.10.2002:5. 
77 No author, ʻΜαρκίδης: Ασήκωτο το ναι ή το όχι [Markides: (either of the answers) yes or no is unbearable]ʼ, Alithia, 29.10.2002:3.
78 See, for example: Alithia, ʻΗ καραμέλα της προδοσίας, [The candy of treason]ʼ, Alithia, 7.12.2002:5. 
79 Alithia, ʻʼΏρα μηδέν και οι μηδενιστές [Zero hour and the nihilists]ʼ, Alithia, 8.12.2002:1. 
80 Alithia, ʻΗ επίθεση Τάσου κατά του κ. Κληρίδη [Tasosʼs attack against Mr. Clerides]ʼ, Alithia,, 21.11.2002:1.
81 This will be further analyzed in the section that describes how Denktaş and his regime have been depicted. 
82 Gogo Alexandrinou, ʻΣε δίκη Τ/Κ συνδικαλιστές: Υποστήριξη από φορείς και οργανώσεις [In trial T/C trade unionists: They are supported
by (various) bodies and organizations]ʼ, Politis, 20.11.2002:29; See the same article in Phileleftheros on top of page 4 and in Alithia on page
3; On the next day Haravgi also reported this development in its editorial on page 3.
83 Androulla Gkiourof, ʻΑπωθημένες ενοχές [Repressed feelings of culpability]ʼ, Haravgi, 22.11.2002:1.
84 No author, ʻΟι Τουρκοκύπριοι επιθυμούν διακαώς ειρήνη [The Turkish Cypriots crave peace]ʼ, Haravgi, 9.12.2002:2. 
85 Androulla Gkiourof, ʻΚρίσιμα 24ώρα [Critical hours]ʼ, Haravgi, 10.12.2002:1.
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projected the notion that the Turkish Cypriots were the Greek Cypriots  ʼcompatriots since it called
them ʻCypriot peopleʼ.86
Gloomy portrait of the Turkish Cypriot leadership
The image of Rauf Denktaş and his regime was ʻbuilt  ʼby the press in a completely different way
than the portrayal of the Turkish Cypriots. All the Greek Cypriot dailies pictured him in dark colors
and named him the ʻoccupation leaderʼ.87 The newspapers represented him as a person who
placed obstacles in the path to a solution and he was most commonly portrayed as an adamant
and dismissive politician. 
The following examples show that most Greek Cypriot dailies stressed that the Turkish Cypriot
leader had fixed claims. On 7 December, Phileleftheros wrote, ʻRauf Denktaş keeps repeating
himselfʼ,88 and on the same day Politis reported, ʻDenktaş comes back intransigent: He is not
committed to dialogue after Copenhagenʼ.89 In its cover story, Simerini argued that he ʻrepeated
his known blackmailʼ, pointing out that ʻit is impossible for the T/C side to continue with the talks
if the G/C administration enters the European Unionʼ.90 Similarly Haravgiʼs title for this issue was,
ʻDenktaş: No91 talks if Cyprus is admitted (into the European Union)ʼ.92 In Alithiaʼs editorial it was
stated that ʻthe document given by Denktaş as a response to the Annan Plan, basically repeats
his intransigent positionsʼ.93
Additionally, on 22 November Machi and Simerini published articles showing that the Turkish
Cypriot leader was a dismissive person. A front-page headline in Machi was, ʻRauf Denktaş
rejects the Plan: he does not want the return of the refugees.94 On the same day Simerini ran the
headline, ʻDenktaş will not signʼ.95
The settlers
The people brought by Turkey from Anatolia to the northern part of Cyprus, commonly called the
ʻsettlersʼ, were also depicted in dark colors. The Greek Cypriots believed and feared that their
influx in big numbers would alter the demographic composition of the island. The newspapers
projected this notion. The papers all gave extensive coverage to a report on the settlers written by
Jaako Laakso for the Council of Europeʼs Parliamentary Assembly. The report was the cover story
in Phileleftheros and Simerini and was also mentioned in the cover story of Politis.96
Simerini published this news story using the following pessimistic title: ʻDemographic
nightmare from the invasion of tens of thousands of settlersʼ.97 On Machiʼs fifth page, the report
was described as ʻdramaticʼ 98 while its front-page headline declared, ʻThe Turkish Cypriots have
become a minorityʼ.99 Phileleftheros highlighted the alarming numbers: ʻThe number of (the
settlers) is 115 thousand while the Turkish Cypriots are 87 thousand,100 as did Alithiaʼs article that
86 Androulla Gkiourof, ʻΑπωθημένες ενοχές [Repressed feelings of culpability]ʼ, Haravgi, 22.11.2002:1.
87 See example: No author, ʻΜάλλον «ναι» η απάντηση Ντενκτας [Denktaşʼs answer will probably be “yes”]ʼ, Machi, 20.11.2002:20. 
88 No author, ʻΟ Ραούφ Ντενκτάς επαναλαμβάνει εαυτόν [Rauf Denktaş keeps repeating himself]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 7.12.2002:10.
89 Michalis Ignatiou, ʻΕπιστρέφει αδιάλλακτος ο Ντενκτας: Δεν δεσμεύεται για διάλογο μετά την Κοπεγχάγη [Denktaş comes back
intransigent: He does not commit to dialogue after Copenhagen]ʼ, Politis, 7.12.2002:3.
90 Yiannos Charalambides, ʻΘρίλερ χωρίς ανάσα: Θέλουν αποτέλεσμα σε τέσσερις ημέρες [Breathtaking thriller: They want a result in four
days]ʼ, Simerini, 7.12.2002:1. 
91 The Turkish word ʻYok  ʼwas used instead of ʻNoʼ.
92 No author, ʻΝτεκτας: «Γιοκ» συνομιλίες αν ενταχθεί η Κύπρος [No talks (“Yok”) if Cyprus is admitted (into the EU)]ʼ, Haravgi, 7.12.2002:1.
93 Alithia, ʻΝέα ανάγνωση μιας απάτης [New reading of a deception]ʼ, Alithia, 7.12.2002:1. 
94 No author, ʻΑπορρίπτει το σχέδιο ο Ραούφ Ντενκτάς: Δεν θέλει επιστροφή των προσφύγων [Rauf Denktaş rejects the Plan: He does not
want the refugees to return]ʼ, Machi, 22.11.2002:1.
95 No author, ʻΟ Ντενκτάς δεν θα υπογράψει [Denktaş will not sign]ʼ, Simerini, 22.11.2002:1.
96 Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻΜοντέλο ΗΠΑ για Ιθαγένεια: Η κυβέρνηση απορρίπτει και ανησυχεί για τις προτάσεις Ντενκτας [United Statesʼ
model for Citizenship: The government rejects it and worries about the proposals of Denktaş]ʼ, Politis, 30.10.2002:1.
97 Yiannos Charalambides, ʻΔημογραφικός εφιάλτης: Από την εισβολή δεκάδων χιλιάδων εποίκων [Demographic nightmare from the
invasion of tens of thousands of settlers]ʼ, Simerini, 30.10.2002:1.
98 No author, ʻΟι Τουρκοκύπριοι έγιναν μειονότητα: Δραματική έκθεση του εισηγητή του Συμβουλίου Ευρώπης [The Turkish Cypriots
have become a minority: Dramatic report of the Council of Europe Parliament Rapporteur]ʼ, Machi, 30.10.2005:5.
99 See Machi, 30.10.2002:1.
100 Androula Taramounta, ʻΛύση αποζημιώσεων για τους εποίκους: Εναλλακτικές εισηγήσεις Λάακσο προς το Συμβούλιο της Ευρώπης
[Solution based on compensation to the settlers: Alternative suggestions of Laakso to the Council of Europe]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 30.10.2002:1.
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suggested that the T/C community was in danger of becoming a minority.101 Haravgi, which included
this topic on its front page, stressed this aspect as well.102 The reaction by Machi, Phileleftheros,
Alithia, and Haravgi to the prospects of the settlers outnumbering the Turkish Cypriot community
reveals that settlers were unwelcome.
The words used to describe the settlers prove that this matter was highly emotive. No solution
was regarded as logical or acceptable if it did not secure the departure of the people who
Phileleftheros dubbed as ʻinterstitial elementsʼ, who were ʻcarried from Anatolia  ʼand who caused
ʻa demographic rapeʻ.103 Simerini also portrayed the settlers negatively-in one editorial they were
characterized as ʻthe third Atilla who ruthlessly assails Cyprusʼ, while their existence in the country
was described as ʻan international crime which turned into gangrene  ʼ and as a ʻdemographic
bombʼ.104
All six dailies agreed on this issue and similarly projected their opinion to the public.   
The Turkish side, Turkey and the Turks
Most newspapers portrayed Turkey as the enemy of the Greek Cypriots. Our data show that
Machi and Simerini expressed their hostility towards Turkey more clearly and intensely than the
other papers.  Alithia was the only newspaper that presented Turkey quite neutrally. 
Phileleftheros, Machi, Simerini and Politis used negative epithets to describe Turkey, stressing
that she had invaded and occupied Cyprus. Phileleftheros named Turkey the ʻinvaderʼ,105 Machi
referred to Turkey as ʻAttilaʼ 106 and ʻimmolatorʼ,107 and Simerini characterized her as ʻslaughtererʼ
and ʻAttila conquerorʼ.108 In Politis a picture for the anniversary of ʻOXI  ʼ (NO) carried a caption
where Turkey was once more named ʻconquerorʼ.109
Turkey was often blamed for the deadlock in negotiations, portrayed as unwilling to negotiate and
as having fixed positions or avaricious demands. All the newspapers pictured her as a country that
placed obstacles in the path to peace. One cover story in Haravgi highlighted that, ʻthe Turkish
side remains negative and intransigentʼ,110 while an editorial in Machi stated that ʻthe Turkish
side…never gave the impression that it has been ready to make decisions, to submit proposals
and to negotiate for finding a solutionʼ.111 One headline in Simerini represented Turkey as inflexible,
ʻTurkish ultimatumsʼ,112 and another portrayed her as greedy, ʻTurks want everything as a new
phase [of meetings] beginsʼ.113
Turkeyʼs unwillingness to negotiate was stressed by Phileleftheros, Politis and Alithia.
Phileleftheros headlined one cover story with, ʻΤhe final bargain (will be conducted) in Copenhagen,
Turkey deliberately defers the procedures until the endʼ.114 Alithia stated that ʻthe other side
procrastinatesʼ to express its opinion on the Annan Plan,115 while Politis believed this country
would employ Fabian tactics for the solution of the Cyprus Problem.116
Clearly Turkey was negatively portrayed in the press, which promoted the idea that Turkeyʼs
policies hindered peace and reunification. 
101 No author, ʻΑπογραφή των Τ/Κ προτείνει ο Γιάκο Λάκσο: Η τ/κ κοινότητα κινδυνεύει να καταστεί μειονότητα στην περιοχή της [Jaako
Laakso proposes a census of T/C: The T/C community is in danger of becoming a minority in its territory]ʼ, Alithia, 30.10.2002:2. 
102 Maria Fragkou, ʻΜειονότητα οι Τουρκοκύπριοι [The Turkish Cypriots are becoming a minority]ʼ, Haravgi, 30.10.2002:1.
103 Phileleftheros, ʻΠρέπει να αναχθεί σε προτεραιότητα [It has to become a priority], Phileleftheros, 31.10.2002:3
104 Simerini, ʻΗ Αλεξανδρέττα της Κύπρου [Alexandretta of Cyprus]ʼ, Simerini, 31.10.2002:1.
105 Phileleftheros, ʻΜπροστά στην στυγνή αλήθεια [Faced with the cruel truth]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 20.11.2002:3. 
106
ʻAttilla  ʼwas the code name given by Turkey to its military operation in Cyprus in 1974.
107 Machi, ʻΝα μη του επιτρέψουμε [Not to allow him]ʼ, Machi, 20.11.2002:1. 
108 Simerini, ʻΣτην Ευρώπη χωρίς ασφάλεια [In Europe without security]ʼ, Simerini, 21.11.2002:1.
109 See the caption on the front page of Politis on 28.10.2002. 
110 Costakis Constantinou, ʻΌχι σε τελεσίγραφα [No to ultimatums]ʼ, Haravgi, 29.10.2002:1.
111 Machi, Τώρα η σειρά τους [Now is their turn]ʼ, Machi, 7.2002:1. 
112 Y. Charalambides, ʻΤουρκικά τελεσίγραφα [Turkish ultimatums]ʼ, Simerini, 20.11.2002:1.
113 No author,  ʼΝέα φάση με τους Τούρκους να θέλουν τα πάντα: Συνομιλίες σε Κύπρο- Ν. Υόρκη [Turks want everything as a new phase
(of meetings) begins: Talks in Cyprus-New York]ʼ, Machi, 7.12.2002:1.
114 Costas Venizelos, ʻΣτην Κοπεγχάγη το τελικό παζάρι: Η Τουρκία παρελκύει σκόπιμα τις διαδικασίες μέχρι τέλους [In Copenhagen the
final bargain: Turkey deliberately defers the procedures until the end]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 21.11.2002:1.
115 Alithia, ʻΗ προειδοποίηση Παπανδρέου [The warning of Papandreou]ʼ, Alithia, 22.11.2002:1.
116 No author, ʻΚυπριακό και «ημερομηνία» [Cyprus Problem and “the date”]ʼ, Politis, 8.12.2002:23.
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Confusion of the Turks or Turkey with the Turkish Cypriot leader
At times, the Turkish Cypriot leader and the Turks were represented as being one and the same.
This representation, which is perhaps indicative of identity positions of some newspapers, was
detected in four dailies, Phileleftheros, Alithia, Machi and Simerini.  Phileleftheros ran one
headline that read, ʻThe Turks attempt to cause confusionʼ;117 the story though was about the
positions of both Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Denktaş. It seems that the Turkish Cypriot leader
was identified simply as a Turk. On 10 December Alithiaʼs cover story referred to the talks
between Alvaro de Soto, the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus and the Greek
and Turkish Cypriots concerning changes to the revised Annan Plan. The story declared that
besides Denktaş, de Soto had also discussed the UN Plan with other people from the ʻTurkish
sideʼ as well,118 revealing that the Turkish Cypriot leader was viewed as an integral part of the
Turkish side. Machiʼs editorial argued that the ʻTurkish sideʼ never gave the impression that it was
willing to negotiate, without clarifying whether it was Turkey or Denktaş who did not wish to
discuss with ʻour sideʼ.119 On the same day the changes to the Annan Plan requested by Denktaş
were noted in Simeriniʼs cover story, but in the same piece it was reported that ʻthe Turks wonʼt
return Morfou and Karpasiaʼ 120 to the Greek Cypriots. It seems that the Turkish Cypriot leader
was simply identified with the whole Turkish side. 
How Greek Cypriots were depicted in relation to the ʻothersʼ
The press always portrayed the Greek Cypriots positively. All the newspapers projected the notion
that the Greek Cypriot side was the victim of the conflict or that it was wronged. They also
supported that, contrary to the ʻothersʼ, the Greek Cypriots strove for peace in order to find a
solution to the political problem of the island. Sometimes the dailies projected the idea that they
were too compliant to the demands of the ʻother sideʼ. Indicative examples are given in the
following lines. 
The portrayal of the Greek Cypriots as victims was detected in Machi, Phileleftheros and
Politis. In an editorial about the Annan Plan Machi stated that everyone ʻthreatens and blackmails
the victim while the immolators are being rewardedʼ.121 Similarly, Phileleftheros contended that the
ʻoccupation agent (Denktaş) and some people who back him in Ankaraʼ demanded everything;
therefore, the international community should not exercise pressure on the ʻvictims of the
depredations  ʼin order to consent to some of the Planʼs provisions.122 Politis wrote that ominous
messages were sent by the ʻother sideʼ regarding the Plan, explaining this allegation by noting
that the ʻTurkish politiciansʼ claimed that they would fight for more guarantees for Turkish Cypriotsʼ
security, while ʻunquestionablyʼ it would be the Greek Cypriots who would not be ʻsecure  ʼif the
provisions of the Plan remained unchanged.123
Alithia, Machi, Simerini and Haravgi projected the notion that contrary to the ʻ othersʼ, the Greek
Cypriots wished to negotiate in order to end the deadlock in the country. Simerini even described
the Greek Cypriot side as being submissive and ready to say ʻyes  ʼto whatever was proposed by
the ʻothersʼ. It ironically commented that ʻweʼ have a ʻrecordʼ of ʻgood deedsʼ or ʻgood willʼ.124
Alithia wrote that ʻour side has agreed to discuss the Annan Plan  ʼ while ʻthe other side
procrastinatesʼ.125 Machi argued that ʻour side… demonstrated excessive receptivity to proposals,
117 No author, ʻΟι Τούρκοι επιχειρούν να προκαλέσουν σύγχυση [Turks attempt to cause confusion]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 22.11.2002:12. 
118 P. Charalambous, ʻΔραματικά εικοσιτετράωρα [Dramatic hours]ʼ, Alithia, 10.12.2002:1. 
119 Machi, Τώρα η σειρά τους [Now it is their turn]ʼ, Machi, 7.12.2002:1. 
120 Yiannos Charalambides, ʻΘρίλερ χωρίς ανάσα: Θέλουν αποτέλεσμα σε τέσσερις ημέρες [Breathtaking thriller: They want a result in four
days]ʼ, Simerini, 7.12.2002:1. 
121 Machi, ʻΝα μην του το επιτρέψουμε [Not to allow him]ʼ, Machi, 20.11.2002:1.
122 Phileleftheros, ʻΑυτό που προέχει σήμερα για όλους [Todayʼs pressing matter for everybody]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 7.12.2002:3. 
123 Politis, ʻΟρατοί κίνδυνοι [Visible dangers]ʼ, Politis, 21.11.2002:8.
124 Nikos Zachariou, ʻΟι Νόμοι του Μέρφυ και η επερχόμενη καταστροφή της Κύπρου: Πως και γιατί με τίποτα δεν γλιτώνουμε [Murphyʼs
Law and the upcoming destruction of Cyprus: How and Why we will not be saved]ʼ, Simerini, 8.12.2002:3.
125 Alithia, ʻΗ προειδοποίηση Παπανδρέου [The warning of Papandreou]ʼ, Alithia, 22.11.2002:1.
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submissions, suggestions and “advice” many times (even) at the expense of the essence of the
Cyprus problemʼ, while it declared that ʻthe Turkish side…never gave the impression that it was
ready to make decisions, to submit proposals and to negotiate to find a solutionʼ.126 Finally,
Haravgi represented Denktaş and Ankara as intransigent, in contrast to Greek Cypriots, named
ʻour side  ʼwho, ʻproved, despite the odds, to have good will and a readiness to negotiateʼ.127
The ʻoccupied areasʼ
All the newspapers used similar semantics when they reported on the areas in the north,
proclaiming that the ʻothers  ʼhad no legitimate power over what was nothing more than a ʻpseudo-
stateʼ. Some indicative examples are presented in the following lines. 
Haravgi named the territory in the north that covers 37% of the country, ʻ the occupied areasʼ,128
while Politis used the compound word ʻpseudo-stateʼ, meaning non-genuine or false entity.129 The
prefix ʻpseudoʼ was also attached to other words, indicating that the Republic of Cyprus denounced
the legitimacy of the regime in the north. In an article in Machi the word ʻpseudo-Prime-Ministerʼ
was noted,130 and on the next day Phileleftheros ran a story about the editor of a Turkish Cypriot
newspaper, headlined, ʻLevent is being dragged into a “court-martial”ʼ 131 the inverted commas
implying that the military court in the north had no real authority. This was also emphasized with
the expression ʻso-calledʼ, used in Simerini to characterize Ergun Olgun, the ʻso-called
Undersecretary  ʼto Denktaş.132
Not only did Machi employ the above-mentioned semantic tactics, but it also repeatedly
emphasized in various ways that the Greek Cypriots were the rightful owners of the areas in the
north; for example, in an editorial where it was stated that ʻthe survival of Cypriot Hellenism in the
land of its ancestorsʼ should be a matter of high priority.133
We also noted a tendency in some papers to depict the north of Cyprus as a source of troubles
for the Republic of Cyprus. Machi ran a front-page news story with the headline, ʻBreakout: Attila
is sending us echinococcusʼ, telling readers that the breakout of echinococcus was caused by
animals that were brought ʻfrom the occupied to the free areasʼ.134 On the previous day, the same
daily contended that ʻthousands of Turks gravitate daily to the free areas for work. Certainly the
majority are settlersʼ.135 In the same period Phileleftheros printed the headline, ʻIllegal immigrants
(come to the Republic of Cyprus) through the occupied areasʼ, and reported that illegal immigrants
were coming from Turkey to the ʻoccupied areasʼ before moving to the ʻfree areasʻ.136
The Press of the ʻother sideʼ
The Greek Cypriot newspapers regularly republished news items from the Turkish Cypriot and the
Turkish press. Phileleftheros even had a section where it reported issues that had been covered
by the dailies of the ʻother sideʼ.137 Haravgi also dedicated a page in its Sunday edition to news
about the Turkish Cypriots, in which it published articles taken from the Turkish Cypriot press.138
Additionally, Politis announced on one of its cover pages that it would translate daily whatever the
126 Machi, Τώρα η σειρά τους [Now it is their turn]ʼ, 7.12.2002:1. 
127 Androulla Gkiourof, ʻΚρίσιμα 24ώρα [Critical hours]ʼ, Haravgi, 10.12.2002:1.
128 See for example: Costakis Constantinou, ʻΌχι σε τελεσίγραφα [No to ultimatums]ʼ, Haravgi, 29.10.2002:1.
129 See for example: Gogo Alexandrinou, ʻΣε δίκη Τ/Κ συνδικαλιστές: Υποστήριξη από φορείς και οργανώσεις [In trial T/C trade unionists:
They are supported by public bodies and organizations]ʼ, Politis, 20.11.2002:29. 
130 See for example: No author, Η «Βολκάν» επικρίνει τον Ντερβίς Έρογλου [Volkan criticizes Dervis Eroglu]ʼ, Machi, 29.10.2002:9. 
131 See for example: No author, ʻΣε «στρατοδικείο» σύρουν τον Λεβέντ [Levent is being dragged into a “court-martial”]ʼ, Phileleftheros,
30.10.2002:14.
132 No author, ʻΟ Ντενκτάς «έτοιμος» σε οκτώ εβδομάδες [Denktaş will be “ready” in eight weeks]ʼ, Simerini, 31.10.2002:5.
133 Machi, ʻΚύρια προτεραιότητα η επιβίωση μας [Our first priority is our survival]ʼ, Machi, 30.10.2002:1
134 Iro Efthimiou, ʻΈξαρση: Ο Αττίλας μας στέλλει εχινόκοκκο [Outbreak: Attila is sending us Echinococcus]ʼ, Machi, 31.10.2002:1.
135 Machi, Μαχητικά: Η απασχόληση των Τούρκων [In a fighting spirit: Turks  ʼemployment]ʼ, Machi, 30.10.2002:4.
136 Christakis Yiannakos, ʻΛαθρομετανάστες μέσω κατεχομένων [Illegal immigrants through the occupied areas]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 30.10.2002:28.
137 See example: No author, ʻΤουρκοκυπριακός & Τουρκικός Τύπος [Turkish Cypriot & Turkish press]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 30.10.2002:4. 
138 No author, ʻΜια πατρίδα, ένας λαός: Το βήμα των Τουρκοκυπρίων [One country, one people: The voice of the Turkish Cypriots]ʼ, Haravgi,
8.12.2002:10.
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Turkish Cypriot press reported regarding the Annan Plan.139 Examination of the news stories that
the Greek Cypriot dailies selected, and the ways in which they were modified, indicates a systematic
negative representation of persons and groups on the ʻother sideʼ. 
Machi published an article relating the former Prime Minister of Turkey Bulent Ecevitʼs views
on the Annan Plan, as expressed in statements previously reported in the Turkish press. However,
Machi stressed that Ecevit advised his successor not to assign Karpasia to the Greek Cypriots,
further noting that he considered proposals for the return of the Greek Cypriot refugees as
ʻunacceptableʼ.140 The same statements were also published by Phileleftheros141 and Haravgi.142
Negative representations were not limited to the Turks, but also included the Turkish Cypriot
leadership or the supporters of Denktaş. On its front page Simerini published a news story taken
from a Turkish Cypriot daily in which it was emphasized that Denktaş would not sign the Annan
Plan before the Copenhagen Summit.143 This article portrayed the Turkish Cypriot leader as non-
compliant. Politis published statements made by Denktaş about the UN Plan, unflatteringly
portraying the Turkish Cypriot leader, ʻDenktaş shouts again: He asks for sovereignty and rejects
the mapsʼ.144 The supporters of the Turkish Cypriot leader were also negatively represented,
ʻDenktaşʼs welcome was a rave of intransigence: How the TC press covered the return of the
TC leaderʼ.145
We also noted a tendency among the Greek Cypriot dailies to change the semantics of the
original Turkish/Turkish Cypriot texts, practicing an intertwinement of views and facts. For example,
Alithia used inverted commas when it reported what had been written in the Turkish Cypriot
newspaper Volkan, yet also enclosed in quotes the title ʻPrime Minister  ʼwhen referring to Dervis
Eroglu.146 The Turkish Cypriot newspaper certainly would not have enclosed the term Prime
Minister in quotes. It appears that the quotation was changed in order to ʻfit  ʼ the Greek Cypriot
stance that the ʻothers  ʼhad no legal or recognized authority over the northern part of the country. 
Conclusion 
The Annan Plan for a settlement in Cyprus was the prevailing newspaper discourse during the
eleven days that were examined for this section of our research. Examination of this subject along
with supplementary news stories illuminated certain practices employed by the Greek Cypriot
newspapers to support their political and ideological stances regarding the solution, the
government, the parties, the EU and the ʻother sideʼ.  
Our data analysis revealed that the dailies that had no particular party or ideological affiliation
did not simply rely on statements from press conferences or press releases; to attract a readership,
they instead struggled for exclusiveness. In contrast, the newspapers with party or ideological
affiliations or those with low circulation and therefore limited resources, regularly published articles
based on press conferences or externally produced texts, often changing this information to serve
their interests and views. 
Our research revealed other practices employed by the six Greek Cypriot newspapers studied
here, to promote or favour specific political or ideological beliefs. 
The dailies  ʼstances on the Annan Plan revealed their positions on the more general issue of
a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Simerini and Machi viewed the Annan Plan as catastrophic and
139 No author, ʻΤι συζητούν στα κατεχόμενα για το σχέδιο [What do they discuss about the Plan in the occupied areas?]ʼ, Politis, 21.11.2002:1.
140 No author, ʻΣτρατηγική σημασία αποκτά η Καρπασία: και υποθήκες Ετσεβιτ [Karpasia becomes strategically important: Ecevitʼs precepts]ʼ,
Machi, 21.11.2002:1. 
141 No author, ʻΤουρκοκυπριακός & Τουρκικός Τύπος: Ετζεβιτ-Γκιουλ [Turkish Cypriot & Turkish press: Ecevit-Gul]ʼ, Phileleftheros,
21.11.2002:4. 
142 No author, ʻΕτζεβίτ προς Γκιουλ: Προσέξτε τις παγίδες [Ecevit to Gul: Beware of the traps]ʼ, Haravgi, 21.11.2002:3.
143 No author, ʻΟ Ντενκτάς δεν θα υπογράψει [Denktaş will not sign]ʼ, Simerini, 22.11.2002:1
144 No author, ʻΖητά κυριαρχία και απορρίπτει χάρτες: Φωνάζει πάλι ο Ντενκτας [Denktaş shouts again: He asks for sovereignty and rejects
the maps]ʼ, Politis, 9.12.2002:7. 
145 KYPE, ʻΝτελίριο αδιαλλαξίας η υποδοχή Ντενκτας: Πώς κάλυψε ο τ/κ Τύπος την επιστροφή του Τ/Κ ηγέτη [Denktaşʼs welcome was a
rave of intransigence: How the T/C press covered the return of the T/C leader]ʼ, Alithia, 10.12.2002:2.
146 No author, ʻΕπικρίνουν ψευδοϋπουργούς επειδή υπάκουσαν στο Χάνεϊ [They criticize pseudo-ministers for obeying Hannay]ʼ, Alithia,
29.10.2002:3. 
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further argued that it was a matter of national interest to reject it, warning that the Greek Cypriots
would face extinction were the Plan to take effect. Phileleftheros did not explicitly reveal its stance
on this subject, but we noted that before the Plan was officially submitted, the newspaper had
stressed aspects that could be perceived by the Greek Cypriots as negative. Politis argued that
to accept the Annan Plan as presented was not possible, but it did not use overly dramatic
language to describe the Plan or its possible outcomes. Haravgi argued that the Plan had to be
modified and insisted on a settlement that would secure the rights of the Cypriot people, both
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Alithia seems to have been the only newspaper that considered the
UN Plan as a compromising but necessary solution to end the deadlock in the country. 
To support their positions, Machi, Simerini and Alithia employed two practices: they gave greater
coverage to stories that backed their opinion, and they reported or even highlighted the statements
of important people, persons of authority, experts or groups who agreed with their stance. 
Three dailies, Haravgi, Machi and Alithia appeared to favour certain politicians, political parties
or the government. Haravgi offered almost exclusive coverage to AKEL and its leader, as well as
to their 2003 presidential candidate Tassos Papadopoulos. Alithia and Machi over-represented
the government of Glafcos Clerides, the ruling party and their members. These newspapers also
represented negatively or positively specific people, parties or the government. Haravgi often
sharply criticized DISY, its leader and the government, while it sometimes compared DISY with
AKEL to emphasize the disadvantages of the former party and the advantages of the latter. Machi
and Alithia flatteringly portrayed the government and the President of the Republic, and Alithia
used its editorials to negatively portray AKEL, its leader and the partyʼs presidential candidate. 
Our examination of the Greek Cypriot press in relation to the EU revealed that the EU and its
officials were regarded either as allies or as enemies according to their position on the Annan
Plan. Simerini, Machi and Haravgi warned of the danger in connecting reunification efforts with
Cyprusʼs accession to the EU. Sometimes these three dailies negatively portrayed the EU and
pictured it as an international organization that exercised pressure on the Republic of Cyprus to
consent to the Annan Plan. Politis tried to separate the UN Plan from Cyprusʼs admission into the
EU, but several days before the Copenhagen Summit when negotiations for the islandʼs accession
were completed, it slightly changed its stance. Phileleftheros and Alithia pictured the developments
positively, and consequently we noted no sense of the EU being portrayed as an enemy.
Data analysis also revealed the way the press viewed and depicted ʻour side  ʼand the way it
perceived and represented the ʻ other sideʼ, as well as whom they viewed as our side and the other
side. ʻOur side  ʼwas divided according to the dailies  ʼnotions on identity and their beliefs in relation
to the UN Plan. The groups of the ʻother side  ʼwere the Turkish Cypriot community, its leadership,
the settlers and the Turks or Turkey. 
Greek Cypriots and the Greeks were ʻour sideʼ. Some newspapers, especially Machi and
Simerini, stressed the bonds with Greece and promoted the idea that Greek Cypriots were an
integral part of Hellenism. Politis, Alithia and Phileleftheros also referred to the Hellenic identity of
the Greek Cypriots, but they did not emphasize this.  Haravgi was the only daily to look at and
refer to both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as ʻthe Cypriot peopleʼ. Yet our research
revealed that all the newspapers, regardless of their identity views, projected the notion of a
connection between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece through their coverage of the Greek
government and Greek politicians on important political matters.
This study also showed that two dailies, Simerini and Alithia, separated Greek Cypriots
according to their stance on the UN Plan. Those who disagreed with them were considered as the
ʻothers  ʼand were severely criticized.  
This research revealed no cases where any of the dailies viewed Turkish Cypriots as the
enemy. Politis, Phileleftheros, Alithia and Haravgi portrayed this community as oppressed by
Denktaş and his regime. Moreover, Haravgi stressed that the Turkish Cypriots longed for peace
and were the Greek Cypriots  ʼcompatriots. Their leader, however, was pictured in a completely
different way, with all naming Rauf Denktaş, ʻoccupation leaderʼ. They represented him as a
person who obstructed the solution and was an intransigent and dismissive politician. The settlers
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were also depicted negatively. The dailies proclaimed to the public that the people brought by
Turkey from Anatolia were distorting the population balance on the island. 
Most newspapers represented Turkey as the enemy of the Republic of Cyprus. Machi and
Simerini expressed this in the most negative terms, while Alithia represented Turkey more
neutrally. Phileleftheros, Machi, Simerini and Politis used negative epithets to describe this
country, stressing that it had invaded and occupied Cyprus, and all the dailies blamed Turkey for
the stalemate on the island. They portrayed Turkey as unwilling to negotiate and as having fixed
positions or avaricious demands. Sometimes Phileleftheros, Alithia, Machi and Simerini did not
clarify whether they referred to Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot leader. It seems that occasionally
Turkey and Rauf Denktaş were represented as being one and the same. 
Our analysis revealed that the Greek Cypriots were always portrayed positively in the press.
They were seen as the victim of the conflict or that they were wronged. All the dailies depicted
them as the people who— contrary to the ʻothers  ʼ—struggled to find a solution to the political
problem of the island. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots were represented as the ʻgoodies  ʼwhile the
Turks or Denktaş were the ʻbaddiesʼ. 
The northern part of Cyprus was pictured as a place lacking legitimacy. All the newspapers
employed semantics to proclaim that the ʻothers  ʼhad no legal power over the territory in the north.
Moreover Machi and Phileleftheros depicted the northern area of the island as a source of
troubles for the Republic of Cyprus. 
Finally, our analysis revealed that when news stories or statements made by  politicians of the
ʻother side  ʼwere republished from the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish press they sometimes were
used in a way that substantiated or perhaps justified negative representations of the ʻothersʼ.
Often, the Greek Cypriot press would change the semantics of the texts taken from the Turkish
Cypriot/Turkish dailies, altering the original articles to adapt them to their own stances and
perceptions. 
Synthia Pavlou
THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS IN 2002
Sanem Şahin
Introduction
At the time the UN presented the first version of their Plan (Annan Plan), the nationalist forces of
the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi -UBP) and the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti -
DP) were in power in north Cyprus, while the head of the state was Rauf Denktaş who symbolised
the nationalist policies and ideology. The dividing line acted as a barrier, not just to crossing but
also to communication between the two communities. People on both sides received news about
the ʻother  ʼthrough the media, which mainly relied on information provided by official sources. 
The Data
The data for this analysis consists of the news texts and editorials of seven daily newspapers,
namely, Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen, Vatan, Kıbrıslı, Ortam, Volkan, Birlik and Afrika. The
periods that will be examined in this part are 28 to 31 October 2002, 20 to 22 November 2002 and
7 to 10 December 2002. 
An overall examination of the newspapers showed that the Cyprus issue and the Annan Plan
dominated the agenda of the press. Every day, many news texts about the topic appeared in the
print media. Even in October 2002, before the Plan was publicly revealed, the newspapers
included articles that envisaged such a proposal being presented to both communities. 
Analysis of Journalistic Practices
The majority of reporting during the period chosen consisted of public statements, press releases,
press conferences and interviews given to the newspapers by the state authorities, political
parties and civil organisations. News stories about the Cyprus Problem and the Annan Plan
occupied the front pages of the newspapers, pushing other topics to the background.
The newspapers were full of many identical news articles, as they all heavily relied on and
benefited from externally produced texts such as news agency dispatches and press releases as
their sources. The news articles based on such texts received by newsrooms made up the
majority of the news content of the papers. There were hardly any original or exclusive stories in
the newspapers, which could be explained by a lack of resources, motivation or effort. The
similarity of the news texts indicated that the newspapers mostly copied and published them
without much editing. The frequency also suggested that this was a common practice of the
Turkish Cypriot press, which again could be explained as a result of shortage of reporters, time
or other resources required for news production. Whatever its cause, reproduction of these texts
as the news reduced journalists  ʼrole to merely processing the information provided for them by
the source rather than them originating the news texts. In a way, the story construction was
determined by the sources rather than the journalists, which highlights the dominance of the
sources in the production process over any news output prepared by journalistic efforts. 
Sometimes the similarities in the texts were not limited to the main body of the article but
included even the article headlines. Headlines, which can be generally described as summaries of
the news texts,1 in the case of the Turkish Cypriot press indicated the position of the news paper
on that topic. In fact, in some instances headlines offered the only clue to the institutional voice of
the newspapers carrying their commentary on the issue. However, during the period analysed
there were some examples where similarities in the headlines did not reflect a similarity in the
1 Teun van Dijk, News as Discourse, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988.
2 No author, ʻSon 50 metre [Last 50 metres]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 31.10. 2002:1; No author, ʻSon 50 metre [Last 50 metres]ʼ, Afrika, 31.10. 2002:1.
3 No author, ʻİşte Kıbrıs Türk Halkı [Here is the Turkish Cypriot people]ʼ, Volkan,  9.12. 2002:1, 4.
4 No author, ʻElli Elli [Fifty Fifty]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 20.11.2002:1.
5 No author, ʻAralıktan sonra muhatabımız AB [After December we will be talking to the EU]ʼ, Afrika, 28.10.2002:1.
6 No author, ʻAnlaşmaya niyeti yok [He has no intention of reaching an agreement]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 8.12. 2002:6.
7 No author, Gelişmeler çığ gibi [Developments are snowballing]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 28.10.2002:1. 
8 No author, ʻÇığ gibi gelişmeler [Snowballing developments]ʼ, Ortam, 28.10.2002:4.
9 No author, ʻRumlara göre gelişmeler çığ gibi [According to Greek Cypriots developments are snowballing] Afrika, 28.10.2002:1.
10 No author, ʻÇözüm İçin Gelişmeler Hızlandı [Solution developments accelerate]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 28.10.2002:19No author, Çığ gibi gelişmeler
[Snowballing developments]ʼ, Birlik, 28.10.2002:12.
11 Teun,van Dijk, News as Discourse, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988.
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different newspapers  ʼ representation of the matter and/or their ideological framework, but their
benefiting from the same sources. For example, when both Kıbrıs and Afrika used the headline
ʻlast 50 metresʼ,2 this did not mean a similarity in the representation and discourse of the two
newspapers (as they reflected opposite spectrums of opinion) but that both news papers
employed the headline given by the source of the text.
In some cases the newspapers stated no source for the information they reported, while in
others the news articles lacked certain crucial information. For example, when Volkan published
a survey on the publicʼs views on the UN Plan, it gave details on how many people were
questioned and how many surveyors were employed, but did not reveal for whom or for which
organisation the survey was carried out.3  Reporting on the changes to the Annan Plan suggested
by the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, Kıbrıslı failed to state its source of information or
where and when Clerides had made the relevant public statement. Without this, the information
mediated was unsubstantiated and did not go further than mere claims. In cases where the source
of the information was not revealed, passive sentences were used to convey the main argument
or event. 
Another common practice of the Turkish Cypriot press observed during this period was
embedding commentary into the news story. For example, reporting on some parts of the Annan
Plan regarded as negative for Turkish Cypriots, Kıbrıslı commented in its summary blurb and at
the end of its front-page article that ʻthe Annan Plan should not be accepted before “mines
underneath” are clearedʼ.4 Similarly, Afrikaʼs headline, ʻafter December we will be talking to the
EUʼ, reflected the paperʼs interpretation of events rather than communicating a news article
composed of facts.5 In this headline ʻwe  ʼdid not refer to the newspaper itself but to the Turkish
Cypriot side. Yenidüzen also published its opinion rather than the facts in the headline for the story
on President Denktaşʼs return to the TRNC: ʻhe has no intention of reaching an agreementʼ.6
Publishing articles from the Greek Cypriot press was another common practice in the Turkish
Cypriot print media. During the period studied the newspapers benefited from the Greek Cypriot
media to report the views of the ʻother  ʼ side on developments related to the Cyprus issue,
especially the Annan Plan. The news articles from the Greek Cypriot press appeared in the
newspapers either together on one page, under the title ʻNews from the Southʼ, or embedded into
the main stories to reflect the events and reactions on both sides of the island. In some cases, the
news stories that had been published in the Greek Cypriot press received significant coverage in
the Turkish Cypriot press. For example, Yenidüzen took a news article that had appeared the
previous day in Phileleftheros, a Greek Cypriot daily, and ran it as its main story.7 This practice
showed the lack of competitiveness within the Turkish Cypriot media about being original or
exclusive. Generally translated and circulated by the news agency of the state, Turkish News
Agency-Cyprus (Türk Ajansı Kıbrıs – TAK also TAK not italics), the same story also appeared in
Ortam in detail8 and on Afrikaʼs front page9 with only slight differences. Halkın Sesi and Birlik
integrated it into the press summaries from the Greek Cypriot media.10
The use of numbers, which generally suggests truthfulness and precision,11 was employed as
a strategy to intensify or weaken the effect of the news. For example, conflicting figures were
reported on the number of people who went to the airport to welcome the TRNC President, Rauf
Denktaş, as he returned to north Cyprus after having spent two months in the USA for health
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reasons. Halkın Sesi, Volkan and Kıbrıslı estimated the number of people to be in their ʻ thousandsʼ.12
Contradicting this, Yenidüzen gave the figure of the crowd at the airport as ʻ900  ʼ rather than
ʻthousandsʼ.13 Criticising a report on BRT, the state broadcasting channel, that ʻtens of thousandsʼ
of people met the presidentʼ, Afrika argued that the number was not more than ʻa thousandʼ.14
While newspapers that were critical of the President limited the number of his sympathisers to not
more than a thousand to show a lack of support for him, the ones that backed him gave the
number in ʻthousands  ʼ to show it otherwise. These diverging quantities revealed how the
numerical information that was supposed to emphasise the precision of the story was actually
manipulated to support the conflicting views of the newspapers. Another example was the
generalisation of the view of one group to represent a larger one. One such instance was in
Volkan, which presented the opinion of one economist as ʻeconomistsʼ, giving the impression that
more than one economist backed these assertions.15
The dailies, apart from reporting events and statements regarding the Plan, also included the
text of the Annan Plan, either in the main parts of the paper or as a supplement. This allowed
readers to find out for themselves about the content of the Plan rather than read accounts of it in
the press. Therefore it contributed to efforts to inform the public about the type of settlement that
was envisaged in order to help them make an informed decision. 
As the press based most of their content on externally produced texts or simply recorded the
statements of political figures, sometimes they failed to provide a framework that would help
readers understand the issue better. In some cases, there were conflicting reports that created
confusion rather than understanding. For example, on 20 November, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen and
Volkan16 published articles based on the Greek Cypriot press that claimed Greek Cypriots were
rejecting the Annan Plan. On the same day, Birlik, Vatan and Afrika, again using articles from the
Greek Cypriot press, reported that Greek Cypriots said ʻyes to Annanʼ.17 Anyone who read this
range of newspapers would have been confused about which one to believe.
Discourse and Representation
There were differences in discourses and representation of events and issues among the
newspapers included in the study. Moreover, their attitudes towards the Plan shifted within the
timeframe chosen. In October, it was easy to notice an expectation of some kind of a development
in the Cyprus issue in the shape of a settlement plan. The details were not known then. November
was dominated by the news texts, which reflected the initial reaction to the Plan. The news
articles in December were the reflections of more established reactions to the Plan within Turkish
Cypriot society. 
The Cyprus Issue and the Turkish Cypriot Negotiator
During the period examined, discussions about the Cyprus problem were linked to the Annan
Plan. The underlying question was whether or not the Plan could be a basis for negotiations for a
settlement in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot press was not only a reflection of different, and
sometimes conflicting, opinions and interests but also a platform where debates on the issue were
carried out. For example, the ill health of President Denktaş, who had been the negotiator of the
Turkish Cypriot community for many years, was one of the main concerns related to the future of
12 No author, ʻOrtaklık Devleti İstemiyorlar [They donʼt want a shared state]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 8.12.2002:1; No author, ʻKıbrıs Türk Halkı Liderini
Bağrına Bastı [Turkish Cypriot people embraced their leader]ʼVolkan, 8.12.2002:1; No author, ʻDenktaşʼa Sıcak Karşılama [A warm welcome
for Denktaş]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 8.12.2002:1.
13 No author, ʻ“Çözümsüz baba” geldi [ʻFather of no solution  ʼhas arrived]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 8.12.2002:1.
14 No author, Afrika, 8.12.2002:1. 
15 No author, BM Belgesi= Ekonomik Yıkım [the UN document= Economic Destruction]ʼ, Volkan, 9.12. 2002:1.
16 No author, ʻRum Halkı Planı Reddediyor [Greek Cypriot people are rejecting the plan]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 20.11.2002:19; No author, ʻKıbrıslı Rum
ʻredʼçiler [Greek Cypriot Rejectionists]ʼ, Yenidüzen 20.11.2002:11; No author, ʻRumlar Annan Planını Reddediyor [Greek Cypriots are Rejecting
the Annan Plan]ʼ, Volkan, 20.11.2002:14.
17 No author, ʻRumʼdan Annanʼa Evet [Yes to Annan from Greek Cypriots]ʼ,  Afrika, 20.11.2002:17; No author, ʻRumʼdan Annanʼa Evet [Yes to
Annan from Greek Cypriots]ʼ, Vatan, 20.11.2002:10; No author, ʻRumʼdan Annanʼa Evet [Yes to Annan from Greek Cypriots]ʼ, Birlik,
20.11.2002:12.
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the Cyprus problem. The discussions about whether he would be capable of continuing as the
negotiator were not only reported in the press but the debates surrounding it were actually carried
out through the press. Kıbrıs raised this question about the negotiator on its front page by
highlighting a quote from the leader of the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi
- TKP), Hüseyin Angolemli, with whom the newspaper conducted an interview: ʻThe negotiator will
be a problemʼ.18 The issue was also the topic of a column written by the editor-in-chief of the
newspaper, Başaran Düzgün: ʻWho will it (the negotiator) beʼ, which was an expression that
referred not only to the identity of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community but also its
future leader.19 Halkın Sesi, on the other hand, underlined that the Greek Cypriot leader, Glafkos
Clerides, had put forward ʻDenktaş as a conditionʼ, which meant that ʻhe would not accept
negotiating with any other Turkish Cypriot authority apart from Denktaşʼ.20 Meanwhile, Akay
Cemal, the editor of the newspaper (also covering the same issue in his editorial column) used
the Greek Cypriot leaderʼs statement to support Denktaşʼs position as the negotiator. Referring to
Clerides he wrote ʻin a way he implied that being a negotiator is not childʼs playʼ.21 As Cemal
argued, it was not only that it was ʻimpossible for the Turkish Cypriot people to accept any
negotiator other than Denktaşʼ, but also that ʻAnkara would not approve changing the negotiatorʼ,
as Denktaşʼs duty was not only to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots but also Turkeyʼs interests
on the island.22
Yet, the same statement was met with suspicion by Kıbrıslı. In contrast to Halkın Sesi, its
interpretation of Clerides  ʼstatement focused on showing the Greek Cypriot side as having ʻlost
control  ʼrather than reinforcing Denktaşʼs position as the negotiator. According to the newspaper,
Clerides  ʼwords signified a new ʻmanoeuvre  ʼon the part of the Greek Cypriots: ʻDenktaş staying
out of the negotiation process because of ill health has also put Clerides out of the course… the
centre of gravity of the peace process has moved to international arenas. Greek Cypriots who
have lost control of the process have started political manoeuvres to put its centre of gravity back
to a Nicosia axisʼ.23 It suggested that the sincerity of Clerides in wanting Denktaş as the negotiator
should be doubted.
Volkan, on the other hand, speculated about the underlying reasons for the debate regarding
Denktaşʼs position as the negotiator. The newspaper argued that Karen Fogg, the EU Commission
Representative to Turkey, gave some ʻcollaborationists – pro-mandate  ʼgroups the instruction to
ʻwear Denktaş outʼ. According to the paper, these groups and their press (Yenidüzen, Yeniçağ,
Ortam and Afrika) had set out to spread the rumours that as Denktaş could not act as the negotiator
he should be replaced. But as Denktaşʼs health improved, the Greek Cypriot Administration, foreign
powers and collaborationists could not satisfy their desire to do so.24 To support its claims, the
newspaper also published extracts from the Greek Cypriot press, as well as from Yenidüzen and
Afrika, that questioned Denktaşʼs health and his status as the negotiator. 
Ideological and Political determinants
Even though all the newspapers reported the views of various groups within society, those
ideologically close to the newspaper were given advantageous treatment. This was no different in
the context of the Annan Plan. Some dailies regarded the Plan as being in the national interest of
Turkish Cypriots while the others considered it as the opposite. Therefore, the representation of
the Annan Plan changed depending on whether it was reported in the news papers that favoured
it or in the ones that opposed it. The latter papers not only highlighted the negative aspects of the
18 No author, ʻAngolemli: Görüşmeci Sorun Olacak [Angolemli: The negotiator will be a problem]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 28.10.2002:1.
19 Başaran Düzgün, ʻBaşaran Düzgünʼle Yüz Yüze [Face to face with Başaran Düzgün]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 28.10.2002:6.
20 No author, ʻKlerides: Görüşmeler Dolaylı Olabilir [Clerides: Negotiations can be indirect]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 28.10.2002:3.
21 Akay Cemal, ʻKleridesʼten Denktaş Koşulu [Clerides makes Denktaş a condition]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 28.10.2002:2.
22 Ibid, p. 2.
23 No author, ʻManevra [Manouvre]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 28.10.2002:1.
24 No author, ʻHevesleri kursaklarında kaldı [They were unable to satisfy their desire]ʼ, Volkan, 28.10.2002:1.
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Plan but also gave more coverage to the views that were against it. For example, newspapers
such as Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıslı, Vatan, Birlik and Volkan were sceptical of the Annan Plan and gave
wide coverage to the Presidentʼs statements against it, excluding the voices of groups that had
proclaimed their support for it. In contrast, the newspapers that were in favour of the Plan, such
as Yenidüzen, Afrika and Ortam, portrayed it as a basis for the solution to the Cyprus Problem
and were critical of President Denktaşʼs attitude towards it. They stressed positive aspects of the
Plan and included views that supported it. Denktaşʼs public statements and opinions appeared less
frequently in these newspapers and, when they did, they were treated with disapproval. For
example, the Presidentʼs declaration that the ʻplan cannot be a basis for negotiations  ʼ received
front-page coverage in Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıslı, Kıbrıs, Vatan and Volkan and was treated within the
same framework: ʻDenktaş: the plan cannot be a basisʼ,25 ʻDenktaş called out to our people from
New York: Assert your ownership of the landʼ 26 Ortamʼs coverage of the issue included the
comments of Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi - TKP), which accused
Denktaş of gaining time with negative statements and called on him to make up his mind.27 On the
same day, Yenidüzen published a different story, which revealed that in 1974 Denktaş had offered
a map to the Greek Cypriot side that envisaged less territory to Turkish Cypriots than the one
offered in the Annan Plan.28 In contrast to the newspapers that gave wide and positive coverage
to Denktaş, Yenidüzenʼs story aimed to discredit him. 
Another example of the ideological and political determinants influencing news production was
observable when the newspapers positioned the political figures they sympathised with,
especially the leaders of the political parties they were affiliated with, in the centre of events and
highlighted their statements and actions as newsworthy. For example, when the US Special
Cyprus Coordinator, Thomas Weston, had a number of meetings with Turkish Cypriot diplomats
and party leaders, Ortam carried a front-page report that said: ʻWeston had a meeting with
Hüseyin Angolemli, the leader of the opposition party, TKP, and Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of
[Republican Turkish Party, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi] CTPʼ,29 ignoring the meetings he had with
other political figures. Even though the main text of the story inside the paper was the same as in
other newspapers, on the front page only Angolemliʼs words were reported. Similarly, Birlik
highlighted Westonʼs meeting with UBP leader, Derviş Eroğlu, without mentioning his get-together
with other political party leaders.30
The language in the news texts also proved to be value- and ideology-laden, as it reflected a
particular political or ideological orientation. For example, anything state representatives uttered
was constructed as if it were the ʻtruth  ʼand verbs such as ʻnotedʼ, ʻstatedʼ, ʻsaidʼ, ʻemphasisedʼ
were used to mark it. Affirmative words adopted for official statements also contributed to their
being perceived as the ʻauthorityʼ. On the other hand, the utterances of opposition groups or
internal ʻothersʼ, as well as the Greek Cypriot authorities, were given as ʻclaimsʼ, ʻsuggestions  ʼor
simply as expressing their opinions rather than pointing at facts. Such use of language not only
discredited these groups  ʼstatements but also enforced the power of ʻour  ʼarguments and cast
them as the norm. In summary, while an authoritarian tone for official discourses in news texts was
employed to increase the ʻfactuality  ʼof what was being reported, the ʻotherʼs  ʼstatements were
presented as mere suggestions. One such example was in Kıbrıs. The paper reflected the Greek
Cypriot government spokespersonʼs utterance that ʻAnkaraʼs attitude is completely different than
Denktaşʼs  ʼas a ʻclaimʼ.31 Yet, the day before, a similar story but concerning Greek Cypriots had
25 No author, ʻDenktaş: Plan Zemin Olamaz [Denktaş: the plan cannot be the basis]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 22.11.2002:1.
26 No author, ʻToprağınıza Sahip Çıkın [Assert ownership of your land]ʼ, Volkan, 22.11.2002:1; No author, ʻDenktaş:Toprağa Sahip Çıkın [Denktaş:
Assert ownership of the land]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 22.11.2002:1.
27 No author, ʻKarar ver [Make up your mind]ʼ, Ortam, 22.11.2002:1.
28 No author, ʻDenktaşʼın Haritası [Denktaşʼs Map]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 22.11.2002:1.
29 No author, ʻÇözüm Kaçınılmaz [Solution is Inevitable]ʼ, Ortam, 29.10.2002:1. 
30 No author, ʻEroğlu ve Coşar Weston ile Biraraya Geldi [Eroğlu and Coşar met with Weston]ʼ, Birlik, 29.10.2002:5.
31 No author, ʻRum Yönetimi Sözcüsü Kasulıdesʼin İddiası: “Ankaraʼnın Tavırları Denktaşʼın Tavırlarından Tamamen Farklı [Greek Cypriot
Government Spokesperson Kasulides  ʼ claim: ʻAnkaraʼs attitude is completely different than Denktaşʼs]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 9.12.2002: 7. 
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a different language structure that implied factuality rather than being a mere insinuation:
ʻVassiliou and the Foreign Affairs Ministry are singing different tunesʼ. So when it was a statement
by ʻus  ʼit was a fact but when the ʻother  ʼsaid a similar thing it was a claim that helped to discredit
it. Also when the main opposition partyʼs womenʼs group issued a press release saying that the
demonstration against the Plan would be unsuccessful, its message was conveyed as a ʻclaimʼ
by Kıbrıs.32 It was not only Kıbrıs that employed this practice, but the press in general. 
It is also noticeable that the selection and reproduction of events within the news articles were
communicated from a particular political and ideological position and by the discourse supported
by the newspapers. These positions were embedded within the choices of raw material that were
available as well as in the discourses within the story. For example, a demonstration with the
motto of ʻyes to peace, no to this planʼ, organised to express opposition to the Annan Plan, was
reported in various ways throughout the print media. The newspapers that represented the Plan
as a basis for a solution in Cyprus reported the rally as being ʻagainst peaceʼ, while others that
opposed the Plan campaigned to encourage people to attend it. For Ortam, the demonstration
was a ʻno to the plan  ʼdemonstration.33 Yenidüzen described the protest rally as a ʻdemonstration
against peaceʼ 34 or as a ʻno to peace demonstrationʼ. Having identified the Plan with a solution
in Cyprus, the newspaper depicted the rally as being against a settlement in Cyprus rather than
against the Plan. It also criticised the state for giving its support to the demonstration: ʻthe stateʼs
shameʼ.35 In contrast, Kıbrıslı described the protest march with a nationalistic discourse: ʻno to
territory concession and migration rallyʼ.36 Vatan gave it a historical aspect by defining it as a
ʻhistoric rallyʼ.37 For Birlik, the demonstration indicated that national struggle, bloodshed and years
of suffering had not been wasted.38 It was Kıbrıs and Halkın Sesi that defined the event with its
proper title, which was ʻyes to peace, no to this plan demonstrationʼ.39
Another good example of how the newspapers reconstructed their stories in line with their
political positions was the news reports of a speech that Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu delivered
during the celebrations of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. According to the newspapers
(all had the same news text which suggested that it was a news agency dispatch) Eroğlu said,
ʻWe are not against entry into the EU. We are against the EU entering Cyprus against our willʼ.40
The newspapers selectively quoted from the statement in their headlines. For example, Kıbrıs
reported him as saying: ʻWe are not against the EUʼ,41 Kıbrıslı as: ʻWe are not against the entry
into the EUʼ,42 and Halkın Sesi as: ʻWe are against the EU entering amongst us against our willʼ.43
Yenidüzenʼs headline, which was: ʻwe are against the EU entering into Cyprusʼ,44 gave the
impression that the Prime Minister opposed the EUʼs involvement in Cyprus. 
Whose views were reflected?
Whose views the newspapers reflected was another confusing issue. Many times headlines
carried statements of political figures without attributing those statements to the speaker. One
32 No author, ʻYurtsever Kadınlar Birliğiʼnin İddiası: “Barışa Evet, bu Plana Hayır Mitingi” Başarısız Olacak [Patriotic Women Unionʼs Claim: “Yes
to Peace, No to This Plan Rally” will be Unsuccessful]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 10.12.2002:6.
33 No author, ʻPlana Hayır Mitingi Yarın Yapılıyor [No to the Plan Rally is Happening Tomorrow]ʼ, Ortam, 9.12.2002:3.
34 No author, ʻUBPʼden “Barış Karşıtı” Mitinge Destek [UBP supports “Anti-peace” demonstration]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 9.12.2002:6.
35 No author, ʻDevletin ayıbı [The stateʼs shame]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 10.12.2002:4. In contrast, Yenidüzen used the proper name for the rally organised
to show support for the Annan Plan: ʻpeace and democracy demonstrationʼ.
36 No author, ʻToprak tavizine ve göçe hayır mitingi [No to territory concession and migration rally]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 10.12.2002:12.
37 No author, ʻTarihi miting yarın Lefkoşaʼda [Historical rally is in Nicosia tomorrow]ʼ, Vatan, 9.12.2002:1.
38 No author, ʻYıllardır verilen ulusal mücadelenin, döküen kanların, çekilen acıların boşa olmadığını gözler önüne serecek miting bugün
gerçekleşiyor: Barışa evet, plana hayır [the demonstration that will show that the years of national struggle, bloodshed and suffering were not
wasted is taking place today. Yes to peace, not to the plan]ʼ, Birlik, 10.12.2002:1.
39 No author, ʻ“Barışa evet bu plana hayır” mitingi [ʻYes to peace, no to this plan  ʼdemonstration]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 10.12.2002:1; No author, ʻ“Barışa evet
bu plana hayır” mitingi [ʻYes to peace, no to this plan  ʼdemonstration]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 10.12.2002:1.
40 Only Birlik used the statement as it was in the title of the story. 30.10.2002:7
41 No author, ʻABʼye karşı değiliz [We are not against the EU]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 30.10.2002:6.
42 No author, ʻBiz ABʼa girilmesine karşı değiliz [We are not against entry into the EU]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 30.10.2002:11.
43 No author, ʻEroğlu: ABʼnin irademiz dışında içimize girmesine karşıyız [Eroğlu: We are against the EU entering amongst us against our will]ʼ,
Halkın Sesi, 30.10.2002:6.
44 No author, ʻABʼnın Kıbrısʼa girmesine karşıyız [We are against the EU entering into Cyprus]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 30.10.2002:6.
37The Turkish Cypriot Press in 2002
such example was in Vatan. Duplicating Denktaşʼs words in its headline, Vatan wrote ʻthere is no
sovereignty in the Plan eitherʼ.45 The headline was taken from a speech the President had
delivered, but not employing quotation marks or any other means of attribution made it unclear
whose views the newspaper was reflecting, Denktaşʼs or the newspaperʼs. In contrast to the idea
that using quotations allows people to distance themselves from participating in the story and lets
the facts speak for them-selves,46 the practice reduced the distance between the views expressed
by the speaker and the newspaper. In other words, it showed the newspaperʼs agreement with
Denktaşʼs statement. 
The newspapers  ʼ representation of the Annan Plan was dominated with views of not only
Turkish Cypriot government representatives and politicians but also of representatives of the EU,
the UN and other states such as Turkey, the USA and the UK. Thus, such reports were comprised
mainly of who said what. 
Views of civil society were given space in the newspapers but, as discussed above, their
treatment depended on whether they were in harmony with the newspaperʼs views. For example,
Vatan published the reactions to the UN Plan of a number of civil society organisations on its first
page under the headline, ʻthe debate on the plan is expandingʼ.47 Yet the story covered the views
only of the organisations that were against the Plan without mentioning those that supported it. 
Volkan benefited from the same strategy as well. Some peoples  ʼopinions on the Plan, which
agreed with those of the newspaper, were presented as the opinions of the entire public: ʻStrong
reaction from our people to the Annan Plan is continuing: we wonʼt give even an inch of our landʼ.48
The phrase not only suggested representing public opinion on the matter but also portrayed it as
being homogenous. In the overall coverage of the issue, the ideas of the opposition were included
in Volkan not to provide a platform where diverse opinions were communicated to readers but as
a subject of criticism.
Nationalist Discourses
Nationalist discourses dominated the news especially in the right wing newspapers that opposed
the Plan. Whether the Plan was in the national interest of Turkish Cypriots was one of the main
arguments in the press. The analysis reveals that contrasting versions of national interest were
articulated in the print media to mobilize the readers in relation to the Annan Plan. 
The newspapers were also involved in drawing boundaries between ʻus  ʼand ʻthemʼ, which not
only established a difference between ʻus  ʼand the ʻother  ʼbut reinforced the perception of each of
these groups as homogenous as well. Yet, there was no fixed categorisation of ʻus  ʼand ʻthemʼ
groups. Depending on the definition of what was in the national interest of Turkish Cypriots, the
inclusion and exclusion process of ʻwe  ʼand the ʻother  ʼgroups changed. While the ʻwe  ʼgroup was
portrayed to represent and defend the interest of the nation, the ʻother  ʼgroup was depicted as
opposing it. 
National interest
The concept of national interest played a crucial role in the representation of the Annan Plan.
National interest can be simply described as what is believed to be in the interest of nation and
how this interest is best served.49 Far from being a fixed notion, the conceptualisation of the
interests of the nation changed depending on the newspaper. For example, the nationalist
newspapers that saw the Plan as a threat to the existence of the TRNC state and the Turkish
45 No author, ʻ Planʼda egemenlik de yok [There is no sovereignty in the Plan either]ʼ, Vatan, 22.11.2002:1. Birlik used the same headline but placed
it in quotation marks to attribute the statement to Denktaş. 22.11.2002:1.
46 GayeTuchman, ʻObjectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmenʼs Notions of Objectivity  ʼin Howard Tumber (ed), News: A reader,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
47 No author, ʻPlan tartışması giderek büyüyor [The debate on the plan is expanding]ʼ, Vatan, 21.11.2002:1.
48 No author, ʻAnnan Planına halkımızdan yoğun tepkiler devam ediyor “Bir karış toprak dahi vermeyiz” [Strong reaction from our people to the
Annan Plan is continuing: we wonʼt give even an inch of our land]ʼ, Volkan, 9.12.2002:5.
49 Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, Self and Nation, London: Sage, 2001.
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Cypriot nation argued against it. Volkan illustrated the UN Plan as the equivalent of an eco nomi -
cally destructive proposal in one of its front-page headlines: ʻthe UN document=economic
destructionʼ.50 For Vatan, accepting the Plan meant losing the fight for the ʻnational causeʼ.51
Therefore, it depicted one of the protest rallies against the Plan as a national mobilization of
Turkish Cypriots to express that ʻthey did not want to be subservient to the Greek Cypriots, lose
territory, become refugees, lose the security of Turkish military, but they wanted to protect their
sovereignty and express their wish for a lasting, fair and honourable peace processʼ.52
These newspapers construed the Annan Plan not as a solution to the Cyprus Problem but, on
the contrary, as a plan for the destruction of the Turkish Cypriot community. Reflecting the
Presidentʼs assertions that the enemies of the nation were threatening the sovereignty of the
country, these newspapers aimed to encourage their readers to a collective action by expressing
their rejection of the Annan Plan. Arguing that accepting the Plan would threaten the sovereignty of
Turkish Cypriots, Denktaş was quoted, ʻweʼre not going to pay the price demandedʼ.53  To prompt
its readers to attend the protest rally against the Annan Plan, Vatan implied that the homeland was
in danger: ʻTurkish Cypriots are guarding the peace and the homelandʼ.54 Volkan was one of the
newspapers that kept stressing the dangers and threats Turkish Cypriots had to be aware of.
According to the newspaper, ʻPresident Denktaş gave a message of resistance to the pressures
coming from outsideʼ.55 Equating the solution in Cyprus as suggested in the Annan Plan to the
collapse of the state, Volkan repeated Denktaşʼs words that ʻour state cannot be the price of a
solutionʼ.56 For the newspaper, the UNʼs proposal was full of traps and dangers to the existence
of Turkish Cypriots, and  ʻTurkish Cypriots  ʼhouses and lands would be taken away from them
which would make them tenants and refugees again  ʼ –but by whom was not revealed.57
Especially Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Birlik and Volkan quoted Denktaş on their front pages in detail, as
when he said that ʻthe Plan was full of trapsʼ,58 ʻTurkish Cypriots should guard their territoryʼ 59
and that the Plan ʻincluded no sovereignty for Turkish Cypriotsʼ.60 Also according to Kıbrıslı, if the
Annan Plan were implemented the new state would become a ʻGreek Cypriot Republic again  ʼin
20 years time.61 In summary, they judged the Plan as being against the national interest of the
Turkish Cypriots.
In contrast, the newspapers that favoured the Plan presented it as being in the interest of the
nation. They kept characterising the Plan as an ʻopportunity  ʼ for a solution in Cyprus and
highlighting its positive aspects. For example, Yenidüzen reported that Turkish Cypriots would
gain representation in the European Parliament if a settlement agreement were reached.62 It was
especially the newspapers such as Afrika, Ortam and Yenidüzen that integrated the discourse of
ʻpeace  ʼand ʻsolution  ʼinto their news texts about the Annan Plan, which enhanced the association
of the Plan with these concepts. Inclusion of the views that were in favour of the Plan more than
50 No author, ʻBM Belgesi=Ekonomik Yıkım [UN document= Economic destruction]ʼ, Volkan, 9.12.2002:1.
51 No author, ʻDağ başını duman almış yürüyelim arkadaşlar [The mountain top is smoky letʼs walk friends)]ʼ, Vatan, 10.12.2002:1 (Authorʼs note:
Lyrics of a youth song).
52 Ibid p.1.
5 No author, ʻIstenen bedeli ödemeyeceğiz [We are not going to pay the price demanded]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 8.12.2002:1.
54 No author, ʻKıbrıs Türkü Barışa ve vatanına sahip çıkıyor [Turkish Cypriots are guarding the peace and the homeland]ʼ, Vatan, 9.12.2002:1.
55 No author, ʻDün KKTCʼye gelişinde ellerinde bayrakları binlerce kişinin coşkulu ve hasret dolu sevgi gösterileriyle karşılanan Cumhurbaşkanı
Denktaş dış baskılara karşı direniş mesajı verdi [President Denktaş who was met by an exuberant show of thousands of people carrying flags
on his arrival to the TRNC yesterday gave a message of resistance to the pressures coming from outside]ʼ, Volkan, 8.12.2002:1.
56 No author, ʻÇözümün bedeli devletimiz olamaz [Our state cannot be the price of a solution]ʼ, Volkan, 10.12.2002:1.
57 No author, ʻKiracı olmayacağız [We are not going to be tenants (refugees)]ʼ, Volkan, 20.11.2002:1.
58 No author, ʻDenktaş: ince tuzaklar var [Denktaş: there are intricate traps]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 21.11.2002:1; No author, ʻPlan içinde tuzaklar var [There
are traps in the plan]ʼ, Vatan, 21.11.2002:1; No author, ʻCumhurbaşkanı Rauf Denktaş: Planın içerisinde çok ince tuzaklar var [President Rauf
Denktaş: there are intricate traps in the plan]ʼ, Birlik, 21.11.2002:1; No author, ʻPlan tuzaklarla dolu [The plan is full of traps]ʼ, Volkan,
21.11.2002:1.
59 No author, ʻDenktaş: Toprağa sahip çıkın [Denktaş: Assert ownership of the land]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 22.11.2002:1; No author, ʻPlanʼda egemenlik
de yok [There is no sovereignty in the plan either]ʼ, Vatan, 22.11.2002:1;No author, ʻCumhurbaşkanı Rauf Denktaşʼtan halka: Belgede
egemenliğimiz yok [From President Rauf Denktaş to people: our sovereignty is not in the document]ʼ, Birlik, 22.11.2002:1; No author,
ʻToprağınıza sahip çıkın [Assert ownership of your land]ʼ, Volkan 22.11.2002:1.
60 Ibid.
61 No author, ʻElli elli [Fifty fifty]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 20.11.2002:1.
62 Sevgül Uludağ, ʻAvrupa Parlamentosuʼnda yerimiz hazır [Our place is ready in the European Parliament]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 9.12.2002:1, 3.
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the opposition also contributed to these newspapers  ʼattempts to show the positive side of the
settlement proposal. When Ortam started to publish the text of the Annan Plan it explained on its
front page that it was to provide objective information so that its readers could make an informed
decision about their future. Yet in the same text the newspaper also described the Plan as an
ʻopportunityʼ, which attributed a positive meaning to it. By highlighting the importance of reaching
informed decisions but at the same time presenting the Plan as ʻan important opportunityʼ, Ortam
did not act very objectively. 
ʻUs  ʼand the ʻOtherʼ
The concept of national interest also determines the discursive construction of ʻ us  ʼand ʻ themʼ. The
newspapers supporting different interests for Turkish Cypriots categorised different groups as ʻusʼ
and the ʻ otherʼ. The expression of ʻ we  ʼfor self-presentation frequently occurred in the news articles.
In many contexts, the ʻwe  ʼgroup comprised Turkish Cypriots and in some cases it referred to the
group expressing an opinion or the newspaper itself. Most of the time ʻwe  ʼmeant not only that the
paper was speaking to the public, but it was also speaking on behalf of it. By declaring that ʻwe
wonʼt be refugees againʼ, Volkan was speaking on behalf of and to the Turkish Cypriot
community.63 It referred to the migration of Turkish Cypriots to safer areas following the inter-
communal conflict in 1960ʼs.  Similarly, speaking on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, Kıbrıslı wrote as
its caption for a photo of Jacques Poos, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament: ʻPoos stressed
guaranteeing protection of our cultural heritage and identity. If these guarantees are similar to the
ones given to the (American) Indians then we donʼt want them. Recognition of our equality and
sovereignty is enough for us to protect our cultural heritage and identityʼ.64 When Yenidüzen was
saying that, ʻour place is ready in the European Parliamentʼ, it also spoke to Turkish Cypriots. By
speaking for and to the society, the media not only represent it but also depict what is to be
represented.65 Employing phrases such as ʻour placeʼ, ʻour president  ʼand ʻus  ʼwas a strategy that
emphasised unification among the members of the society to create a ʻ national weʼ. Adopting such
a ʻ we  ʼdiscourse in the news texts also helped to reduce the distance and strengthen the relationship
between the media and audience. It helped the media not only symbolize the society but also in
some ways reconstruct it. 
The concept of ʻwe  ʼalso implied consensus among Turkish Cypriots. Actually, the newspapers
widely benefited from the ideology of consensus66 to show their perspective of the events as
agreed by the general public and also to depict the society as a homogenous one without any
dissidents. During the period studied the newspapers benefited from the language of consensus
to portray the society as united around the ideas they had been promoting. For example, Afrika
talked about ʻour peopleʼs hope of a solutionʼ,67 Vatan predicted that Turkish Cypriots would gather
in the protest rally against the plan as ʻone voiceʼ,68 and according to Volkan, ʻthe Turkish Cypriot
people embraced their leaderʼ.69
Another way of depicting Turkish Cypriots as united was to present the opinion of a few people
as that of the public. This practice depicted the public as sharing the same views and interests
with no dissenters. It also gave an impression of consensus, implying that everyone agreed with
the statement, and enhanced the newspapers  ʼimage as the voice of their readers. Halkın Sesi
frequently used this strategy, reporting the views of some members of the public on the Plan but
63 No author, ʻKiracı olmayacağız [We are not going to be tenants (refugees)]ʼ, Volkan, 20.11.2002:1.
64 No author, ʻBM planına AB desteği [the EU support the UN plan]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 31.10.2002:1.
65 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995.
66 Roger Fowler, Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press, London:Routledge, 1991; John Hartley, Understanding News,
London: Routledge, 1982.
67 No author, ʻTaş bastık [We suffer patiently]ʼ, Afrika, 9.12.2002:1.
68 No author, ʻDağ başını duman almış yürüyelim arkadaşlar [The mountain top is smoky letʼs walk friends)]ʼ, Vatan, 10.12.2002:1 (Authorʼs note:
Lyrics of a youth song).
69 No author, ʻKıbrıs Türk halkı liderini bağrına bastı [Turkish Cypriot people embraced their leader]ʼ, Volkan, 8.12.2002:1.
40 Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem
generalising them as everyoneʼs: ʻPeople are worriedʼ.70 It headlined another article as ʻthe public
is apprehensiveʼ— again based on the comments of few people. Claiming that citizens reacted
against the maps suggested in the Plan, Halkın Sesi wrote that they found it wrong to give so
much territory to the Greek Cypriots and therefore regarded the Plan as unacceptable.71 Volkan
also presented a public opinion survey on the Annan Plan as ʻhere is the real will of Turkish
Cypriotsʼ.72 Claiming that such a survey was conducted for the first time, which strengthened the
validity and truthfulness of it, Volkan generalised the results of the survey to all Turkish Cypriots.
The same strategy was also used to provide a positive represen tation of ʻusʼ. For example,
Turkish Cypriots were portrayed as united behind their President or determined not to give any
territory to Greek Cypriots by newspapers such as Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Volkan, Kıbrıslı, Kıbrıs.
The ʻotherʼ
The concept of ʻother  ʼis crucial in the representation of ʻusʼ. As Hall describes it, it is only through
the concept of the ʻother  ʼthat ʻour  ʼidentity is established, because whatever the ʻother  ʼis ʻwe  ʼare
not.73 In other words ʻour  ʼself-image is dependent on the image of the ʻotherʼ, as it is determined
as the opposite. The representation of the ʻother  ʼgroup in the press varied depending on the
newspaper and the context of its construction. In some cases it was defined on the basis of
nationality such as ʻGreek Cypriotʼ, and in others on political views and ideo logical positions in
relation to the Cyprus Problem or more specifically the Annan Plan. We found that there were
more negative depictions of the ʻother  ʼin the press compared to positive representations of ʻusʼ.
Greek Cypriots as the ʻother  ʼ
Greek Cypriots were cast as the ʻother  ʼor the ʻenemy  ʼespecially by the nationalist papers that
were opposed to the Annan Plan. According to these papers, the Plan meant the surrender of
Turkish Cypriots to Greek Cypriots, whose ill-will towards the Turkish Cypriots remained unchanged.
Announcing that a protest rally against the Plan would take place, Vatan described it as an action
opposing a Plan that, ʻincludes the threat of taking the Turkish Cypriot people further back than
the 1960 Agreements, proposes to abandon a vital proportion of our territory to Greek Cypriots….ʼ.74
The fear of Greek Cypriots joining ʻus  ʼwas also discernible in Kıbrıslı, which warned its readers
that if the Plan were implemented, in 20 years  ʼ time the state would turn into a ʻGreek Cypriot
Republicʼ, and therefore the Plan should not be accepted before certain articles in it were
changed.75 According to Volkan, the maps suggested in the UN document infuriated Turkish
Cypriots. In one of its features entitled: ʻNo to living together with Greek Cypriots againʼ, which
consisted of some peopleʼs view on the issue, the newspaper explained that people believed that
Greek Cypriots would attempt to fulfill their dream of enosis at the first opportunity.76
Some newspapers strengthened the perception of Greek Cypriots as the ʻenemyʼ, especially
through reporting on the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaşʼs such statements. By printing Denktaşʼs
public pronouncements in which he constantly referred to the Plan as ʻfull of traps  ʼand ʻcannot be
a basis for a solution  ʼas well as employing some of his expressions such as ʻthey do not want a
shared stateʼ,77 ʻreturn of Greek Cypriots to the north is very dangerousʼ,78 ʻTurkish Cypriotsʼ
70 No author, ʻHalk tedirgin [People are worried]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 21.11.2002:3. 
71 Ibid., p.3.
72 No author, ʻİşte Kıbrıs Türk halkı [Here is the Turkish Cypriot people]ʼ, Volkan, 9.12.2002:1, 4.
73 Stuart Hall, ʻIntroduction: Who needs ʻIdentityʼ?  ʼin S.Hall and R. Gay (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage, 1996.
74 No author, ʻTarihi miting yarın Lefkoşaʼda [Historical rally is tomorrow in Nicosia]ʼ, Vatan, 9.12.2002:1.
75 No author, ʻElli elli [Fifty fifty]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 20.11.2002:1.
76 No author, ʻRumlarla yeniden yaşama hayır  ʼ[No to living together with Greek Cypriots again]ʼ, Volkan, 22.11.2002:3.
77 No author, ʻOrtaklık devleti istemiyorlar [They do not want a shared state]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 8.12.2002:1.
78 No author, ʻPlanʼda egemenlik de yok [There is no sovereignty in the plan either]ʼ, Vatan, 22.11.2002; No author, ʻDenktaşʼtan toprağa sahip
çıkın çağrısı [Call from Denktaş to assert ownership of the land]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 22.11.2002; No author, ʻCumhurbaşkanı Rauf Denktaşʼtan halka:
Belgede egemenliğimiz yok [[From President Rauf Denktaş to people: our sovereignty is not in the document]ʼ, Birlik, 22.11.2002:1; No author,
ʻToprağınıza sahip çıkın [Assert ownership of your land]ʼ, Volkan, 22.11.2002.
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sover eignty is not included in the planʼ,79 the newspapers enhanced the notion that Greek
Cypriots were still a threat to Turkish Cypriots. Despite the frequent appear ance of Denktaşʼs anti-
Plan statements in the print media, the blame of destroying peace hopes was shifted on to the
Greek Cypriot President by Kıbrıslı, when he made some suggestions regarding changes to the
Plan: ʻClerides blew up hopes of peaceʼ.80
The ʻother  ʼin the image of Greek Cypriots was cast as homogenous and was demonised. It
was only Yenidüzen, Afrika and Ortam that highlighted a divergence within them; there were some
who backed the Plan and some who didnʼt. Reporting the results of a survey that appeared in the
Greek Cypriot press, Yenidüzen differentiated those who rejected the Plan from the general
population, calling them ʻGreek Cypriot rejectionists  ʼand so established them as a separate group
rather than generalising the tendency to the whole population.81 Ortam also collectivised the
Greek Cypriots who joined in the protest rally against the Plan as ʻfanatics  ʼrather than suggesting
that the whole community opposed it.82 It called Turkish Cypriots who organised and would attend
the anti-Plan demonstration in the north ʻfanatics  ʼ as well. For Afrika it did not matter either
whether it was Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots who opposed the Plan, as it collectively named
them ʻpro-no  ʼgroups (hayırcılar), which also implied that it did not view Greek Cypriots as the
ʻhomogenised  ʼother but all those opposed to the Plan.83
The ʻother  ʼstate was not defined as a ʻrepublic  ʼ in the news but only as an ʻadministrationʼ.
Adopting the official discourse, none of the newspapers called that state by its official and interna -
tionally recognised name, ʻ the Republic of Cyprusʼ, but simply as ʻ the Greek Cypriot Administrationʼ.
In contrast ʻour  ʼstate was referred to as a republic, and its name, ʻTurkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus  ʼ (TRNC), was employed frequently. Inevitably, while the head of ʻour  ʼ state was the
ʻPresidentʼ, the ʻotherʼs  ʼwas the ʻleader of the administrationʼ. The examples of this discourse
were visible in all the newspapers. For example, Kıbrıs reported that ʻthe UN is studying the
answers of the TRNC President Denktaş and the Greek Cypriot leader Cleridesʼ.84 In Ortam
Glafkos Clerides was also identified as ʻthe leader of the Greek Cypriot Administrationʼ,85 while in
another story Denktaş was described as the ʻTRNC Presidentʼ.86 The same title was adopted by
Afrika and Yenidüzen. It can be argued that these newspapers employed the ʻleader- presidentʼ
distinction because it was in the discourses of the texts of the news agency dispatches or the
press releases used for the newspaper articles. However, it shows that the papers did not see any
problem in using it as they were not edited any differently.
Internal ʻothersʼ: Denktaş and traitors
The concept of the ʻother  ʼwas not limited to Greek Cypriots. Depending on the papers  ʼsupport or
opposition to the UN Plan, different groups were cast as the ʻotherʼ. For the newspapers that
backed the Plan, President Denktaş was in the ʻother  ʼgroup. These dailies called him ʻfather of
no solution [çözümsüz baba]ʼ,87 suggested that he ʻ reassured those who say no to the Annan planʼ,88
criticised him for ʻgiving negative statements to gain time  ʼ89 and accused him of ʻprovoking the
79 No author, ʻDenktaşʼtan toprağa sahip çıkın çağrısı [Call from Denktaş to assert ownership of the land]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 22.11.2002; No author,
ʻCumhurbaşkanı Rauf Denktaşʼtan halka: Belgede egemenliğimiz yok [[From President Rauf Denktaş to people: our sovereignty is not in the
document]ʼ, Birlik, 22.11.2002:1.
80 No author, ʻKlerides barış umutlarını havaya uçurdu: Anasının nikahı [Clerides blew up hopes of peace; an outrageous demand]ʼ, Kıbrıslı,
9.12.2002:1.
81 No author, ʻKıbrıslı Rum “red”çiler [Greek Cypriot rejectionists]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 20.11.2002:11.
82 No author, ʻDün, Rum fanatikler plana karşı miting yaptı [Yesterday Greek Cypriot fanatics demonstrated against the plan]; ʻBugün de Türk
fanatikler çözüme ve BM planına karşı miting yapıyor [And today Turkish fanatics are demonstrating against a solution and the UN plan]ʼ, Ortam
10.12.2002:2.
83 No author, ʻHayırcılar [the no group], Afrika, 10.12.2002:4.
84 No author, ʻYanıtlar inceleniyor [The responses are being examined]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 7.12.2002:5.
85 No author, ʻKlerides önerdi: ABʼye Mayıs 2004ʼte Türk tarafı ile birlikte girelim [Clerides proposed: we enter into the EU in May 2004 together
with the Turkish side]ʼ, Ortam, 10.12.2002:1.
86 No author, ʻYeni belge sunulmaya hazır [A new document is ready to be presented]ʼ, Ortam, 10.12.2002:7.
87 No author, ʻ“Çözümsüz baba” geldi [Father of no solution has arrived]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 8.12.2002:1.
88 No author, ʼ 12 Aralık Kopenhag Zirveʼsinden önce... Anlaşma yok [Before 12 December Copenhagen Summit ….there is no agreement]ʼ, Afrika,
8.12.2002:11.
89 No author, ʻTKP olumsuz beynatlar vererek zamana oynayan Denktaşʼa çağrı yaptı: Karar ver [TKP called Denktaş who has been giving
negative statements to play for time: Make up your mind]ʼ, Ortam, 22.11.2002:1.
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“no to the plan” campaignʼ.90 When territory division in the Plan was on the agenda, Yenidüzen
printed a map on its front page that had been accepted by Denktaş in 1974. Titled as ʻDenktaşʼs
mapʼ, the story aimed to discredit his arguments on losing territory with the implementation of the
Annan Plan, because according to this map, Denktaş had agreed to give the Greek Cypriot side
some areas that are in the Turkish Cypriot administration now.91 Yenidüzenʼs disapproval of
Denktaşʼs dealing with the Plan was such that it even compared his rejection of the Plan to a
murder committed in Lefkoşa: ʻMr Denktaş is opposing the UN plan on the basis of our life safety
but murderers are prowling aroundʼ.92
The news coverage of Denktaşʼs return to north Cyprus from the USA illuminates the different
newspapers  ʼattitudes towards him. For example, Vatan, Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Kıbrıslı and Kıbrıs
reported on their front pages that excited crowds welcomed him at the airport. According to these
newspapers, ʻthe Turkish Cypriot people embraced their leaderʼ,93 ʻthousands of people welcomed
him with exuberanceʼ,94 ʻthere was a warm welcome for Denktaşʼ,95 ʻan exuberant crowd of
thousands of people greeted himʼ,96 and ʻDenktaş was welcomed with exuberanceʼ.97 In contrast,
Yenidüzenʼs and Afrikaʼs front-page reports on the Presidentʼs return to the country were full of
criticism instead of being welcoming. Yenidüzenʼs headline was ʻthe father of no solution has
arrivedʼ.98 The story continued inside the paper with the headline, ʻDenktaş has returned to the
island; there is no positive message about a solution and the EU; he has no intention of reaching
an agreementʼ.99 Meanwhile, Afrikaʼs front page was ʻDenktaş, who has returned home, relieved
those who say no to the planʼ.100
The newspapers that backed the President used the same strategy to portray opposition
groups as the ʻ otherʼ. To justify Denktaşʼs rejection of the changes suggested by the Greek Cypriot
leader in the Annan Plan, Kıbrıslı employed CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talatʼs image as a political
figure who favoured a solution with Greek Cypriots. It wrote ʻNot only Denktaş but even Talat
cannot accept Clerides  ʼoffer of minority status to Turksʼ.101 Portraying Talat as the opposition to
Denktaş, Kıbrıslı suggested that Clerides  ʼoffer was so extreme that even those in opposition to a
nationalist leader could not accept it, which enhanced the notion that the President was right in
his reaction. For Volkan the ʻother  ʼamong ʻus  ʼwas equivalent to a traitor. Anyone who suggested
choosing another negotiator to represent Turkish Cypriots because of Denktaşʼs ill health was called
a ʻcollaborationist – pro-mandateʼ.102 Furthermore, the newspaper named well-known journalists,
newspapers and politicians as some of these traitors. According to Volkan, journalists such as
Hasan Hastürer and Hasan Kahvecioğlu and the newspapers Yenidüzen, Yeniçağ, Ortam and
Afrika as well as CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat and TKP leader Hüseyin Angolemli were those who
had started a campaign to choose a new negotiator to replace Denktaş.
Ortam labelled the groups on both sides and of both nationalities that protested against the
Plan as ʻfanaticsʼ. The headlines of two separate stories were positioned one below the other so
that both could be read together; ʻyesterday Greek Cypriot fanatics demonstrated against the
plan  ʼ and ʻtoday Turkish Cypriot fanatics are demonstrating against the solution and the UN
90 No author, ʻZirveye kadar Denktaşʼtan imza yok [No signature from Denktaş until the summit]ʼ, Afrika, 21.11.2002:1.
91 No author, ʻDenktaşʼın haritası [Denktaşʼs map]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 22.11.2002:1.
92 No author, ʻDenktaş Bey “BM Planı”na “can güvenliğimizi” öne sürerek karşı çıkıyor ama ...Katiller kol geziyor [Mr Denktaş is opposing the UN
plan on the basis of “safety of our lives” but murderers are prowling around]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 10.12.2002:1.
93 No author, ʻKıbrıs Türk halkı liderini bağrına bastı [the Turkish Cypriot people embraced their leader]ʼ, Volkan, 8.12.2002:1.
94 No author, ʻOrtaklık devleti istemiyorlar [They do not want a shared state]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 8.12.2002:1.
95 No author, ʻDenktaşʼa sıcak karşılama [A warm welcome for Denktaş]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 8.12.2002:1.
96 No author, ʻDenktaşʼa sıcak karşılama [A warm welcome for Denktaş]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 8.12.2002:1.
97 No author, ʻIstenen bedeli ödemeyeceğiz [We are not going to pay the demanded price]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 8.12.2002:1.
98 No author, ʻ“Çözümsüz baba” geldi [Father of no solution has arrived]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 8.12.2002:1.
99 No author, ʻAnlaşmaya niyeti yok [He has no intention of reaching an agreement]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 8.12.2002:6.
100 No author, ʻZirveye kadar Denktaşʼtan imza yok [No signature from Denktaş until the summit]ʼ, Afrika, 21.11.2002:1.
101 No author, ʻKlerides barış umutlarını havaya uçurdu: Anasının nikahı [Clerides blew up hopes of peace: an outrageous demand]ʼ, Kıbrıslı,
9.12.2002:1.
102 No author, ʻHevesleri kursaklarında kaldı [They were unable to satisfy their desire]ʼ, Volkan, 28.10.2002:1. 
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Planʼ.103 Yenidüzen used similar expressions: ʻyesterday they shouted in the south of Cyprus and
today in the north: No to Peaceʼ.104 It described the protest rally as a joint organisation of ʻthe state
and military  ʼ and reported that civil servant officers and students were forced to attend the
event.105 Similarly, Afrika announced that the ʻno demonstration  ʼwas supported by the state. As
well as categorising those backing the rally as ʻthe no-groupʼ, Afrika also branded them as
ʻreactionaryʼ.106
History and collective memory
Even though many of the news texts about the Annan Plan were oriented towards the future,
history and collective memory were also used in the construction of these texts, especially by the
nationalist newspapers. History and collective memory not only created continuity between the
past and present but also encouraged the interpretation of present events within the framework
of the past. For example, reminding the ʻwe  ʼ group of ʻour  ʼ suffering in the past, history was
reproduced through the negative acts of the ʻotherʼ. This strategy was especially employed by two
newspapers, Volkan and Vatan. By publishing two old photos that showed families living in tents
and caves, Volkan aimed to evoke the hardship Turkish Cypriots had to endure when they left
their homes following the inter-communal conflict.107 Vatan also urged its readers to attend the
protest rally by reconstructing the past through the suffering of ʻus  ʼand the demonisation of the
ʻotherʼ: ʻnot to return pre -1974 and not to take any Greek Cypriot amongst us…ʼ.108 It also argued
that the Plan ʻincluded the threat of taking the Turkish Cypriot people to the situation before 1960
Agreementsʼ.109 Such portrayals of the ʻother  ʼalso contributed to a boundary drawing process. By
using the collective memory, these newspapers reflected arguments that aimed to strengthen
bonds among Turkish Cypriots as well as portray the ʻother  ʼwith ʻunchanging evil intentionsʼ. 
The EU
Representation of the EU in relation to the Cyprus issue was closely linked to the debates on the
Annan Plan and Turkeyʼs membership negotiations with the organisation. Its portrayal in the news
varied not only depending on the newspaper but also on context and time. The news that the EU
would get involved in the Cyprus issue along with the UN received mixed treatment in the Turkish
Cypriot press. For instance, a caricature that appeared in Kıbrıs gave an indication that the EUʼs
intervention in the Cyprus problem was not so welcome, as it illustrated the EU as a man not only
stirring a pot labelled the ʻCyprus Problem  ʼbut also using bellows to fan the fire.110 Kıbrıslı, on the
other hand, announced that the proposal the UN would put forward was also backed by the EU:
ʻThe EU support to the UN planʼ.111 Yenidüzenʼs headline for the story on the US Special Cyprus
Coordinator Thomas Westonʼs meeting with CTP and TKP leaders was, ʻthe Cyprus problem is
“the EU problem”!  ʼ112 However, the phrase ʻ the EU problem  ʼwas in inverted comas and there was
an exclamation mark at the end without any indication of why.
The newspapers that supported the Plan saw the EU as an ally, while those who opposed the
Plan treated it as a foe. Yenidüzen, having announced that Turkish Cypriots would have seats as
observers in the European Parliament when an agreement based on the Annan Plan was
103 No author, ʻDün, Rum fanatikler plana karşı miting yaptı [Yesterday Greek Cypriot fanatics demonstrated against the plan]; ʻBugün de Türk
fanatikler çözüme ve BM planına karşı miting yapıyor [And today Turkish fanatics are demonstrating against a solution and the UN plan]ʼ, Ortam
10.12.2002:2.
104 No author, ʻDevletin ayıbı [The stateʼs shame]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 10.12.2002:1; No author, ʻ“Barışa hayır” mitingi [“No to peace” demonstration]ʼ,
Yenidüzen, 10.12.2002:1, 4.
105 No author, ʻDevletin ayıbı [The stateʼs shame]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 10.12.2002:1, 6.
106 No author, ʻHayırcılar [the No group]ʼ, Afrika, 10.12.2002:1, 4.
107 No author, ʻKiracı olmayacağız [We are not going to be tenants (refugees)]ʼ, Volkan, 20.11.2002:1.
108 No author, ʻTarihi miting yarın Lefkoşaʼda [Historical rally is tomorrow in Nicosia]ʼ, Vatan, 9.12.2002:1.
109 Ibid.
110 Utku Karsu, Caricature, Kıbrıs, 29.10.2002:7.
111 No author, ʻBM planına AB desteği [The EU support to the UN plan]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 31.10.2002:1.
112 No author, ʻKıbrıs sorunu  “AB sorunu” [Cyprus Problem is “the EU Problem”]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 29.10.2002: 6.
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reached, treated the notion as a positive development.113 An academic article written by a scholar
concerning advantages the Turkish Cypriot community would gain from entering into the EU as
united Cyprus appeared in both Yenidüzen and Afrika.114
It was Afrika that gave the greatest coverage to the EU in its pages. It started a countdown on
the number of days before the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU. It published every day the
phrase ʻ(number of) days left to Cyprusʼs EU membership  ʼin a box next to its masthead. During
the period studied, it also printed a banner at the top of each page that said ʻno to invasion and
annexation, yes to the EU and a solutionʼ. Afrika also argued that once the Republic of Cyprusʼs
membership was confirmed at the Copenhagen Summit, ʻthe ones that the Turkish side will have
to speak to will be the EU rather than Greek Cypriotsʼ 115 and that ʻ“nationalists” amongst us are
already writing that after December North Cyprusʼs bordering neighbour will be the EUʼ.116 It also
suggested that ʻDenktaş went to New York as a TRNC citizen but is returning as an EU citizenʼ:
ʻlike all other Cypriots, Denktaş will also gain a new citizenship in 5 days: EU citizen(ship)ʼ.117
Meanwhile, some newspapers were sceptical about the EU. An opinion column in Halkın Sesi
was headlined, ʻYes to the EU but no to concessionsʼ, in which the author explained that it was
unacceptable to make concessions on issues such as sovereignty and territory.118 It was again
Halkın Sesi that pointed out that Jacques Poos, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament, met
with the political party leaders as well as an advisor from the Presidentʼs Office but not with the
government representatives: ʻThe EU ignored the governmentʼ.119
It was Volkan that characterised the EU with Greek Cypriots as members as the enemy of
Turkish Cypriots. In an editorial for the paper, Sabahattin Ismail wrote, ʻForeign powers, their
extensions amongst us, the UN, the EU and the Greek Cypriot and Greek duo should listen to the
message the President, united with his people yesterday in Geçitkale, gaveʼ.120 The newspaper
also argued that the EU was behind the speculations about whether Denktaş as a negotiator
should be replaced because of his failing health, reporting that the EU representative in Turkey,
Karen Fogg, was the one who instructed and financially supported some journalists and political
figures to start a campaign against Denktaş.121 In another issue, it published an article on the UN
Special Cyprus envoy Alvarez de Soto having met in secret with three journalists whom Volkan
labelled as ʻKaren Foggʼs journalistsʼ. Furthermore, it described Hasan Hastürer, one of these
journalists, as ʻthe EU lobbyistʼ.122
Political Parties
As Kıbrıs pointed out, the political parties were divided over the Plan: ʻThe Plan divided the
political parties into two. While UBP expressed its opinion that the Plan does not reflect views of
the Turkish side; DP announced that it can be negotiated, but with Turkey and President Denktaş.
CTP and TKP stated that the Plan can be negotiatedʼ.123 Overall the parties and the politicians
received varying coverage and treatment depending on the political position of the newspapers.
One such example was the news on the attendance of Mustafa Akıncı, an MP of TKP, at a
conference in Greece. While Ortam portrayed his presence at the conference as a positive and
113 Sevgül Uludağ, ʻAvrupa Parlamentosuʼnda yerimiz hazır [Our place is ready in the European Parliament]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 9.12.2002:1, 3.
114 Theo Georgiou, ʻTek umut çözüm [The only hope is a solution]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 30.10.2002:1; Theo Georgiou, ʻKıbrısʼın tek umudu çözüm
[Cyprusʼs only hope is a solution]ʼ, Afrika, 30.10.2002:11.
115 No author, ʻAralıktan sonra muhatabımız AB [After December we will be talking to the EU], Afrika, 28.10.2002:1.
116 No author, ʻMuhatabımız AB [We will be talking to the EU]ʼ, Afrika 28.10.2002:4.
117 No author, ʻBütün Kıbrıslılar gibi Denktaş da 5 gün sonra yeni bir vatandaşlık kazanacakç AB vatandaşı [Like all other Cypriots, Denktaş will
also gain a new citizenship in 5 days: EU citizen(ship)]ʼ, Afrika, 7.12.2002:1.
118 Levent Özadam,  ʻAvrupa Birliğiʼne Evet, Tavize Hayır [Yes to the European Union, No to Concession]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 20.11.2002:7.
119 No author, ʻAB hükümeti takmadı [the EU ignored the government]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 31.10.2002:1.
120 No author, ʻLiderimizi bağrımıza basıyoruz [We are embracing our leader]ʼ, Volkan, 8.12.2002:1.
121 No author, ʻHevesleri kursaklarında kaldı [They were unable to satisfy their desire]ʼ, Volkan, 28.10.2002:1.
122 No author, ʻAyıp ediyorsun de Soto [You are behaving shamefully, de Soto]ʼ, Volkan 21.11.2002:3.
123 Hüseyin Ekmekçi, ʻPartiler plana kilitlendi [Parties focus on the plan]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 21.11.2002:3.
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significant event and published it on its front page as its main story, Volkan used it to cast Akıncı
in a negative light: ʻTKPʼs shadow leader Mustafa Akıncı, who is still very angry for losing his seat,
poured his rancour out and told the lie that “Turkish Cypriots greeted the Annan Plan with great
joy”ʼ.124 The newspaperʼs depiction of two other politicians, Patriotic Peace Movement (Yurtsever
Barış Hareketi - YBH) leader Alpay Durduran and TKP leader Hüseyin Angolemli was no different:
ʻWhile Turkish Cypriots are going through critical days, Durduran and Angolemli are linked arm-
in-arm with Greek Cypriotsʼ.125
In contrast to its position towards TKP, Volkan openly approved some political parties whose
position on the Annan Plan it agreed with: ʻWe applaud the decision of UBP, DP and MAPʻ (Milliyetçi
Adalet Partisi - Nationalist Justice Party).126 According to the paper, these parties reflected the
views of 70% of the population and their opposition to the Plan was an indication of publicʼs
disagreement with it. 
Conclusion
As our analysis has confirmed, the mediaʼs portrayal of the Cyprus issue in the form of the Annan
Plan was determined by the ideological and political positions of the newspapers. While the dailies
with a nationalist orientation depicted the Plan as against the interests of the nation, the others
viewed it as an opportunity for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. In some cases, the political
affiliations of the press led to a distorted representation of the issue. There were many examples
of the newspapers giving advantageous treatment to a political view they favoured while criticising
the one they opposed. Therefore, the representation of the Annan Plan was divided; it was either
positive or negative depending on the newspaper. 
The news primarily consisted of opinions and statements of both national and international
political figures. The newspapers prioritised and mediated the views of these individuals and
representatives of political bodies, while using the opinion of the public or ordinary people only to
enhance the arguments the newspapers had been defending and only if they agreed with the
newspapers  ʼopinion. Adopting the language of consensus, each newspaper represented their
arguments as a reflection of general public opinion. Yet, the analysis revealed that the print media
did not act as a platform where different ideas and views were communicated but functioned as
an instrument of propaganda. The press did little to encourage public participation in the debates
about its future. 
Nationalist discourses were intertwined with the discourses about the Annan Plan. The
newspapers such as Birlik, Volkan, Vatan and Kıbrıslı that held an anti-Plan position argued that
the Plan was against the national interest of Turkish Cypriots and was, therefore, unac ceptable.
Taking the opposite position, Yenidüzen, Afrika and Ortam, having construed the Plan as
beneficial to Turkish Cypriots, campaigned for its acceptance and highlighted the advantages it
would bring to them. They all adopted the discourse of ʻus  ʼand ʻthemʼ, which not only depicted
each group as ʻunited  ʼbut also cast the ʻother  ʼas different from ʻus  ʼand not acting in the interest
of ʻour  ʼnation. Therefore, the concepts of the national interest, and the ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼdichotomy
shifted according to the newspaper. Just like the Annan Plan, President Denktaş, whose image
was identified with the Cyprus issue, received conflicting treatment by the press. The nationalist
newspapers featured him as the ultimate leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, while the
opposition newspapers portrayed him as one of the reasons for the lack of a solution in Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the newspapers that were anti-Annan Plan benefited from history to strengthen the
perception of Greek Cypriots as the ʻenemy with unchanging intentionsʼ. 
124 No author, ʻBoyun kadar konuş [Speak-out according to your standing]ʼ, Volkan, 20.11.2002:3.
125 No author, ʻDurduran: Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetinin devamından yanayız [Durduran: we are in favour of the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus]ʼ,
Volkan, 21.11.2002:9.
126 Sabahattin İsmail, ʻUBP, DP ve MAPʼın kararını alkışlıyoruz [We applaud UBP, DP and MAPʼs decision]ʼ, Volkan, 21.11.2002:1. 
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The image of the EU was also variable. The two most radical newspapers, Volkan and Afrika,
treated the EU news topic in completely opposite ways. Afrika considered the Republic of
Cyprusʼs  entry to the EU such a positive step and an important development that it even started
counting down the number of days until entry on the front page each day. Volkan, in contrast, was
sceptical of the EUʼs involvement in the matter and cast it as one of the actors in the scenario of
displacing Denktaş as the negotiator.
The newspapers provided an advantageous portrayal of the parties and their represen tatives
with whom they sympathised or were affiliated with, and provided just the opposite treatment for
those they disagreed with. Ortam and Birlik, for example, were two newspapers that frequently
highlighted their parties  ʼviews on their front pages in the leading stories. Volkan openly gave its
approval to some parties they agreed with, but its depiction of those it opposed was close to
insulting. 
Overall, there were very limited researched news article in the newspapers regarding the
Annan Plan and the Cyprus issue. Some articles even lacked such crucial information such as the
source, which reduced them to mere claims rather than communications of factual infor mation.
Using the press releases in the news text without applying any journalistic transformation helped
these publicity and propaganda materials to be disguised as the news. 
Sanem Şahin
CYPRUS ON A NEW COURSE
(SEPTEMBER 2007 – JANUARY 2008)
This section of our research focuses on a period five years after the first study.  During theseyears the country witnessed catalytic developments; and unfortunately, what could haveradically changed the course of the islandʼs history— a solution and reunification— failed.
Thus, the EU welcomed Cyprusʼs membership with the country still divided after the failed
referenda of 24 April 2004 where Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected the UN-proposed Plan
while Turkish Cypriots voted in favour.
After the blueprint of November 2002, the Annan Plan was successively amended, until the UN
Secretary General exercised arbitration, agreed in February 2004 in New York. Annan Plan V, for
a ʻComprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problemʼ, was the result of a process of negotiations
in Nicosia and in Switzerland, sealed by that arbitration on 31 March 2004. Its rejection meant that
division was to continue, and that Turkish Cypriots were left out of the EU, although they could
individually enjoy some rights as EU citizens.
The ʻday after  ʼ(the 2004 referenda) marked a reversal in the course of relations between the
two communities and eventually, as revealed by research, a new era of distrust.1 The (negative)
impact was stronger on Turkish Cypriots, who blamed Greek Cypriots for the collapse of their
hopes; their massive mobilisation and rallies in support of EU accession and a solution, which ran
counter to the official line and ended with a ʻyesʼ-to-the-UN-Plan vote, led nowhere. 
The situation in the Greek Cypriot community was different. Further to hopes for a solution more
favourable to the Greek Cypriots after EU membership, the whole society suffered a serious blow
that deeply divided the political forces and the people.
Changes in power took place on both sides of the dividing line: Tassos Papadopoulos won out
the presidential elections over the incumbent President of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides
in February 2003 and his party DIKO, communist AKEL and Movement of Social Democrats EDEK
(Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών ΕΔΕΚ – S.K.EDEK)2 shared power. In the Turkish Cypriot community,
the left wing CTPʼs dubious win in December 2003 and initial share of power with the DP, at a time
when Denktaşʼs authority was waning, led to complete success in April 2005, when CTP and its
leader Mehmet Ali Talat gained full control of power. This change was a reflection of the political
and social transformation Turkish Cypriots had been going through.
The most decisive development, however, occurred on 23 April 2003, when a partial lifting of the
ban on free movement between the two sides took place. For the first time in 29 years, people from
both communities could cross to the ʻother  ʼside and meet the people they had not been in contact
with for nearly 29 years. They could also see for themselves the realities, and the media could now
directly access their sources on the other side and inform their public. The results of this experience
were mixed, as, for various reasons, a significant number of people, especially Greek Cypriots, chose
not to cross the line, while the open news access has not always guaranteed balanced information.
Data studied in this chapter from both the press and television cover three periods in early and
late September 2007 and January 2008. They are related to significant events, such as the meeting
between the two leaders, Papadopoulos and Talat on 5 September 2007, and the presidential
elections in the Republic of Cyprus, but also to other less noticeable developments. 
1 A. Lordos, Civil Society Diplomacy: A New Approach for Cyprus, An Evidence-based Report in co-operation with CYMAR Market Research Ltd
and KADEM Social Research Centre, 2005.
2 KISOS reverted to its former name EDEK in June 2003, as Movement of Social Democrats EDEK.
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Introduction 
The meeting of Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat on 5 September and activity related
to presidential elections in mid-January 2008 were the most significant events that took place in
the period studied. Thus, the analysis of data will allow an insight into how the media cover issues
at the heart of our study both in times of significant developments, but also on ordinary days, when
no major events monopolise attention. 
The Data
We analyze the same dailies as in the earlier period: Phileleftheros, Politis, Simerini, Machi-
Tharros, Haravgi and Alithia. The data studied were drawn from these papers  ʼeditions of 4 to 7
and 24 to 26 September 2007 and 17 to 20 January 2008. 
The main news stories and what they reveal
Several issues were high on the press agenda during this period of study, with the presidential
elections in the Republic of Cyprus, scheduled for February 2008, being a major topic. 
In September, the dailies focused on the meeting between the President of the Republic of
Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, their second
encounter after the rejection of the Annan Plan. The Greek Cypriots appeared not very optimistic
about the talks while some politicians and newspapers suggested that this initiative was simply a
tactical move on the part of Papadopoulos to prove, before the presidential elections, that he was
willing to reach a settlement.
In the same month all the dailies also included pieces regarding a dreadful fire that broke out
in Greece. Several articles reported on Cyprusʼs efforts to help.
Other stories included the initiation of a ferry service between the occupied port of Famagusta
and Latakia in Syria. Reports of an inaugural trip emerged on 22 and 23 September. This issue
alarmed the Greek Cypriot political community since they considered it a matter of indirect recognition
of the northern part of the island.  
In January, in addition to articles concerning the elections, newspapers wrote about a draft
report to the European Parliament Petition Committee on Famagusta. It was suggested by the
authors of the report that the reason for the non-return of Famagustaʼs inhabitants to the
abandoned city was the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan. This suggestion caused tumult
among Greek Cypriot politicians as did the fact that Mehmet Ali Talat was referred to as the
ʻPresident of the Turkish Cypriot Authorities  ʼand the invasion as the ʻTurkish interventionʼ. 
As in our earlier analysis, these issues and a series of supplementary news stories are used as
examples to reveal,
a) the stances of each daily regarding the solution sought, the government / the parties, the
European Union and the ʻother sideʼ;
b) the means employed to project these positions.
Media Practices
The newspapers appear to have used specific tactics and tools in order to project their views. In
this section we describe some of these practices, while other strategies employed by the press
are outlined simultaneously with the discourses, especially in the section entitled, the government
and the parties. 
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The aces of the commercial dailies
The newspapers with no party or ideological links or affiliations appear to fight for exclu siveness,
as was also noticed in 2002. They could not simply rely on press conferences and press releases
for their articles, but had to offer different stories and additional data to earn their readers  ʼtrust
and loyalty. Using outside /additional sources would signal their reliability, and subsequently would
help them to promote their views, draw more funds, and remain competitive. Therefore, Phileleftheros
published articles based on its ʻown informationʼ, ʻdiplomatic  ʼor ʻinformed sourcesʼ,3 while Politis
offered its readers extra details in its news stories.4 This is an indication that the two dailies had
sufficient resources to avoid the use of copy-paste texts and publish exclusive news stories.5
Furthermore, and as in the 2002 period, these two newspapers employed correspondents to offer
first-hand information to the public.6
The above strategies reveal the efforts of Politis and Phileleftheros to increase their circulation
figures; it was a tactic aimed at persuading the public that their own journalists knew more about
a specific subject than the reporters of the other dailies. Presenting more stories and providing
additional or exclusive information, as neutrally as possible, could help the papers establish
trustworthiness, which subsequently would help them ʻsell  ʼtheir own positions to the public. The
news story about the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of Cyprusʼs presidency is an
example of how Phileleftheros,7 Politis8 and Simerini 9 attempted to impartially report this subject.
The three dailies simply revealed the communication tricks used by the candidates to win more
votes, without favorable or unfavorable depiction of any of the presidential candidates.
The challenge of low newspaper circulation 
The dailies with party or ideological links or affiliation, and those with low circulation figures, such
as Alithia, Haravgi and Machi, were often obliged to rely on externally produced texts and press
conferences for their news stories. 
The information taken from these sources was often published unedited; sometimes the
reporters did not even correct the grammatical mistakes or the syntax errors in the original text.
For example, an article in both Machi and Alithia, which was probably copied from KYPE, was
published with the same error of syntax.10
The newspapers with low circulation figures and a few advertisements apparently faced
limitations in human or other resources. This forced them to frequently republish articles from KYPE.
3 Panikos Panagiotou, ʻΥποδείξεις ΗΠΑ για 8η Ιουλίου: Καλούν όλους τους εμπλεκόμενους να σεβαστούν τη συμφωνία [United Statesʼ
recommendations for the July 8th agreement: They request all the involved (parties) to respect the agreement]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 26.9.2007:5;
Costas Venizelos, ʻΣκληρό ροκ για «παράθυρο λύσης»: «Χάνουμε την υπομονή μας με το Κυπριακό», προειδοποιεί ο Τούρκος ΥΠΕΞ
[Tough game for “(opening) a window to a solution”: The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs warns “We have lost our patience with the Cyprus
Problem”]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 18.1.2008:5.
4 See examples of Politisʼs own sources: George Kaskanis, ʻΚαι τώρα...εκ του σύνεγγυς [And now proximity talks]ʼ, Politis, 6.9.2007:4; See
example of Turkish Cypriot sources: Vaggelis Vasiliou.ʻΣτο πρότυπο της «επιτροπής»: Αισιόδοξοι οι Τ/Κ για τον διορισμό του Χακκί [In
the model of the “committee”: The T/C are optimistic for Hakkiʼs appointment]ʼ, Politis, 6.9.2007:5; See example of governmental circles: George
Kaskanis, ʻΔιζωνική μέσω της 8ης Ιουλίου: Έμμεση δέσμευση όλων για τη μορφή της λύσης [Bi-zonal through the July 8th agreement:
Indirect commitment of all (parties) for the form of solution]ʼ, Politis, 4.9.2007:5; See example of sources from the Greek Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: Thanasis Tsitsas, ʻΦοβού την Ισλαμική: Πολιτική των δύο κρατών, υιοθετεί επίσημα η Άγκυρα [Beware of the (organization of
the) Islamic (Conference): Ankara officially adopts the two states policy ]ʼ, Politis, 25.9.2007:3.
5 See, for example, an exclusive interview with Jacques Barrot: Petros Theoharides, ʻΜε τα εμπάργκο η Τουρκία εκτός Ευρώπης [Turkey will
be out of Europe because of the embargos]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 25.9.2007:1. See also an exclusive interview with Jose Manuel Barroso in Politis:
Lefteris Adilinis, ʻΔιαρκεί πολύ το Κυπριακό [The Cyprus Problem stands for too long]ʼ, Politis, 19.1.2008:1. 
6 See examples: Teti Sarantopoulou, ʻ«Μαύρη τρύπα» τα κατεχόμενα: Στο συμβούλιο οδεύει το θέμα της πράσινης γραμμής [The
occupied areas are (like) a “black hole”: The Green Line issue goes to the Council]ʼ, Politis, 26.9.2007:5; Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻΚλοιός για
απόσυρση του προσχεδίου: Λαϊκό κόμμα, Σοσιαλιστές και Αριστερά «τα έψαλλαν» στον Πρόεδρο της Επιτροπής [Pressures for the
withdrawal of the draft report: The European Peopleʼs Party-European Democrats, the socialists and the left (wing party) are telling the
President of the Committee]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 17.1.2008:6. See also: Michalis Ignatiou, ʻΜατ Μπραϊζα: Απαιτείται συνέχιση των διαπραγμα -
τεύσεων [Matt Bryza: The continuation of the negotiations is required]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 7.9.2007:5.
7 Andreas Pimpisis, ʻΈβγαλαν κρυφά χαρτιά στην υποβολή υποψηφιοτήτων: Τι είπαν και τι διαμήνυσαν Παπαδόπουλος, Χριστόφιας και
Κασουλίδης [During the submission of candidacies they revealed their hidden aces: What did Papadopoulos, Christofias and Kassoulides say
and what messages did they send]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 20.1.2008:4. 
8 See, Politis, ʻΠροεδρικές εκλογές [Presidential elections 2008]ʼ, Politis, 19.1.2008:32, 57. 
9 Kornilios Hadjicostas, ʻΜάχη εντυπώσεων στην υποβολή υποψηφιοτήτων: Προσωπικότητες υποστήριξαν τους υποψηφίους [Impressionsʼ
battle during the submission of candidacies: (Important) Personalities have supported the candidates]ʼ, Simerini, 20.1.2008:3-5. 
10 No author, ʻΔεν αποτελεί εξέλιξη εκτιμά ο Κασουλίδης  ʼ [It does not constitute a development]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:14; No author,
ʻΚασουλίδης: Η 8η Ιουλίου είναι ένα βοηθητικό εργαλείο [Kassoulides: The July 8th agreement is an auxiliary tool]ʼ, Alithia, 25.9.2007:4.
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The pieces about the ʻother sideʼ, for example, were usually copied from this press agency,11
meaning that the ʻother side  ʼin these papers was viewed and depicted in the same way. 
These dailies rarely published exclusive data or exclusive stories. They often settled for copy-
paste information from press conferences12 and/or politically oriented news stories whose data had
been taken from press releases of a particular political party.13 This could damage their reliability
and hinder their efforts to convince readers of their stances. 
All the dailies, however, regardless of their distribution figures and links to certain parties,
followed various tactics to gain credibility. One of these strategies was the use of numbers.
The use of numbers
The press used numbers to lend plausibility and to substantiate its claims. An example of this is
the way the newspapers reported the talks between Papadopoulos and Talat. They stated the
exact time of the two leaders  ʼarrival at their meeting place, and the time frame of their meeting.
This practice could have been employed to reassure readers that their journalists were indeed
present at the meeting place. Additionally, the dailies  ʼfocus on detail, probably aimed to persuade
the public that, whatever their reporters wrote regarding the talks was true and accurate. An article
in Phileleftheros stated that, ʻPresident Papadopoulos reached Mollerʼs residence first, at 4.01
p.m…five minutes later Mehmet Ali Talat came as well.ʼ 14 In Haravgi it was noted that, ʻthe two
leaders arrived at Mollerʼs residence 4-5 minutes apartʼ.15 In Alithia it was reported that, ʻthe
meeting…began at 16:10 and ended at 19:20ʼ.16 Machi used numbers to point out the differences
of the involved parties: Its front page story stated that, ʻ(It took) three hours and twenty minutes
to reveal the two sides  ʼdifferences of opinionʼ.17
Different Discourses and Media Practices
The form of the solution
The focus in this section is on the ideologies of the newspapers regarding the desirable settlement
on the island and not on the journalistic practices. The news stories did not offer enough data that
would allow the researcher to categorise the different strategies used by the newspapers to
promote their stances. 
The editorials provided the key source from which conclusions were drawn about the dailiesʼ
position on the solution to the Cyprus Problem. There were three events where newspapersʼ
stances on this issue were revealed. The first was the meeting between Republic of Cyprus
President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat. The second was the claim
that Karpasia was offered to the Greek Cypriot side during the negotiations for the Annan Plan in
Burgenstock.18 The third was a draft report on Famagusta by the European Parliament Petition
Committee. These facts showed that the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution and the July 8
agreement, also known as the Gambari agreement,19 were the poles around which the press
11 See, for example, No author, ʻ«Μια τρύπα στο νερό» [“A hole into the water”]ʼ, Alithia, 7.9.2007:5; No author, ʻ«Μια τρύπα στο νερό»: Σαν
μια από τα ίδια αντίκρισαν τη συνάντηση Τάσσου-Ταλάτ τα Τ/Κ ΜΜΕ [“A hole into the water”: The meeting of Tassos-Talat was regarded
by the T/C media as being one and the same]ʼ, Machi, 7.9.2007:27. See also, another example of a copied text which was published by two
newspapers: No author, ʻΟΑΣΕ: Συμμετοχή Τ/Κ [OSCE: T/C participation]ʼ, Alithia, 25.9.2007:5; No author, ʻΤ/Κ στον ΟΑΣΕ [T/C in OSCE]ʼ,
Haravgi, 25.9.2007:7. 
12 See, for example, Neophytos Neophytou, ʻΠαραδοχή για αθέτηση δεσμεύσεων του [Admission for a breach of promises]ʼ, Haravgi, 17.1.2008:8.
13 No author, ʻΑναζητείται η αλήθεια για την απόφαση έλευσης του φυσικού αερίου: Ο ΔΗΣΥ ζητά με επιστολή του προς τον Υπ. Εμπ.
να παραδώσει στην επιτροπή ελέγχου της βουλής όλα τα έγγραφα [(DISY) seeks out the truth for the advent of natural gas: DISY, through
a letter, asks the Minister of Commerce to give the documents to the parliamentʼs control committee]ʼ, Machi, 6.9.2007:5. 
14 No author, ʻΜε διαφορά 5 λεπτών [5 minutes apart]ʼ, Philelefhteros, 6.9.2007:4. 
15 Niki Koulermou, ʻΔημοσιογραφικό ενδιαφέρον, μια παρτίδα τάβλι εν αναμονή... [The Reporters  ʼinterest; in the meantime (they played) a
game of backgammon]ʼ, Haravgi, 6.9.2007:3.
16 George Kallinikos ʻΚοινή ανακοίνωση δύο μόλις προτάσεων [Common statement only two sentences long]ʼ, Alithia, 6.9.2007:4.
17 Apostolos Tomaras, ʻΕπιβεβαιώθηκε το χάσμα απόψεων των δύο πλευρών: Άλλα ο Τάσσος άλλα ο Ταλάτ [The gap between the two
sides was confirmed: Tassos said one thing and Talat another]ʼ, Machi, 6.9.2007:1. 
18 Burgenstock is a small Alpine village in Switzerland where the last phase of the negotiations for the Annan Plan was held at the end of March 2004. 
19 This was an agreement between the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, also known as
the Gambari agreement, because it was brokered by the UN Undersecretary General, Ibrahim Gambari. This agreement was achieved in
July 2006 and it provides for the establishment of working groups and technical committees for the discussion of issues that affect the day-to-
day life of the two communities. This would eventually lead to more substantive negotiations for the political settlement of the Cyprus problem.
For additional information on this matter, see a document posted on the website of the Press and Information Office:
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/793035B13B07CD8FC225727C00353501?OpenDocument
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shaped its positions on the type of political settlement. Some of these subjects were presented
through the context of the presidential elections, allowing the press to promote its views for, or
against a specific candidate.
Supporting the federal solution and the July 8 agreement
Most dailies had an opinion on the bi-zonal bi-communal federal solution, and often times this
form of settlement was connected to the July 8 agreement that set the process through which a
federal solution could be reached. The newspapers that seemed to support that the bi-zonal bi-
communal federal solution was the means to the reunification of the island often stressed that,
a) the Greek Cypriot political community ought to re-affirm its commitment to this type of
settlement, given that it had already agreed to it under the July 8 agreement; 
b) this was the only type of solution that would quickly lead to peace.  
The dailies that did not support this form of settlement, nor expressed a clear-cut opinion for any
specific solution, seem to have tried to project that, 
a) the Greek Cypriot political community never wanted this kind of settlement and had been
forced to give its consent in the high level agreements; 
b) there was not much hope of ending the deadlock in the country since the two sides had
completely different views on significant matters. 
Haravgi, the mouthpiece of AKEL, wrote in an editorial that the party ʻstruggles for a proper federal
solutionʼ.20 Its cover story on 5 September 2007 the paper spoke of the ʻpatrioticʼ efforts of AKEL
general secretary Demetris Christofias to persuade the national council to re-affirm its commitment
to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution. It found Christofiasʼs view justified since it believed
that he was aiming to ʻreinforce the negotiating positionʼ of President Papadopoulos before his
meeting with Mehmet Ali Talat. Thus we see that Haravgi echoed AKELʼs position that the stalemate
on the island could be brought to an end with a federal solution,21 and reflected the paperʼs
traditional pro-settlement stance.  
Alithia, in an editorial published on 4 September 2007, came out strongly against Mr.
Papadopoulos and his supporters who presented the ʻbi-zonal (federation) as catastrophicʼ,22
pointing out that the Greek Cypriot side had already committed itself to this solution. The paperʼs
criticism of the President indicates its support for the bi-zonal, bi-communal type of settlement. This
is also evident in the tone of a headline referring to the Papadopoulos - Talat meeting: ʻAnastasiades:
The non re-affirmation of the bi-zonal (bi-communal federal solution) worries me: The meeting is
risky with an open agendaʼ.23
The newspapers also took a stance on the Gambari agreement, which has been tied to the bi-
zonal bi-communal federal solution. Haravgi was a supporter, and we can read its commit ment in
the headline and the introduction of its cover story on 7 September: ʻInsistence on the agreement,
pressures on Turkeyʼ.24
Phileleftheros also explicitly supported the July 8 agreement, writing in an editorial that it was
ʻthe only way to end the deadlockʼ in the country.25 It also stressed the need for promoting the
agreement because this would create ʻthe conditions for the beginning of direct negotiations for the
solution of the Cyprus problemʼ.26 We note, however, that while the paper supported the July 8
20 No author, ʻΞεκάθαρες Θέσεις [Clear-cut positions]ʼ, Haravgi, 4.9.2007:5. 
21 Niki Koulermou, ʻΠατριωτική η στάση του ΑΚΕΛ: Ενισχύει την ε/κ πλευρά, όταν οι άλλοι την υπονομεύουν [The attitude of AKEL is
patriotic: It reinforces the G/C side, when others undermine it]ʼ, Haravgi, 5.9.2007:1. 
22 Alithia, ʻΠαραμύθια της Χαλιμάς [Halimaʼs fairy tales (Arabian nights)]ʼ, Alithia, 4.9.2007:2. 
23 No author, ʻΑναστασιάδης: Με ανησυχεί η μη επανατοποθέτηση για τη διζωνική: Επικίνδυνη η συνάντηση με ανοικτή ατζέντα
[Anastasiades: The non re-affirmation of the bi-zonal (bi-communal federal solution) worries me: The meeting is risky with an open agenda]ʼ,
Alithia, 4.9.2007:5. 
24 Niki Koulermou, ʻΕμμονή στη Συμφωνία, πιέσεις προς Τουρκία  ʼ[Insisting on the agreement, pressures on Turkey]ʼ, Haravgi, 7.9.2007:1.
25
ʻΝα υπάρξει αποτέλεσμα [To produce a result]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 5.9.2007:6. 
26
ʻΟ εγκάθετος της Άγκυρας [Ankaraʼs agent]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 6.9.2007:6. 
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agreement, it avoided any mention that one of its clauses provided for a federal bi-communal and
bi-zonal solution. Although the paper did not openly oppose the federal solution, it cast doubt on it,
questioning the agreed form of solution in an editorial, and suggesting that the solution should be
ʻin line with what the public opinion wishesʻ. The publicʼs views, the paper said, could be deducted
from opinion polls to be conducted by the government.27
Politis did not state explicitly the form of solution it preferred; still, it appeared to support the bi-
zonal bi-communal federation. The dailyʼs headline regarding a national council meeting ironically
stated that the political leaders had ʻdiscovered  ʼ their commitment to this form of federation
through the July 8 agreement.28 The way this and other articles covered the matter of the solution
showed the paperʼs positive stance.
Against the bi-zonal bi-communal federal solution?
It appears that Simerini did not back this type of settlement. The stance of the newspaper is
evident in its opinion column and from its coverage of various events.  For example, in its cover
story on 4 September it stressed that the national council had declared its ʻcommitment to the July
8th agreement that provides, however, a solution based on the bi-zonal bi-communal
federationʼ.29 The use of the qualifying word ʻhoweverʼ indicates the newspaperʼs disapproval of
this kind of settlement. Furthermore, in its editorials it consistently criticised the Greek Cypriot
leadershipʼs pursuit of a bi-communal federation as a chimeric and illusionary goal. Simerini
believed that the ʻother side  ʼdid not want and had abandoned this goal, opting instead for partition
of the island.30 Opposition to this form of solution can also be seen in the way another article
referring to Makariosʼs position on federation in 1977 was presented. This article assured readers
that documents ʻconfirm that Makarios did not accept the bi-zonal bi-communal federation as the
Turks want(ed) it…ʼ,31 and even suggested that Makarios had given a ʻwarningʼ about this kind of
agreement: ʻMakarios warning in 1971 about federation: “(With this solution) we would be heading
to partition”ʼ.32 The author of the article in Simerini implied that the popular and charismatic
ethnarch, who was the person who agreed to this type of solution, was in fact against it. The article
continues by listing the problems that would arise under a bi-zonal bi-communal federation:
ʻMakarios:  the unity of the state would be fragile with the way the Turkish community saw (the
federation)ʼ.33 The headline of Simeriniʼs cover story on 25 September  showed that the first
President of the Republic of Cyprus was eventually forced to accept this settlement: ʻForeign
office: This is how they pressured Makarios: With a gun (pointed) at his head for the sake of the
bi-zonal (federation).ʼ 34
Our data reveals no clear stance on the federal solution from Machi. However, there were
numerous articles in this daily that highlighted that many issues separated the two sides and that
the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had completely different views regarding how they
wanted to end the deadlock in the country. Hence, it emphasized the fact that there was little hope
for resolving the Cyprus problem. The cover story headline for the leaders  ʼmeeting read, ʻ The gap
between the two sides was confirmed: Tassos said one thing and Talat anotherʼ,35 while in the
27 Phileleftheros, ʻΤο Όραμα των Πολιτών [The citizens  ʼvision]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 4.9.2007:6.
28 George Kaskanis, ʻΈμμεση δέσμευση όλων για τη μορφή της λύσης: Διζωνική μέσω 8ης Ιουλίου [All were indirectly committed to the
form of the solution: Bi-zonal (Federation) through the July 8th agreement]ʼ, Politis, 4.9.2007:5. 
29 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΑπερρίφθη προτού συζητηθεί η πρόταση Χριστόφια: Σολομώντεια λύση στο Εθνικό Συμβούλιο [Christofiasʼs
proposal was rejected before it was discussed: A Solomonʼs verdict by the national council]ʼ, Simerini, 4.9.2007:1.
30 See editorial ʻΠραγματικότητες και ψευδαισθήσειςʻ [Realities and Illusions], Simerini, 5.9.2007:3. 
31 Fanoula Argyrou, ʻΝέα βρετανικά έγγραφα (1971-1976) ρίχνουν άπλετο φως [New British documents (1971-1976) cast glare light]ʼ,
Simerini, 24.9.2007:4. 
32 Fanoula Argyrou, ʻΗ προειδοποίηση Μακαρίου το 1971 για την ομοσπονδία: «Θα οδηγούμασταν στη διχοτόμηση» [Makariosʼs warning
in 1971 for the federation: (With this solution) We would be leading to partition]ʼ, Simerini, 24.9.2007:4. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Fanoula Argyrou, ʻΦόρεϊν όφις: Έτσι έπεισαν το Μακάριο: Με το πιστόλι στον κρόταφο, χάριν της διζωνικής [Foreign Office: That is how
they convinced Makarios: With a gun (pointed) at his head for the sake of bi-zonal (federation)], Simerini, 25.9.2007:1.
35 Apostolos Tomaras, ʻΕπιβεβαιώθηκε το χάσμα απόψεων των δύο πλευρών: Άλλα ο Τάσσος άλλα ο Ταλάτ [The gap between the two
sides was confirmed: Tassos said one thing and Talat another]ʼ, Machi, 6.9.2007:1. 
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introduction of the story, it was pointed out that there was a difference of opinion between the two
parties even in the way they wanted to implement the July 8 agreement. 
The Government and the Parties
In this part of the report we illuminate journalistic practices, as well as the various newspapersʼ
stances on government and political parties, as these both are evidenced in news stories and
editorials. The long pre-election period allows us to see quite clearly the dailies  ʼpositions and
practices.
Wider coverage for one party and its candidate
Some newspapers overrepresented certain politicians and specific parties according to their own
political beliefs and this preferential coverage was sometimes obvious. In September the title
above pages 16-17 of Haravgi was, ʻThe activities of the popular movementʼ. 36 In January the
extensive representation of AKEL was connected to the presidential elections: On weekdays,
pages 16-17 carried the header, ʻDemetris Christofias. Humane politics. A just solution. A just
societyʼ.37 On the other hand, Machi devoted whole pages to report news stories related to Ioannis
Kassoulides, whose candidacy was backed by DISY.38
The selective offer of more newspaper space to one party and its members was not always
apparent, but it was noticeable. Some dailies highlighted information related to a particular party by
placing it in a separate box within an article, occasionally with a bold outline or some other stand-
out feature to catch the readerʼs eye. On 17 January, Machiʼs cover story was on the European
Parliament draft report on Famagusta. This piece was continued on pages 18 and 31 where the
efforts by Kassoulides for the withdrawal of the draft were described in a dark gray box beneath the
main article.39 A second example provided by Alithia further illustrates this practice: On 4
September the newspaper reported Anastasiadesʻs views on the meeting between Papadopoulos
and Talat, placing them in a box very conspicuously next to the lead-in to its cover story.40
Favouritism for one party and its members  was also indicated in the type of coverage a
politician received; more specifically, the favoured party or politicianʼs views often appeared as a
separate news story and not as part of a piece, which often included additional information,
beyond the stance of that particular individual. This strategy was also noticed in some dailies in
the previous period studied, in 2002. Machi, under the column the main story (το Θέμα), outlined
the proposals of DISYʼs candidate regarding the steps that ought to be taken by the Greek Cypriot
side after the Papadopoulos-Talat meeting. On the same day, Haravgiʼs lead story covered the
proposals of AKELʼs candidate on the same issue.41 Conversely, Phileleftheros and Politis included
the statements of these politicians in a piece with the evaluation of the developments by the
political community.42
News stories presented favorably or unfavorably towards a candidate or a party
There were also many subjects not directly linked to the presidential elections that the
newspapers presented with a bias towards a particular candidate or party. The news story about
the Presidentʼs thirteen pledges on housing is an example. The newspapers that reported this
issue focused on the fact that Papadopoulos had promised refugees that they could sell their
36 See, for example, Haravgiʼs article: ʻΔραστηριότητες του Λαϊκού Κινήματος [The activities of the popular movement]ʼ, Haravgi,
25.9.2007:16, 17. 
37 See, for example, in Haravgi: ʻ Δημήτρης Χριστόφιας. Πολιτική με ανθρωπιά. Δίκαιη λύση. Δίκαιη κοινωνία [Demetris Christofias. Humane
politics. A just solution. A just society], Haravgi, 17.1.2008:16, 17. 
38 See, for example, in Machi, 18.1.2008:3. 
39 A. Alistratlis, ʻ«Ζητούμε την απόσυρση της Έκθεσης» [“We ask for the withdrawal of the report”]ʼ, Machi, 17.1.2008:18, 31. 
40 George Kallinikos, ʻΟ Χριστόφιας σε ρόλο Αναστασιάδη [Christofias assumes the role of Anastasiades]ʼ, Alithia, 4.9.2007:1.
41 Niki Koulermou, ʻΕμμονή στη Συμφωνία, πιέσεις προς Τουρκία  ʼ[Insisting on the agreement, pressures on Turkey]ʼ, Haravgi, 7.9.2007:1.
42 See, Andreas Pimpisis, ʻΑπογοήτευση, αιχμές και εισηγήσεις από τα κόμματα [Disappointment, incisive criticism and suggestions by the
parties]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 7.9.2007:4; Katerina Zorpa, ʻΠροεκλογική... γαργάρα: ΑΚΕΛ και ΔΗΣΥ ζητούν την ανάληψη πρωτοβουλιών [Pre
election...: gargling: AKEL and DISY ask for initiatives]ʼ, Politis 7.9.2007: 5. 
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occupied building coefficient to others. Haravgi, which naturally favoured AKEL general secretary
Demetris Christofias, highlighted a negative aspect of Mr. Papadopoulosʼs announcement by
stressing that not ʻallʼ displaced persons would benefit from this measure.43 Alithia on the same
day devoted almost half a page to this topic, minimizing the significance of the presidential
promise by pointing out that this pledge might not be applicable. To this end, it published the view
of an official body that could be considered expert on this matter: ʻThe scientific opinion surpasses
the political dispute. ETEK: 44 (is) puzzled about the building coefficient.ʼ 45 Phileleftheros remained
more neutral, but highlighted the reassuring words of the President regarding the building
coefficient: ʻThis measure can be applied in 18 monthsʼ.46 Politis included the opinions of the
entire political community, but chose to emphasize only the negative statements: ʻThe coefficient
was on fire. AKEL: action that aimed to impress, Kassoulides: not a real giftʼ.47
A news story on AKEL efforts to secure the support of EDEK members in the presidential
elections provides one more example of the negative or positive description of a development
according to a newspaperʼs political line. One piece in Haravgi carried the subtitle, ʻThe
Cooperation with EDEK is fairʼ,48 while exactly the opposite was stressed in Machi: ʻEDEK blames
AKEL for harassing its membersʼ. The text began with the words of the President of the District
Committee of EDEK who accused AKEL for ʻunfair and preposterous election tacticsʼ.49
Negative and positive representation of politicians and parties
The presidential elections led Haravgi, Alithia, Machi and Politis to depict certain politicians and
parties in bright or in dark colors. 
Some dailies would include articles and photographs projecting a positive or a negative image
of a candidate, and although sometimes these referred to stories that were not really very
newsworthy, they were nevertheless run on the front pages. Haravgi, ran a  photograph of the
AKEL candidate hugging a small girl on the front page, with the caption: ʻDeeply moved and with
a tear rolling down his cheek, D. Christofias reassured the people, who were stricken by the
tragedy of 1974, of his steady, consistent and constant supportʼ.50 This indicates Haravgiʼs
portrayal of the specific politician as sensitive and caring. It is further reinforced on pages 11-12
where there were two articles depicting Christofias as a compassionate person who would support
parents of large families and who would secure the rights of the handicapped if he were elected.51
On the same day, on the front page of Machi there was a picture of DISY candidate, Kassoulides,
at a nursing home holding hands with the elderly,52 confirming that the candidate was an
affectionate man. In the paperʼs cover story (το Θέμα) about DISYʼs Pan-Cypriot Congress for
the support of the candidacy of Mr. Kassoulides, there was a separate box within this news story
recounting the collapse of an old man and the aftermath: ʻImmediately Kassoulides interrupted his
speech and rushed to the stage (to help)ʼ,53 illustrating the candidate as merciful. The fainting
incident was also mentioned in Alithiaʼs cover story on DISYʼs congress: The journalist wrote that
Kassoulides stopped his speech to help the person who passed out, returning to the podium only
43 Neophytos Neophytou, ʻΠαραδοχή για αθέτηση δεσμεύσεων του [Admission for a breach of promises]ʼ, Haravgi, 17.1.2008:8. 
44 Cyprus Scientific and Technical Chamber (Επιστημονικό Τεχνικό Επιμελητήριο Κύπρου - ΕΤΕΚ). 
45 George Kallinikos, ʻΗ επιστημονική άποψη υποσκελίζει την πολιτική αντιπαράθεση: ΕΤΕΚ: Πολλοί προβληματισμοί για το συντελεστή
δόμησης [The scientific opinion surpasses the political dispute: ETEK: Puzzled for the building coefficient], Alithia, 17.1.2008:5. 
46 No author, ʻΝα πάρει αξία χρήσης η περιουσία  ʼ[In order to add value to the property]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 17.1.2008:4. 
47 Antonis Makrides, ʻΠήρε φωτιά ο συντελεστής: ΑΚΕΛ: κίνηση εντυπωσιασμού, Κασουλίδης: δώρον άδωρον [The coefficient was on fire:
AKEL: action that aimed to impress, Kassoulides: not a real gift]ʼ, Politis, 18.1.2008:22. 
48 No author, ʻ«Θα δώσω τη δική μου μάχη κατά τη διάρκεια της πενταετίας» [“I will give my own battle during the next five years”], Haravgi,
18.1.2008:6. 
49 No author, ʻΗ ΕΔΕΚ κατηγορεί το ΑΚΕΛ για παρενοχλήσεις στελεχών του [EDEK blames AKEL for harassing its members]ʼ, Machi,
17.1.2008:11. 
50 See picture in Haravgi, 17.1.2008:1. 
51 See, Marina Koumasta, ʻΔιαχρονική στήριξη Χριστόφια στους τρίτεκνους [Diachronic support to families with many children]ʼ, Haravgi,
17.1.2008:10; Marina Koumasta, ʻ Διασφάλιση δικαίων των αναπήρων [In safeguard of the rights of the handicapped]ʼ, Haravgi, 17.1.2008:11.
52 See, Machi, 17.1.2008:1. 
53 Marilena Xypsiti, ʻΚι ένα απρόοπτο γεγονός …[Also an unexpected event…]ʼ, Machi, 20.1.2008:4.
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when he was certain that the elderly man was completely well.54 Alithia, therefore, also projected
a caring image of this politician.
The dailies often portrayed certain people very darkly, and Tassos Papadopoulos was the
person on whom most newspapers turned their arrows. The statements and actions of the
President were often harshly criticized. On 17 January, Alithia devoted page 6 to criticism of the
President, with two news stories on his claimed mishandling of the Annan plan negotiations in
Burgenstock, which led to Karpasia not being under Greek Cypriot administration in the final
version of the proposed settlement. The headline of one of its articles was: ʻIdleness buried
Karpasiaʼ,55 implying that Papadopoulos was not competent enough to solve the Cyprus problem.
On the same day Politis ran, on page 5, a more neutral version on the issue of Karpasia. However,
by highlighting the words of the European Commissioner for Enlargement, we can see that the
paper was also negatively portraying the President and his actions: ʻGunter Verheugen stated that
“There were no intensive negotiations for the matter of Karpasia”ʼ.56 Politis, too, was revealed in this
period of study to be against the candidacy of Mr. Papadopoulos, often depicting him as rigidly
opposed to the possibility of ending the stalemate on the island. In one editorial it was implied that
the President employed strategies of good will not because he wished for a solution but in order
to remain in power: ʻWe predict that the meeting between Tassos and Talat… only aims to cause
sensation (to the public) because of the upcoming electionsʼ.57 On 26 September, Politis wrote
about, ʻPre-election games with the Cyprus Problemʼ, reporting that the people who worked for the
President were trying to create the impression that substantial developments were taking place.58
Not only certain politicians but also specific parties or the government were occasionally
portrayed negatively or positively. On 26 September, Politis ran on its front page three different
stories illustrating how the government had mismanaged several political issues: ʻThe government
continues to have three open fronts, despite its efforts to diminish (the significance of these
issues)ʼ.59 The headline of an article in Alithia about the EP draft report on Famagusta was:
ʻWherever and whatever this government touches turns into a big messʼ.60 Conversely, the
headline of an article in Machi painted opposition party DISY as being free of tendentious
accounts: ʻDISY is committed to supporting the local self-government regardless of who will be
elected President.61
The views of important people
In the fight for the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus, several newspapers decided to promote
their candidate through endorsements of influential persons or those in authority. Haravgi, Machi
and Alithia employed this practice, which was also noted in the previous period of study.  
To promote their candidate, Haravgi quoted statements of famous Greek artists, such as Mikis
Theodorakis and Thanos Mikroutsikos:ʻ“D. Christofias is a competent leader”: We rarely meet in
Europe such an outstanding political leader, says the leading composer Thanos Mikroutsikosʼ.62
Alithiaʼs cover story on 20 January published former President of the Republic Glafkos
Clerides  ʼremarks flattering the DISY candidate.. The headline of this article was, ʻCompetent and
54 George Kallinikos, ʻΟι γιοι της Κλαίρης, το μήνυμα του Β. Μαρτένς, η Νεολαία και η λιποθυμία [Claireʼs sons, W. Martens, the youth
(organization of DISY) and the collapse]ʼ, Alithia, 20.1.2008:5. 
55 Panagiotis Tsaggaris, ʻΗ αδράνεια έθαψε και την Καρπασία [Inaction buried also Karpasia]ʼ, Alithia, 17.1.2008:6.
56 George Kaskanis, ʻΣκοντάψαμε στις δεσμεύσεις [We stumbled over the commitments]ʼ, Politis, 17.1.2008:5. 
57 Politis, ʻΤο εθνικό και η λύση [The national (council) and the solution]ʼ, Politis, 4.9.2007:12. 
58 Katerina Zorpa, ʻΚόλπα με Μπερνς [Tricks with Burns]ʼ, Politis, 26.9.2007:4. 
59 No author, ʻΑνοικτά μέτωπα [Open fronts]ʼ, Politis, 26.9.2007:1. 
60 Panagiotis Tsagkaris, ʻΌπου και ό,τι αγγίξει αυτή η Κυβέρνηση γίνεται χαμός [Wherever and whatever this government touches turns into
a big mess]ʼ, Alithia, 17.1.2008:7. 
61 No author, ʻΟ ΔΗΣΥ δεσμεύεται να στηρίξει την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση ανεξάρτητα ποίος θα εκλεγεί πρόεδρος [DISY is committed to
supporting the local administration regardless of who will be elected President]ʼ, Machi, 18.1.2008:1. 
62 No author, ʻ«Άξιος ηγέτης ο Δ. Χριστόφιας»: Σπάνια συναντούμε τέτοιον εξαίρετο πολιτικό ηγέτη σε Ευρωπαϊκή κλίμακα, δηλώνει ο
Θάνος Μικρούτσικος [“D. Christofias is a competent leader”: We rarely meet in Europe such an outstanding political leader, says the leading
composer Thanos Mikroutsikos]ʼ, Haravgi, 17.1.2008:1. 
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honest Presidentʼ.63 On the same day Machi also used a quote from Clerides to promote
Kassoulides: ʻGlafkos Clerides: Competent leader for allʼ.64
Certainty for victory or defeat
Haravgi, Machi and Alithia often gave the impression that their candidate was certain to win.
Haravgi ran a cover story on Christofiasʼs presidential candidacy, with a headline: ʻCandidacy of
victory, hope and perspectiveʼ.65 Many events, even the cut of a traditional cake, were described
in a way to emphasize the notion that the leader of AKEL would be elected: “The cake
(Vasilopita66) of Victory was cut in Limassolʼ.67 Machi reported on a conference organized by DISY
to promote its favoured candidate: ʻVictory message by Kassoulidesʼ,68 and Alithia ran a similar
headline referring to the same candidate: ʻ Conference of victoryʼ.69 In the same way, the newspapers
sometimes published reports of a candidateʼs certain defeat. Politis suggested that the efforts of
the Presidential team to create the impression that substantial developments regarding the Cyprus
Problem were indeed taking place would not help Tassos Papadopoulos to remain in power.70
Similarly, in its editorials Alithia insisted on referring to Papadopoulos as the ʻincumbent Presidentʼ.71
The European Union
News stories related to the EU were published regularly, an indication that the matters of the
Union were viewed as important. In addition to reports on Cyprusʼs efforts to meet the require -
ments of the EU acquis communautaire, there was now the new topic of the euro, since the
Republic of Cyprus entered the euro zone on 1 January 2008. Although the news was full of
articles on the euro, for research purposes here we will focus only on the way the EU was seen
in relation to various issues that concerned Cyprus. It appears that the EU and its officials
continued to be perceived either as allies or as enemies according to their stance on issues
related to the Republic of Cyprus. Five news stories provided the data for this section of the paper:
1. Statements by the vice-president of the European Commission, Jacques Barrot, regarding
Turkeyʼs embargo on ships flying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus.
2. A warning to the Republic of Cyprus, in a European Commission annual report on the Green
Line, calling on the authorities to take immediate measures to stop illegal immigration across the
buffer zone. 
3. The EP draft report on Famagusta prepared by the European Petition Committee. 
4. The Slovenian Prime Ministerʼs view on the role the EU could play in the settlement of the
Cyprus Problem, as expressed during a meeting with President Papadopoulos. 
5. The view expressed during an informal conference of EU foreign ministers from the
Mediterranean states  that the Cyprus Problem was not an EU high priority issue.
The European Union as an ally
Jacques Barrotʼs comments concerning Turkeyʼs ban on ships from the Republic of Cyprus led to
the EU being depicted as a community that supported the rights of the Greek Cypriots. Machi,
Haravgi and Alithia published identical reports on this issue, indicating that they used the same
source, possibly KYPE. This reveals the three papers  ʼintention to suggest that the Commissioner
responsible for transport,72 who was thought to represent the stances of the EU, agreed with the
63 George Kallinikos, ʻΆξιος και τίμιος Πρόεδρος [Competent and honest President]ʼ, Alithia, 20.1.2008:1. 
64 Marilena Xypsiti, ʻΜήνυμα νίκης Κασουλίδη [Victory message by Kassoulides]ʼ, Machi, 20.1.2008:1.
65 Maria Fragkou, ʻΥποψηφιότητα νίκης, ελπίδας και προοπτικής [Candidacy of victory, hope and perspective]ʼ, Haravgi, 19.1.2008:3.
66 Vasilopita is a traditional cake eaten on the first day of the year. 
67 Tasos Tsapparellas, ʻΚόπηκε στη Λεμεσό η βασιλόπιτα...της Νίκης [The cake (Vasilopita) of victory was cut in Limassol]ʼ, Haravgi,
18.1.2008:10. 
68 Marilena Xypsiti, ʻΜήνυμα νίκης Κασουλίδη [Victory message by Kassoulides]ʼ, Machi, 20.1.2008:1.
69 No author, ʻΣυνέδριο νίκης [Conference of victory]ʼ, Alithia, 19.1.2008:1.
70 Katerina Zorpa, ʻΚόλπα με Μπερνς [Tricks with Burns]?ʼ, Politis, 26.9.2007:4.
71 See for example, Alithia ʻΔεν είναι τσίρκο η πολιτική [Politics is not a circus]ʼ, Alithia, 20.1.2008:2.
72 Jacques Barrot was not only the Commissioner responsible for transport but also the vice-president of the European Commission.
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Republic of Cyprusʼs position on this issue. Machi published an article in which it interpreted
Barrotʼs statement: ʻTurkeyʼs embargo is also a problem of the EU: Specific and Clear message
of Jacques Barrot to Ankaraʼ.73 On the same day, Haravgi ran the following headline on its front
page: ʻFirm message from Barrot to Ankaraʼ.74 Alithiaʼs headline was very similar but not so strong:
ʻBarrotʼs message to Turkeyʼ.75 On its front page Phileleftheros ran an exclusive interview with
Jacques Barrot illustrating that the EU stood ready to assist the Greek Cypriot community: ʻThe
path of Turkey towards the EU will be closed and 8 (negotiating) chapters will not open until Turkey
opens its ports and aerospace to Cyprusʼ.76 Similar statements by the Commissioner were also
used in a Politis headline: ʻSevere recommendations to Turkey: It is obliged to open its ports to
Cypriot shipsʼ.77
The European Union as an enemy
Sometimes the EU was pictured negatively, which might indicate a particular newspaperʼs
perspective, but more likely it signifies the paperʼs view that the Greek Cypriot side had just
demands and was the victim and not the villain of the conflict. A news story about the European
Commissionʼs annual report on the Green Line,78 posted on the same day as the previous
example, declared that the EU was set against the Republic of Cyprus. This was based on an EU
warning to the authorities to act immediately to stop illegal immigration across the buffer zone. The
press stressed that the Commissionʼs request might set up a hard border between the two sides.
The headline of Politis regarding this issue was, ʻNew slap from the (European) Commission: It
raises a “hard border”ʼ.79 Phileleftherosʼs title was, ʻKnife in the neck for the Green Line: The
Commission calls Nicosia to police it, which creates the image of a hard borderʼ. The represen -
tation of the EU as the enemy is evident in this dailyʼs text: ʻ(The EU) instead of turning its
recommendations towards Ankara or the T/C community… asks the authorities to tighten up the
policing of the Green Line, and calls Nicosia “reluctant” to take additional measuresʼ.80
The news story about the EP draft report on Famagusta is another example of the unflattering
depiction of the EU. Alithia ran an article in which the secretariat of the EP Petition Committee was
accused of ʻmanipulations.ʼ 81 On the previous day, this subject was the cover story of Machi, with
a headline emphasizing that the committee was in agreement with a country perceived by Machi
as the enemy: ʻScandalous report on Famagusta: It adopts Turkeyʼs rationale on the possibility of
the (Greek Cypriotsʼ) return only in the framework of an overall solution.82 Phileleftheros declared
that the draft report was ʻTurkey-friendlyʼ,83 while Haravgi characterized it as ʻunacceptableʼ.84
These dailies appeared to have assumed that the EU was not acting in Greek Cypriots  ʼ best
interest or, even worse, that this community was their rival. 
73 No author, ʻΠρόβλημα και της ΕΕ το τουρκικό εμπάργκο: Σαφές και Ξεκάθαρο Μήνυμα του Ζακ Μπαρό [Turkeyʼs embargo is also a
problem of the EU: Specific and Clear message of Jacques Barrot to Ankara]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:1.
74 No author, ʻΑυστηρό μήνυμα Μπαρό στην Άγκυρα [Firm message from Barrot to Ankara]ʼ, Haravgi, 25.9.2007:1.
75 No author, ʻΜήνυμα προς Τουρκία από Μπαρό [Barrotʼs message to Turkey]ʼ, Alithia, 25.9.2007:5. 
76 Petros Theoharides, ʻΜε τα εμπάργκο η Τουρκία εκτός Ευρώπης [Turkey will be out of Europe because of the embargos]ʼ, Phileleftheros,
25.9.2007:1.
77 Yiannis Kostakopoulos, ʻΑυστηρές υποδείξεις στην Τουρκία: Οφείλει να ανοίξει τα λιμάνια της στα κυπριακά πλοία [Severe
recommendations to Turkey: It is obliged to open its ports to Cypriot ships]ʼ, Politis, 25.9.2007:7. 
78 The line that divides the Greek and the Turkish quarters of Nicosia, first established in 1963. After the 1974 invasion by Turkey, many use the
term ʻGreen Line  ʼto name the impassable cease-fire line between the Turkish Armed Forces and the National Guard of the Republic of Cyprus.
Various crossings have been opened along the Green Line since 2003. 
79 No author, ʻΝέο χαστούκι από την Κομισιόν: Στήνει «σκληρό σύνορο» [New slap from the Commission: It raises a “hard border”]ʼ, Politis,
25.9.2007:3.
80 Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻΜαχαίρι στο λαιμό για την Πράσινη γραμμή: Κομισιόν καλεί Λευκωσία σε αστυνόμευση που δημιουργεί εικόνα
σκληρού συνόρου [Knife in the neck for the Green Line: The Commission calls on Nicosia to police it, which creates the image of a hard
border]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 25.9.2007:6.
81 Yiannos Charalampides, ʻΧαστούκι στο σκάνδαλο...: Όχι σε συζήτηση επί του εγγράφου της Αμμοχώστου [Slap over the scandal…:
Refusal to discuss the draft on Famagusta]ʼ, Simerini, 18.1.2008:5.
82 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΣκανδαλώδης έκθεση για την Αμμόχωστο: Υιοθετεί την επιχειρηματολογία της Τουρκίας για πιθανότητα
επιστροφής μόνο στο πλαίσιο συνολικής λύσης [Scandalous report on Famagusta: It adopts Turkeyʼs rationale on the possibility (of Greek
Cypriotsʼ) return only in the framework of an overall solution]ʼ, Machi, 17.1.2008:1.
83 Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻΚλοιός για απόσυρση του προσχεδίου: Λαϊκό κόμμα, Σοσιαλιστές και Αριστερά «τα έψαλλαν» στον Πρόεδρο της
Επιτροπής [Pressures for the withdrawal of the draft report: The European Peopleʼs Party-European Democrats, the socialists and the left
(wing party) are telling the President of the Committee]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 17.1.2008:6.
84 No author, ʻΕπιεικώς απαράδεκτο το προσχέδιο για Αμ/το: Προσπάθειες ΑΚΕΛ νʼαποσυρθεί και να συνταχθεί νέο κείμενο [The draft
report on Famagusta is at least unacceptable: AKEL tries for its withdrawal and for the writing of a new text], Haravgi, 18.1.2008:8.
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ʻUsʼ and the ʻother sideʼ
Here we examine who exactly was considered to be ʻus  ʼor ʻour side  ʼin the timeframe studied and
who the ʻothers  ʼwere. The ideologies of the newspapers and the practices used to promote them
are presented simultaneously on the basis of information from several news stories. 
ʻUsʼ and issues of ethnic origin
The dailies appear to have remained loyal to their positions on matters of identity, outlined in the
2002 analysis. As in the previous period, the Greeks and, of course, the Greek Cypriots were
viewed by the newspapers as ʻour sideʼ.
Machi and Simerini continued emphasizing a connection between the Greek Cypriots and
Greece. This bond was more stressed in the previous period of study, probably because of the
Annan plan which must have triggered nationalistic feelings, but it was still obvious in 2007-2008.
Machi characterized the Greeks as the Greek Cypriots  ʼ ʻbrothersʼ,85 while Simerini repeatedly
referred to the Greek Cypriot community as the ʻGreek side.ʼ 86 In contrast, Haravgi used the
expression the ʻGreek Cypriot sideʼ 87 and called the two communities ʻCypriotsʼ.88
All dailies however, regardless of their views on identity, highlighted that the Republic of Cyprus
had a strong relationship with Greece. Most newspapers even had special sections or whole
pages dedicated to news stories referring to Greece.89
The way the deadly fires in Greece were reported clearly revealed the bond between the
Republic of Cyprus and Greece. This unfortunate event received wide coverage while it projected
the notion that Cyprus would always support Greece. The fact that the Republic of Cyprus joined
forces with Greece to face the catastrophe was pointed out, while the financial aid Cyprus offered
was also emphasized. The headline of Machiʼs main story was: ʻCyprus continues to show solidarity
to the fire-stricken Greeksʼ.90 The newspaper also published on its front page an announcement
for a fund raising event it was organizing to help the Greeks.91 Simerini, too, informed its readers
of a fundraiser arranged by the publishing house that owned the newspaper.92
The determination of the Greek Cypriots to stand by Greece was constantly stressed in
extensive reports on the work of a Cypriot team rebuilding Artemida village and the valiant efforts
of the Cypriot firemen. Phileleftheros, which sent special correspondents to Greece, stated that
the team of Cypriot experts had ʻcast light over the black land (of Artemida) and over despairʼ.93
Politis pointed out in one article that 100 houses would be built from scratch under the guidance
of the team from Cyprus,94 while in another it heralded the  return of the ʻtired, worn down but filled
with pride  ʼCypriot firefighters.95 Alithia also wrote a piece about the Cypriot redcap volunteers,
who ʻhelped out in the fire extinction in Greeceʼ.96
85 Machi, ʻΠαγκύπριος έρανος της «Μάχης»: Για τους πυρόπληκτους Έλληνες αδελφούς μας [Pan-Cypriot fundraising by “Machi”: for our
Greek fire stricken brothers]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:1.
86 Simerini, ʻΠοίος θα πιέσει την Τουρκία [Who will pressure Turkey?]ʼ, Simerini, 25.9.2007:3.
87 Niki Koulermou, ʻΠατριωτική η στάση του ΑΚΕΛ: Ενισχύει την ε/κ πλευρά, όταν οι άλλοι την υπονομεύουν [The attitude of AKEL is
patriotic: It reinforces the G/C side, when others undermine it]ʼ, Haravgi, 5.9.2007:1. 
88 Haravgi, ʻΣαφή μηνύματα, ξεκάθαρες θέσεις [Specific messages, clear positions]ʼ, Haravgi, 25.9.2007:5. 
89 See Alithia, 7.9.2007:8, 9 and 18.1.2008:18. The same headline was used in Machi. See, ʻΕλλάδα-Εκλογές [Greece-Elections]ʼ, Machi,
5.9.2007:9 and 19.1.2008:14. See also Politis, 20.1.2007:48, 49, Simerini, 20.1.2008:98, Phileleftheros, 7.9.2007:6.
90 No author, ʻΣυνεχίζεται η αλληλεγγύη από την Κύπρο προς τους πυροπαθείς Έλληνες [Cyprus continues to show solidarity to the fire-
stricken Greeks]ʼ, Machi, 4.9.2007:14. 
91 Machi, ʻΠαγκύπριος έρανος της «Μάχης»: Για τους πυρόπληκτους Έλληνες αδελφούς μας [Pan-Cypriot fundraising by “Machi”: for our
Greek fire-stricken brothers]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:1.
92 Simerini, ʻ Έρανος ΔΙΑ και ΣΙΓΜΑ για τους πυροπαθείς [Fundraising of Dias (publishing house) and Sigma (TV) for the fire stricken (people)]ʼ,
Simerini, 5.9.2007:1.
93 Frixos Dalitis, ʻΣαν να ανηφορίζεις προς την κόλαση [As if you were climbing towards hell]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 4.9.2007:1.
94 Miranda Lysandrou, ʻ100 σπίτια από την αρχή: Σήμερα η λεπτομερής καταγραφή των ζημιών στην Αρτέμιδα [100 Houses (will be built)
from scratch: Today the detailed record of the damages in Artemida]ʼ, Politis, 4.9.2007:3. 
95 Kostas Nanos, ʻΠεριζήτητοι στην Εύβοια: Επέστρεψαν συγκλονισμένοι οι δασοκομάντος [Much wanted in Euboea: The firefighters
returned shaken]ʼ, Politis, 4.9.2007:3. 
96 No author, ʻΕπέστρεψαν οι στρατονόμοι: Βοήθησαν στην κατάσβεση των πυρκαγιών στην Ελλάδα [The redcaps have returned: They
helped with the fire extinction in Greece]ʼ, Alithia, 5.9.2007:10. 
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The ʻother sideʼ; Thumbs up for the Turkish Cypriots
The ʻother side  ʼconsisted of many categories, one of which was the Turkish Cypriots. The press
was not negative in its views of this community; on the contrary, the dailies that referred to them
stressed that nothing separated the two communities. 
Haravgi and Politis continued to argue that the peaceful co-existence of Greek and Turkish
Cypriots was achievable. Haravgi, promoting the stance of AKEL, put forth the idea that the
peaceful reunification of the two communities was possible.97 Politis also remained loyal to its
traditional rapprochement policy, and regularly published a column written by a Turkish Cypriot
journalist.98 In one editorial it was stated that if Turkey allowed Turkish Cypriots to decide on the
solution ʻthings would be much betterʼ, suggesting that the two communities had no significant
differences regarding the settlement. Simerini also backed this stance in an editorial: ʻNothing
separates us from the Turkish Cypriots and we have only a few things to negotiateʼ.99 Agreement
between the two communities was also mentioned by Alithia, which ascertained that the Greek
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots agreed on the matter of the settlers.100
Thumbs down for the Turkish Cypriots  ʼleadership
The newspapers remained consistent with their 2002 positions, and none of them portrayed
positively the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots, despite the fact that left wing Mehmet Ali Talat
succeeded Rauf Denktaş, viewed as nationalist and intransigent. Simerini and Phileleftheros often
named Mehmet Ali Talat ʻthe occupation leaderʼ,101 also characterizing him as Turkeyʼs ʻagent
provocateurʼ 102 or this countryʼs ʻ bondservantʼ.103 Mr. Talat was frequently pictured as someone who
followed the wishes of Ankara and obstructed the solution of the Cyprus Problem104 by requesting
procedures other than those already agreed. For example, reporting on the meeting between
Papadopoulos and Talat, Phileleftheros wrote: ʻUnder Ankaraʼs order he went to kill the July 8th
(agreement): Talat suggested a different process and cut off communication.105 On the same day,
the headline of Simeriniʼs cover story was: ʻTalat “kicked away” the July 8th agreement: Yesterdayʼs
meeting confirmed the dead endʼ.106 Although Haravgi did not use harsh epithets to describe
Mehmet Ali Talat, its lead story nevertheless stated that ʻsome analysts interpret Talatʼs proposal as
an effort of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to disengage from the July 8th agreement with which
Ankara was never happyʼ.107 On the next day in this newspaperʼs editorial it was noted that ʻthe
stance of the Turkish Cypriot leader, who of course acted in the framework of Turkeyʼs  as well as
the militaryʼs instructions, shows that he did not leave any room for the continuation (of the talks)ʼ.108
The dailies were set against the settlers
All the newspapers covered events and developments related to the settlers, which is a very
sensitive issue for the Greek Cypriot community. They usually pointed out that Turkey or the
ʻpseudo-stateʼ imported them from Anatolia in order to change the demography in Cyprus. Thus,
Haravgi ran a lengthy article with the headline: ʻOrganized importation of settlers,  ʼ stating that
97 Haravgi, ʻΗ μεγάλη συστράτευση [The great support]ʼ, Haravri, 20.1.2008:5.
98 See, for example, Sener Leventʼs column in Politis, 17.1.2008:6. 
99 Simerini, ʻΚόκκινο χαλί στον επιδρομέα [Red carpet for the invader]ʼ, Simerini, 18.1.2008:3.
100 Panagiotis Tsaggaris, ʻΔίνουν «ιθαγένεια με τη σέσουλα» [They freely give “citizenships”]ʼ, Alithia, 18.1.2008:1.
101 See, Phileleftheros, 6.9.2007 and the editorial ʻΟι πολιτικοί και η διζωνική [The politicians and the bi-zonal]ʼ, Simerini, 4.9.2007:3. 
102 See, ʻΤα Τουρκικά σενάρια [Turkish scenarios]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 24.9.2007:6. 
103 See, ʻΠραγματικότητες και ψευδαισθήσεις [Realities and illusions]ʼ, Simerini, 5.9.2007:3.
104 The view that Mehmet Ali Talat is a sensible, realist person who supports the solution was characterised as a myth. See, ʻ Η μοναδική διέξοδος
[The only way out]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 7.9.2007:6. 
105 Costas Venizelos, ʻΜε εντολή Άγκυρας πήγε να σκοτώσει την 8η Ιουλίου: Ο Ταλάτ πρότεινε άλλη διαδικασία και έκοψε τις γέφυρες
επικοινωνίας [Under Ankaraʼs order he went to kill the July 8th (agreement): Talat suggested a different process and cut off communication]ʼ,
Phileleftheros, 6.9.2007:4.
106 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΟ Ταλάτ «κλότσησε» τη συμφωνία της 8ης Ιουλίου: Η χθεσινή συνάντηση επιβεβαίωσε το αδιέξοδο [Talat
“booted out” the July 8th agreement: Yesterdayʼs meeting confirmed the dead end]ʼ, Simerini, 6.9.2007:1. 
107 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣτο επανειδείν αν και εφόσον: «Εποικοδομητική» συνάντηση Τάσσου-Ταλατ αλλά δεν συμφώνησαν υπό ποίες
προϋποθέσεις θα ξανασυναντηθούν [See you later if…: The meeting of Papadopoulos and Talat was “fruitful” but they did not agree under
which circumstances they will meet again]ʼ, Haravgi, 6.9.2007:1.
108
ʻΣυλλογικά να συνεκτιμηθεί η κατάσταση [The situation should be evaluated collectively]ʼ, Haravgi, 7.9.2007:5.
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Papadopoulos said that the settlers outnumbered the Turkish Cypriots by two to one and that this
fact was a consequence of Turkeyʼs calculated plan.109 Moreover, some newspapers stressed
that the Turkish Cypriot community was also not pleased with the rising numbers of the settlers.
This was highlighted in an interview with the Turkish Cypriot, New Cyprus Party (Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi
- YKP) leader, Murat Kanatli in Alithia.110 Simerini ran a cover story purporting that the regime in the
north helped the settlers to remain in Cyprus, causing distress to the Turkish Cypriots: ʻThey give
away “citizenships”ʼ. Below this title, there were several alarming sentences in red type: ʻThe
Turkish Cypriots estimate that the settlers will reach 1 million within 10 years. 90% of the stores
in Kyrenia are controlled by Turks - The T/C worryʼ.111
Turkey as a hostile country
In the press Turkey was never portrayed in positive terms; it did not permit the Turkish Cypriots to
decide their own fate; it was following a well-planned strategy to establish a new separatist status
quo in Cyprus by altering the demography of the island, among other things.
Simerini portrayed Turkey in darker colors than the other papers, calling this country ʻthe land
of Attila  ʼor the ʻinvader,ʼ 112 criticizing many of its actions, and arguing that she did not wish to
negotiate. Simerini also pictured Turkey as a country with extreme positions,113 i.e, that she was
aiming for Cyprusʼs partition, and so was always obstructing a peaceful settlement. This depiction
of Turkey was found in the other dailies, which resulted in Turkey being presented as the Greek
Cypriots  ʼenemy, and the one to blame for the deadlock in Cyprus. On 24 and 25 September
several dailies reported that Turkeyʼs Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said that the Cyprus
Problem should be discussed in the framework of two peoples, two democratic regimes, two
languages and two religions. The papers added editorials or com men taries related to this
statement-in Simeriniʼs editorial it was stated that Turkey was promoting a velvet divorce solution114
that would split Cyprus into two states;115 according to Phileleftheros, Turkey had been moving
along the same lines for decades, but with Erdoganʼs statement she was officially expressing this
policy;116 in Politis, the lead story announced: ʻAnkara officially adopts the two states policyʼ.117
Three newspapers argued that Turkeyʼs objectives collided with those of the Greek Cypriots,
making her an enemy. Simerini ran some articles and editorials pointing out that Turkey aimed for
the adoption of the Annan plan, while others stressed that she aimed to upgrade the occupied
areas and thereby achieve international recognition.118 In January, Machi published a research
report on the Turkish army in Cyprus. This study posited that one reason Turkey wanted its troops
to remain on the island was to ʻlegalize the illegal regimeʼ in the northern part of Cyprus.119 Haravgi
wrote that Turkish diplomacy tried to persuade the European Council on the issue of ʻdirect trade,
for the increase of the representation of the Turkish Cypriots (in the EU), for direct flights from and
to the occupied areas, for the upgrading and recognition of the illegal universities and for the
participation of the pseudo-stateʼs sports organizations in international athletic organizationsʼ.120
109 No author, ʻΟργανωμένη εισαγωγή εποίκων: Κατήγγειλε χθες ο Πρόεδρος, μιλώντας κατά τα διαπιστευτήρια ξένων πρέσβεων [The
President reported yesterday during the foreign ambassadors  ʼaccreditations: Organized importation of settlers]ʼ, Haravgi, 5.9.2007:8. 
110 Efi Ioannou. ʻΜουράτ Κανατλι: Ο πρώτος Τ/κ αρχηγός κόμματος που θα ψηφίσει στις προεδρικές εκλογές [Murat Kanatli: The first T/C
party leader who will vote in the presidential elections]ʼ, Alithia, 20.1.2008:16. 
111 See, ʻΠραγματικότητες και ψευδαισθήσεις [Realities and illusions]ʼ, Simerini, 5.9.2007:3.
112 See, Simerini, ʻΠοίος θα πιέσει την Τουρκία [Who will pressure Turkey?]ʼ, Simerini, 25.9.2007:3 and Yiannos Charalampides, ʻΧαστούκι στο
σκάνδαλο...: Όχι σε συζήτηση επί του εγγράφου της Αμμοχώστου [Slap over the scandal …: Refusal to discuss the draft on Famagusta]ʼ,
Simerini, 18.1.2008:5.
113 Simerini, ʻΤο κόστος του ναυαγίου [The cost of the dead end]ʼ, Simerini, 7.9.2007:3.
114 The split of Czechoslovakia into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1.1.1993 is commonly known as the ʻvelvet divorceʼ. 
115 See, Simerini, ʻΤο κόστος του ναυαγίου [The cost of the dead end]ʼ, Simerini, 7.9.2007:3.
116 Phileleftheros, ʻΤουρκικά σενάρια [Turkish scenarios]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 24.9.2007:6.
117 Thanasis Tsitsas, ʻΦοβού την Ισλαμική: Πολιτική των δύο κρατών, υιοθετεί επίσημα η Άγκυρα [Beware of the Islamic (Conference):
Ankara officially adopts the two states policy]ʼ, Politis, 25.9.2007:3. 
118 See for example, Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΜανούβρες από τον Ταλάτ: Δεν πείθει η «προθυμία» του για προώθηση της Συμφωνίας
[Talatʼs maneuvers: His “willingness” for forwarding the agreement is not convincing]ʼ, Simerini, 5.9.2007:4. 
119 No author, ʻΔιατηρεί υπεροπλία ο κατοχικός στρατός: Μειωμένες οι δαπάνες για εξοπλισμό της Εθνικής Φρουράς [The occupation army
continues to have superior firepower: The expenses for military equipment of the National Guard have been decreased]ʼ, Machi, 18.1.2008:10.
120 Neophytos Neophytou, ʻΠροληπτική παρέμβαση Βουλής: Στο Ευρωκοινοβούλιο για τις τουρκικές επιδιώξεις [Parliamentʼs preemptive
strike in the European Council against the Turkish designs]ʼ, Haravgi, 7.9.2007:9. 
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Turkey was also often depicted as a dangerous country, a practice that would surely heighten
Greek Cypriot security concerns. Machi published a piece about the Turkish troops in the north
with the headline, ʻThe occupation army continues to have superior firepower: The budget for the
military equipment of the National Guard has been reducedʼ, and a subtitle within this news story,
ʻThe equivalent of one National Guardsman (from the Republic of Cyprus) is three Turkish
soldiersʼ.121 Machi wrote another article on Turkeyʼs purchase of new submarines, headlined,
ʻTurkey will get six more submarines: It significantly reinforces its navyʼ.122 This news story was
also posted in Simerini, suggesting that this country posed a threat to the Republic of Cyprus. 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader, sometimes one and the same
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were often represented as being one and the same. Simerini and
Machi repeatedly promoted this image, as when they used the expression the ʻTurkish sideʼ to
refer to Turkey, Turkish Cypriots and/or the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This practice  reveals their
identity views and might also promote the notion that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had the
same stances and goals, as declared in a Simerini lead story on the Papadopoulos - Talat
meeting: ʻThe positions expressed by Turkey and the pseudo-state lead to the conclusion that the
Turkish side methodically tries to cancel the agreement.ʼ 123 Machi offers another example of this
with a headline reading, ʻDisappointment and judgments against the Turkish Sideʼ, while the text
states that the ʻTurkish Cypriot sideʼ was responsible for the deadlock in the country.124
Τhe ʻothers  ʼin relation to ʻusʼ
All the newspapers, for the most part, represented the Greek Cypriots as the ʻgoodiesʼ. When the
papers compared the actions of the Greek Cypriots with those of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot
leadership, they pictured ʻthe others  ʼas the ʻbaddiesʼ. 
Phileleftheros and Simerini depicted the Greek Cypriots as willing and ready to resolve the
Cyprus problem by adhering both to past agreements and the wishes of the United Nations. For
example, in an article on the Papadopoulos - Talat meeting Phileleftheros reported that ʻthe
occupation leader…basically suggested (that) a new process (should be adopted) abandoning the
July 8th agreement,,ʼ125 which did not concur with the UN position. Another inside headline for this
same story was, ʻUnder Ankaraʼs order he went to kill the July 8th (agreement): Talat suggested
a different process and cut off communicationʼ, while the text reaffirmed that the President of the
Republic of Cyprus aimed solely for implementation of the July 8th agreement, although he also
offered ʻseveral alternative ideasʼ. In its lead story on the meeting, Simerini pictured Mr.
Papadopoulos as someone who went to the talks knowing exactly what he wanted: ʻTassos goes
with specific proposalsʼ.126 In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot leader was accused of using tricks in
order to avoid the July 8 process, since, ʻthe Turkish side methodically tries to cancel the
agreementʼ.127
There were also news stories promoting the idea that it was Greek Cypriots who deserved the
sympathy of the international community. This was accomplished through the recall of bitter
121 See note 119.
122 No author, ʻΕπιπλέον έξι υποβρύχια θα προμηθευτεί η Τουρκία: Ενισχύει σημαντικά το ναυτικό της [Turkey will get six more sub-
marines: It significantly reinforces its navy]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:5. 
123 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΜανούβρες από τον Ταλάτ: Δεν πείθει η «προθυμία» του για προώθηση της Συμφωνίας [Talatʼs maneuvers:
His “willingness” for forwarding the agreement is not convincing]ʼ, Simerini, 5.9.2007:4. 
124 Apostolos Tomaras, ʻΟμόφωνα τα πολιτικά κόμματα: Απογοήτευση και επικρίσεις κατά της Τουρκικής πλευράς [Consensus among the
parties: Disappointment and judgments against the Turkish side]ʼ, Machi, 7.9.2007:14. 
125 Costas Venizelos, ʻΜε δεμένα χέρια ο Ταλάτ: Στη συνάντηση με περιοριστικές εντολές από την Άγκυρα για να σκοτώσει την 8η
Ιουλίου [Talat with bound hands: (He) went to the meeting with restrictive orders from Ankara in order to kill the July 8th (agreement)]ʼ,
Phileleftheros, 6.9.2007:1, 4. 
126 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻ Κόλπα Ταλάτ για «προώθηση» της συμφωνίας: Θέλει συναντήσεις χωρίς την παρουσία των Ηνωμένων Εθνών
[Talatʼs tricks for “forwarding” the agreement: He wants meetings without the United Nations]ʼ, Simerini, 5.9.2007:1.
127 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΜανούβρες από τον Ταλάτ: Δεν πείθει η «προθυμία» του για προώθηση της Συμφωνίας [Talatʼs maneuvers:
His “willingness” for forwarding the agreement is not convincing]ʼ, Simerini, 5.9.2007:4. 
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memories, in reports describing the atrocities committed by the ʻother side  ʼagainst the Greek
Cypriots, who were pictured as the victims of the conflict. In an article in Phileleftheros about the
missing persons, the Turkish soldiers were depicted as merciless: ʻOne-year-old baby John was
bleeding from the ear. He was laying above the head of his father who was killed by the bullets of
the Turkish soldiersʼ.128 The headline of an article in Simerini was, ʻ“Three times they put me
against the wall…”: The horrifying moments of a priest in the hands of the Turksʼ.129 In another
news story about the release of British documents on Cyprus, the same newspaper wrote that
Turkey was the side that constantly broke the cease-fire agreement achieved in Geneva.130 Politis,
despite its traditional rapprochement policy, also posted a news story about the missing persons
showing that ʻthe other side  ʼmistreated the Greek Cypriots.  In the piece, it was reported that a
Turkish Cypriot medical student was arrested carrying a Greek Cypriotʼs skull. The skull was
unearthed by a person who was paid with two trucks of dung for finding one. Part of the sentence
which was placed beneath the title of this story was, ʻSkeletons, skulls and other bones belonging
to Greek Cypriot missing persons from Ashia and Komi Kebir were found in the hands of medical
students and in the offices of T/C doctorsʼ.131
The above examples show that the Greek Cypriots were positively represented in contrast with
the ʻother side  ʼ which was depicted as unwilling to reach a solution or responsible for the
grievances of the past. 
The areas in the north
All the newspapers called the northern part of the island ʻ the occupied areasʼ 132 and used the term
ʻpseudo-stateʼ to contest the legitimacy of the territory they consider was taken from the Greek
Cypriots by Turkey. The first part of this composite word was frequently attached to other words
such as parliament (ʻpseudo-parliamentʼ 133) or prime minister (ʻpseudo-prime ministerʼ 134)
showing that the area in the north of the country was not internationally recognized. Another
common practice related to the semantics was quoting in inverted commas the title of a person,
a body, an institution or anything that could denote authority to the ʻother sideʼ. For example,
Alithiaʼs cover story on the ferry services between Famagusta and Latakia in Syria refers to Turgay
Avcı as ʻThe T/C foreign affairs “minister”ʼ.135 Sometimes the inverted commas were replaced by
the expression: ʻthe so-calledʼ, to stress the lack of international recognition. Simerini, for example,
covering the same news story, named Avcı as ʻthe so-called Minister of Foreign Affairs.ʼ 136
Machi and Simerini not only used the above wording, they also stressed in various ways that
the Greek Cypriots were the rightful owners of the ʻoccupied areasʼ. Machi ran a cover story
stating that the EU draft report on Famagusta completely adopted Turkeyʼs rationale that the
return of the abandoned city to its ʻ rightful ownersʼ was possible only in the framework of an overall
solution.137 This view was also expressed a day later in Simeriniʼs editorial: ʻ Attila… does not allow
its rightful owners to return to their lands and to their propertiesʼ.138
128 Vassos Vasiliou, ʻ«Δεν δεχόμαστε να παραλάβουμε ελλιπή οστά»: Ανυπόταχτη ψυχή η Χαρίτα Μάντολες στέκει ολόρθη πριν την
ακροτελαυταία στροφή του δράματος [“We will not accept incomplete bones”: Harita Mantoles is an untamed soul who stands proud just
before the last scene of the drama]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 18.1.2008:3. 
129 Demetris Manousakis, ʻ«Τρείς φορές με έστησαν στον τοίχο...»: Οι εφιαλτικές στιγμές ενός ιερέα στα χέρια των Τούρκων [“Three
times they put me against the wall…”: The horrifying moments of a priest in the hands of the Turks]ʼ, Simerini, 19.1.2008:40. 
130 Fanoula Argyrou, ʻΤουρκική προέλαση 1974 [Turkish advancement in 1974]ʼ, Simerini, 24.9.2007:4. 
131 Andreas Paraschos, ʻΈνα Κρανίο για δύο φορτηγά κοπριά: Στοιχεία για Ε/Κ αγνοούμενους από την Άσσια και την Κώμη Κεπήρ [A skull
for two trucks of dung: Leads regarding G/C missing persons from Ashia and Komi Kebir]ʼ, Politis, 6.9.2007:50.
132 See, for example, No author, ʻΚάθοδος Γκιουλ: Ποδαρικό με κατεχόμενα [Gulʼs descent: First-Footing on the occupied areas], Politis,
4.9.2007:5.
133 See example, Spyros Athanasiades, ʻΑποχής συνέχεια [The abstention is continued]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 7.9.2007:6.
134 See example, No author, ʻΔιαφορετικές προσεγγίσεις στα κατεχόμενα [Different approaches in the occupied areas]ʼ, Haravgi, 7.9.2007:8. 
135 Panagiotis Tsaggaris, ʻΔεν προλαβαίνουμε τις νότες: Προτού απαντήσει το διάβημα μας η Συρία, ξεκινήσαμε προς την Ιταλία [We
cannot deliver the memorandums fast enough: Before Syria answers our demarche, we make demarches to Italy], Alithia, 25.9.2007:1.
136 Michalis Hadjistylianou, ʻΠοίος λέγει την αλήθεια; Στα κατεχόμενα πανηγυρίζουν, εμείς διαψεύδουμε [Who tells the truth? In the
occupied areas they celebrate while we confute]ʼ, Simerini, 24.9.2007:6. 
137 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΣκανδαλώδης έκθεση για την Αμμόχωστο: Υιοθετεί την επιχειρηματολογία της Τουρκίας για πιθανότητας
επιστροφής μόνο στο πλαίσιο συνολικής λύσης [Scandalous report on Famagusta: It adopts Turkeyʼs rationale for the possibility of returning
(to this abandoned city) only in the frame of an overall solution]ʼ, Machi, 17.1.2008:1.
138 Simerini, ʻΚόκκινο χαλί στον επιδρομέα [Red carpet for the invader]ʼ, Simerini, 18.1.2008:3.
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While this stance was not clearly detected in all the dailies, nevertheless each one of them,
without exception, widely covered news stories that were related to actions of indirect political
recognition of the north. This tendency eventually reflected the Greek Cypriots  ʼ fear of losing
forever land that they considered theirs. The issues of ferry services with Latakia in Syria and the
meeting of Turgay Avcı with some Italian officials were extensively reported and support this
argument. Phileleftheros stated that, ʻSyria under Turkeyʼs pressure proceeds with actions to
upgrade the occupation regimeʼ.139 According to Simerini the ferry services indicated ʻindirect
recognition of the pseudo-stateʼ,140 while Machi appears to have considered this issue along with
the intention of Turgay Avcı to give ʻTRNC  ʼpassports to two Italian politicians important enough
to run them under the title, the ʻmain storyʼ (το Θέμα).141 Alithia reported these developments in its
cover story suggesting that the Republic of Cyprus was trying to fend off blows: ʻWe cannot deliver
the  memorandums fast enough : Before Syria answers our demarche, we make demarches to
Italyʼ.142 In inside pages of the paper a related story was headlined: ʻA slap from Italy as wellʼ.143
Politis used a similar headline for the same issue: ʻSlaps from everywhereʼ,144 while Haravgi
stressed that Avcıʼs actions were unlawful: ʻThey distribute illegal traveling documentsʼ.145
Coverage of matters related to indirect political recognition of the ʻoccupied areasʼ reveals that
such actions were not condoned by the newspapers, while it suggests that the northern part of
the island was considered to belong to the Greek Cypriots and that the Turkish Cypriot leadership
had no legal authority over the territory. 
The north was also very often depicted negatively, with four dailies publishing articles
portraying the area as a source of crimes that frequently caused trouble to the Republic of Cyprus.
A headline in Simerini reads, ʻConstant flow of illegal immigrants: They travel by ships and fishing
boats to the occupied areas and from there to the free areasʼ.146 The same subject was discussed
on the front page of Machi: ʻWe have been flooded with… illegal immigrants: forty more (persons)
have passed to the free areasʼ; 147 again in Machi, ʻThey incessantly sell fake European
identification cards: (The illegal immigrants) buy them from the occupied areas for as much as
3000 eurosʼ.148 Politis ran the headline: ʻThe occupied areas are (like) a “black hole”: The Green
Line issue goes to the Councilʼ 149 and an article in Phileleftheros about the arrest of two
Romanian suspects was headlined: ʻThey were coming from the occupied areas to stealʼ.150
Stories from the ʻother sideʼ
It is interesting to look at which news stories from the Turkish Cypriot press were selected for
republication by the Greek Cypriot newspapers, as well as how these stories were modified. In
139 Costas Venizelos, ʻΣε τεντωμένο σχοινί οι σχέσεις με Συρία: Η θαλάσσια σύνδεση Αμμοχώστου- Λατάκειας σήμανε συναγερμό στη
Λευκωσία [Relationships with Syria are on a tightrope: The ferry connection between Famagusta and Latakia alerted Nicosia]ʼ, Phileleftheros,
25.9.2007:4.
140 Michalis Hadjistylianou, ʻΣτα πρόθυρα διπλωματικού επεισοδίου με Δαμασκό: Αγνόησε το ΥΠ. Εξωτερικών ο Επιτετραμμένος της
Συρίας [On the verge of a diplomatic episode with Damascus: Syriaʼs attaché ignored the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]ʼ, Simerini, 25.9.2007:3.
141 No author, ʻΤο παίζουν «Κινέζοι» στη Δαμασκό: Κανονικό δούλεμα τριών 24ωρων από τη Συρία [In Damascus they pretend to know
nothing: Syria played us for 3 days]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:14, 27. 
142 Panagiotis Tsaggaris, ʻΔεν προλαβαίνουμε τις νότες: Προτού απαντήσει το διάβημα μας η Συρία, ξεκινήσαμε προς την Ιταλία [We
cannot deliver the memorandums fast enough: Before Syria answers our demarche, we make demarches to Italy], Alithia, 25.9.2007:1.
143 Panagiotis Tsaggaris, ʻΚαι με Ιταλίδα υπουργό συναντήθηκε ο Αβτζί: Χαστούκι και από την Ιταλία- Ο Τ/κ «ΥΠΕΞ» συναντήθηκε με
Ιταλούς αξιωματούχους και τελετή στην ιταλική Βουλή [Avcı also met an Italian minister: A slap from Italy as well-The T/C “Prime Minister”
met with Italian officials and (there was a) ceremony in the Italian Parliament], Alithia, 25.9.2007:5.
144 Vaggelis Vasiliou, ʻΧαστούκια από παντού [Slaps from everywhere]ʼ, Politis, 25.9.2007:7.
145 No author, ʻΔιανέμουν παράνομα ταξιδιωτικά έγγραφα [They distribute illegal traveling documents]ʼ, Haravgi, 25.9.2007:6. 
146 Georgia Ioannidou, ʻΣυνεχής ροή λαθρομεταναστών: Με πλοιάρια και ψαρόβαρκες στα κατεχόμενα και απ  ʼεκεί στα ελεύθερα εδάφη
[Constant flow of illegal immigrants: They travel by ships and fishing boats to the occupied areas and from there to the free areas]ʼ, Simerini,
17.1.2008:14. 
147 Sofi Orphanidou, ʻΠλημμυρήσαμε...Λαθρομετανάστες: Άλλοι σαράντα πέρασαν στις ελεύθερες περιοχές [We have been flooded
with…illegal immigrants: forty more (persons) have passed to the free areas]  ʼMachi, 17.1.2008:1.
148 Larnaca Press Agency, ʻΤους πωλούν αβέρτα πλαστές ευρωπαϊκές ταυτότητες: Τις αγοράζουν από τα κατεχόμενα μέχρι και 3000
ευρώ [They incessantly sell fake European identification cards: (The illegal immigrants) buy them from the occupied areas for up to 3000
euros]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:4. 
149 Teti Sarantopoulou, ʻ«Μαύρη τρύπα» τα κατεχόμενα: Στο Συμβούλιο οδεύει το θέμα της πράσινης γραμμής [The occupied areas are
(like) a “black hole”: The Green Line issue goes to the Council]ʼ, Politis, 26.9.2007:5.
150 No author, ʻΠιάστηκαν και οι δύο σαν τον ποντικό στη ΄φάκα: Έρχονται από τα κατεχόμενα ειδικά για να κλέβουν [They were caught
like a mouse in a trap: They were coming from the occupied areas to steal]ʼ, Philelefhteros, 24.9.2007:40.
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the present timeframe, the dailies seem to have focused more on articles and subjects drawn from
the newspapers of ʻthe other side  ʼthan in 2002. Some dailies even added a special section or a
page dedicated to reporting developments in Turkey or in the northern part of Cyprus. On page
six, Phileleftheros included a box entitled: Turkey/occupied areas151 and in its Sunday edition a
theme page with articles about the ʻoccupied areasʼ, while it also named its seventeenth page:
Turkey. In the 24 September paper, on page nine, Haravgi published the following headline:
Turkey: The echo of the current newsʼ.152 Politis usually covered news stories about the Turkish
Cypriots or Turkey on page six, where the public could also read the column of the Turkish Cypriot
regular columnist, Sener Levent. 
The newspapers frequently selected stories referring to efforts of the ʻother side  ʼ to achieve
political recognition. They all covered the way that the Turkish Cypriot press reported on the ferry
service from Famagusta to Latakia and Turgay Avcıʼs visit to Italy. These issues were likely
selected because they were considered as matters of de facto recognition of the ʻoccupied areasʼ.
Simerini, for example, posted a picture from a Turkish Cypriot daily to prove that Syria accepted
ʻTRNC  ʼ passports. The caption below the photo was, ʻ“Halkin Sesi”, published in yesterdayʼs
edition (pictures) of the pseudo-stateʼs passports with Syriaʼs stamp (on them)ʼ.153 Phileleftheros
ran an article by Levent Ozadam that had been published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper,
Kibrisli, reporting that ʻSyriaʼs stance was brave and was sending some messages to the
international community. It appears that Avcıʼs visit to Syria produced the desirable results and
that the Syrian officials have accepted the T/C “passports”ʼ.154 Machi stated that ʻthe Turkish
Cypriot media report that the so-called minister of foreign affairs, Turgay Avcı is in Italy to deliver
two passports of the (occupation) regime to two Italian politiciansʼ.155
It also appears that when the G/C newspapers published pieces from the T/C or Turkish press
they changed the semantics of the original texts. This practice of intertwining commentary and facts
was employed by all the Greek Cypriot newspapers.156 Politis republished an article taken from a
Turkish daily, saying that it ʻaccuratelyʼ reported what was noted in the piece in Cumhuriyet; yet
every phrase that suggested authority to the northern part of Cyprus was placed within inverted
commas, such as the words ʻoppositionʼ, ʻprime ministerʼ or ʻparliamentʼ.157 Phileleftheros posted an
article written by Levent Ozadam covering the ferry services from Famagusta to Syria. The piece
seems to have been published unedited but the words ʻTRNCʼ and ʻpassportsʼ were enclosed
within quotation marks,158 indicating that the piece was tailored to fit the general stance of the
Greek Cypriots that the ʻoccupied areasʼ did not have the status of a state. Machi reported what
was published in the Turkish Cypriot press and wrote that, ʻMr. Toptan mentioned his trip to the
occupied areas and said that traditionally the first journey of each President of the Grand National
Assembly is in the pseudo-stateʼ.159 Mr. Toptan, obviously, did not use the words ʻoccupied areasʼ
or ʻpseudo-stateʼ.
151 See example, Spyros Athanasiades, ʻΤουρκία/ Κατεχόμενα [Turkey/ Occupied areas]ʼ, Philelefhteros, 4.9.2007:6.
152 Haravgi, ʻΤουρκία στον απόηχο της Επικαιρότητας [Turkey: The echo of the current news]ʼ, Haravgi, 24.9.2007:9.
153 Michalis Hadjistylianou, ʻΣτα πρόθυρα διπλωματικού επεισοδίου με Δαμασκό: Αγνόησε το ΥΠ. Εξωτερικών ο Επιτετραμμένος της
Συρίας [On the verge of a diplomatic episode with Damascus: Syriaʼs attaché ignored the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]ʼ, Simerini, 25.9.2007:3.
154 Spyros Athanasiades, ʻΗ Συρία μπορεί να γίνει γέφυρα [Syria can become a bridge]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 25.9.2007:6.
155 No author, ʻΤο παίζουν «Κινέζοι» στη Δαμασκό: Κανονικό δούλεμα τριών 24ωρων από τη Συρία [They pretend to know nothing in
Damascus: Syria played us for 3 days]ʼ, Machi, 25.9.2007:27. 
156 This practice was also used by the journalists in articles that were not published by the T/C press. See, for example, Michalis Hadjistylianou,
ʻΠιέστε τον Ταλάτ για την 8η Ιουλίου: Κοινό αίτημα Κύπρου-Ελλάδας στο Γ.Γ. του ΟΗΕ Μπαν Κι-Μουν [Pressure Talat for the July 8th
(agreement): Common request by Cyprus and Greece to the Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-moon]ʼ, Simerini, 24.9.2007:5. In this article,
while the journalist described the meeting of President Papadopoulos with the UN Secretary General, he mixed his opinion with the facts in
order to blame Talat for trying to cancel the 8 July agreement. 
157 Vaggelis Vasiliou, ʻΣτο παιγνίδι το ΚΕΕ: Σενάρια για αλλαγή στο στάτους του κατοχικού στρατού [UBP in the game: Scenarios for the
change of the occupation armyʼs status]ʼ, Politis, 6.9.2007:6.
158 Spyros Athanasiades, ʻΗ Συρία μπορεί να γίνει γέφυρα [Syria can become a bridge]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 25.9.2007:6.
159 No author, ʻΠαράνομη επίσκεψη στα κατεχόμενα και από τον Τοπτάν [Toptan will also illegally visit the occupied areas]ʼ, Machi, 5.9.2007:9.
The same words were used in Phieleftheros, which indicates that both newspapers used the same source, probably the Cyprus News Agency. 
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Conclusion
For the dates researched here, the dailies showed little change from 2002; they appear to have
remained bound by their political or ideological beliefs and they also continued to promote specific
positions with the same techniques, strategies and tools used in the earlier period. The
newspaper stances, their resources and limitations still played a very important role in the way a
news story was changed and promoted, but for this period of study it appears that there was a
greater effort for objectivity. This attempt at greater impartiality, however, did not stop the dailies
from promoting their own positions.
All the newspapers maintained their 2002 stances with regard to the solution to the Cyprus
Problem.  Simerini and Machi continued pointing out the divergence of opinion between the two
communities, and they still blamed Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership for placing obstacles
in the path to a solution. Phileleftheros, which was always careful not to oppose the official stance
of the Greek Cypriot side, backed the July 8 agreement but also supported positions that could lead
away from the agreed form of the solution. Politis and Haravgi, following a policy of rapprochement,
stressed the need for a prompt settlement that would reunify the island.
In this period the press focused less on the solution, as attention was turned towards the
presidential elections. Analysis of the news stories revealed that most newspapers offered
favorable coverage to specific parties or politicians. This trend, also observed in 2002, was
manifested through several practices, including overrepresentation of a party and/or a politician;
reporting specific subjects favorably and/or unfavorably in relation to a candidate or a party;
portrayal of certain parties or candidates positively and/or negatively; use of flattering statements
made by an influential individual in favor of a candidate; and, last but not least, the projection of
the notion that the presidential hopeful, backed by the party to which a daily offered favorable
coverage, would win the presidential elections. 
The depiction of the EU was inconsistent, as media positions changed frequently. The EU
would be perceived either as an ally or as an enemy according to its stance on several issues that
were related to the Republic of Cyprus. This was also noted in the 2002 press analysis.
The press considered certain groups to be ʻus  ʼor ʻour side  ʼand other groups as the ʻothersʼ,
each characterized by a specific image. The Greek Cypriots and the Greeks were viewed as ʻour
sideʼ. Machi and Simerini especially, as in the previous period of study, emphasized the bond
between the Greek Cypriots and Greece. Haravgi continued to consider the two communities as
one people. All newspapers however, seemed to feel there was a close connection between the
Republic of Cyprus and Greece. 
The ʻother side  ʼcomprised several categories. The Turkish Cypriots were depicted favourably,
although their leadership was pictured negatively. The portrayal of the settlers in even darker
colors shows that they were considered to be part of Turkeyʼs well-planned strategy to alter the
demography in Cyprus and achieve a new status quo. Turkey was always pictured as a country
that wanted partition and hindered peace. It was projected as the Greek Cypriots  ʼenemy, aiming
for a settlement unfavourable to the Republic of Cyprus, and for the political recognition of the
ʻoccupied areasʼ. Some dailies even depicted it as dangerous, increasing perhaps the security
concerns of the Greek Cypriots. 
Regardless of their political persuasions or identity beliefs, the newspapers portrayed the
Greek Cypriots as the good guys who were willing to end the deadlock on the island. Conversely,
Simerini and Phileleftheros projected the idea that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership
blocked the process of solution. These contradicting images became more obvious in reportages
about the past. The use of memories by Simerini, Phileleftheros and Politis put forth the view that
Greek Cypriots were the victims of the conflict and the ones who deserved the sympathy of the
international community. 
The northern part of the island under Turkish control was characterized as the ʻoccupied areasʼ
and depicted negatively. All the newspapers repeatedly reported news stories that were linked to
the matter of indirect recognition of this part. This perhaps reflected the Greek Cypriots  ʼfear of
losing forever a territory which they considered as their own. Moreover, that area of the island was
often depicted as a source of problems for the Republic of Cyprus. 
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The news stories from Turkish Cypriot dailies were changed before being republished by Greek
Cypriot newspapers. Many of the articles selected for publication referred to the efforts of the
ʻother side  ʼto achieve political recognition.  Furthermore, in this section of the report it appeared
that the newspapers systematically tailored the semantics used in the original texts to their own
stances. This practice of intertwinement between views and facts was employed by all dailies. 
Synthia Pavlou
GREEK CYPRIOT TELEVISION IN 2007-2008
Synthia Pavlou
The different reality of television 
It has been said that a news report is ʻonly a passing parade of specific events, a “context of no
context”ʼ.1 Our research, however, reveals that a newscast not only reports on the big news of the
moment, but also carries its own implicit messages. 
Here we examine the roles of the presenters, the headlines, the subtitles, and the voice-overs.2
Yet a broadcasting team uses much more than words to describe an event, to convey information
or certain views to the public. Therefore, besides the story content, we must also examine the
order of news items, their length, accompanying images, statements of the people included in the
news and natural ambient sound. 
The Data
The five national free-to-air television channels, the public service Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation
(Ραδιοφωνικό Ίδρυμα Κύπρου - RIK), and the commercial Mega, ANT1, Sigma and Plus TV 3
are examined in this part of the research. The data studied were drawn from the main evening
news bulletins, for the same dates as for newspapers, i.e., from 4 to 7 September, 24 to 26
September 2007 and 17 to 20 January 2008.
The main news stories and what they reveal
At the beginning of September 2007, the meeting between President Tassos Papadopoulos and
the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat was widely covered in all the media. In the same month
all channels also covered the forest fires in Greece and emphasized the Cypriot contribution.
Additionally, the initiation of a ferry service between the occupied port of Famagusta and Latakia in
Syria was extensively reported. In January 2008, the presidential elections and the candidatesʼ
campaigns dominated the eight oʼclock news bulletins. 
These top news stories, which were repeatedly covered, along with a series of supplementary
reportages are examined to reveal the following:  
a) Trends /practices of television stations; 
b) The stances of each TV channel regarding the solution, the government, the political parties, the
European Union and the ʻother sideʼ; 
The strategies followed to promote these positions. 
Media Practices
The study reveals the main practices that the stations used to draw viewers to their newscast
while trying to remain competitive and inform the audience of significant events as objectively as
possible. 
1 Shanto Iyengar, ʻTelevision News and Citizens  ʼExplanations of National Issuesʼ, American Political Science Review, 81, no. 3, September
1987:140.
2 Spoken copy or dialogue delivered by an announcer who is heard but not seen. See, Institute of Communications and Advertising. (No date), ICA
Glossary of Media Terminology: Broadcast & Internet [online]. Available from: http://www.ica-ad.com/pdf/publications/MediaGlossary.pdf
[Accessed 2 June 2008].
3 This channel was launched on 28 July 2006 and it was called CNC (Cyprus New Channel) Plus TV.
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News offerings and competitiveness
Some argue that ʻtelevision reporting is nothing more than a “section” of a commercial businessʼ.4
This might explain the various stategies and practices that the stations employed to increase the
competitiveness of their product, which in this case was the eight oʼclock news report. 
A more fulfilling viewing experience
Television channels aim to keep the public tuned to their newscast; they have to remain
competitive to stay in business, and so they ʻ invent  ʼways to maintain viewers  ʼinterest. To this end,
most stations offer a mix of visual and verbal information5 aiming to ʻ sensationalize and glamorizeʼ 6
the news. Such means were the use of special effects such as the split screen technique, the
video wall, images and words that gradually appeared on the screen, shots which succeeded
each other giving the impression of turning pages and graphics seamlessly mixed with live action.
The assumed goal is to astonish the audience, engage viewers in a fulfilling viewing experience
and become the market leader in news production.7 Electronic images, which are considered vital
in todayʼs news bulletins that ʻblend  ʼinformation with entertainment (infotainment),8 seem to have
helped the channels titillate the viewers. 
In addition to computer-generated graphics, sound was also manipulated for maximum effect.
Music, for example, was used to create a dramatic backdrop,9 possibly resulting in the amusement
of the public10 or simply emphasizing the significance of a story.11 As background to their reportage,
the TV stations played  different types of melodies that could lead to eliciting audience responses
such as laughter,12 tears13 or a rapid heartbeat. Ambient sound as an accompaniment to news
stories could make the reportages more vibrant and appealing; e.g., the applause heard during
news stories about the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of Cyprus presidency is an
example of this media practice.14
Wide coverage and timely report of the news
The TV stations were quite competitive; two tactics that could garner large audiences were wide
coverage and timely reporting of the news. These features enabled TV channels not only to keep
their audience up-to-date about an important development, but also to improve the quality of their
nightly newscast. 
A practice in the effort to give extensive coverage was to air different reportages for the same
news story. One example was coverage of the submission of presidential candidacies, for which
all the channels offered several different reports.15
4 Stelios Papathanasopoulos, Η Δύναμη της Τηλεόρασης: Η Λογική του Μέσου [Television power: From Medium to market logic, Athens:
Kastaniotis, 1997:257.
5 Carole Rich, Ειδησεογραφία και Ρεπορτάζ [Writing and Reporting news - A coaching method] (translated by N.Sarris), Athens: Ellin
publications G. Parikos & CO. EE, 1997
6 Ulysses award (no date), The art of reportage [online]. Available from: http://www.lettre-ulysses-award.org/about/Art_of_Reportage.html
[Accessed 2 June 2008]. 
7 See, for example, the split screen technique on Plus TV, item 5, 20.1.2008; Mega, item 11, 20.1.2008. See also, the effects used by RIK and
Mega in their news stories about the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of Cyprus presidency. RIK, item 1, 18.1.2008; Mega, item 4,
18.1.2008; Sigma, item 9, 19.1.2008; ANT1, item 4, 6.9.2007. The researcher separated the news report into different items by counting the
news stories that were introduced by the presenter. The stories that are linked to certain reportage were classified by the number of the relevant
news story and a letter, for example 1a, 1b, 1c, etc. 
8 Papathanasopoulos, 1997:253.
9 Mega broadcast a news story about a team of MPs from the Republic of Cyprus sent to the European Parliament to sandbag the spread of
negative impressions that might have been created by the positions of MEP, Marios Matsakis, regarding a solution based on two separate
states. A music that implied danger was heard at the beginning of this reportage; Mega, item 3, 5.9.2007. 
10 A news story about a concert organized for the support of Demetris Christofiasʼs candidacy was aired by Plus TV. It passed its own political
messages but it was also related to entertainment issues. This is why it was accompanied by the music pieces of those who would participate
in this event; Plus TV, item 4, 20.1.2008.
11 See, for example, ANT1, item 5, 17.1.2008. This reportage was about the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of Cyprus presidency.
See also, RIK, item 7, 26.9.2007. This news story was about a poll regarding the Presidential elections. 
12 ANT1 aired a story about funny instances that occurred during the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of Cyprus presidency. A cheerful
tune was heard at the beginning of this reportage to cultivate the appropriate mood in the audience. See, ANT1, item 4, 18.1.2008.
13 A news story about the fires that broke out in Greece began with a sad melody. See Mega, item 6, 5.9.2007.
14 Mega, items 4a and 4b, 18.1.2008; RIK, items 2, 3 and 4, 18.1.2008; Sigma, item 4, 18.1.2008; Plus TV, item 1, 18.1.2008. 
15 Plus TV, items 1-7, 18.1.2008; RIK, items 1-5, 18.1.2008; ANT1, items 2-5, 18.1.2008; Mega, items 4, 4a-4c, 5-6, 6a-6b and 7, 18.1.2008;
Sigma, items 4-6, 18.1.2008.
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Live broadcasting was a practice the stations employed in order to instantly report on newsworthy
issues, which could attract the attention of the audience and eventually help them win the viewing
race. All five television stations tried to offer wide coverage of significant events while simulta -
neously attempting to broadcast breaking news in real time. They used live links, studio interviews,
live telephone reports and last-minute information delivered by a journalist to the newsroom. The
meeting between Papadopoulos and Talat was one of the news stories broadcast live, proving that
the stations were constantly present and ready to report a significant development.16 The display of
different windows on the screen was another live broadcasting-related tool that helped the
channels remain competitive; it was likely used to dazzle the viewers and persuade them that they
were not only being provided with very thorough coverage but also with a valuable commodity.
This technique was employed in the news stories on the ferry service from the port of Famagusta
to Latakia17 and the visit of several EU officials to Cyprus upon the countryʼs adoption of the euro.18
The channels  ʼ attempt to broadcast developments as quickly as possible and their wish to
reach the top-rated spot were perhaps the reasons behind their decision to employ international
correspondents or to send their local journalists abroad to cover specific events.19 This practice
confirmed the stations  ʼefforts for providing extra and timely information on a variety of issues. 
Scoops and extra information
TV channels tried to provide exclusive coverage of events or developments. This was most often
in the form of offering additional information about a widely reported event.  This perhaps
contributed to their reliability, and helped them gain a larger audience as they earned the trust of
the viewers. This, in turn, could subsequently help them to promote their views, draw more funds
and remain competitive. ANT1 aired ʻa well-documented (ντοκουμέντο)ʼ video20 and Plus TV
offered ʻan exclusiveʼ video21 highlighting the fact that they broadcast unique images, which no
other channel had filmed, attesting to the importance of extra information. 
If a station scooped all the others by airing a news story first, then it made sure to point it out.
This was achieved by placing the word ʻexclusiveʼ22 on the screen, or more commonly, by empha -
sizing in the introductory headlines or reports that a piece of information23 or a statement24 would
be only broadcast by that specific station. 
Impartiality and truthfulness
ʻThe power of television is partly attributed to its completeness: it entertains, comments and
informsʼ.25 In this part of the report we will examine whether the stations tried to objectively inform
the public. This issue is crucial since television news is the most important source of information
for the majority of people in western societies.26
It appears that most channels attempted to cover some news as neutrally as possible. The
stations tried to objectively report various events not only to serve their duty as news providers
but also to gain credibility and ensure the publicʼs trust. This tactic seems to have subsequently
16 RIK, item 1, 5.9.2007; Plus TV, item 1, 5.9.2007; ANT1, item 1, 5.9.2007; ANT1, item 3, 5.9.2007; Mega, item 1, 5.9.2007; Sigma, item 1,
5.9.2007. 
17 Plus TV, item 2, 24.9.2007. 
18 Mega, item 8, 18.1.2008; Sigma, item 15, 18.1.2008; RIK, item 8, 18.1.2008.
19 RIK, items 1 and 3, 24.9.2007. RIK also collaborated with a correspondent in Greece who delivered reports regarding the countryʼs current
affairs. See, for example, RIK, item 8, 6.9.2007; Plus TV, item 8, 5.9.2007; Sigma, item 6, 6.9.2007; Sigma, item 17, 6.9.2007. Additionally,
Sigma collaborated with a journalist in Brussels who informed the public about EU issues. See, for example, Sigma, item 7, 17.1.2008; ANT1,
item 13, 5.9.2007; Mega, item 4, 24.9.2007.
20 ANT1, item 6, 5.9.2007. 
21 Plus TV, item 9, 25.9.2007. 
22 Sigma, item 3, 17.1.2008.
23 Data in a leading story of RIK were attributed to ʻRIKʼs informationʼ: RIK, item 1, 24.9.2007. ANT1 aired the developments on the issue of the
ferry service between Famagusta and Latakia based on ʻANT1ʼs reliable informationʼ: ANT1, item 13, 25.9.2007. 
24 RIK, item 16, 18.1.2008.
25 Papathanasopoulos, 1997:261.
26 Maria Komninou and Christos Lirintzis, eds. Κοινωνία, Εξουσία και Μέσα Μαζικής Ενημέρωσης [Society, Power and Mass Media], Athens:
Papazisis, 1989:242. 
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helped the stations to ʻsell  ʼ their own perceptions and opinions about other significant political
issues. The way the campaigns for the presidential elections were presented can support this
view. Most channels repeatedly attempted to include the opinions or actions of the three main
candidates in the same news bulletin.27
The stations followed several strategies to gain credibility. One was the use of numbers, which
were perhaps included to substantiate their claims, but probably also to persuade the public that
whatever was reported was true and accurate. The meeting between Papadopoulos and Talat can
once again be used as an example to support this argument. The channels informed the viewers
of the exact time the two leaders arrived at the residence of the United Nationʼs special envoy,
and they also specified the time frame of the meeting.28
Financial Support
While most stations appear to have tried to cover some news as neutrally as possible, still, this
research found that many times their depiction of events was affected by certain views and
political aspirations. Sponsorship appears to have partly influenced the stations  ʼ representations.
RIK, for example, which is a state-funded public service station, appears to have offered favorable
coverage to the government. Mega, on the other hand, which is owned by the Church of Cyprus
and Teletypos S.A., sometimes offered coverage to activities and the views of the Church.
Furthermore, this channel occasionally highlighted the role of the Church in several matters while
in many cases it backed the Churchʼs stance.29
Discourses and Media Practices
The form of the solution
The news stories covered during the timeframe of this research did not offer enough material for
categorising the various strategies used by the media to project their stances. Therefore, the focus
here is on the channels  ʼideologies related to the settlement of the Cyprus Problem and not the
journalistic practices used to promote their views on this subject. 
Our analysis reveals that no channel explicitly opposed the official stance of the government
regarding the way forward for a solution. They all appear to have considered the Gambari
agreement as an acceptable arrangement to reach a solution of the Cyprus Problem. 
Mega invited prominent DIKO, DISY and AKEL officials to their studio to share their opinions
on the upcoming meeting between Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat. The presenter
initiated the discussion using the following words: ʻOur side aims…to begin the July 8 processʼ.30 On
the next dayʼs news bulletin, it was stressed that ʻthe Greek Cypriot side correctly insists on the
agreement reached a year agoʼ.31 The use of the possessive determiner of the personal pronoun
ʻwe  ʼin the first example and use of the adverb ʻjustly  ʼin the second sentence reveal that Mega
adopted the official position of the government on the solution sought. RIK also appears to have
projected the idea that the Gambari process could end the deadlock in the country. One of the
journalists who covered the leaders  ʼmeeting said that the July 8 agreement was ʻthe beginning
of a substantial effort for the solution of the Cyprus problemʼ.32 Plus TV also seems to have
supported this process; during a report on the Papadopoulos-Talat meeting it said that ʻAKEL
expresses its satisfaction with the National Councilʼs… reassurance that we will honor the July 8
27 RIK, item 21, 20.1.2008; Mega Cyprus, items 15-17, 20.1.2007; ANT1, items 9, 9a, 9b, 20 .1.2008; Sigma, item 7 and 13, 20.1.2008; Sigma
did not broadcast a campaign-related reportage about Papadopoulos, but, it did air a news story in which Tassos Papadopoulosʼs positions on
the water problem were positively described: Sigma, item 6, 20.1.2008.
28 Sigma, item 1, 5.9.2007; RIK, item 1, 5.9.2007; ANT1, item 1, 5.9.2007; Plus TV, item 1, 5.9.2007. Mega used numerical data to convey that
the Turkish-Cypriot leader did not actually wish to re-affirm his commitment to the Gambari agreement. In one of this channelʼs news stories it
was said that ʻfifty meetingsʼ between President Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat reveal that the latter politician did not want to implement
the July 8 agreement: Mega, item 1, 5.9.2007. 
29 Mega, item 11, 26.9.2007. Compare with RIK, item 13, 26.9.2007 and Sigma, item 13, 26.9.2007.
30 Mega, item 6, 4.9.2007. 
31 Mega, item 1, 5.9.2007. 
32 RIK, item 1, 5.9.2007. 
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agreement which, in its first paragraph, commits the two sides to work for a bi-zonal bi-communal
federal solutionʼ.33 This was also stressed during another Plus TV news story about the United
Democratic Youth Unionʼs (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Οργάνωση Νεολαίας – EDON) views on the
settlement.34 Plus TV, which always offered favorable coverage to AKEL and often took the line of
this partyʼs stances, favored the implemen tation of the Gambari agreement and a solution based
on the bi-zonal bi-communal federation.  
ANT1ʼs and Sigmaʼs views on this subject were not clearly revealed. However, the fact that
both channels criticized the Turkish Cypriot leader for not wanting to implement the July 8
process35 might imply that they supported this agreement, meaning that their notions about this
issue were aligned with those of the government. 
The fact that all five Greek Cypriot stations enthusiastically pointed out that the UN Secretary-
General, Ban Ki Moon, backed the Gambari process during his meeting in New York with
President Papadopoulos, reinforces the argument that they were not against the arrangement.36
This matter united the channels against the ʻother side  ʼwhich was considered to be Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This unanimity was less evident when the channels reported news
stories that were not related to the solution. 
The Government and the Parties
Our analysis attempted to trace the channels  ʼstances on the government and the political parties
by examining the journalistic practices and the ways that certain views received favorable
treatment. 
Any news or events linked to the presidential elections were widely covered by the stations and
revealed their stances, representations and practices. RIK 37 appears to have been the channel
that dedicated the most broadcast time to this issue, with Plus TV 38 and Mega39 not far behind.
ANT140 and Sigma41 included reports in their news bulletins that were related to this political
matter, but they did not focus on this subject. The analysis of the news stories revealed that most
television stations had preferences and offered more favorable coverage to certain people or
parties. This trend was also noticed in reports that were not linked to the issue of the elections. 
Wider coverage for one party and its candidate
Most channels seem to have overrepresented certain politicians or parties. Sometimes this was
evidenced by the fact that a particular personʼs or partyʼs actions and/or views were the only
subject of a news story. The examples given below substantiate this claim.
This research revealed that ANT1 and RIK offered more favorable coverage to Papadopoulos
during the pre-election period. On one day both channels emphasized the stances of this politician
in reports that focused solely on the Presidentʼs views on the solution of the Cyprus Problem.42
On the other hand, Sigma, which appears to have remained neutral during the elections, and Plus
TV, which seems to have offered favorable coverage to Christofias, included Papadopoulosʼs
statements in a report on another development, the official encounter of the US Under-Secretary
33 Plus TV, item 2, 4.9.2007.
34 Plus TV, item 8, 17.1.2008. 
35 ANT1, item 1, 5.9.2007; Sigma, item 1, 5.9.2007.
36 RIK, item 1, 24.9.2007; Sigma, item 2, 24.9.2007; Mega, item 3, 24.9.2007; ANT1, item 10, 24.9.2007. 
37 RIK aired in total seven news stories related to the Presidential elections in two days. See, RIK, item 1-5 and 19-20, 18.1.2008; RIK, items 1-2, 9-
10, 14 and 18-20, 19.1.2008. The next day, it broadcast six reportages on election issues. See, RIK, items 2, 4-5, 14-15 and 21, 20.1.2008. 
38 Plus TV included seven news stories related to the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of Cyprus Presidency, in one news bulletin. See,
Plus TV, items 1-7, 18.1.2008. Five reportages directly or indirectly connected to the presidential elections were broadcast on each of the
following two days. See, Plus TV, items 1-3, 6 and 9, 19.1.2008; Plus TV, items 1-5, 20.1.2008. 
39 Mega broadcast six news stories and included a speakage in its news bulletin concerning the submissions of candidacy for the Republic of
Cyprus Presidency. See, Mega, items 4, 4a-4c, 5-6, 6a-6b and 7, 18.1.2008. It broadcast five reportages in each of the following two days and
included a speakage linked to the Presidential elections. See, Mega, items 3, 3a-5, 15-16, 19.1.2008 and items 11-12 and 15-17, 20.1.2008. 
40 ANT1 broadcast in total eleven reportages about the elections over three days. See, ANT1, items 2-5, 18.1.2008, items 5, 8, 16 and 21,
19.1.2008 and 9-9a and 10, 20.1.2008. 
41 Sigma also aired 11 news reports connected to the Presidential elections in three days. See, Sigma, items 4-7, 18.1.2008, items 4-5 and 8-9,
19.1.2008 and items 5, 7 and 13, 20.1.2008. 
42 See, ANT1, item 17, 25.9.2007; RIK, item 3, 25.9.2007. 
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for Political Affairs with the Greek Foreign Minister.43 Another example of overrepresentation can
be found in RIKʼs reports on the Papadopoulos-Talat meeting, in which the only views covered
were those of the representatives of DIKO, EDEK and the European Party (Ευρωπαϊκό Κόμμα-
EVROKO)44 which supported the candidacy of Papadopoulos.45 Sigma and Plus TV did not
report the opinions of these three parties in a different news story; instead, they broadcast them
in the same report where they covered the reactions of the parties  ʼleaders to the official encounter
of the President with Mehmet Ali Talat.46
Another example of the extensive reporting of a certain party was the Plus TV broadcast that
focused solely on Christofiasʼs mother and her wishes for her son.47 This event was possibly
televised in an effort to give wider coverage to the general secretary of AKEL. The other channels
that broadcast Mrs. Christofiasʼs statements included them in the report on her sonʼs submission
of candidacy or in the news story on the other candidates  ʼsubmissions.48
Minimum coverage of the independent candidates
Coverage of the independent candidates, in terms of broadcasting time, was not equal to that of
politicians with party backing. Not only were the views of the independent candidates not widely
covered, they were even ridiculed. These observations also support the argument that the
channels served their own political persuasions and preferences.
We can take one newscast of Plus TV to illustrate the unequal allocation of time for independent
versus party-backed candidates. The coverage of Christofiasʼs candidacy lasted approximately
six minutes and thirty seconds;49 for Papadopoulos, two minutes and thirty-six seconds50 and for
Kassoulides, two minutes and fifteen seconds.51 There was only one news story on the six
remaining candidates and it lasted only two minutes and nineteen seconds.52 ANT1 offers another
example, as all submissions were reported in a single story, with Papadopoulos given one minute
and twenty seconds, Christofias one minute and sixteen seconds, and Kassoulides one minute
and nineteen seconds; among independents, Costas Themistocleous was allotted thirty-two
seconds, and Marios Matsakis, thirty-one seconds. No more than ten seconds were dedicated to
the three remaining independent candidates.53
One day, all the stations broadcast several humorous incidences that had occurred during the
submissions. These amusing stories, however, which were also sometimes embarrassing,
concerned only the independent candidates.54 One report of Mega for example, recounted
unexpected events and funny incidents related to minor candidates.55 The subsequent story was
dedicated solely to an independent candidate, highlighting his amusing statements.56
Government-centered or party-centered news stories
A popular means for stations to show their support to a particular party, the government or
candidate was to lead with a news item related to their favourite. They might also highlight the
43 See Sigma, item 13, 25.9.2007; Plus TV, item 3, 25.9.2007. 
44 Tassos Papadopoulosʼs candidacy was supported by DIKO, EDEK, EVROKO, the Fighting Democratic Movement (Αγωνιστικό Δημοκρατικό
Κίνημα- ADIK) and the Ecologists - Environmentalists Movement (Κίνημα Οικολόγων Περιβαλλοντιστών - KOP).
45 RIK, item 3, 6.9.2007. 
46 Sigma, item 1, 6.9.2006; Plus TV, item 1, 6.9.2007. 
47 Plus TV, item 2, 18.1.2008.
48 Mega, item 4b, 18.1.2008; Sigma, item 4, 18.1.2008; RIK, item 3, 18.1.2008; 
49 Plus TV, item 1, 18.1.2008. 
50 Plus TV, item 3, 18.1.2008. 
51 Plus TV, item 4, 18.1.2008. 
52 Plus TV, item 5, 18.1.2008.
53 ANT1, item 2, 18.1.2008. 
54 Only Sigma dedicated some seconds to report an amusing incident that was not related to the independent candidates but to Papadopoulosʼs
supporters. See, Sigma, item 6, 18.1.2008. The rest of the channels that included  reportage of humorous incidences did not do the same;
instead they chose to entertain the public by broadcasting only funny events that happened to the people who were not backed by a specific
party. See, ANT1, item 4, 18.1.2008; Plus TV, item 6, 18.1.2008; RIK, item 19, 18.1.2008. 
55 Mega, item 6a, 18.1.2008.
56 Mega, item 6b, 18.1.2008. 
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views of their preferred party, politician or the government by reporting them in the captions or in
an introductory announcement prior to the main news bulletin. The practice of highlighting
government-centered or party-centered news stories was most often used by RIK and Plus TV. 
For example, in one newscast, RIK began with statements of the President and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs regarding the ferry service from the occupied port of Famagusta to Latakia; the
second story was a sound bite from the Minister of Internal Affairs on his meeting with the Syrian
attaché; the third item reported on Papadopoulosʼs meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov.57 Plus TV, in contrast to RIKʼs government-centered
report, focused on AKEL and Christofias. The first news item covered the meeting of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Erato Kozakou-Markoulli, with her Syrian counterpart,58 but the introduction of
the second focused solely on Christofiasʼs stance on the ferry issue.59 The fourth news story was
about the governmentʼs decision to reduce the heating oil tax, but during the cue and in the voice-
over of this report, AKELʼs position on this matter was heard.60
While the above-described practices resulted in promoting a certain party or a person, when it
came to the presidential elections, we will see that much more powerful weapons that would
ʻcoerce  ʼthe viewers to follow a particular political line, were required. 
Positive representation of politicians and parties
RIK and Plus TV, especially, gave flattering coverage to the candidates and politicians they
supported. For example, Plus TV aired a news story highlighting AKELʼs efforts to help out in the
face of high commodity prices: ʻAKEL increases pressure on the government to give generous
social benefits through a new packageʼ.61 In another story reporting on a music concert, this same
station noted in the cue that the performers, which were well-known Greek musicians, considered
the general secretary of AKEL ʻan outstanding leader, a positive and firm politician who [would]
unite the people and lead Cyprus toward a fair solution that would set the foundations for a just
societyʼ.62 Conversely, RIK often stressed the virtues of the govern ment and the President by
pointing out that they could handle all kinds of challenges and successfully tackle the deadlock in
the country. In a lead story it noted that although Papadopoulos was in New York, he remained
ʻfully informedʼ on the Syria issue.63 In a different news story the following words were heard: ʻhe
personally gives instructions for the operations and the demarches…ʼ.64
Negative representation of a ʻrival  ʼcandidate or a party
On occasion most channels presented news stories in an unfavorable manner towards a certain
candidate or party that did not share the channelʼs views or opposed the person or political group
to which they offered favorable coverage. 
ANT1, for example, in the cue to a news item on President Papadopoulosʼs meeting with the
UN Secretary General, wrote: ʻIoannis Kassoulides and Costas Themistocleous… had a negative
attitude and clearly reduced [the meetingʼs] importanceʼ.65 Similarly, Mega aired a story on the
refugees  ʼbuilding coefficient, stating, ʻAKEL insists on considering that the pro posed measure
was to no avail…while it was also aggressively opposed to the other benefits announced by the
Presidentʼ.66 Plus TV was often critical of the government, e.g., ʻThe issue of the ferry service
between the occupied areas and Latakia caught the [government] diplomatic services by surprise.
57 RIK, item 1-3, 26.9.2007.
58 Plus TV, item 1, 26.9.2007. 
59 Plus TV, item 2, 26.9.2007. 
60 Plus TV, item 4, 26.9.2007. 
61 Plus TV, item 5, 24.9.2007. 
62 Plus TV, item 4, 20.1.2008. 
63 RIK, item 1, 25.9.2007. 
64 RIK, item 4, 25.9.2007. 
65 ANT1, item 10, 24.9.2007. 
66 Mega, item 8, 17.1.2008. 
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They are trying to catch up before things get worse…ʼ;67 and, on another occasion;, ʻThe govern -
mentʼs decision to reduce the heating oil tax, five months prior to the presidential elections,
caused turmoilʼ,68 implying that Papadopoulos announced this measure simply to win more votes.
The European Union
Developments related to the EU and the Republic of Cyprus were widely covered by all the
stations except Plus TV. The European Union would be illustrated either as an ally or as an enemy
according to its stance on issues that concerned the island.
The EU as an ally
During the timeframe of this research, a story that received wide coverage concerned the view of
the EU vice-president and Commissioner responsible for transport, Jacques Barrot, on Turkeyʼs
embargo on ships sailing under the flag of the Republic of Cyprus. Because of his stance the EU
was pictured as a community that supported the rights of the Greek Cypriots.69 RIK wrote in a
caption: ʻA firm message to Turkeyʼ, while the journalistʼs voice-over began, ʻThe vice-president of
the European Commission…harshly warned Turkey for its responsibilities for a second time within
twenty-four hoursʼ.70 Megaʼs caption was almost identical; its presenter said that Jacques Barrot
ʻcondemned Turkeyʼ; the voice-over noted that the Commisioner responsible for transport was
ʻexplicitʼ.71 Sigma announced that the vice-president of the European Commission gave a ʻclear
messageʼ to Turkey: ʻJacques Barrot warns Turkey that the embargo is also its own problem: Firm
messageʼ.72 These three stations used the same sharp words to describe this event in an effort
perhaps to project that the vice-president of the European Commission, who was thought to
represent the position of the EU, took the side of the Greek Cypriots.73
The European Union as an enemy
Sometimes the Union was pictured negatively, as noted in the case of two stations which depicted
the EU as being in favor of the ʻother sideʼ. This representation might reveal the stations  ʼstance,
but it could also imply the position that the Greek Cypriots had justified demands and expected
EU support. 
The view of the European Commission that the Republic of Cyprus ought to take immediate
measures in order to stem illegal immigration across the buffer zone, which was included in its
annual report on the Green Line,74 was read by the media as pro-Turkey. Regarding the report,
ANT1 correspondent in Brussels said, ʻthe commission attempts to lead Nicosia to a tragic
dilemma, asking the Cypriot government to substantially reinforce the policing of the Green Line,
something that in reality will create the image of a hard border between the free areas and
occupied Cyprusʼ, adding, ʻone would expect that the commission would turn [its recommen da tions
towards] Ankara and not towards Nicosiaʼ.75 Plus TV provided another example of the negative
depiction of the EU, with a news story on the visit of the ʻso-called Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the occupied areas to Romeʼ, which alerted the Greek Cypriots. In the report it was said that the
EU was ʻblissfully unaware of the issueʼ,76 thus promoting the notion that the Union was not
helping the Republic of Cyprus in the face of a challenging situation. 
67 Plus TV, introductory theme 2, 24.9.2007. 
68 Plus TV, item 4, 26.9.2007. 
69 Jacques Barrotʼs statement: “Cyprusʼs shipping in particular has to cope with the handicap of the [denied] access to the Turkish ports. Please
be sure that I will work hard to solve this issue. It is not only a problem for Cyprus; it is a problem for Europe and also a problem for Turkey”. 
70 RIK, item 6, 24.9.2007. 
71 Mega, item 16, 24.9.2007. 
72 Sigma, item 16, 24.9.2007. 
73 The fact that the channels used the same words to describe this occurrence might also mean that they were all influenced by a piece originating
from the same source. 
74 The report examines the implementation of the Green Line Regulation of 2004, which “deals with the movement of persons and goods across
the line”. See, The European Commission Representation in Cyprus (no date), Turkish Cypriot Community [online]. Available from:
http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/turkish_community/index_en.htm [Accessed 4 January 2010].
75 ANT1, item 14, 24.9.2007. 
76 Plus TV, item 2, 25.9.2007. 
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ʻUsʼ and the ʻother sideʼ
The channels  ʼviews about who were considered to be ʻus  ʼand who were the ʻothersʼ, and the
image promoted for each category, are examined next. The way they viewed and represented the
occupied areas is also revealed, along with the channels  ʼideologies and the practices with which
these ideologies were put forward. 
A bond with Greece, collaboration with Greek channels
All Greek Cypriot TV stations collaborated with Greek TV stations and re-broadcast specific news
stories from these channels. RIK often presented reports taken from the news bulletins of ERT77
and Alpha,78 while Mega aired news from ʻMega Greeceʼ.79 ANT1 re-broadcast reportages from
ANT1 Greece,80 Plus TV collaborated with Alter 81 and Sigma had an affiliation agreement with
Star Channel.82 The reports taken from the Greek television stations were either about news from
other countries or about the current affairs of Greece. This clearly indicates a connection between
Cyprus and Greece, and the following examples reveal that the Greek Cypriot channels
considered Greece as part of ʻour sideʼ. 
ʻUsʼ, bonds  and identity issues
All TV channels highlighted a connection between Cyprus and Greece by widely covering
important developments in Greece. A clear example of this is the way in which the Greek Cypriot
stations reported the elections in Greece. For an election debate, Sigma connected to its studio
in Athens where its correspondent informed the public about the debate, which would be
conducted that same evening, between the Greek Prime Minister and the party leaders.83 ANT1
aired a report on the debate84 and at the end of its newscast connected with ANT1 Greece which
ran a live broadcast of the beginning of the debate.85 RIK aired a news story about this subject,86
which included a telephone report delivered by its correspondent in Athens.87 Plus TV announced
early in its broadcast that it would carry the debate live.88 Mega did not cover this story until the
following day, but it dedicated three minutes of news time89 to report it.90 Also on the following day,
RIK,91 ANT192 and Sigma93 broadcast updates on the outcome of the debate. Sigma also included
in its newscast a report on this matter, telephoned in to the station by its correspondent.94
Also widely covered were the devastating fires in Greece; stations aired numerous stories while
Plus TV and Sigma even sent journalists there to report the developments, live. Plus TV aired a
broadcast with the caption: ʻExpedition: Plus TVʼs pilgrimage to Artemida: “A Cypriot” hope.ʼ 95 The
choice of words reveals that this station wanted not only to emphasize that it would deliver reports
from where the tragedy occurred but also that the Greek Cypriots boosted the morale of the Greek
victims. Sigma broadcast a news story that included a sound bite from the on-site reporter in
which he described the gratitude of a Greek man towards the Cypriots who battled to save his
77 ERT is the state channel in Greece. See, for example, RIK, items 7 and 8, 4.9.2007. 
78 See for example, RIK, item 5, 5.9.2007. 
79 See for example, Mega, item 11, 5.9.2007. 
80 See for example, ANT1, items 10, 20 and 23, 6.9.2007. 
81 See for example, Plus TV, items 14-15, 24.9.2007. 
82 See for example, Sigma, item 5, 6.9.2007. 
83 Sigma, item 17, 6.9.2007. 
84 ANT1, item 14, 6.9.2007. 
85 ANT1, item 27, 6.9.2007. 
86 ANT1, item 8, 6.9.2007. 
87 RIK, item 10, 6.9.2007. 
88 Plus TV, item 3, 6.9.2007. 
89 A news story that lasts more than two minutes is considered long and is probably about an important issue.
90 Mega, item 10, 7.9.2007. 
91 RIK, item 14, 7.9.2007. 
92 ANT1, item 11, 7.9.2007. 
93 Sigma, item 11, 7.9.2007. 
94 Sigma, item 13, 7.9.2007. 
95 Plus TV, item 8, 5.9.2007. 
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house.96 Cyprusʼs effort to help Greece was highlighted by all the channels, strengthening the
perception that the two countries were closely bound. 
On one day alone, ANT1 and Mega included in their newscasts  ʼtop ten news stories, three
reportages on how much Cyprus had helped Greece face the catastrophe—the Cypriot experts
who made a study for the reconstruction of a burned Greek village;97 the return of the redcap
firefighters;98 Cypriot financial assistance to victims of the fires.99 RIK, too, ran three stories in
one day on how Cyprus stood by Greece,100 one story reporting on the Cyprus Red Cross
donations said that Cypriots had sent ʻin good faith what ever they hadʼ,101 while another on the
reconstruction of Arthemida reported that Cyprus would ʻsubstantially contribute  ʼto bringing the
village back to life.102
Another indication of the perception of close ties with Greece was the fact that some stations
initiated their own efforts to aid the Greek victims. For example, Sigma organized a telethon to
raise money to send to victims, and aired a news story covering this event the next day.103
Reporting on the Cypriot donations, Sigma characterized the Greeks as ʻbrothers  ʼof the Greek
Cypriots,104 the noun ʻbrother  ʼhighlighting the close bonds between Cypriots and Greeks. ANT1
also mounted a fundraiser; and in reporting on its success said, ʻthe Cypriot people showed their
solidarity towards their fire-stricken Greek brothersʼ.105
The other side
The conception of the ʻothers  ʼwas not as clear-cut as that of ʻusʼ. In fact, we identified three
separate categories of the ʻotherʼ, which will be analysed separately:
a) The Turkish Cypriot community;
b) The Turkish Cypriot leadership;
c) Turkey and its troops.
The Turkish Cypriots 
During this period of study most channels stressed that Greek Cypriots did not consider Turkish
Cypriots as the enemy.106 Even when not stated outright, we can infer this from the wording of
reports. For example in a news story about Turkeyʼs goals to increase the number of the settlers
in the north, Sigma stressed that this action would be at the Turkish Cypriots  ʼexpense.107 ANT1ʼs
coverage of the same story—by a Turkish Cypriot who collaborated with the channel—included a
statement made by the governmentʼs spokesman who pointed out that the Turkish Cypriots and
the Greek Cypriots were compatriots.108 The very fact that this station cooperated with a Turkish
Cypriot reporter and aired that specific sound bite could be an indication that it valued the quality
of relations with the ʻother  ʼside. Another lead story on ANT1 reported the findings of a survey of
Greek Cypriots  ʼ stances towards the Turkish Cypriots, stressing in the cue that ʻsix out of ten
Greek Cypriots [were] … in favor of living with the Turkish Cypriotsʼ.109 Reporting on an incident
where the Cypriot athlete Marcos Baghdatis chanted the slogan ʻTurks out of Cyprusʼ at a
96 Sigma, item 6, 6.9.2007. 
97 ANT1, item 3, 4.9.2004; Mega , item 7, 4.9.2007.
98 ANT1, item 6, 4.9.2007; Mega , item 9, 4.9.2007. 
99 ANT1, item 8, 4.9.2007; Mega , item 8, 4.9.2007. 
100 See one of them: RIK, item 19, 7.9.2007. 
101 RIK, item 20, 7.9.2007. 
102 RIK, item 21, 7.9.2007. 
103 Sigma, item 6, 6.9.2007. 
104 Sigma, item 22, 7.9.2007; Sigma, item 7, 5.9.2007. 
105 ANT1, item 7, 6.9.2007. 
106 Safe conclusions could not be drawn about the way RIK viewed the Turkish-Cypriots. Therefore this channel is excluded from the examples
which are given in order to show the stances of the stations regarding this community. 
107 Sigma, item 10, 17.1.2008. 
108 ANT1, item 15, 17.1.2008.
109 ANT1, item 4, 17.1.2008. 
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gathering in Australia,110 Mega defended him, pointing out that ʻit is clear that when we say Turks
we refer to the Turkish occupation forcesʼ and not to the Turkish Cypriots.111 Plus TV generally
took the stance of AKEL, and so appeared to endorse rapprochement. It ran a news story on the
youth sections of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot party who declared that partition was
catastrophic ʻfor Cyprus and for its people, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriotsʼ.112
Another story emphasized the need for re-unification and promoted the idea of amity between the
two communities; this report described a Turkish Cypriot, who supported Christofias, embracing
a Greek Cypriot priest,113 a scene suggesting also that the two communities tolerated each otherʼs
religious views.
A gloomy portrait of the Turkish Cypriot leadership
No station offered a positive portrayal of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Most channels called
Mehmet Ali Talat ʻthe occupation leaderʼ.114 He was frequently illustrated as following Ankaraʼs
policies and obstructing a solution to the Cyprus Problem by requesting procedures different than
those already agreed. Coverage of the Papadopoulos-Talat meeting clearly reveals this.115 RIKʼs
introductory headlines said: ʻTalat fought to kill the July 8 [agreement]ʼ,116 while on the same day
Megaʼs lead story reiterated, ʻMehmet Ali Talatʼs refusal to comply with what was agreed on the
July 8 and his insistence on changing the talks  ʼprocedure, which he himself had agreed to 14
months earlier, led…[the] meeting into a deadlockʼ.117 ANT1 announced that the ʻoccupation
leader torpedos the July 8 processʼ, and portrayed Talat as an adamant and a revengeful person
who refused a second meeting with Papadopoulos when he realized that his plans would not
materialize.118 A similar representation was observed on Sigma: ʻMehmet Ali Talat was negative
and dismissive. He said no to Tassos [who proposed] a new meeting on Mondayʼ.119
Moreover, the same three channels depicted Talat as Turkeyʼs dutiful servant. RIK claimed that
ʻobviously following Turkeyʼs instructionsʼ, Mehmet Ali Talat pursued different goals than
Papadopoulos during their meeting.120 Reporting on the Turkish governmentʼs intention to
increase the number of settlers in the north, Sigma said that ʻthis dramatic development occurred
after Talatʼs recent visit to Turkeyʼ,121 implying that the Turkish Cypriot leader was following
Turkeyʼs orders. The first sentence of ANT1ʼs cue was: ʻ[The will] of Turkey prevailed regarding
the assignment of so-called citizenship in the pseudo-state to thousands of settlersʼ.122 The
choice of words reveals that according to ANT1 the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not wish for this
action, but still obeyed Turkeyʼs demands. 
Turkey and its troops as the villain
The stations also depicted Turkey and its troops very negatively. This was revealed in several
news stories in which the choice of words repeatedly highlighted that this country was the
Republic of Cyprus  ʼfoe. 
ANT1ʼs and Sigmaʼs portrayal of Turkey seemed slightly darker than the other channels. These
stations projected the view that the Turkish troops, which they called ʻAttila  ʼ(Αττίλες),123 posed a
grave threat. ANT1 aired a news story with the caption: ʻNew provocations: The Turks opened fire
110 Mega, item 1, 18.1.2008. 
111 Mega, item 1b, 18.1.2008. 
112 Plus TV, item 8, 17.1.2008. 
113 Plus TV, item 6, 18.1.2008. 
114 Sigma, item 3, 4.9.2007; ANT1 Cyprus, item 4, 6.9.2007; Plus TV, item 1, 4.9.2007; Mega, item 4, 24.9.2007.
115 Plus TV was the only station that did not negatively depict Mr. Papadopoulos in this news story.
116 RIK, first introductory headline, 6.9.2007. 
117 Mega, item 1, 6.9.2007. 
118 ANT1, item 4, 6.9.2007. 
119 Sigma, newscastʼs introduction, 6.9.2007. 
120 RIK, item 1, 6.9.2007. 
121 Sigma, item 10, 17.1.2008. 
122 ANT1, item 15, 17.1.2008. 
123 See, ANT1, item 6, 5.9.2007; Sigma, item 3, 17.1.2008. 
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at Kokkina against Greek Cypriot flocksʼ.124 Sigma ran a newscast recalling events in the village
of Mia Milia in the summer of 1974: ʻThe occupied village was at the center of the invasion troopsʼ
attack… the inhabitants and several [Greek Cypriot soldiers] found themselves exposed. They
were surrounded and many of them were killed on the spot. Others were captured and transferred
to Turkeyʼ.125
Furthermore, three channels highlighted Turkeyʼs link to illegal activities. Sigma broadcast the
news that police found a weapon that they identified as originating from Turkey. It used a caption
reading: ʻTurkish pistolʼ;126 while Megaʼs headline for the same story was: ʻA pistol of Turkish
originʼ.127 ANT1 stressed the same in its cue reporting the incident,128 and in another story, aired the
same day, blamed Turkey for problems in the Republic of Cyprus concerning illegal immigration. In
its coverage of the annual report of the European Commission on the Green Line, it said that ʻone
would expect that the commission would direct [its recommen dations] to Ankara and not Nicosia,
since 36.4% of the 3778 immigrants picked up in Cyprus had a Turkish visa on their passportsʼ.129
All the channels ʻaccused  ʼTurkey of importing people from Anatolia, as part of a well-planned
strategy to change the demography of Cyprus and ensure Turkish dominance in the north and
establish her authority on the island. They often reported news stories related to the settlers— a
very sensitive issue for the Greek Cypriot community. In Sigmaʼs reports harsh epithets were
used, not only to describe these people, but also to depict Turkey, considered responsible for their
rising numbers: ʻTurkey makes a new provocative gesture in the occupied areas. She increases
the number of settlers by tens of thousands negating the population balanceʼ. This action was
characterized as Ankaraʼs transgression.130 In ANT1ʼs cue the presenter announced that Turkey
intended to transfer 50,000 people to Cyprus,131 while Plus TV reported that ʻaccording to
Ankaraʼs demands, the number of applicants for so-called Turkish Cypriot citizenship will gradually
reach 50,000ʼ.132 Mega referred to ʻthe pseudo-stateʼs intention of giving…so-called citizenship to
thousands of Turkish citizensʼ,133 and although Mega did not name Turkey as the instigator of this
plan, this country was thought to control the decisions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the
ʻoccupation regimeʼ. Two days later RIK broadcast a report on Papadopoulosʼs statements about
Turkey, and used a caption reading: ʻTurkish plan for colonialismʼ, with no indication that they were
actually quoting the President. This phrase also projected the idea that Turkey was responsible
for the alteration of the demography in the north.134
One last notion related to Turkey that four channels135 highlighted was that she fought to
legalize the regime in the northern part of Cyprus. Reporting on the Papadopoulos-Talat meeting,
RIK said that according to government sources, the Turkish goal was to upgrade the pseudo-
state.136 In its lead story on the ferry service to Syria, Plus TV announced that ʻTurkey [had] laid
a specific plan to convince the Republic of Cyprus [to recognize the northern areas of the country
as a different state]ʼ,137 while Sigma stressed that the ferry service served the interests of Turkey.138
Mega claimed that ʻAnkara [had] also approached Jordan asking to open its ports to ferry
services, from and to, the occupied areasʼ.139
124 ANT1, item 5, 24.9.2007. A follow-up story was broadcast by this channel on the next day. 
125 Sigma, item 3, 17.1.2008. On the next day there was a follow-up reportage related to this news story. 
126 Sigma, item 14, 24.9.2007. 
127 Mega, item 17, 24.9.2007. 
128 ANT1, item 12, 24.9.2007. 
129 ANT1, item 14, 24.9.2007. 
130 Sigma, item 10, 17.1.2008. 
131 ANT1, item 15, 17.1.2008.
132 Plus TV, item 6, 17.1.2008. 
133 Mega, item 17, 17.1.2008. 
134 RIK, item 3, 19.1.2008. 
135 ANT1 did not point out this view . 
136 RIK, item 1, 6.9.2007. 
137 Plus TV, item 1, 24.9.2007. 
138 Sigma, item 1, 24.9.2007. 
139 Mega, item 8, 20.1.2008. 
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The Turkish side
Sometimes the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were perceived as being one and the same. Sigma
repeatedly promoted this image but all the stations, except Plus TV, at least once did not clarify
whether their news stories referred to Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot leadership. They highlighted
the Turkish identity of the ʻothers  ʼ who were always depicted unflatteringly.  Sigma aired a
broadcast for which the headline was: ʻNew Turkish plotʼ, while the caption was: ʻT/Cs sell their
properties in the free areas with sham contractsʼ.140 Mega, RIK and ANT1 used the expression
ʻthe Turkish sideʼ while referring to Talat in the news story about his meeting with Papadopoulos.
This phrase perhaps reveals that these channels considered that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot
leadership shared the same stances and goals. Mega ran a story arguing that the ʻTurkish sideʼ
showed that it was against implementation of the Gambari process,141 and RIK reported that ʻthe
Turkish side systematically aimed for the cancellation of the agreementʼ.142 ANT1 on the same
meeting said: ʻThe mood on the Turkish side: They ask for a complete negotiation processʼ.143
Our analysis shows that most stations had a tendency to identify Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriot leadership as one and the same, and sometimes the Turkish Cypriots too. Moreover, they
did not represent the ʻTurkish side  ʼpositively. 
The ʻothers  ʼin relation to ʻusʼ
The TV news channels projected the idea that the Greek Cypriots were in the right regarding
important political matters and that they deserved the sympathy of the international community
because they were the victims of the conflict. The ʻothers  ʼwere portrayed in a completely different
way. To substantiate their positive representation of Greek Cypriots, the stations would include in
their broadcasts the notion that important people, organizations or even countries agreed with the
Republic of Cyprus. The use of memories was another strategy used to support the view that the
Greek Cypriots were in the right and were victims. 
Coverage of the Papadopoulos-Talat meeting exemplifies how the stations projected the notion
that the Greek Cypriot leadership was willing to end the deadlock in the country while the ʻother
side  ʼplaced obstacles in the path to a solution. Mega said that the Greek Cypriot side ʻjustlyʼ
insisted on implementation of the agreement reached a year before, while claiming that Talat
wanted to change the procedure.144 A RIK journalist covering the meeting reported that ʻobviouslyʼ
the Turkish Cypriot leader ʻas we had all expected, attempted…to break the July 8 agreement
[while] of course the President of the Republic insisted on its implemen tationʼ.145 ANT1 reported
that ʻwhen Talat saw that his plan was not working he refused [to have] a second meeting as
proposed by President Papadopoulos to avoid a stalemateʼ.146 Sigma made a similar statement
in one of its cues,147 and Plus TV in a positive representation of the Greek Cypriots, said that at
least ʻour sideʼ had hoped that the meeting would produce encouraging results regarding the
Cyprus problem.148
To back up their depiction of the justness of the Greek Cypriots  ʼaims and stances, the stations
would highlight the opinions or statements of persons in authority who represented the EU, the
UN or the USA. For example, all the channels emphasized that the UN Secretary General, who
had a meeting with President Papadopoulos in New York, was in favor of the Gambari process—
an arrangement  accepted by the Greek Cypriots but allegedly opposed by the ʻothersʼ. In the cue
of Sigmaʼs reportage it was said that, ʻBan Ki-moon asks for the implementation of the July 8
140 Sigma, item 6, 25.9.2007.
141 Mega , item 1, 5.9.2007. 
142 RIK, item 1, 4.9.2007. 
143 ANT1, item 10, 4 .9.2007. 
144 Mega, item 1, 5.9.2007. 
145 RIK, item 1, 5.9.2007. 
146 ANT1, item 4, 6.9.2007. 
147 Sigma, item 1, 6.9.2007. 
148 Plus TV, item 3, 4.9.2007. 
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agreementʼ,149 while Mega announced that, ʻthe Secretary General of the United Nations expressed
his support for the Gambari process and the complete implementation of the July 8 agreementʼ.150
ANT1 suggested that the Gambari process won the trust vote from Ban Ki-moon;151 Plus TVʼs
news story caption was, ʻUN Secretary General: In support of the July 8 [agreement]ʼ; 152 RIK ran
the headline, ʻThe United Nations insist on the July 8 agreementʼ.153 Yet none of the stations
covered the meeting, so there was no proof that Ban Ki-moon had actually expressed the
declared view. 
Moreover, RIK and Sigma often stressed that the EU backed the Greek Cypriots  ʼviews. It is
likely that they emphasized EU backing to confirm that the demands of the Republic of Cyprus
were fair, since important personages, who were thought to represent the Union, supported them. 
Two indicative examples are given in the next few lines. RIK aired a story beginning with the
following cue: ʻThe President of the EU Council and the Foreign Minister of Slovenia, Dimitri Rupel,
stated that the only valid procedure for the Cyprus problem is the Gambari agreementʼ.154 Another
example, mentioned earlier,155 is the broadcast by Sigma, Mega and RIK of the statements of
Jacques Barrot concerning Turkeyʼs embargo on ships flying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus.
The three stations implied that the European Commission vice-president and the EU were on the
Greek Cypriot side. Sigmaʼs caption can illustrate this argument: ʻJacques Barrot warns Turkey
that the embargo is also its own problem: Firm messageʼ.156
Sigma, Mega and RIK also pointed out that United States  ʼofficials backed the Greek Cypriots.
Sigma introduced a report related to the Gambari process using the following words: ʻThe US
Under Secretary for political affairs, Nicholas Burns…spoke about an inspiring United Nationʼs
procedure for the [resolution of the] Cyprus Problemʼ.157 Megaʼs New York correspondent said that
an official of the State Department expressed his hope that the July 8 agreement would be imple -
mented,158 and RIK headlined a news story, ʻUS and UN point towards the July 8 [agreement]ʼ.159
These would appear to be attempts to substantiate the view that the Republic of Cyprus had
reasonable diplomatic positions and that these stances were favored by the international
community. 
The use of memories and recall of 1974 events was another practice occasionally employed by
the stations to justify Greek Cypriots  ʼviews and feelings regarding the ʻother sideʼ. This promoted
the notion that the Greek Cypriots were the victims of the conflict while the ʻothers  ʼ were the
villains who committed atrocities. 
Sigma was the station that most frequently employed this practice. It broadcast a follow-up
report on the events that occurred in the ʻoccupied villageʼ Mia Milia in 1974, using a sound-bite
from a priest, who said that the Turkish soldiers bound his hands and carried him to the ship that
would take him as prisoner to Turkey.160 The report describing the past abuse of a man of God
projected the idea that the ʻothers  ʼwere the ʻbaddies  ʼand the Greek Cypriots the victims. 
The ʻoccupied areasʼ
All TV stations characterized the north of the island as ʻthe occupied areasʼ 161 and used the term
pseudo-state162 to describe it, proclaiming that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership had no
149 Sigma, item 3, 24.9.2007. 
150 Mega, item 3, 24.9.2007. 
151 ANT1, item 10, 24.9.2007. 
152 Plus TV, item 3, 24.9.2007. 
153 RIK, beginning headline 1, 24.9.2007. 
154 RIK, item 11, 18 Janaury 2008. 
155 Plus TV and ANT1 did not point out that the vice-president of the EU was on our side. 
156 Sigma, item 16, 24.9.2007. 
157 Sigma, item 13,25.9.2007. 
158 Mega, item 1, 5.9.2007. 
159 RIK, item 2, 7.9.2007. 
160 Sigma, item 8, 18.1.2008. 
161 See, for example, ANT1, item 6, 24.9.2007.
162 See, for example, a news story in which the term pseudo-state was used: Sigma, item 12, 25.9.2007.
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legitimate power over the territory, which according to them, was taken from the Greek Cypriots.
Another semantics practice employed by the stations for the same reason was the use of inverted
commas in captions, such as in this Plus TV broadcast: ʻ18,000 more Turks will receive “T/C
citizenship”ʼ.163 A sound equivalent of inverted commas was the expression ʻthe so-calledʼ, which
was used to stress that the north was not internationally recognized, so it could not, for example,
have ʻreal  ʼofficials: RIK,  reporting on Turgay Avcıʼs meeting with Italian officials, called Avcı ʻthe
so-called Minister of Foreign Affairsʼ.164
These practices demonstrate that the channels believed and projected the view that the
northern part of the island was ruled illegally by the ʻoccupation regimeʼ,165 and led to wide
coverage and sometimes negative representation of efforts made by Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriot leadership to achieve political recognition. This reveals Greek Cypriots  ʼ fear of losing
forever a territory they considered as their own. The numerous stories on the newly launched ferry
services to Latakia in Syria166 and Turgay Avcıʼs intention of giving ʻTRNCʼ passports to two Italian
politicians are indicative of this fear. Megaʼs caption on the passport issue was, ʻMore tricks: The
pseudo-state now also “enfranchises” Italian politiciansʼ,167 while in Plus TVʼs cue, the newscaster
announced that the occupation regime ʻgave a performance of recognitionʼ.168
Some channels, i.e., RIK, ANT1, Sigma, depicted the north as a criminal or a trouble source.
One could interpret this as an attempt to show that as long as the north was controlled by the
ʻothersʼ, there would be problems that would subsequently affect the Republic of Cyprus. For
example, Sigma aired a report in which it was said that the police investigated the possibility that
a Turkish pistol was ʻillegally transported from the occupied areasʼ, as this specific type of gun was
not used by any security service in the ʻfree areasʼ.169 ANT1 broadcast a story on an infamous
criminal, it which it was stressed that he was able to escape to the north. The newscasterʼs first
sentence was: ʻC........ M..... is hiding in the occupied areas  ʼand the caption of this report was:
ʻEcevit is in…the occupied areasʼ.170 RIK also used this caption in the intro duction of its own
report.171 In another story, RIK said that illegal immigrants used the north to reach the southern
part of the country: ʻIllegal immigrants (are coming) from the buffer zoneʼ.172
Stereotyped images and sounds
The stations used stereotyped images when they aired news stories related to the ʻpseudo-stateʼ,
the settlers or the occupied areas; this was most often shots with the Turkish and TRNC flags.
This emblem of identity defined the ʻotherʼ173 or the areas in the north, reaffirming the notion that
a flag is a strong  symbol that can evoke emotions and transmit underlying messages. For example,
a shot that shows a flag situated in a disputed area and where it is clearly visible to people who
believe that the land belongs to them, can provoke emotional responses since some people might
consider that this emblem was placed there to provoke or threaten them. 
The frequent use of particular shots of the flags can also awaken memories. ANT1 and Mega
broadcast reports during which this symbol, which has been recognized as creating ʻa detrimental
163 Plus TV, item 6, 17.1.2008. 
164 RIK, item 4, 25.9.2007. 
165 This expression was used by RIK and Plus TV. It sometimes replaced the word ʻpseudo-stateʼ. See examples: RIK, item 4, 24.9.2007; Plus
TV, item 12, 19.1.2008. 
166 During the dates that were analyzed for this research, RIK and Mega each aired four news reports on this issue. ANT1, Sigma and Plus TV
each broadcast three. Some stations also included live reports on this subject.
167 Mega, item 2, 24.9.2007. 
168 Plus TV, item 1, 24.9.2004. 
169 Sigma, item 14, 24.9.2007. 
170 This personʼs nickname was Ecevit. ANT1, item 17, 26.9.2007. 
171 RIK, item 21, 26.9.2007.
172 RIK, item 19, 26.9.2007. 
173 During the dates that were examined in this part of our research, ANT1 aired five reportages in which these stereotyped images were used. In
three of these news stories there were shots of the Turkish flag and in the remaining two, the Turkish and the ʻTRNC  ʼflag appeared. Mega also
broadcast five reportages where the flags were seen. In three of them both flags were shown. Sigma aired five news stories where the images
of the flags were used. Solely in one of them, the viewer could see only the ʻTRNC  ʼflag. Plus TV broadcast four reportages in which the flags
appeared, and again in three of them there were shots of the two flags flying next to each other. RIK aired only one news story in which several
Turkish and ʻTRNC  ʼflags appeared. 
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effect on community relationsʼ,174 appeared at a place where it was viewed as a ʻconstant reminder
that the neighboring “other” hasnʼt gone awayʼ.175 The news story of a Greek Cypriot shepherd,
whose animals were shot by Turkish soldiers, was aired by ANT1 together with images of the Turkish
and the ʻTRNCʼ flags in a village that defines the limits of a territory which was once controlled by
the Republic of Cyprus. Also, Mega repeatedly aired a shot of a huge ʻTRNCʼ flag at the occupied
Pentadaktilos Mountains, a visible reminder to the Greek Cypriots of their lost land.176
The use of the flags, a symbol considered as ʻan important element in the ongoing tensionsʼ
and  ʻwhich can give and take offenceʼ,177 was not the only practice that might arouse feelings
concerning the ʻother sideʼ; music and sound were also employed with similar effects. 
RIK broadcast a report on a highly emotive issue, that of the missing persons. This news story
began and ended with images from a funeral which were accompanied by the sound of a death
bell.178 The shots of people crying, together with the sound of the death knell, could induce feelings
of resentment towards those who were thought to be responsible for the deaths of these Greek
Cypriots.  ANT1 aired a piece about a Turkish commando unit in the north, showing images of this
camp with dramatically suspenseful music as the backdrop-music that was slightly threatening, and
could lead viewers to feel that Greek Cypriots  ʼsecurity was in danger. Mega also used a dramatic
sound beat during the news story about Turgay Avcıʼs visit to Rome,179 perhaps to emphasize the
potential danger of political recognition of the ʻso-called authorities of the pseudo-stateʼ.
Conclusion
Our research revealed that the television channels not only reported the news, but they also
ʻsensationalized and glamorizedʼ it. They achieved this mainly through the use of flashy special
effects and computer-generated graphics, while sometimes they used music. The stations were
likely sensationalizing the news or—in more positive terms—transforming the news into a more
interesting viewing experience, in an effort to eventually attract a wider audience and so remain
commercially viable.
Thus with the dual objective of informing the audience of the dayʼs significant events, and
achieving market dominance, or at least surviving, the stations offered wide coverage and timely
report of the news. They accomplished these aims by covering an event with several different
news stories or from several angles, and they included live broadcasting to inform the public about
important events in real time. This immediate reporting of the news was occasionally delivered
through different windows on the screen (split-screens), and the timeliness of news coverage was
assured by employing permanent correspondents abroad and/or by sending reporters abroad to
cover significant events. All the stations also aimed at producing news ʻexclusivesʼ.
The channels appeared to make an effort to cover the news as neutrally as possible; this would
be a way to gain and maintain the viewers  ʼtrust. This strategy may have had the added benefit
of subsequently helping the stations to ʻsell  ʼtheir own positions to the audience. Another means
of convincing audiences of their truthfulness, engaged in by all the channels, was the use of
numbers. Numbers would appear to lend accuracy and reliability to news reports.  However, in
the final analysis, the stations were shown to be not completely impartial, as there were many
instances where the stations were biased towards certain views and political aspirations. Party or
ideological links and affiliations appear to have greatly influenced representations of events,
people, etc., on all channels.
174 Dominic Bryan and Gordon Gillespie (2005). Transforming conflicts: Flags and emblems [online], p.5. Available from:
http://www.culcom.uio.no/aktivitet/flagg-konferanse/graphics/Bryan%20rapport%20Flags-05.pdf [Accessed 21 July 2008]. 
175 Neil Jarman (no date), Pride and Possession, Display and Destruction [online], p.14. Available from: http://www.culcom.uio.no/aktivitet/flagg-
konferanse/graphics/Jarman%20%20-%20Draft%20paper.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2008].
176 Mega, item 4, 25.9.2007. 
177 Neil Jarman (no date), Pride and Possession, Display and Destruction [online], p.5. Available from: http://www.culcom.uio.no/aktivitet/flagg-
konferanse/graphics/Jarman%20%20-%20Draft%20paper.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2008].
178 RIK, item 12, 6.9.2007. 
179 Mega , item 2, 24.9.2007. 
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Regarding the settlement of the Cyprus Problem, all the stations appeared to follow the official
(government) stance that supported the Gambari agreement. This matter united the channels
against the ʻother sideʼ, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. There was a greater divergence
of views, however, when the channels reported on other issues. 
Most channels offered favorable coverage to specific people or parties. This was accom plished
through several media tactics, including overrepresentation, leading with reports linked to a specific
political group or individual, highlighting a particular partyʼs or personʼs view, positive representation
of a certain person or party and the negative depiction of ʻrival  ʼcandidates and parties.  
Positions on the EU were inconsistent; the EU was pictured either as an ally or as an enemy
of the Republic of Cyprus depending on its stance on several issues that concerned the island. 
On the issue of identity and representation of the others, it appeared that the Greek Cypriots
and the Greeks were considered to be ʻus  ʼwhile the Turkish Cypriots, their leadership, Turkey and
its troops were the ʻothersʼ. 
The collaboration with Greek television stations, the rebroadcast of some of their news stories
and the extensive reports on important developments that occurred in Greece, revealed identity
views. The way the channels emphasized Greek Cypriot help to Greece during the severe fires
in 2007 and the stations  ʼfundraising to aid the victims clearly revealed the belief that Cyprus was
strongly connected to Greece. The bond between the two countries was even more evident when
two channels characterized the Greeks, as the Greek Cypriotsʼ ʻbrothersʼ.
The ʻother  ʼwas not always viewed as the enemy. No cases were noted where Turkish Cypriots
were considered the Greek Cypriots  ʼ enemy. But while the channels positively portrayed this
community, they did not do the same for the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Negatively depicted by
all, Mehmet Ali Talat was frequently illustrated as someone who followed Ankaraʼs instructions and
placed obstacles in the path to a solution of the Cyprus Problem. 
Turkey and its troops were also pictured in dark colors. Some stations promoted the idea that
the Turkish soldiers posed a threat to the Greek Cypriots  ʼsafety, and they all projected Turkey as
a hostile county and a source of problems for the Republic of Cyprus. Most stations represented
Turkey as a state that claimed territory that belonged to the Greek Cypriots. 
Sometimes, images of the ʻother  ʼ were amalgamated, as most of the channels used the
expression ʻthe Turkish sideʼ without clarifying whether they referred to the Turkish Cypriots, their
leadership or Turkey. It appeared as if these entities were occasionally viewed as being one and
the same. The ʻTurkish sideʼ was always pictured unflatteringly. 
The negative depiction of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey was also clear in their
comparison with the Greek Cypriot side. It was often stressed that the Greek Cypriots were in the
right regarding important political matters and that they deserved the sympathy of the international
community. The exact opposite image was promoted about the ʻothersʼ. The channels projected
that the positions of the Greek Cypriots were fair, as important people, organizations or even
countries agreed with the stances of the Republic of Cyprus. The contrast between the Greek
Cypriots and the ʻothers  ʼwas also transmitted through the use of memories where the Greek
Cypriot community was portrayed as the victim of the conflict and the ʻother side  ʼwas the villain
who committed atrocities. 
The negative illustration of the ʻothers  ʼwas also put forward through the repetition of the notion
that the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey and its army had no authority over the land in the north
and that as long as they ruled it, this territory would be a source of troubles for the Republic of
Cyprus. 
In the last part of this section it was revealed that not only words, but also stereotyped images,
music and sounds were employed in a way to reinforce negative pictures and eventually feelings
and fear related to the other side. 
Synthia Pavlou
THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS IN 2007-2008
Sanem Şahin
Introduction
A completely different situation prevailed in the present period compared to the end of 2002.
There was a new team in power handling the fate of the Turkish Cypriots, following the victory of
the CTP and Mehmet Ali Talat over the conservative forces. The Cyprus Problem was in a
stalemate. After the Turkish Cypriot media briefly turned their attention to the meeting between the
two leaders in early September, they shifted their focus back to internal affairs and politics.
The Data
This part of the research will analyse the 12 daily newspapers that were publishing at the time of
this study: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen, Vatan, Kıbrıslı, Ortam, Volkan, Afrika, Güneş, Demokrat
Bakış, Sözcü and Kıbrıs Star. The data covers the periods 4 to 7 September 2007, 24 to 26
September 2007 and 17 to 20 January 2008, and will be examined as was the data for the
previous time period. In other words, we will analyse the media portrayal of themes such as the
Cyprus Issue, the representation of the EU, the reflection of internal politics and Turkish Cypriot
self-perception in relation to the ʻothersʼ. 
The Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
Regarding the timeframe of this part of our research, the news reporting did not show much
change in terms of style, source or treatment from the 2002 period. The newspapers continued to
rely heavily on externally produced texts such as news agency dispatches and press state ments,
as well as covering press conferences and public announcements of political figures and civil
society organisations. Yet there was little attempt to offer exclusive coverage, and most stories
that appeared in the newspapers were identical, such that the content of the 12 newspapers was
also almost identical. For example, all 12 newspapers ran articles reporting on the meeting of the
two leaders, Mehmet Ali Talat and Tassos Papadopoulos. The articles were all the same, as all
newspapers had used the same TAK dispatch. Although the news articles covering this meeting
stated that many journalists had attended the event, no different accounts of it appeared in the
papers. Only one paper, Yenidüzen, reported the event differently: it presented highlights of the
day in bullet points under the by-lines of the two journalists who covered the event, and it even
included the journalists  ʼ opinions and expectations.1 Kıbrıs Star was the only other paper that
sought the views of the public and the political leaders on this event.2
Another example of the print media sharing the same reports was their coverage of the DP
MPs  ʼresignation from the parliament. All the newspapers published the same reports on, the party
assembly in which the members decided on resignation; the parliamentary session in which the
MPs handed in their resignations; and the views of other political party leaders on these
developments. Because these reports were identical, it was difficult to isolate the individual
newspaperʼs institutional voice. Again, although some newspapers sent reporters to cover these
events, they generally used the news agency dispatches for the main story, using their journalistsʼ
1 Çağıl Günalp and Fayka Arseven,ʼGörüşme tarihi yok [There is no date for negotiation]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 6.9.2007: 8,9.
2 Elif İyidoğan and Volkan Karaca, ʻVatandaş da barış istyor [Citizens want peace, too]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 4.9.2007: 7; No author, ʻBen olsam derdim
ki [If it was me I would have said]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 5.9.2007:1.
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reports in separate sections as ʻobservations  ʼor ʻnotesʼ. For example, despite having its reporter
and photographer at a DP party meeting, Yenidüzen still published the same text as the other
papers, a TAK news dispatch. It printed its reporterʼs observations in short paragraphs with some
photos rather than presenting them as a whole text.3 It followed the same format to report on the
parliamentary meeting in which the DP MPs presented their resignations to the assembly.4
Kıbrısʼs account of the parliamentary session was no different: while TAKʼs story was used to
report the event, its correspondentʼs observations were published as ʻnotes from the parliamentʼ5
in short paragraphs instead of a long news article. ʻNotes  ʼaimed to provide insights for what had
been said or done during the assembly gathering. Often times, these sections written by the
correspondents as well as the newspapers  ʼheadlines were the only evidence of a newspaperʼs
attitude towards the events. 
Compared to the number of articles that derived from news agencies, the news items produced
by journalists were minimal, even including the front-page stories. The role of the journalist was
reduced to merely editing the source text; and even in cases where journalists compiled reports
themselves, they usually did little more than write up statements or comments from the relevant
individuals or groups. Journalistic processes of news production rarely involved any research or
investigation, which raised the question about the role of research in newsgathering practices of
journalists working for the Turkish Cypriot media. Instead (of research) there were cases in which
rumours were disguised as news, or unconfirmed infor mation was turned into a factual text. For
example, Yenidüzen claimed that UBP would meet with the Turkish government representatives
in Ankara, but did not state its source.6
Use of numbers in the news is generally a sign of precision and truthfulness.7 In the news
reports on the Talat - Papadopoulos meeting, the only numbers that appeared were the arrival
time of each leader and the start and finishing times of the meeting. Apart from Yenidüzen, all the
newspapers used the same text, a TAK dispatch. According to Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Kıbrıslı,
Kıbrıs Star, Ortam, Volkan, Güneş and Afrika, the Greek Cypriot leader arrived at 16:03 while the
Turkish Cypriot leader arrived at 16:08 and at that time the meeting started. Such precision
regarding the arrival time was applied to the finishing time as well, 19:20. On the other hand, in
Yenidüzenʼs article these times were slightly different: 16:02 and 16:06.8 The length of the meeting
also varied according to the different newspapers. Generally they all stated that the leaders  ʼtalk
lasted three hours, but some were more specific: Yenidüzen reported that it was ʻ3 hours 20
minutesʼ,9 Kıbrıslı noted ʻ3.5 hoursʼ10 and Ortam ʻ3 hours 15 minutesʼ.11 Vatan and Yenidüzen found
the length of the meeting worthy of their front pages. Vatan stressed in its main headline that ʻ(the
meeting) lasted 3 hoursʼ12 while Yenidüzenʼs headline was ʻ3-hour-long summitʼ.13 Overall, time
was regarded an important factor to be included in reports.
Intertwining commentary with facts was common in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers;  Kıbrıslı,
especially, treated its front-page stories like editorials. For instance, on the day of the leadersʼ
meeting its front-page story was more like a commentary than communication of information.14
The following dayʼs issue was no different, as its front-page story again appeared more like  an
editorial commentary rather than a news text.15 Yet, it was not only Kıbrıslı that used this practice;
3 Fayka Arseven, ʻDPʼden 16 ay sonra istifa [Resignation from DP after 16 months]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 17.1.2008:9. 
4 Fayka Arseven ʻFayka Arsevenʼin izlenimiyle [Fayka Arsevenʼs impressions]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 18.1.2008:7. 
5 Dilek Çetereisi, ʻDP Tavukluğu Seçti Horozluğu CTPʼye Bırkatı [DP Chose to be a Chicken and Left it to CTP to be a Rooster]ʼ, Kıbrıs,
18.1.2008:14, 15.
6 No author, ʻYine Ankaraʼya [To Ankara again]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 26.9.2007:1.
7 Teun van Dijk, News as Discourse, (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988).
8 Çağıl Günalp and Fayka Arseven,ʼGörüşme tarihi yok [There is no date for negotiation]ʼ, Yenidüzen,  6.9.2007:8. 
9 Ibid.
10 No author, ʻDağlar, denizler, okyanuslar [Mountains, sea, oceans]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:3. 
11 No author, ʻDağ fare doğurdu [The mountain gave birth to a mouse]ʼ, Ortam, 6.9.2007:1. 
12 No author, ʻ3 saat sürdü [It lasted 3 hours]ʼ, Vatan, 6.9.2007:1.
13 No author, ʻ3 saatlik zirve [3 hour long summit]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 6.9.2007:1.
14 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1. 
15 No author, ʻBM bayrağı altında görüşme değil buluşma [Meeting not negotiation under the UN flag]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:1.
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most of the other newspapers also did. Yenidüzenʼs  main story two days after the meeting had
as its headline ʻthe hidden side of the matterʼ,16 which was actually a summary of an opinion
column by a journalist, Sami Özuslu. Reporting on the discussions that took place in the meeting,
Yenidüzen did not even attempt to attribute them to any source; moreover, the article did nothing
more than present some unconfirmed information— yet it appeared on the front page. 
Headlines were another place where the newspapers  ʼviews on an issue could be discerned.
For example, Ortam defined the leaders  ʼmeeting as ʻthey are meeting only to have metʼ;17 Afrika
summarised the outcome as ʻthey got nowhereʼ18 and Kıbrıslı claimed that it was a ʻforced meetingʼ.19
To increase the persuasiveness and enhance the truthfulness of their stories, the newspapers
claimed that the information came from ʻobserversʼ, ʻexpertsʼ, ʻsome reliable sources  ʼor ʻdiplomatic
sourcesʼ. For example, Kıbrıslı defined some of its sources simply as ʻobserversʼ, ʻdiplomatic
sources who follow the Cyprus Problem closelyʼ, and ʻauthoritative sourcesʼ.20 Ortam employed
the same strategy when it attributed some information it reported on its front page to ʻreliable
sourcesʼ.21 In some cases stories lacked other crucial information. For example, Afrika, running
a story on how some influential people were exempt from paying their electricity bills claimed that
ʻcitizens  ʼreacted to this news, yet its article did not include any citizens  ʼviews.
Another common characteristic of the newspapers was to raise questions on their front pages.
Asking questions within the news reports rather than researching and reporting them can be seen
as an easy way to obtain information. That is to say, rather than investigating and mediating the
outcome for their readers, the newspapers actually published questions on their front pages in the
hope that they would provoke a reaction from the authorities. This practice likely developed as a
result of lack of sources, time and journalists. Throughout the period studied, there were many
such examples: Vatan: ʻEveryoneʼs asking about the Democrat Party MPʼs resignation: what is
going to happen now?ʼ 22 Afrika: ʻWho is protecting the ones who donʼt pay (their electricity
bills)?ʼ; 23 Yenidüzen asked UBP and DP whether they would end their boycott of the parliament
and rejoin the assembly, ʻin or out?ʼ; 24 Halkın Sesi: ʻWhat happened to the minimum wage?ʼ;25
Kıbrıslı: ʻWhoʼs the targetʼ in a car bomb incident.26 Güneş asked if the DP would really resign27
and Demokrat Bakış used its front page to answer and also ask questions on behalf of the DP,
the party affiliated with it.28
The newspapers sometimes used photographs to express their views as well. Publishing a
photograph on its front page that showed both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders looking
at Michael Moller, the UN Secretary Generalʼs Special Envoy in Cyprus, Afrika wrote: ʻlook at this
photograph carefully. Here is the latest photograph of our situationʼ.29 The explanation for the
headline came in the editorial: ʻHere is our latest photograph. This is our state of thinking of
ourselves as clever and others as stupid... Two little lambs… Looking into Mollerʼs mouthʼ. 30 The
paper further clarified what it meant by ʻour situation  ʼin its next issue in one of its commentary
sections, ʻTunnelʼ: ʻMoller is standing the most relaxed, Talat and Papadopoulos look like students
in the photographʼ.31
16 Sami Özuslu, ʻPerde gerisi [Behind the curtains]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:1.
17 No author, ʻGörüşmek için görüşecekler [They are meeting only to have met]ʼ, Ortam, 5.9.2007:1. 
18 No author, ʻHavanda su dövdüler [They pounded water in a mortar]ʼ, Afrika, 6.9.2007:1.
19 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1. 
20 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1.
21 No author, ʻİngiliz üssü olduk [We have become a British base]ʼ, Ortam, 4.9.2007:1. 
22 No author, ʻDemokrat Parti miletvekillerinin istifasının adından herkes soruyor; Şimdi ne olacak? [Everyoneʼs asking about the Democrat Party
MPʼs resignation: what is going to happen now?]ʼ, Vatan, 19.1.2008:1.
23 No author, ʻÖdemeyenleri kim koruyor [Who is protecting the ones who donʼt pay (their electricity bills)]ʼ, Afrika, 26.9.2007:1.
24 No author,  ʻİçeri mi dışarı mı [In or out]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 25.9.2007:1.
25 Pelin Şahin, ʻAsgari ücrete ne oldu? [What happened to the minimum wage?]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 24.9.2007:1.
26 No author, ʻHedef kim [Whoʼs the target]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 24.9.2007:1.
27 No author, ʻDP sine-i millete dönecek mi [Will DP return to the nation?]ʼ, Güneş, 17.1.2008:1 (Authorʼs note: Meaning, will DP resign?).
28 No author, ʻCTPʼye cevap [Reply to CTP]ʼ, Demokrat Bakış, 19.1.2008:1.
29 No author, ʻİşte Kıbrısʼtaki halimizin son fotoğrafı [Here is the latest photograph of our situation]ʼ, Afrika, 6.9.2007:1. 
30 No author, ʻKıbrısʼtaki halimizin son fotoğrafı [The latest photograph of our situation]ʼ,  Afrika, 6.9.2007:3.
31 No author, ʻTünel: Fotoğrafların dili [Tunnel: Language of photographs]ʼ,  Afrika, 7.9.2007:8.
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Yenidüzen also focused on a photograph in a front-page story. Reporting that the Greek Cypriot
leader was meeting with the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, it published a photograph of
Papadopoulos which showed him holding his hand on his front just below his waistline. The
headline was ʻfena sıkıştıʼ.32 ʻFenaʼ means badly but the tricky word was ʻsıkıştı  ʼ in this phrase.
ʻSıkıştı  ʼin Turkish means either ʻto get caught in or become tightly wedged  ʼor ʻto need to go to
the toiletʼ.33 The photograph clearly referred to the latter meaning of the word, but the article did
not correspond to the photo as it was about Papadopoulosʼs meeting with the UN General
Secretary. The headline must have raised some questions among its readers as the editor-in-
chief, Cenk Mutluyakalı, later republished the photograph in his column with a circle around
Papadopoulosʼs hand to highlight it, and also an explanatory text: ʻHere is the harmony between
the headline and the photographʼ.34 However, even if the headline matched the photograph, it was
not in harmony with the article. Therefore it can be assumed that it was used to humiliate the
Greek Cypriot leader. 
Discourse and Representation
The Cyprus Issue
The Cyprus Issue dominated the media agenda in relation to the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting,
but rarely made the front page of the newspapers in the other two timeframes selected (24 to 26
September, 2007 and 17 to 20 January 2008). Therefore, this part of the research will focus on
the accounts of the leaders  ʼmeeting to study how the press depicted the Cyprus Issue.
How Diverse is the Press?
The two leaders  ʼmeeting was called by various names: summit (zirve),35 meeting (buluşma)36 and
negotiation (görüşme).37 Rejecting the notion that the meeting was a summit or a negotiation,
Kıbrıslı argued that it was a ʻmeetingʼ.38 Doğan Harman, the editor-in-chief of the paper, explained
that ʻsummits  ʼare organised ʻsometimes to initiate big changes and sometimes to end big changes
and such summits are prepared by working together for a long periodʼ, which was not the case in
this situation. Negotiation, on the other hand, Harman said, occurs if ʻthe political leaders come
together to solve a common problem or problems and exchange ideas and may involve bargainingʼ,
which again was not the case. Therefore, he argued, it could only be described as ʻmeetingʼ, as
the leaders did not come together to solve common problems but were working for their own
benefit.39 Meanwhile, Kıbrıs Star called the leaders  ʼmeeting a ʻcritical rendez-vousʼ.40
The Turkish Cypriot press did not depict the leaders  ʼmeeting optimistically. Having stated that
the leaders were ʻmeeting for the sake of meetingʼ,41 and that it was a ʻforced meetingʼ,42 most
newspapers expressed their scepticism at a positive outcome. Kıbrıs even ran a news feature
entitled ʻno expectations from the 5th of September  ʼ(the date of the meeting), with the subheading
ʻneither community is hopefulʼ. 43 The main story was accompanied by two political partiesʼ
announce ments that expressed their cynicism about the meeting.44 The coverage in the other
32 No author, ʻFena sıkıştı [Tightly wedged or Need to go to the toilet]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 24.9.2007:1.
33 Redhouse Yeni Elsözlüğü [The New Redhouse Portable Dictionary, English-Turkish, Turkish-English] (Istanbul: SEV Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık
Eğitim Tic. A.Ş.,1996), p.525.
34 Cenk Mutluyakalı, ʻFotoğraf ile manşetin uyumu bu işte [Here is the harmony between the headline and the photographʼ]ʼ, Yenidüzen,
24.9.2007:1.
35 Redhouse Yeni Elsözlüğü [The New Redhouse Portable Dictinary], (Istanbul: SEV Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık Eğitim Tic. A.Ş.), 1996:699.
36 Ibid: 87.
37 Ibid: 207.
38 Doğan Harman, ʻÖnce temel çelişki çözülür sonra diğerleri (First the Basic Problem is Solved, Then the Rest), Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:3.
39 Doğan Harman, ʻÖnce temel çelişki çözülür sonra diğerleri (First the Basic Problem is Solved, Then the Rest), Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:3.
40 No author, ʻAra bölgede kritik randevu [Critical rendezvous in the buffer zone]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 5.9.2007:7.
41 No author, ʻGörüşmek için görüşecekler [They will meet for the sake of meeting]ʼ, Ortam, 5.9.2007:1.
42 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1.
43 Anıl Işık, ʻ5 Eylül”den beklenti yok [No expectation from the 5th of September]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 4.9.2007:1.
44 No author, ʻSonuç beklemek faydasız ve halka boş ümit vermek [Expecting a result is of no use and is giving people empty hopes]ʼ, Kıbrıs,
5.9.2007:5.
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newspapers was no different, as they also stressed that the reason behind the talk was the
elections in south Cyprus in February 2008 and that the Turkish Cypriot side took part ʻnot to be
the side avoiding negotiations againʼ 45 and ʻto start the negotiation processʼ.46 Kıbrıslı articulated
strong doubts on its front page: ʻEveryone knows that this forced meeting is taking place because
of the Greek Cypriot elections. While Papadopoulos tries to manipulate voters, Talat will stress
that the UN is the place to seek a solutionʼ.47 Güneş felt the meeting was ʻan election helping hand
for Tassosʼ.48 Only Yenidüzen expressed optimism: Having underlined some encouraging
aspects about the meeting, it headlined its main story as ʻpositive atmosphereʼ49 and its front-page
story as ʻlife buoyʼ 50 meaning that a good outcome would help the country economically.
According to the Turkish Cypriot press, the meeting ended with no concrete result. The
newspapers found unconvincing the UNʼs Special Envoy to Cyprus Michael Mollerʼs announce -
ment that both sides agreed to start the process that would lead to a comprehensive settlement.
Some papers expressed their lack of faith quite colloquially. For example, Ortam ran the headline:
ʻThe mountain gave birth to a mouseʼ,51 meaning that ʻour expectations were built up only to be
let down in a big wayʼ.52 Afrika also defined the summit as ʻpounding water in a mortar  ʼ which
suggested that the meeting led nowhere.53 Other newspapers such as Halkın Sesi emphasised
that it was a ʻsummit with no resultʼ.54 Taking it a step further, Erten Kasımoğlu, the owner of Vatan,
stressed in one of his editorials that ʻthe result was worse than expectedʼ.55
The newspapers also conveyed the Greek Cypriot politicians  ʼ views on the meeting, again
using a news story that originated from TAK: ʻThe Greek Cypriot politicians donʼt have great
expectationsʼ.56 Halkın Sesiʼs slight transformation in the headline to ʻthe Greek Cypriot politicians
donʼt have great expectations either  ʼ or Kıbrıs Starʼs version, ʻthe neighbour is also without hopeʼ
subtly changed its meaning to generalise the lack of hope to include the Turkish Cypriots.57
Press coverage of the meeting was dominated by the official discourse. Having benefited from
the same official sources, the depiction of the meeting was the same throughout the Turkish
Cypriot press: The Turkish Cypriot leaderʼs proposal of launching comprehensive talks and
reaching a solution by the end of 2008 was refused by the Greek Cypriot leader, Papadopoulos,
simply because Greek Cypriots did not want a solution. All the newspapers copied the text in
which Talat was quoted justifying the Turkish Cypriot attempt to transform the 8 July process to
make it more productive, and accused the Greek Cypriot side of not being mentally prepared to
reach a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. Use of the same text by the press contributed to the
reproduction and dissemination of the official opinion. None of the dailies looked critically at Talatʼs
statement or questioned why there was a need to change the 8 July agreement. They also
reported that Papadopoulos insisted on application of the 8 July agreement with no changes. 
A newspaperʼs position was relayed not only through news reports but also through the page
layouts and distribution of the stories. Kıbrısʼs page design was one such example: On page 4 of
the September 7 issue a big headline read: ʻTalat: weʼre committed to a solutionʼ, and next to it on
page 5 was an account of a statement given by the Presidential spokesperson: ʻPapadopoulos
45 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1.
46 No author, ʻ40ʼncı yıla doğru [Towards the 40th year]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 5.9.2007:1.
47 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1.
48 No author, ʻTasosʼa seçim kıyağı [Election helping hand for Tassos]ʼ, Güneş, 5.9.2007:1.
48 Meltem Sonay ʻOlumlu have [Positive atmosphere]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 4.9.2007:8 & 9.
50 Meltem Sonay, ʻCan Simidi [Life buoy]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 4.9.2007:1, 9.
51 No author, ʻDağ fare doğurdu [The mountain gave birth to a mouse]ʼ, Ortam, 6.9.2007:1. 
52 Redhouse Yeni Elsözlüğü [The New Redhouse Portable Dictinary], (Istanbul: SEV Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık Eğitim Tic. A.Ş.), 1996:122.
53 Redhouse Yeni Elsözlüğü [The New Redhouse Portable Dictionary], Istanbul: SEV Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık Eğitim Tic. A.Ş., 1996:235.
54 No author, ʻSonuçsuz zirve [Summit with no result]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 7.9.2007:1.
55 Erten Kasımoğlu, ʻRum Yunan Gerçeği ve Kuzeyʼdeki Mekanizma [Greek Cypriot and Greek Reality and Mechanism in the North]ʼ, Vatan,
7.9.2007:1,3. 
56 No author, ʻRum siyasilerin fazla beklentisi yok [The Greek Cypriot politicians donʼt have great expectations]ʼ, Ortam, 5.9.2007:16; Afrika,
5.9.2007:11; Vatan, 5.9.2007:11; Yenidüzen, 5.9.2007:8.
57 No author, ʻRum siyasiler de görüşmden umutsuz [The Greek Cypriot politicians donʼt have expectations from the meeting either]ʼ, Halkın Sesi,
5.9.2007:3; No author, ʻKomşu da umutsuz [Our neighbour is also without hope]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 5.9.2007:9.
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does not want to start negotiations for a comprehensive settlementʼ. Turning to page 7, the Prime
Minister was quoted in the headline: ʻPapadopoulos wants to crash bi-zonal federationʼ.58
Similarly, Yenidüzen positioned statements of the President and the Prime Minister next to each
other in a way that blamed the Greek Cypriot leader. A headline on page 6, which carried only that
story, quoted Prime Minister Soyer: ʻPapadopoulos is unproductiveʼ; next to it on page 7 was an
account of Talatʼs press conference in which he had evaluated the summit: ʻTalat: the Greek
Cypriot side is against negotiations for a comprehensive settlementʼ.59 Volkan,60 Kıbrıslı,61 and
Halkın Sesi 62 also employed similar headlines for the same stories that pointed the finger at the
Greek Cypriot leader for obstructing the efforts for a solution on the island. These examples reveal
how the Turkish Cypriot print media became instrumental in mediating the official representation
of the events as they accepted and followed it. It is important to highlight that in the absence of
any challenges, the domination of the official discourses in the newspapers can serve to establish
them as the norm and shape the framework in which events are understood.
Despite the pessimism regarding its outcome, the meeting was depicted as historically
important. Kıbrıs defined it as a ʻhistorical summitʼ 63 while Kıbrıs Star stressed that it had been
14 months since both leaders last met.64 Yenidüzen and Vatan reminded their readers that the
negotiations to solve the Cyprus Problem had been going on for 40 years. The day the leaders
met Yenidüzenʼs main headline was ʻtowards the 40th yearʼ, referring to June 1968 when the
negotiations first started in Beirut.65 Vatanʼs editorial by Kasımoğlu also positioned the Talat -
Papadopoulos meeting in a historical context of 40 years.66 Such historical references not only
established continuity between the past and present by creating a temporal link, but also
enhanced the perception of the problem as hard to solve, as it had lasted for 40 years. 
Nationalistic Representations and Discourses: ʻUs  ʼand ʻthemʼ
Among the many expressions of nationalistic discourses, the most obvious is the distinction
between the positive self and negative ʻotherʼ. This binary division of ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼnot only acts
as a unification process within ʻus  ʼby producing a sense of distinctiveness from the ʻotherʼ, but
also reinforces conflict rather than reconciliation. In the 12 newspapers studied the representation
of ʻus  ʼ was based on differentiation from the ʻother  ʼ and a negative portrayal of it. Yet, the
categorisations of ʻus  ʼ and ʻthem  ʼ were fluid rather than fixed, and changed depending on the
newspaper and context. 
Positive Self-representation of ʻusʼ
In all the newspapers the Turkish Cypriot side was depicted as the side that wanted peace, while
the Greek Cypriot administration was portrayed as the opposite: The Turkish Cypriots were
attending this meeting to restart the process for a solution,67 while the Greek Cypriot leader was
participating as part of a propaganda act for the coming general elections in the south.68
58 No author, ʻTalat: Çözüm hedefine bağlıyız [Talat: weʼre committed to the aim of a solution]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 7.9.2007:4; No author, ʻPapadopulos
kapsamlı çözüm müzakerelerine başlanmasını istemiyor [Papadopoulos does not want to start negotiations for a comprehensive settlement]ʼ,
Kıbrıs, 7.9.2007:5; No author, ʻ Papadopulos iki bölgeli federasyonu çökertmek istiyor [Papadopoulos wants to crash bi-zonal federation]ʼ, Kıbrıs,
7.9.2007:7.
59 Özkan Taşkent, ʻPapadopulos verimsiz [Papadopoulos is unproductive]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:6; No author, ʻTalat: Rum tarafı bütünlüklü çözüm
müzakerelerine karşı [Talat: Greek Cypriot side is against the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:7.
60 No author, ʻCumburbaşkanı Mehmet A. Talat: Sonuç alamadık çünkü Rum tarafı çözüm müzakerelerine karşı..Zamana yayma hedefinde
[President Mehmet A. Talat: We couldnʼt get a result because the Greek Cypriot side is against the negotiations for a settlement ..it aims to play
for time]ʼ, Volkan, 7.9.2007:2.
61 No author, ʻRumʼun amacı zamana yayma [Greek Cypriot aim is to play for time]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 7.9.2007:3, 4.
62 No author, ʻSoyer: Papadopulos iki bölgeli federasyonu çökertmek istiyor [Soyer: Papadopoulos wants to crash bi-zonal federation]ʼ, Halkın
Sesi, 7.9.2007:3, 6.
63 No author, ʻLiderler masada [The leaders are at the table]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 5.9.2007:1.
64 No author, ʻ14 ay sonra aynı masada [At the same table after 14 months]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 6.9.2007:1.
65 No author, ʻ40ʼncı yıla doğru [Towards the 40th year]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 5.9.2007:1.
66 Erten Kasımoğlu. ʻRum Yunan Gerçeği ve Kuzeyʼdeki Mekanizma [Greek Cypriot and Greek Reality and Mechanism in the North]ʼ, Vatan,
7.9.2007:1, 3.
67 No author, ʻ40ʼncı yıla doğru [Towards the 40th year]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 5.9.2007:1.
68 No author, ʻZoraki görüşme [Forced meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:1.
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Otherwise, asked Özuslu from Yenidüzen and Harman from Kıbrıslı, why was Papadopoulos,
ʻwho would not even agree to have coffee with Talatʼ 69 now meeting with him? According to
Kıbrıslı, the main challenge of the meeting was opposing views: ʻThe main contradiction of the
meeting that took place yesterday was that the Turkish side acted with the idea of a solution and
the Greek Cypriot side are chasing sovereigntyʼ.70 Kıbrıs Star likened the process to ʻpolitical
chessʼ,71 further stating that Papadopoulos angered the international community with his attitude
while Talat gained an advantage in the negotiations.72
Identifying the leaders with their communities, the newspapers attributed positive charac -
teristics for ʻus  ʼand cast the ʻother  ʼin a negative light. For example, Talat was portrayed as the
one who started a new process by saying ʻstop  ʼto the ʻdelaying tactics  ʼof Papadopoulos,73 and who
accepted the offer of meeting so as not to be the side avoiding negotiations for a solution again.74
On the front page of Kıbrıs, he was reported as saying: ʻWe are committed to the aim of solutionʼ,75
where the ʻwe  ʼrefers not to Talat alone but to Turkish Cypriots in general. The day before, nearly
all the newspapers had printed a photograph of Talat tying a piece of cloth on a wishing tree on a visit
in Turkey,76 with headlines describing him as a person and leader committed to peace: ʻTalat tied (a
piece of) cloth to the wishing tree for peace (or a solution)ʼ77 or ʻTalat wished for peaceʼ.78
Turkey as part of ʻusʼ
Sometimes the newspapers treated Turkey as part of ʻusʼ; this was especially true for Vatan,
Volkan and Kıbrıslı. For example, when it was revealed that Turkey would not appear on the new
Euro coins as part of the European map, Vatan reacted angrily and accused the EU of being a
hypocrite: ʻTwo-faced EUʼ.79
In order to portray the Greek Cypriots as the ʻenemyʼ, Volkan frequently used news stories from
the Greek Cypriot press where their state officials and politicians criticised the presence of the
Turkish army in the north. The newspaper announced that according to AKEL leader Demetris
Christophias, a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation was ʻa federation without the Turkish armyʼ.80
The paper was also very critical of Tassos Papadopoulos for making derogatory comments about
ʻmotherland Turkeyʼ.81
Greek Cypriots as the ʻotherʼ
In contrast to Talat, Papadopoulos was cast as the one who ʻrefused everythingʼ,82 was ʻrunning
away  ʼfrom negotiations,83 ʻrefused Talatʼs offers of launching a comprehensive negotiation process
that would lead to a solution in a determined wayʼ,84 and whose attitude was ʻuncom pro misingʼ.85
Kıbrıslı even illustrated Papadopoulosʼs rejection as a trait: ʻAs expected, Papadopoulos avoided
taking a step towards solutionʼ.86 The expression ʻas expected  ʼmade it seem as though this was
Papadopoulosʼs natural behaviour. Interestingly, nearly all the newspapers used the strategy of
69 Sami Özuslu, ʻPerde Gerisi [Behind the curtains]ʼ, Yenidüzen 7.9.2007:5; Doğan Harman, ʻDiyalog ve evet siyasetini ileri götürmek Talatʼın
boynunun borcu [To advance dialogue and yes policy is Talatʼs duty]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:3.
70 No author, ʻBM bayrağı altında göüşme değil buluşma [Meeting not negotiation under the UN flag]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:1.
71 Aytuğ Turkkan, ʻTalat öne geçti [Talat is ahead]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 7.9.2007:1.
72 Ibid.
73 No author, ʻ8 Temmuzʼun sonu [The end of 8th July]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 6.9.2007:1.
74 No author, ʻBM bayrağı altında göüşme değil buluşma [Meeting not negotiation under the UN flag]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:1.
75 No author, ʻTalat: Çözüm hedefine bağlıyız [Talat: weʼre committed to the aim of solution]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 7.9.2007:1.
76 Tying a piece of cloth to some trees and making a wish is a common tradition in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot cultures. The story did not appear
in Ortam, 4.9.2007. 
77 The newspapers that used this headline are Afrika, 4.9.2007:3; Yenidüzen, 4.9.2007:1, 6,10; Volkan, 4.9.2007:8; Halkın Sesi, 4.9.2007:3;
Vatan, 4.9.2007:3; Güneş, 4.9.2007: 1.
78 The newspapers that used this headline are Kıbrıs, 4.9.2007:5; Kıbrıslı, 4.9.2007:4; Kıbrıs Star, 5.9.2007:6.
79 No author, ʻİşte iki yüzlü AB [Here is the two-faced EU]ʼ, Vatan, 26.9.2007:1. 
80 No author, ʻTürk askerinin olmadığı federasyon [A federation without the Turkish army]ʼ, Volkan, 4.9.2007:1.
81 No author, ʻÇözümde tek egemen devlet olmalı [There should be a single sovereign state]ʼ, Volkan, 6.9.2007:1.
82 No author, ʻPapadopulos herşeyi reddetti [Papadopoulos refused everything]ʼ, Volkan, 6.9.2007:1.
83 No author, ʻTasos kaçıyor [Tassos is running away]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 6.9.2007:1.
84 No author, ʻBM bayrağı altında göüşme değil buluşma [Meeting not negotiation under the UN flag]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:1.
85 Çağıl Günalp and Meltem Sonay, ʻ“Beklenen sonuç” çıktı [The “expected result” has emerged]ʼ,Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:8.
86 No author, ʻBM bayrağı altında göüşme değil buluşma [Meeting not negotiation under the UN flag]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:1.
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shifting the blame to the Greek Cypriot leader and found nothing to criticise in ʻour  ʼleader. Such
reproduction of the events not only gave the impression of a harmonious ʻ we  ʼbut also encouraged
the negative perceptions of the ʻotherʼ. This can be attributed to the wide use of the official sources.
The Turkish Cypriot newspapers were not alone in employing the strategy of shifting
responsibility. According to the Greek Cypriot press summaries that appeared in nearly all the
Turkish Cypriot newspapers it was Talat to blame: ʻTalat kicked 8th of Julyʼ. The article was given
a full page in Vatan, Ortam, Kıbrıs Star and Yenidüzen. But Yenidüzenʼs reported the expression
as ʻcommentsʼ87 and Kıbrısʼ called it ʻclaims  ʼof the Greek Cypriot press,88 which means they saw
them as mere suggestions in contrast to the authoritarian tone they normally assigned to the
Turkish Cypriot authorities. 
It was not just the President of the Republic of Cyprus Tassos Papadopoulos who was cast as
the ʻother  ʼ but Greek Cypriots in general. For example, when the Presidential spokesperson
Hasan Erçakıca issued a press statement in which he pointed the finger at Greek Cypriots as the
cause of the isolation Turkish Cypriots were experiencing, Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Yenidüzen, Güneş,
Bakış and Kıbrıs published the announcement in its entirety.89 While the similarity of the texts may
not reveal the institutional voice of the newspapers, it shows that they all found it acceptable to
publish the statement and they all reproduced the official discourse in the form of news. It
confirmed the tendency of the press to treat the official sources as valid news and to integrate the
official ideologies and policies into their stories disguised as news. In other words, as these
examples reveal, they simply reproduced official discursive acts rather than putting them through
a journalistic process.
Halkın Sesi, on the same day it published Erçakıcaʼs statement blaming Greek Cypriots for
Turkish Cypriots  ʼisolation, also reported that Greek Cypriots were objecting to Foreign Minister
Turgay Avcıʼs visit to Italy: ʻNow they are protesting against Italyʼ.90 Just the day before, Halkın Sesi
had published on its front page (exactly where the story on protesting against Italy had appeared)
that the Greek Cypriot government disapproved the start of ferry services from Famagusta to the
Syrian port Latakia: ʻThey will ask for an explanation from Syriaʼ; 91 The coverage strengthened
the notion that Greek Cypriots were continuously obstructing Turkish Cypriots from developing
any relations with other countries and keeping them in international isolation.
The newspapers used articles from the Greek Cypriot press whenever they criticised their own
government or wrote any negative portrayal of their society. One such example was an article
published in the Greek Cypriot daily, Haravgi, about an increase in the use of illegal drugs in south
Cyprus. The story was on the front pages of Vatan92 and Kıbrıslı 93 and appeared in the inner
pages of Volkan and Kıbrıs Star.94 The similarity in the stories not only suggested that they
originated from the same source but also confirmed a tendency in these newspapers to consider
anything that was negative about the ʻother  ʼside as newsworthy. Volkan, taking this a step further,
transformed the original phrase ʻaround 50,000 Greek Cypriots have tried marijuana at least once
in their life  ʼto ʻ 50,000 Greek Cypriots are using drugsʼ. Vatan and Kıbrıslı used the same headline:
ʻThe drug use in the South  ʼwhile Kıbrıs Starʻs title was ʻ50 thousand Greek Cypriots have used
drugsʼ.95 The story did not appear in any other Turkish Cypriot newspaper. 
87 No author, ʻTalat 8 Temmuzʼu tekmeledi [Talat kicked 8th of July]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:9.
88 No author, ʻTalat 8 Temmuzʼu tekmeledi [Talat kicked 8th of July]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 7.9.2007:15.
89 No author, ʻIzolasyonların nedeni Rumlardır [Grek Cypriots are the cause of isolation]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 26.9.2008: 3; No author, ʻRumʼun amacı
Osmosis [Greek Cypriotʼs aim is Osmosis]ʼ, Vatan, 26.9.2008:12; No author, ʻ3ʼlü zirveden kaçmayız [We donʼt avoid summit of 3]ʼ, Yenidüzen,
26.9.2008:10; No author, ʻTalat zirve bekliyor [Talat awaits summit]ʼ, Güneş, 26.9.2008:8; No author, ʻİzolasyonlar Rum tarafından
kaynaklanıyor [Isolations derive from the Greek Cypriot side]ʼ, Demokrat Bakış, 26.9.2008; No author, ʻOsmosis istiyorlar [They want osmosis]ʼ,
Kıbrıs, 26.9.2008:4.
90 No author, ʻŞimdi de İtalyaʼyı protesto ediyorlar [Now they are protesting against Italy]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 26.9.2007:1.
91 No author, ʻSuriyeʼden izahat isteyecekler [They will ask for an explanation from Syria]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 25.9.2007:1.
92 No author, ʻ Güney Kıbrısʼta asker ve öğrenciler arasında uyuşturucu artışı [Increase in drug use among soldiers and students in South Cyprus]ʼ,
Vatan, 25.9.2007:1.
93 No author, ʻGüneyʼde uyuşturucu alarmı [Alarm over drug use in the south]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 25.9.2007:1
94 No author, ʻ50 bin Rum uyuşturucu kullanıyor: Uyuşturucudan erkek ölüm oranı %28”den %57”ye çıktı [50 thousand Greek Cypriots are using
drugs: the male death rate from drug use has increased from 28% to 57%]ʼ, Volkan, 25.9.2007:1; No author, ʻ50 bin Rum esrar içmiş [50
thousand Greek Cypriots have used drugs]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 25.9.2007:5.
95 No author, ʻ50 bin Rum esrar içmiş [50 thousand Greek Cypriots have used drugs]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 25.9.2007:5.
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It was again these three newspapers, Kıbrıs Star, Vatan and Kıbrıslı, that reacted to a video
film on an internet site showing the Greek Cypriot tennis player Marcos Baghdatis shouting
slogans against the presence of Turks in Cyprus. Calling him ʻracistʼ, Vatanʼs front page said ʻjust
look what the racist Greek Cypriot tennis player saidʼ.96 In Kıbrıslı, the event was reported in the
sports page with a headline, ʻ(heʼs) turned out to be racistʼ 97. Kıbrıs Star wrote that the footage
on the internet led him to be labelled as ʻracistʼ.98 Volkan generalised this anti-Turk action to all
Greek Cypriots. Even though the event had taken place a year before, the newspaper chose to
combine it with recent reports of other similar incidents in the south99 which was a strategy to
enhance the perception that all Greek Cypriots are anti-Turk. Marcos Baghdatisʼs public
announcement that he was protesting only against the presence of the Turkish army on the island
and not Turkish Cypriots did not mean much for these newspapers as they considered the
existence of the Turkish army on the island as crucial to the security of Turkish Cypriots. It was
also an indication that the paper did not differentiate between Turkish Cypriots and Turks as two
separate nations. 
The official national discourse of defining the Republic of Cyprus as the ʻGreek Cypriot
Administration  ʼwas adopted by all the newspapers. As part of this discourse, Mehmet Ali Talat
was described as the ʻTRNC Presidentʼ, while the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos
Papadopoulos, was referred to as the ʻGreek Cypriot leaderʼ, the ʻGreek Cypriot community
leader  ʼor the ʻleader of the Greek Cypriot Administrationʼ. None of the newspapers described him
as the ʻ President of the Republic of Cyprusʼ. For example, all news reports on the leaders  ʼmeeting
referred to Talat as the ʻTRNC President  ʼand Tassos Papadopoulos as ʻthe leader of the Greek
Cypriot administration  ʼ or ʻthe Greek Cypriot leaderʼ. It was only Afrika that pointed out this
distinction in an editorial: ʻAccording to our news agencies, ours is President… the other is only
the leader of the Greek Cypriot Administrationʼ.100 The text about the meeting next to this editorial
did not identify the leaders as ʻthe president  ʼor the ʻleader  ʼbut referred to them only with their
names. Yet, on another page, in a story probably taken from a news agency, the leaders were
once again differentiated as ʻthe president  ʼand ʻthe leaderʼ.101
The European Union (EU)
There were not many stories related to the EU for the dates examined in this part of the research.
When a story on the EU appeared, it portrayed the EU as either positive or negative depending
on the context. For example, it was pictured positively as a source of funding for the improvements
needed in the country, while for its role in negotiating a settlement the picture was more negative,
although its policies towards Cyprus were still considered important. In either case, most news
articles about the EU were identical, suggesting that the original texts were either press
statements or news agency dispatches. The only difference in the stories was their headlines, but
sometimes even those were identical. For example, to convey what the European Commission
President Jose Barroso said about the Cyprus Issue, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen, Kıbrıs and Vatan
used the headline ʻBarroso: Cyprus can be effective in the EU only after a solutionʼ,102 while
Volkan and Kıbrıslı noted that ʻthe EU would not react if the TRNC adopted the Euroʼ.103
96 No author, ʻIrkçı Rum tenisçinin yediği naneye bak [Just look at what the racist Greek Cypriot tennis player said]ʼ, Vatan, 19.1.2008:1.
97 No author, ʻIrkçı çıktı [ʻ(Heʼs) turned out to be racist]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 19.1.2007:40.
98 Mihrişah Safa, ʻYıldız mı serseri mi [Is he a star or a jerk]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 20.1.2008:1.
99 No author, ʻ“Türkler Kıbrısʼtan dışarı” [“Turks out of Cyprus”]ʼ, Volkan, 19.1.2007:1.
100 No author, ʻİşte Kıbrısʼtaki halimizin son fotoğrafı [Here is the latest photograph of our situation]ʼ, Afrika, 6.9.2007:1. 
101 No author, ʻTalat: 14 ay mı, 14 yıl mı, 140 yıl mı süreceği belirsiz [It is uncertain whether it will continue for 14 months, 14 years, 140 years]ʼ,
Afrika, 6.9.2007:8.
102 No author, ʻBarrosoʼdan Rumlara çözüm uyarısı [Solution warning from Barroso to Greek Cypriots]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 20.1.2008:1; No author,
ʻBarroso: Kıbrıs ancak çözümle ABʼde etki sahibi olabilir [Barroso: Cyprus can be effective in the EU only after a solution]ʼ, Yenidüzen,
20.1.2008:6; No author, ʻBarroso: Kıbrıs ancak çözümle ABʼde etki sahibi olabilir [Barroso: Cyprus can be effective in the EU only after a
solution]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 20.1.2008:6; No author, ʻBarroso: Kıbrıs ancak çözümle ABʼde etki sahibi olabilir [Barroso: Cyprus can be effective in the EU
only after a solution]ʼ, Vatan, 20.1.2008:11.
103 No author, ʻAB, Euroʼnun KKTCʼde benimsenmesine tepki göstermeyecek [The EU will not react against the adoption of the Euro in the TRNC]ʼ,
Volkan, 20 January 2008:1; No author, ʻAB Euroʼya tepki göstermeyecek [The EU will not react against the EU]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 20.1.2008:1.
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A Source of Funding
The analysis revealed that one of the main perceptions about the EU was that it was a source of
funding. For example, Kıbrıs reported that the EU had drawn up and funded a project that would
help solve the countryʼs traffic problem: ʻ3 million Euro from the EU for trafficʼ.104 The article
portrayed the EU as a funding source; however, the story was based solely on information from
a single source, the Chairman of the Road Traffic Accident Prevention Association Mehmet Avcı,
with no additional researched information to back up the newspaperʼs representation of the issue.
That the EU was perceived as a source of funding was also evident in an article in Kıbrıslı.
Reporting that Nicosia Mayor Cemal Bulutoğluları showed the new municipality building to Italyʼs
Ambassador to Cyprus, the newspaper quoted the mayor saying, ʻthe construction of the building
was carried out without any funds from the government or the EUʼ,105 implying that the EU usually
funded such projects in the country. The EU was also depicted as a meas urement of comparison
for standards, as a headline in Kıbrıslı illustrates: ʻSuch a magnificent municipality palace does
not exist even in the EU.ʼ 106 Only when the main text was read does it become clear that the
headline was quoting the Italian ambassador during his visit to this new municipality building.  
Is it just or not?
It can be argued that the stories about a group of Turkish Cypriots applying to the European Court
of Human Rights for a case107 might have reinforced the association of Europe with justice, which
indirectly may also have influenced the perception of the EU in a similar way. But Vatan was not
very convinced that the EU was a fair union as it accused it of being ʻtwo-faced  ʼfor not including
Turkey in the map of Europe on new Euro coins.108
The EU vs the UN
The official discourse that a Cyprus solution had to occur under UN auspices and  not with the EU
was also integrated into the news discourse. For example, Halkın Sesi quoted Talat as saying that
ʻthe EU cannot solve the Cyprus Problem  ʼon its front page.109 Kıbrıslı also stressed the importance
of the leaders  ʼmeeting being ʻunder the UN flagʼ.110 Explaining this phrase further in his column,
Doğan Harman, editor-in-chief of the paper, wrote ʻPapadopoulos, who has taken the Cyprus
Problem out of the UN umbrella and put it under the EUʼs framework, eventually agreed to meet
under the UN frameworkʼ.111 Some regarded EU involvement in the Cyprus Issue as a cause of
concern, as they believed that the EU backed the Greek Cypriots. Ertem Kasımoğlu, the owner
of Vatan, wrote ʻ…for years by turning their back to the realities of Cyprus and by backing Greek
Cypriots in the international platforms they have made them the EUʼs spoilt childʼ,112 and, ʻ whatever
the EU and Greek Cypriots and Greeks  ʼother western relatives say, two separate states have
been in existence for 30 years…ʼ.113 Meanwhile, most of the newspapers published Prime Minister
Ferdi Sabit Soyerʼs statements in which he remarked that the leaders  ʼnegotiation had confirmed
once more that the UN was the basis for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Reproduction of the
statement enhanced the official discourse that the Cyprus Issue should be dealt with under UN
auspices rather than being an issue of the EU.  
104 Ergül Ernur, ʻABʼden trafiğe 3 milyon euro [From the EU 3 million euro for traffic]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 20.1.2008:1.
105 Kartal Harman, ʻBöyle muhteşem Belediye Sarayı ABʼde bile yok [Such a magnificent municipality palace does not exist even in the EU]ʼ,
Kıbrıslı, 4.9.2007:1, 7.
106 Ibid. 
107 The story appeared in Afrika, 7.9.2007:1;Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:10; Volkan, 7.9.2007:9; Halkın Sesi, 7.9.2007:6; Vatan, 7.9.2007:10; Kıbrıs,
7.9.2007:14; Ortam, 7.9.2007:2; Kıbrıslı, 7.9.2007:16; Kıbrıs Star, 7.9.2007:11.
108 No author, ʻİşte iki yüzlü AB [Here is the two-faced EU]ʼ, Vatan, 26.9.2007:1. 
109 No author, ʻKıbrıs sorununu AB çözemez [The EU canʼt solve the Cyprus Problem]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 19.1.2008:1.
110 No author, ʻBM bayrağı altında göüşme değil buluşma [Meeting not negotiation under the UN flag]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:1.
111 Doğan Harman, ʻÖnce temel çelişki çözülür sonra diğerleri [First the basic problem is solved, then the rest]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 6.9.2007:3.
112 Erten Kasımoğlu, ʻRum Yunan gerçeği ve Kuzeyʼdeki mekanizma [Greek Cypriot, Greek reality and the mechanism in the north]ʼ, Vatan,
7.9.2007:3.
113 Ibid. 
99The Turkish Cypriot Press in 2007-2008
Internal Politics
Newspaper affiliation with a political party is common in north Cyprus. Although this connection is
not always stated on the newspaper masthead, the public will be aware of it as their content
reflects the specific party politics.
Criticism of the Government
The government was a main source of news for the dailies. All the newspapers reported
statements given by the government representatives or sought out their comments on an issue.
Dependence on TAKʼs reports meant actions and policies of government and state officials found
wide and positive coverage in the print media.
The newspapers  ʼaffiliations with political parties played a large role in the level of criticism
directed at the government. That is to say, while stories with a critical tone appeared in the dailies
that sympathised with the opposition, pro-government newspapers reported them in a positive
light. For example, Yenidüzenʼs close links with the Republican Turkish Party-United Forces
(Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Birleşik Güçler - CTP-BG), the larger party in the coalition government,
influenced its coverage of events that were critical of the government. One such example was
when the government attracted public criticism for its decision to extend the power supply to the
end of Karpaz peninsula. The protest rally organised by some civil society organisations received
wide coverage in the newspapers. While Kıbrıs, Vatan, Ortam, Bakış, Kıbrıs Star and Halkın Sesi
put the story on their front pages together with the  Talat - Papadopoulos meeting, in Yenidüzen it
appeared on the inner pages.114 Apart from the leaders  ʼmeeting Yenidüzen chose to publish a
story on the conflict between two opposition parties, UBP and DP.115
Another such example was on 26 September 2007, a randomly chosen date to test the claim.
While most dailies published news on actions critical of the government policies or decisions, this
was not the case for Yenidüzen. Halkın Sesi and Kıbrıs informed their readers on the front page
that the Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants Trade Union (Kıbrıs Türk Amme Memurları Sendikası -
KTAMS) had filed a court case against the government for the changes it made in the public
examination regulation, and also that the price of fuel increased.116 On the same day, Afrikaʼs main
headline was ʻwhoʼs protecting the ones who donʼt pay (their electricity bills)?  ʼwhich argued that
the authorities allowed some influential people exemptions from paying their bills even though
they amounted to billions of Turkish liras.117 Kıbrıslı invited the Education Minister to intervene in
the administration of a high school on whose premises some condoms and empty beer bottles
were found.118 Volkan summarised the reaction of some trade unions to government actions on
its front page as ʻCTP-ÖRP government is falling apartʼ.119 Güneş pointed at the problems in schools
and blamed the government.120 In contrast, Yenidüzen published no such news but announced
positive policies of the government, e.g., a special credit would be awarded to businesses in
Morphou to help their development, and that two new power stations would be built to meet the
electricity needs of the country.121
Similarly, when the union of electricity board workers protested the Finance Minister Ahmet
Uzunʼs accusations directed at the board, the story was reported on the front pages of all the
newspapers except Yenidüzen. 
114 It also appeared in the inner pages of Güneş, Volkan and Afrika. In Afrika, the related news article covered the entire page. No author, ʻBir
“kazık” da çevreciler dikti [Environmentalist put up a stake, too]ʼ, Afrika, 6.9.2007:13.
115 Fayka Arseven, ʻDP Genel Sekreteri Hasipoğlu: UBP istifa etsin biz de edeceğiz [DP General Secreteri Hasipoğlu: when UBP resigns we will
do too]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 6.9.2007:1.
116 No author, ʻ KTAMSʼtan hükümete karşı dava [Lawsuit from KTAMS against the government]ʼ, Halkın Sesi 26.9.2007:1; No author, ʻ Sınav tüzüğü
mahkemelik oldu [Exam regulation in a court case]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 26.9.2007:1.
117 No author, ʻÖdemeyenleri kim koruyor [Who is protecting the ones who donʼt pay (their electricity bills)]ʼ, Afrika, 26.9.2007:1.
118 Kartal Harman, ʻFahişe ruhlar [Prostitute souls]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 26.9.2007:1.
119 No author, ʻCTP-ÖRP hükümeti dökülüyor [CTP-ÖRP government is falling apart]ʼ, Volkan, 26.9.2007:1.
120 No author, ʻİlk ve orta eğitim sorunlar yumağı [Primary and secondary education is full of problems]ʼ, Güneş, 26.9.2007: 1.
121 No author, ʻÖzel kredi [Special credit]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 26.9.2007:1; No author, ʼ70 MWʼlık santrale ilave 2 yeni santral daha [2 new power station
added to the power station of 70 MW]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 26.9.2007:1.
100 Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem
Political Biases
The newspapers  ʼsympathies or links with political parties influenced both their news selection as
well as their representation of events. For example, Yenidüzen, with close ties to CTP-BG, was
critical of two main opposition parties, UBP and DP, for not attending parliamentary meetings.
UBP and DP had skipped meetings to protest the formation of a coalition government with the
Freedom and Justice Party (Özgürlük ve Reform Partisi - ÖRP), since, they argued, the party did
not reflect Turkish Cypriots  ʼpolitical will. Yenidüzen reported that the two parties ʻhad become
aware that the  “parliament boycott” has been damaging to them and therefore were looking for
ways to return to Parliamentʼ.122 Its headline directed a question to them: ʻin or outʼ.123 Reporting
on the meetings of the three main parties, CTP-BG, UBP and DP, regarding some constitutional
changes, Yenidüzen was especially critical of UBP: ʻCTP-BG have dis cussed the suggestions in
their party assembly, DP is meeting today..(sic) UBP is indecisiveʼ.124 The newspaper not only
portrayed UBP as indecisive but also as incapable of making a decision on its own and needing to
seek advice of ʻAnkara  ʼi.e. the Turkish government: ʻUBP will consult Ankara againʼ,125 the ʻagainʼ
suggesting that consulting Ankara was characteristic of UBP. 
It was not only Yenidüzen that reflected its political orientation in its pages. Kıbrıslı and Güneş
disapproved ÖRP, and continually referred to it sarcastically as ʻÖP  ʼ(which means kiss in Turkish)
rather than using its proper name. For example, in one front-page story, Kıbrıslı claimed that ʻDP
would use force to throw ÖP MPs out of the parliament  ʼ and that they would protest ʻthe coalition
with ÖPʼ. The newspaper also quoted some unnamed DP authorities saying that ÖP emerged as
a political formation comprised of people formerly belonging to UBP.126 Demokrat Bakış, the
publication of DP, frequently published cartoons on its front page that made fun of the party as ʻ ÖPʼ.
Political affiliations were also influential in the selection of the news. Newspapers would
favourably report actions of the political parties and other organisations that it sympathised with
or was linked to. For example, press statements released by the Communal Democracy Party
(Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi – TDP) leader Mehmet Çakıcı were regarded as very important and
were given wide coverage in Ortam,127 while in other newspapers he received no such advan -
tageous treatment. 
Providing Information?
The resignation of the DP MPs from parliament was an unusual event, which meant that the public
relied on the media to help them understand. The newspapers, however, covered the event in a
way that reflected their views, as we stated earlier— a common journalistic practice in the Turkish
Cypriot press. 
Reporting the developments, some newspapers used the same term that DP used to describe
its action of resigning: ʻReturn to nation  ʼ(sine-i millet), accompanied by an explanation that it meant
withdrawal from the parliament.128 According to Kıbrıslı, the DP withdrawal from parliament meant
ʻthe ropes have snapped  ʼ(ipler koptu- the relationship has been severed). However, the newspaper
did not provide any further information or explanation.129 Afrika was the only newspaper that
highlighted the action as ʻa first in our political historyʼ,130 maybe because it was the first time that
122 No author, ʻİçeri mi dışarı mı? [In or out]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 25.9.2007:1.
123
İbid.
124 No author, ʻYine Ankaraʼya: CTP-BG önerileri Parti Meclisiʼnde görüştü. DP bugün toplanıyor.. UBP kararsız [To Ankara again: CTP-BG have
discussed the suggestions in their party assembly, DP is meeting today.. UBP is indecisive]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 26.9.2007:1.
125
İbid.
126 No author, ʻGizli görüşme [Secret Meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 7.9.2007:1.
127 No author, ʻGidilen yol çıkmaz yoldur [The road taken is a dead-end]ʼ, Ortam, 7.9.2007:1; No author, ʻÇakıcı maskeli balo devam ediyor [Çakıcı:
Costume ball is continuing]ʼ, Ortam, 18.1.2008:5.
128 These newspapers are Halkın Sesi, 17.1.2008:1; Kıbrıs, 17.1.2008:1; Yenidüzen, 17.1.2008:9; Volkan,18.1.2008:1; Güneş, 17.1.2008:1 and
Demokrat Bakış, 17.1.2008:1.
129 Mutlu Esendemir, ʻİpler koptu [The relationship has been severed]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 17.1.2008:1.
130 No author, ʻDPʼden istifa kararı [Resignation decision from DP]ʼ, Afrika, 17.1.2008:1.
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there was confusion131 and ʻeveryone kept asking: whatʼs going to happen nowʼ.132 According to
the papers, the uncertainty led everyone to ʻturn their eyes to parliamentʼ,133 where a decision on
the resignation of the MPs would be taken. Halkın Sesi tried to guess what might happen next,
suggesting that the resignations might be rejected by CTP-BG and UBP, but if they were
accepted, there would likely be either a by-election or a general election.134 Similar information
appeared in an opinion column in Yenidüzen.135 Güneş was the only newspaper that reported the
development very briefly and did not elaborate on it. It described the parliamentary session as a
ʻUBP-CTP duel  ʼon its front page without highlighting the DP MPs resignation, which appeared
only on its inner pages.136
None of the newspapers clearly explained the reason for the MPs  ʼ resignation. They all
reminded their readers that the party had been boycotting the parliament for nearly a year and a
half to protest ÖRPʼs establishment and participation in the coalition government. They noted that
the party said this happened because of AKPʼs —the governing party in Turkey—intervention,
against Turkish Cypriots  ʼ political will. The newspapers took quotes from the resigning MPsʼ
speech in the assembly that ʻthey did not want to be political extras  ʼand ʻthey did not want to be
part of political pollutionʼ. Even though in the news texts, the resignations were depicted as an
action the party had taken in protest, in many opinion columns it was also linked to UBPʼs giving
up boycotting the parliament and returning to the assembly. Many construed this as a move that
left DP in political isolation. 
Because the newspapers used TAKʼs coverage of the developments, certain discourses and
treatment were repeated in all the dailies. For example, they all stressed the underlying reason
for the resignation as ʻthe intervention  ʼand reported that DP leader Serdar Denktaş apologised
for not reacting against similar ʻ interventions  ʼin the past. Yet, none of the newspapers provided their
readers with any background information on these previous interventions, probably assuming that
they all knew. They all limited their coverage of the issue to quoting Denktaş without offering any
further information to their readers. Even Ortam, whose headline was ʻApology and Confession:
DP leader Serdar Denktaş confessed that there had been intervention in the past and apologised
for not taking actionʼ,137 and Afrika, who wrote ʻDenktaş apologised for not reacting against such
interventionsʼ,138 did not explain what ʻintervention  ʼthey referred to.
Another discourse that appeared in all the newspapers simply because it was in the texts TAK
provided to them was that DP had ʻleft the reconciliation door (or path)  ʼopen. Yet, apart from
Halkın Sesi, none indicated clearly how the party did that. Unlike the other newspapers, Halkın
Sesi did not use the agency text but produced its own story that consisted of interviews with the
political party leaders, including those of DP. It linked the expression of ʻleaving the reconciliation
path open  ʼwith a quote from Serdar Denktaş: ʻWe have made a decision. If CTP comes with an offer
that will remove the consequences of what occurred 16 months ago, then weʼre open to dialogʼ.139
Although some newspapers were critical of the resignations, this was not evident in their
coverage, again because they used externally prepared texts that did not include such under -
standings. In these cases, interpretations were limited to headlines. For Vatan the resignation was
not that convincing; it wrote, ʻresignation but!!(sic)ʼ.140 Kıbrıs Star described it as a ʻresignation
show from DPʼ.141 Yenidüzen also kept writing the word resignation in inverted commas as if it
131 No author, ʻDP “istifa” dedi, tepkiler gecikmedi [DP said “resignation” reactions followed]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 17.1.2008:3.
132 No author, ʻDemokrat Parti miletvekillerinin istifasının adından herkes soruyor; Şimdi ne olacak? [Everyoneʼs asking about the Democrat Party
MPs  ʼresignation: what is going to happen now?]ʼ, Vatan, 19.1.2008:1.
133 No author, ʻGözler meclise çevrildi [Eyes are turned to parliament]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 19.1.2008:1.
134 No author, ʻIstifa dilekçeleri Meclisʼe verildi [Written applications of resignation letters are given to the Parliament]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 18.1.2008:1, 3.
135 Sami Özuslu, ʻDPʼnin Kararı: Yarım İstifa [DPʼs Decision: Half Resignation]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 17.1.2008:5.
136 No author, ʻMeclisʼte adeta UBP-CTP düellosu yaşandı [It was like a CTP-DP duel in the parliament]ʼ, Güneş, 18.1.2008:1.
137 No author, ʻÖzür ve itiraf [Apology and confession]ʼ, Ortam, 18.1.2008:1 & 9.
138 No author, ʻDPʼliler istifalarını sundu [DP MPs presented their resignation]ʼ, Afrika, 18.1.2008: 1.
139 No author, ʻDP “sine-i millet” dedi [DP said “return to nation”]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 17.1.2008: 1.
140 No author, ʻDP Parti meclisinin karari: Istifa ama!! [DPʼs party assemblyʼs decision is: resignation but!!]ʼ, Vatan, 17.1.2008:1.
141 No author, ʻDPʼden istifa şov [ʻResignation show from DPʼ]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 18.1.2008:1.
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carried a different meaning than it suggested.142 Güneş was also sceptical: ʻWill DP return to the
nation?ʼ.143 Otherwise, any interpretation of events was limited to the newspapers  ʼopinion columns.
While Sami Özuslu from Yenidüzen described it as ʻDPʼs decision: “Half resignation…”ʼ,144 Ali
Tekman from Vatan raised questions about it: ʻIs it resignation or benefiting?[istifa  mı istifade
me]ʼ.145 Dilek Çetereisi from Kıbrıs also named the action as ʻnot complete [yarı buçuk]ʼ.146
However, such criticisms or interpretations were not included in the news articles. 
Whose Views are Reflected?
The media can offer a picture of a given society. By articulating cultural values and mediating
symbols embedded in typical social routines, the media reflect a symbolic form of society. The
language of the media contributes to the definition of who ʻwe  ʼare. The usage of ʻwe  ʼin media
discourse creates a bond between the media and the  audience and enhances the sense of unity.
The press offered numerous examples of the deictic use of ʻwe  ʼin that sense: ʻIskele youth makes
us proudʼ,147 ʻWe gave 9 million Cyprus Pounds to Greek Cypriotsʼ,148 ʻwe have become a British
base or else what is meaning of bas?ʼ,149 ʻwe are defeated by cancerʼ,150 ʻWe have become a
bridge to the Middle Eastʼ,151 etc. The use of ʻweʼ, as in these examples, helped to portray a society
in consensus, a society in which everyone has common interests and therefore is united. It also
gave the impression that besides speaking to the public the news papers were also speaking on
behalf of it. 
For the dates examined in this part of the research, only certain groups  ʼviews and comments
were integrated in the texts. On the Cyprus Issue, it was essentially the views of the president and
government that were mediated by the newspapers. Official representation of the two community
leaders  ʼ meeting dominated the coverage of the event in the print media as the stories were
mostly based on official statements. Coverage of public opinion was mainly limited to the views of
some politicians, a few trade union representatives and journalists. For example, just before the
leaders  ʼmeeting Yenidüzen published a feature describing the opinions of representatives of the
four major political parties.152 The only time members of the public were given a chance to express
their opinion was in Kıbrıs, when it reported on  both Turkish and Greek Cypriots  ʼexpectations of
this meeting.153 Kıbrıslı also wrote about the hopes of some shopkeepers in the area known as
Arasta in Lefkoşa that a decision to open the Lokmacı barricade or the Ledra Street crossing
might come out of the leaders  ʼmeeting.154
Yenidüzen was partial to the opinions and analysis of journalists and trade union repre -
sentatives. Having reported comments of journalists from both communities who had attended the
leaders  ʼsummit,155 the newspaper also integrated their views on the outcome in a feature article.156
Interestingly, the feature included the views of some trade union representatives as well.157
Yenidüzen ran a similar article, comprised of the comments of some journalists and trade union
142 No author, ʻ DPʼden “istifa” [“Resignation” from DP]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 17.1.2008:1; No author, ʻ DPʼnin istifası mercek altında [DPʼs resignation is being
examined]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 19.1.2008:1.
143 No author, ʻDP “sine-i millet”e dönecek mi [Will DP return to nation]ʼ, Güneş, 17.1.2008:1 (Authorʼs note: Meaning, will DP resign?).
144 Sami Özuslu, ʻDPʼnin Kararı: Yarım İstifa [DPʼs Decision: Half Resignation]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 17.1.2008:5.
145 Ali Tekman, ʻİstifa mı İstifade mi [Is it resignation or benefiting]ʼ, Vatan 19.1.2008: 5 
146 Dilek Çetereisi, ʻDP Tavukluğu Seçti Horozluğu CTPʼye Bırkatı [DP Chose to be a Chicken and Left it to CTP to be a Rooster], Kıbrıs,
18.1.2008:14, 15.
147 No author, ʻİskeleli gençler gururumuz oldu [Iskele youth makes us proud]ʼ, Vatan, 4.9.2007:1.
148 No author, ʻRumʼa 9 milyon KL akıttık [We gave 9 million Cyprus Pounds to Greek Cypriots]ʼ, Volkan, 20.1.2008:1.
149 No author, ʻİngiliz üssü olduk [We have become a British base]ʼ, Ortam, 4.9.2007:1. 
150 Fazile Çukurovalı, ʻKansere yeniliyoruz [We are defeated by cancer]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 24.9.2007:1.
151 No author, ʻOrtadoğuʼya köprü olduk [We have become a bridge to the Middle East]ʼ, Afrika, 24.9.2007:1.
152 Meltem Sonay ʻOlumlu have [Positive atmosphere]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 4.9.2007:8.
153 Anıl Işık, ʻ5 Eylül”den beklenti yok [No expectation from the 5th of September]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 4.9.2007:1,4.
154 Alihan Pehlivan, ʻLokmacıyı konuşun [Talk about Lokmacı]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 5.9.2007:4. 
155 Çağıl Günalp, ʻGörüşme öncesi Kıbrıslı Türk ve Kıbrıslı Rum gazeteciler ne dedi [What did the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot journalists
say before the meeting]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 6.9.2007:9.
156 Çağıl Günalp and Meltem Sonay, ʻ“Beklenen sonuç” çıktı [The expected result has emerged]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 7.9.2007:8.
157 Ibid.
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representatives on the DP MPs  ʼ resignation.158 As journalists have been those shaping and
defining the news, the trade union perspective was the only voice to reflect the opinion of the
society. Otherwise, with articles focused on the views of political parties, the reports ignored what
the rest of the society thought on the issue.
The coverage of political news was no different and political party leaders, especially, were
given opportunities to express their opinions. For example, when the DP assembly decided on
resignation, CTP-BG General Secretary Ömer Kalyoncuʼs comment on the issue was included in
the TAK story (which meant that it appeared in all the newspapers that based their stories on it),
with no explanation as to why only his views were reported. The newspapers decided to record
mainly the views of CTP-BG and UBP, for the most part ignoring the small partner of the coalition
that was at the centre of the debate.159
During the period included in the study women were invisible in the press. It was only when
UBP MP Şerife Ünverdi issued a press release critical of Fatma Ekenoğlu, the Speaker of the
Parliament, that women appeared in the papers.160 Kıbrıslıʼs report of these statements carried a
belittling tone as it referred to both female politicians by their first names rather than their
surnames as it would do to male politicians: ʻA strong reaction from Şerife to Fatmaʼ.161
The journalistic practice of publishing statements without contextualizing them led to some
views, ideas and discourses being reproduced in the newspapers disguised as news. For
example, sometimes political party statements that were basically propaganda material rather
than informational were integrated into news articles. News articles reporting on the speech DP
leader Serdar Denktaş delivered at his party assembly were one such example: Both Kıbrıslı and
Ortam published most of the speech text instead of an account of it,162 which helped the
dissemination of a text prepared specifically for the party members as it included the beliefs and
ideology of the political party. By publishing it the newspapers communicated them to a wider
audience, as mentioned before, hidden in the form of news. 
Conclusion
Research for this time period also confirmed that the print media rely heavily on externally
prepared texts, especially news agency dispatches, rather than produce their own news items.
Reworked or edited in some cases, but copied with minimal change most times, these texts from
the same sources comprised the majority of the newspapers  ʼnews content. News articles were
practically identical in all the newspapers even when reporters attended a news event and could
have written up their own accounts. Thus, it is difficult to talk about a diverse media landscape as
generally only one version of events was ever presented. In the absence of challenging
discourses and representation, such reproduction of issues and events reinforces perception of
that version as the ʻtruth  ʼas well as providing a hegemonic frame to understand and construct a
particular social reality. This was the case in the news reports on the Cyprus Issue. As the majority
of the press employed TAK dispatches, which can be described as officially approved, the print
mediaʼs depiction of developments regarding the leaders  ʼmeeting was not only dominated by the
official framework but also strengthened and justified their arguments on the matter. The official
discourse that portrayed the Turkish Cypriot side as wanting a peaceful solution, while casting the
Greek Cypriot side as the opposite, was integrated into the news. As a result, it reinforced a
158 Meltem Sonay, ʻUzlaşı beklentisi [Expectation of reconciliation]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 19.1.2008:10.
159 That is, the party ÖRP, against whom the DP was protesting. Only the partyʼs General Secretary Mustafa Gökmenʼs view was included in the
report, but again this derived from a TAK story that also reported views of the representatives of the parties that had a seat in the parliament,
DP, UBP, CTP, TDP and ÖRP. Gökmenʼs comments also appeared in Yenidüzen but otherwise the voice of ÖRP that was in the centre of the
debate was hardly heard in the newspapers.
160 No author, ʻEkenoğlu yanlış yapıyor [Ekenoğlu is doing wrong]ʼ, Güneş, 24.9.2007:1;
No author, ʻÜzüntüyle izliyoruz [We are watching with sadness]ʼ, Vatan, 24.9.2007:1; No author, “Meclis başkanlığını saldırdığın 40 yıllık
mücadeleye borçlu olduğunu unutma [Donʼt forget that you owe your position as the Speaker of the parliament to 40 year old struggle]ʼ, Volkan,
24.9.2007:1.
161 No author, ʻŞerifeʼden Fatmaʼya sert tepki [Strong reaction from Şerife to Fatma]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 24.9.2007:12.
162 Mutlu Esendemir, ʻDP ipleri kopardı [DP has severed the relationship]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 17.1.2008:3; No author, ʻDP Milletvekilleri meclisten istifa etti
[DP MPs resigned from the Assembly]ʼ, Ortam, 17.1.2008:11.
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common public perception that Greek Cypriots do not want a peaceful solution with Turkish
Cypriots.
Intertwining commentary with information was common in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers
examined. They frequently presented their opinions in the form of the news or factual information
which was far from providing a clear understanding of the issue. Any remarks that implied a
newspaperʼs views were usually embedded in the headlines. Because so often the news agency
reports were copied verbatim and published as the newspaper story, headlines and subheads
were the only place to hear— and so to analyse—the institutional voice of a newspaper. 
Nationalistic representations and discourses were obvious especially in the stories focused on
the Cyprus Issue. Reports depicting the Turkish Cypriots as united against the Greek Cypriots
confirmed that when the topic was a national issue such as the Cyprus Problem, the media
employed the image of a homogenous nation. Meanwhile, accounts of the talks between the
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders used the discourse of ʻus  ʼand ʻthemʻ. Such dichotomy
not only acted as a unifying force within ʻus  ʼby producing a sense of distinctiveness from the
ʻotherʼ, but also enhanced the conflict between the two sides. On the other hand, the relationship
with the ʻother  ʼdid not show much variation: Generally, it was Greek Cypriots in the position of the
ʻother  ʼwhile there was no reference to Greeks; and Turkey and Turks did not appear in the position
of the ʻotherʼ, but on the contrary, featured as part of ʻusʼ. The construction of oppositional positions
of ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼand the positive representation of ʻus  ʼand the negative portrayal of the ʻotherʼ
were discernible throughout the dates included in the study. 
There were political biases inherent in the representations of the newspapers. In some cases
subtle and in others openly, these biases were reflected in the news. For example, the coverage
in the newspapers of the DP withdrawal from parliament reflected intra-national differences and
political orientations. Our study confirmed that the affiliations the Turkish Cypriot press had with
some political parties were influential in the construction of the news. Even though usage of stories
prepared by the news agency might have helped the newspapers insulate themselves from
political bias, their headlines still mirrored their political agreements with and oppositions to the
issue discussed.
The EU did not feature much in the press during the dates analysed here, indicating a lack of
interest in the institution. There were no stories reporting actions and policies of the EU in the
Turkish Cypriot press, but only events that had a direct influence on the country such as providing
funding or its role in the Cyprus Problem. When the EU featured in a story related to the Cyprus
Problem, it was in some cases portrayed as an ally and in others as a foe. 
Sanem Şahin




Analysis of television news requires a different approach since both the production and the
reception processes of broadcast news are different. News on television, a visual- and audio-
based medium, is considered to be more impartial and trustworthy than the newspapers.1 The
process of constructing television news, from information gathering to selection and writing, is also
different than print news because of the nature of television. Unlike print journalists, broad cast
journalists have to be present at the event and record it in audio and video form. Clarity, brevity
and the narrative based on audio and visuals shape the way the story is told on television.
John Hartley, in his study of the news, asserts that television news tells us about certain
aspects of society as well as about television news production itself.2 That is because social
relations in a society are reflected onto the news production and are also influential in shaping
news discourses. Therefore, this part of the research aims to discover the representation of the
Cyprus Issue, the EU, internal politics and self-perception in relation to the ʻothers  ʼin the Turkish
Cypriot television news. It also investigates common routines and practices in the broadcast
journalism in north Cyprus. 
The Data
The context of the research is similar to that of the newspaper analysis in 2007. The data covers
the period of 4 to 7 September 2007, 24 to 26 September 2007 and 17 to 20 January 2008, and
includes the main evening news bulletins of five television channels, Bayrak Radio Television
(BRT), Kıbrıs TV, Genç TV, Kanal T and Avrasya TV (ART).3 Around 40 hours of news were
analysed for the research.
For the analysis we studied the visual and verbal structures of the news narratives and investi -
gated the relationship between images and texts. News selection, accessed voices, construction
and presentation of stories are examined to compare treatment and discourse on the different
television channels. As with the newspapers, this kind of comparison is made in order to reveal
the shared values and common practices within the Turkish Cypriot media as well as establish
their differences. 
The Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
The television news programmes that were included in the study consisted of presentation of a
topic by a newsreader who set the frame and discourse of the story and in some cases provided
links with other topics in the programme. The filmed portion included a voice report and presented
images related to the story. Correspondents, whose role is to offer further details and explain the
importance of the issue, rarely appeared on the news bulletins. During the period examined,
Kanal T, Genç TV and BRT journalists reported live from the location of the leaders  ʼmeeting to
give the latest developments.4 Apart from this event, it was mainly Kanal T that had items showing
1 John Hartley, Understanding News, London: Routledge, 1982.
2 Ibid. p.47.
3 Akdeniz TV is not included in the research as it had no news bulletins during 4-7.9.2007, 24-26.9.2007.
4 Kanal T, item 1, 5.9.2007; Genç TV, item 1, 5.9.2007; BRT, item 1, 5.9.2007.
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a reporter involved in the story; that is to say, doing a stand-up piece to camera at the end or in
the middle of a story or appearing on screen while carrying out interviews. 
Film reports mainly consisted of the newsreaderʼs voice over video images and, in some cases,
sound-bites from a speaking source. Nearly all television news programmes benefited from
graphics in the form of captions appearing at the bottom of the screen; to an extent, these
summarised the story. Otherwise, it was only ART that used full-frame text graphics that not only
indicated the gist of the news topic but also conveyed some commentary. In some cases a news
item had several such graphics highlighting certain aspects of the report. 
Like newspaper reports, television news programmes were very similar to each other and far
from being exclusive. Again, having used the same sources, such as TAK, the content of news
bulletins was alike and similar to the print mediaʼs stories as well. For example, reporting on the
views of TRNC Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer, the Speaker of the Assembly and the political
party representatives concerning the meeting between the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat
and the Greek Cypriot counterpart Tassos Papadopoulos, all the television channels aired the
same news with slightly different images. Either because of lack of resources or reporters,
exclusive reports rarely appeared on the television news. While Kanal Tʼs exclusive stories were
mainly human-interest ones, BRTʼs consisted of comments of politicians, especially on issues
related to the Cyprus Problem. 
Although television is a visual medium, the quantity and quality of images were far from
satisfying. Shaky and badly lit video pictures were common. Probably caused by not having
enough images for news scripts, the same visuals were used in a loop—meaning that audience
kept seeing the same pictures over and over and not only in the same report but in several reports
within the same news bulletin. For example, on BRT two separate stories that concerned the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) were presented one after the other and showed the
same archive footage of the ECHR building.5 Similarly, any reference to the Talat-Papadopoulos
meeting in the news used the same or similar footage of the two leaders with Michael Moller, the
UN  Secretary Generalʼs Special Envoy in Cyprus, giving an after-meeting press statement. This
image appeared in the video part of the stories concerning the leaders  ʼmeeting on nearly  all
television channels. 
Lack of recent or new pictures also led to frequent use of archive footage, most of the time
without acknowledging this fact. Images from picture libraries were used especially when written
press statements were reported. In some cases, even when the script specified that it was a
written press release, pictures showed the source as speaking. Use of still photography was also
common when there was no video footage. Genç TVʼs film report on the opening of a new branch
of the Red Crescent6 and tree planting activity organised by the Turkish army forces comprised
only photographs, with no video.7 Kıbrıs TV also employed this method when it had no footage
for a meeting between the Minister of Labour and Social Security, Sonay Adem, and a trade union.8
Stills also appeared in another news item on Kıbrıs TV, reporting on an announcement of the
Agriculture Minister; but this time the report combined photographs with some video shots of the
ministry building.9 Kanal T also chose to broadcast a story about Turkeyʼs first lady, Emine Erdoğan,
even though it had no video footage for the item. It simply compiled the report with some stills.10
One of the main rules of television news writing is that the pictures and the script (or voice
report) should complement each other. Certainly, the basic theme of pictures should highlight the
main topic of a script. On Turkish Cypriot television, the news stories based mainly on who said
what showed the image of the person who issued the statement. Therefore, pictures in the
television news predominantly demonstrated one person speaking, and matching picture and
5 BRT, items 7 and 8, 6.9.2007.
6 Genç TV, item 9, 19.1.2008.
7 Genç TV, item 7, 20.1.2008.
8 Kıbrıs TV, item 9, 18.1.2008.
9 Kıbrıs TV, item 5, 20.1.2008.
10 Kanal T, item 16, 25.9.2007.
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script did not seem to create a big problem. But in stories where the pictures and the script came
from different sources, for example, if pictures were recorded by the channelʼs came r aper sons
and the script was taken from a news agency, then reports and pictures did not have direct
correspondence. One such example was the media account of a protest demonstration by
environmentalist groups against the governmentʼs decision to transfer electricity to the end of
Karpaz peninsula. Reports of the event on Kanal T, Kıbrıs TV and Genç TVʼs utilised different
pictures to illustrate the same script— probably a news agency dispatch, as the same text
appeared in most of the newspapers as well.11 In this example, it is hard to talk about a picture-
script harmony. 
Representation of certain issues and institutions with the same pictures helped to establish a
symbolic relationship between them. Shots of flags were one means employed, especially by
ART, to identify one or the other side of the island as the focus of the news topic. That is to say,
whenever there was an issue concerning south Cyprus or Greek Cypriots in general, the flag of the
Republic of Cyprus, and in some cases of Greece, were shown. In one news items ART described
the Greek Cypriot side as being ʻprestigious in fiasco and illegal events  ʼand showed a Republic
of  Cyprus flag to identify the place in the pictures as the Greek Cypriot side.12 It also integrated
pictures of huge Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags drawn on the mountain in the north into its film
report immediately after the full-screen text that said ʻGreek Cypriots are anxiousʼ.13 In a report
on shopkeepers  ʼexpectations from the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting, the Kanal T journalist began
by showing both Greek and Republic of Cyprus flags first and then zooming out towards Turkish
Cypriot and Turkish flags to indicate his position at the border and to illustrate the separation.14
Apart from national symbols such as flags, wide-ranging street shots were the other pictures
used for topics that referred to the people in general. For stories related to the Greek Cypriot side,
shots of shopping streets or traffic in the south were used. Reporting that the Greek Cypriot
Administration rejected the Turkish Cypriot sideʼs offer of cooperation to prevent illegal immigration
and human trafficking to Cyprus, Kanal T, BRT and ART showed pictures of people walking in the
streets in south Nicosia.15 Kıbrıs TV did not use street shots for that story, but did use them for
another story reported in the same bulletin concerning a survey carried out about the presidential
elections in the south.16 When south Cyprus was the topic of the news most pictures were usually
from Ledra Street, a major shopping street in south Nicosia. Yet, unless stated in the voice report,
there was no indication that would help audience to identify it as such or even as the Greek
Cypriot side. 
The practice of showing general view shots was not limited to the stories about the Greek
Cypriot side. When the news reported on events in the north, such as campaigns, developments,
research findings, general street shots or views from the rooftop of the well-known Saray Hotel in
north Nicosia were used. For example, Genç TV used the picture of the view from Saray Hotel for
two separate stories in the same bulletin, one reporting on a seminar organised by the Chamber
of Commerce and the other on a joint meeting of youth organisations of two political parties from
both sides.17 Similar pictures were used by Kıbrıs TV for a news report on the start of a campaign
called ʻend slaveryʼ,18 while Kanal T used general street shots for the same report.19 ART and
Genç TV also showed general pictures of Nicosia their report on research findings related to
illegal drug usage amongst primary school students.20 And BRT used similar pictures for a story
11 Kanal T, item 4, 5.9.2007; Kıbrıs TV, item 6, 5.9.2007; Genç TV, item 3, 5.9.2007.
12 ART, item 9, 18.1.2008.
13 Art, item 2, 20.1.2008.
14 Kanal T, item 3, 4.9.2007.
15 Kanal T, item 5, 17.1.2008; BRT, item 7, 17.1.2008; ART, item 3, 17.1.2008.
16 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 17.1.2008.
17 Genç TV, items 11 and 13, 18.1.2008.
18 Kıbrıs TV, item 9, 19.1.2008.
19 Kanal T, item 11, 19.1.2008.
20 ART, item 5, 20.1.2008; Genç TV, item 10, 20.1.2008.
110 Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem
on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe meeting where human rights abuse
and injustices against Turkish Cypriots were among the issues to be discussed.21
Images for foreign news came either from news agencies such as IHA, a Turkish news agency,
or were recorded from news channels such as Euronews. These types of pictures required no
editing and, combined with text received from a news agency, were ready to broadcast with little or
no transformation. Recordings from Turkish television channels were another source for such visuals. 
In television news, sound-bites or clips where a source is heard speaking are considered useful
not only to convey information but also to communicate feelings, ideas and emotions.22 For these
reasons they are frequently used in broadcast news to attract audience attention. Common
practice is to keep them short, not more than 20-30 seconds; however, our research revealed that
the average length of a sound-bite in the Turkish Cypriot television news is around a minute or
more. Moreover, some news bulletins included parts from discussion programmes aired earlier on
the same channel. In such cases sound-bites were much longer. For example, BRTʼs first news
item the day after the Talat–Papadopoulos meeting was based on another news programme aired
on BRT in which Talat had been a guest. The sound-bite employed in this approximately five
minute-long report was nearly three minutes long.23 Similarly, one leading story on Kanal T, which
was an account of a heated argument between two guests on another news programme shown
earlier on the channel, included a sound-bite around five minutes long.24 Genç TV had a similar
news item that again consisted of lengthy sound-bites from a television programme that had been
broadcast earlier on the channel.25
Clarity is crucial in broadcast news as the audience hears the information only once. Yet the
news analysed here cannot always be described as ʻclearʼ, mainly, it seems, because they used
stories written for the press without editing them for broadcast. As a result, long and complex
sentences in scripts made it difficult to follow and understand the presentation. There were also
many instances in which the identity of a source seen speaking on screen was vague, as no clear
indication was given either in captions or a verbal introduction. There were also times when the
wrong image was used for the person mentioned in the text. This practice was noted especially
on Genç TV. Reporting on the British Foreign Secretary Peter Milibandʼs visit to Turkey and his
statements about Talat and Papadopoulos  ʼmeeting, the channel showed the wrong image for the
British diplomat.26 It made the same mistake in another report on the DP MPs  ʼ resignations;
showing the party assembly in which the resignation decision was taken, Genç TV quoted
Mustafa Adaoğlu, one of the party authorities, but showed someone elseʼs picture.27
Time is accepted as an important factor that distinguishes broadcast news from print media. It
plays a role in shaping the presentation and style of the news bulletins as broadcast news has to
be given at a specific time and has a fixed duration.28 In broadcast news it is always ʻtodayʼsʼ
developments that are reported rather than the events of the past. Yet, in the Turkish Cypriot
broadcast culture, time is not so important a factor. Even though many channels showed a clock
to indicate the start time of their news bulletins and highlight their timeliness, most failed to start
their news programme on time. Events that took place a day earlier also appeared in bulletins of
all the television channels. For example, Prime Minister Soyerʼs public meeting in a village was
on the next dayʼs evening main news bulletins of BRT, Kanal T and Genç TV.29 Also the
attendance of President Talat to an event organised by the Union of Journalists was reported in
the next dayʼs main evening news bulletins on all the television channels.30
21 BRT, item 7, 24.9.2007.
22 John Herbert, Journalism in the Digital Age, Oxford: Focal Press, 2000.
23 BRT, item 1, 6.9.2007.
24 Kanal T, item 1, 17.1.2008.
25 Genç TV, item 7, 24.9.2007. 
26 Genç TV, item 7, 6.9.2007.
27 Genç TV, item 1, 17.1.2008.
28 Philip Schlesinger, Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identity, London: Sage, 1991.
29 BRT, item 3, 4.9.2007; Kanal T, item 5, 4.9.2007; Genç TV, item 5, 4.9.2007.
30 Kıbrıs TV, item 6, 18.1.2008; Genç TV, item 3, 18.1.2008; Kanal T, item 3, 18.1.2008; ART TV, item 1, 18.1.2008.
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Discourse Analysis
The Cyprus Issue
There are a variety of ways that the news can be arranged within a bulletin, for example, by
importance or categories of topics. The Turkish Cypriot television channels generally order stories
according to their topics and usually start with any issue related to the Cyprus Problem. That is
not to say that if any extraordinary and unexpected event happened they would not report it first,
but to note that when there is no such news, then priority is given to the news about the Cyprus
Issue. Accounts of announcements made by state or government figures or foreign diplomats on
the Cyprus Problem are always in the first part of the news bulletin. The Cyprus Issue is regarded
as so newsworthy that even in the events not related to the Cyprus Problem any mention of the
issue is highlighted as the most important aspect. In other words, if any official made a statement
during an event and referred to the Cyprus Problem, then this part is reported before the event
itself. For example, when Talat gave a speech at a Union of Journalists event, the television
channels led with his remarks on the Cyprus Issue, highlighting this as more significant than the
event itself.31
Domination of the Official Discourses
The depiction the leaders  ʼ meeting on the television news was no different from the official
representation, which set itself as the dominant discourse and established a framework for
interpretation of the events. According to the official story, the Turkish Cypriot side had made an
offer that would help both sides to progress in finding a settlement to the Cyprus Problem, but the
Greek Cypriot side, by rejecting it, showed its unwillingness for a peaceful solution on the island.
As the television channels benefited from the same sources of information, they not only
contributed to presenting these viewpoints as uniform but the fact that most of these sources were
official ones, justified and strengthened their discourses as well.
The television channels treated the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting as the most important
development in their news bulletins, even the day before it took place. Like the press, the
television channels reminded their audience ahead of the meeting that the two leaders would get
together the following day, and provided them with some details such as where and what time
they would meet and who would accompany them.32 The content of these stories was the same
as that of the newspapers, which meant that they originated from the same source. The channels
also gave an account of Talatʼs spokesperson, Hasan Erçakıcaʼs, press briefing on the issue. The
script used in the reports was again the same as the texts that appeared in the newspapers
(except the sound-bites)33 and consisted of repeating what the official spokesperson said. 
Most of the television channels expressed the same pessimism as the newspapers about the
outcome of the leaders  ʼmeeting. Kıbrıs TV, highlighting the opinion of the main opposition party
UBP, as expressed in a press conference, reported that ʻUBP does not seem very optimistic about
the summitʼ.34 The next item on the same bulletin continued with the story, but gave also citizensʼ
views on the issue, which apart from one were all negative. Carried out in vox-pop style,
audiences heard the interviewee say ʻI donʼt have much hopeʼ. In sections where the interviewee
gave an explanation for his pessimism then the blame was mostly put on the Greek Cypriot side
for not wanting a solution.35 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kıbrıs newspaper also had a
similar feature reporting on the publicʼs view on the topic.36 In the same way, Kanal T asked
members of the public for their opinions on the meeting, but they were more specific and
interviewed retailers in the shopping area known as ʻArasta  ʼin Lefkoşa (north Nicosia). While all
31 Ibid.
32 The only channel that did not find it newsworthy that day was ART, which did not include a story on the issue.
33 BRTʻs script was different but with the same discourse. BRT, item 2, 4.9.2007.
34 Kıbrıs TV, item 4, 4.9.2007.
35 Kıbrıs TV, item 5, 4.9.2007.
36 Kıbrıs, items 1, 4, 4.9.2007.
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the interviews revealed that the shopkeepers did not expect a positive outcome from the meeting,
they also voiced their wish for an opening of the Lokmacı/Ledra checkpoint.37 The same story also
appeared in the next dayʼs issue of Kıbrıslı newspaper. Compiled by the same reporter who
worked for both Kanal T and Kıbrıslı, the photos of the interviewees showed the same people as
those who had appeared on the screen, but their words were slightly transformed.38 Genç TV, on
the other hand, reported on the Greek Cypriot political figures only. Basing its story on a news
agency report that was derived from the Greek Cypriot press on the issue (it also appeared in the
newspapers the next day), the newsreader remarked that ʻGreek Cypriot political leaders have
little expectation from the meeting that will take place between TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat
and the leader of the Greek Cypriot Administration Tassos Papadopoulosʼ.39
The leaders  ʼpress conferences that occurred after their meeting received different levels of
coverage, with the Turkish Cypriot leader being treated much more favourably. The press
conferences took place too late to be covered in any of the television main evening news bulletins,
but were reported the next day. Kıbrıs TV summarised the main points of the statements made by
both leaders in its lead story;40 while it had a news package that included some sound-bites from
Talatʼs press conference, the Greek Cypriot leaderʼs comments were reported only as a voice-
over report without any actual sound from him. The reason for this difference in treatment could
be lack of relevant footage from Papadopoulosʼs press conference. Genç TV also first showed
Talatʼs press conference, including sections with Talatʼs voice, and then Papadopoulosʼs but only
as a voice report. The script was the same as the articles in the newspapers.41 BRT, on the other
hand, probably having reported both press conferences in its daytime news bulletins, chose not
to repeat the same stories in its main evening bulletin. Instead it reported on an interview Talat
had given to the channel earlier that day as well as the comments of the Greek Cypriot
government spokesperson and political party leaders on the meeting. The channel reported that
Talat did not expect any advancement in the Cyprus Issue prior to the presidential elections in
south Cyprus, which again put the responsibility on the Greek Cypriots.42
Adopting the official discourse, all the news reports represented the Turkish Cypriots as making
positive suggestions that would aid in solution of the Problem, and the Greek Cypriots as rejecting
it. According to the television news, the Turkish Cypriot offer was to launch comprehensive talks
in 2008 following a rapid preparation period and to target a solution by the end of the same year,
but the Greek Cypriot leader did not accept it. While the reports on the Turkish Cypriot leader
attributed him a positive attitude and underlined his concern for finding a settlement, the reports
on the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos did the opposite. 
The state and government representatives who blamed the Greek Cypriot leader were also
given preference. For instance, the Speaker of Assembly Fatma Ekenoğluʼs views on the leadersʼ
meeting were reported on every news channel. BRT and Genç TV showed exactly the same
sound-bite from Ekenoğlu where she accused Papadopoulos of ʻavoiding meeting our president.
But now conditions forced him to attend this meetingʼ.43 Prime Minister Soyer was also reported
to have pointed a finger at the Greek Cypriot leader for not being sincere. Kıbrıs TV used a quote
from Soyer as one of the captions in the film report that said, ʻthe whole world saw the real
intention of Papadopoulosʼ; 44 the quote that BRT used was, ʻPapadopoulos sent Talat a letter (of
invitation) when he was corneredʼ.45
37 Kanal T, item 3, 4.9.2007.
38 Kıbrıslı, item 4, 5.9.2007.  
39 Genç TV, item 2, 4.9.2007.
40 Kıbrıs TV, item 1, 6.9.2007.
41 Genç TV, items 1, 2, 6.9.2007.
42 BRT, item 1, 6.9.2007.
43 BRT, item 3, 6.9.2007; Genç TV, item 3, 6.9.2007.
44 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 6.9.2007.
45 BRT, item 2, 6.9.2007.
113Turkish Cypriot Television in 2007-2008
Balanced reporting? The views from the Greek Cypriot side
Reportage of the leaders  ʼmeeting within the Greek Cypriot political community received limited
coverage in the Turkish Cypriot television news. BRT broadcast a story concerning the opinions
of the Greek Cypriot government spokesperson as well as political party representa tives as a
voice report over a mixture of images of the people quoted. The story appeared after a news item
that included views of the Turkish Cypriot party representatives.46 In the story the Greek Cypriot
government spokesperson was reported to be accusing Turkish Cypriot leader Talat of looking for
ways to violate the 8 July agreement. The caption of the story was, ʻthe Greek Cypriot side puts
the blame on the Turkish sideʼ.47 Genç TV also included news items from the Greek Cypriot side,
which provided an insight to the representation of the topic in south Cyprus. For instance, it
broadcast stories consisting of press coverage of the meeting in the Greek Cypriot press. Using
one such story, Genç TV announced that the representation of the meeting was different there
and that it was Talat who was blamed for not honouring the 8 July agreement. It summarised the
Greek Cypriot pressʼs attitude in the caption of its story as ʻTalat kicked the 8th July.ʼ 48 Genç TV
also reported AKEL General Secretary Christofiasʼs statement regarding the offer Talat made
during the meeting, which (according to the channel), he found ʻwrong even to discuss itʼ.49 Within
the television news broadcasting, these were the only indications that the Greek Cypriot side
viewed the issue in a different and contrasting way than the Turkish Cypriot side. There was no
other story in the Turkish Cypriot television news that included Greek Cypriots  ʼcomments on the
outcome of the meeting.  
Greek Cypriots as the ʻotherʼ
Discursive construction of a dichotomy based on ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼwith negative attributes enforces
the binary position and may contribute to the enforcement of conflict rather than reconciliation.
Creation of the ʻother  ʼas the ʻenemy  ʼencourages ethnocentric and nationalist perceptions among
people. The Turkish Cypriot television channels reinforced the perception of the Greek Cypriot
side as the ʻother  ʼeither by repeating official discourses that showed them as such or in their
interpretation of the events. Throughout the period in which the television news was analysed, the
Greek Cypriot side was frequently portrayed as working against the interests of Turkish Cypriots
and a settlement in Cyprus. Referring to a letter the Greek Cypriot adminis tra tion sent to the UN
Secretary General blaming the Turkish Cypriot leader Talat for not following the 8 July procedure,
Kanal T and BRT reported that, ʻthe side that refused the Turkish sideʼs suggestion of starting the
procedure has immediately started political manoeuvresʼ.50 In this expression, having cast a positive
light on the Turkish Cypriot side, they attributed a negative attitude to the Greek Cypriot side.
News broadcasts frequently included repetition of official proclamations, which shifted the
responsibility for lack of progress in the meeting to the Greek Cypriots and helped to strengthen
the perception of Greek Cypriots as the ʻotherʼ. Foreign Minister Turgay Avcıʼs statement accusing
the Greek Cypriot authorities of using Turkish animosity in their election propaganda appeared on
BRT and Genç TV.51 The discourse the Presidentʼs spokesperson used in a press briefing in
which he blamed the Greek Cypriots for the isolation imposed on Turkish Cypriots was repeated
on all the television channels.52 Another example of such reports was on prevention of human
trafficking on the island. The reports again repeated the accusation of the presidential
spokesperson that the Greek Cypriot side, ʻas it usually did on every issue  ʼrefused to cooperate
on the sensitive issue of illegal immigration. By suggesting that the Greek Cypriot side ʻusuallyʼ
46 BRT, item 5, 6.9.2007. 
47 BRT, item 5, 6.9.2007.
48 Genç TV, item 5, 6.9.2007.
49 Genç TV, item 3, 7.9.2007.
50 BRT, item 2, 7.9.2007; Kanal T, item 2, 7.9.2007.
51 BRT, item 3, 24.9.2007; Genç TV,  item 6, 24.9.2007.
52 BRT, item 7, 25.9.2007; Kanal T, item 1, 25.9.2007; Genç TV, item 5, 25.9.2007;  ART, item 2, 25.9.2007; Kıbrıs TV, item 9, 25.9.2007.
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took this attitude the news discourse helped to set its behaviour as a trait and strengthened the
stereotypical representation of it. Furthermore, some television channels enhanced such
stereotyping by not only repeating the official discourse but by integrating their interpretation of the
subject into the news discourse. Kanal T, in describing the Turkish Cypriot sideʼs offer as ʻa
humane moveʼ, effectively portrayed the Greek Cypriot side as the opposite for refusing it.53 ART
went a step further, and described the Greek Cypriot administration as ʻbeing so blinded with rage
it even refuses to cooperate with the TRNC in vitally important mattersʼ.54
Treatment of the Greek Cypriot side as the ʻother  ʼ or as the enemy with unchanging evil
intentions was more frequent on channels with a nationalistic stance, such as ART. One such
example was the report that Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos had sent a letter to the
UN Secretary General, in which he accused the TRNC and Turkey of not working for a settlement
but for the recognition of the TRNC. ART first announced that the Greek Cypriot administration,
which did not want Turkish Cypriots to live peacefully in the state they estab lished, was making
attempts to stop it and then mentioned Papadopoulosʼs letter as an example. Its film report stated
that ʻthe Greek Cypriot administration, which cannot stand the existence of the TRNC, is
continuing to take negative steps  ʼover the pictures of both Greek Cypriot and Greek flags. The
caption that stayed on throughout the report defined Papadopoulos as ʻthe Greek Cypriot leader
who denies the existence of the TRNCʼ.
The diplomatic note the Greek Cypriot government gave to Syria for allowing ferry services
from Famagusta to Syriaʼs port Latakia was regarded as another example of the Greek Cypriot
administration efforts against Turkish Cypriots. Kanal T, in its report on the issue used a caption
that said ʻisolation for the TRNCʼ,55 while ART stated that the Greek Cypriot administration, which
tried to suffocate the TRNC through embargos, could not stand the TRNC establishing relations
with the outside world,56 BRT and Kıbrıs TV also ran stories on the issue, announcing that the
Greek Cypriot administration disapproved the start of the ferry services and had expressed that
to the Syrian authorities.57
Despite being cast as the ʻotherʼ, there was an interest in the coming presidential elections in
the south. Both, Genç TV and ART informed their audience of the application process for
presidential candidates in the Republic of Cyprus.58 Accounts of surveys about the elections also
found their way into the Turkish Cypriot television news bulletins. Basing one of its news items on
a survey carried out in south Cyprus, ART announced that the difference in estimated support
between two candidates, Papadopoulos and Christofias, was diminishing.59 Kıbrıs TV, also using
a survey that had appeared in a Greek Cypriot daily, highlighted that the number of Greek Cypriots
who were willing to live together with Turkish Cypriots was on the increase.60 Kanal T was the only
channel that produced an exclusive news item on the presidential elections in the south. Their
report, which was based on interviews with some Greek Cypriots, stressed that ʻeven though
Greek Cypriots wish DISY leader Ioannis Kassoulides to win the elections, they believe
Papadopoulos willʼ. The caption that ran throughout the film said ʻKassoulides  ʼname is in hearts
but Papadopoulos  ʼname spills from mouths.ʼ 61 However, as the report did not refer to or quote
any research or survey, the claim raised in the story did not go further than mere speculation.
Turkey
In general, the broadcast news representation and related discourse on Turkey were no different
than the official ones. During the period included in the study, Turkey appeared on television news
53 Kanal T, item 5, 17.1.2007.
54 ART, item 3, 17.1.2007.
55 Kanal T, item 6, 25.9.2007.
56 ART, item 1, 26.9.2007.
57 BRT, item 5, 24.9.2007; Kıbrıs TV, item 5, 26.9.2007.
58 Genç TV, item 4, 18.1.2008; ART, item 3, 19.1.2008.
59 ART, item 6, 20.1.2008.
60 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 17.1.2008.
61 Kanal T, item 3, 26.9.2007.
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bulletins mostly when Turkish state authorities made statements concerning the Cyprus Issue62
and when the state representatives from the two countries visited each other.63 The TRNC
Foreign Ministerʼs visit to Turkey was one such example of an official visit from one state to the
other. It received wide coverage in the Turkish Cypriot media, which apart from being regarded as
newsworthy, could be explained by the newsrooms being provided with the relevant press
releases and necessary visual materials, as in most cases the news material was very similar. 
Turkey was also the topic of the news when its membership in the EU was an item, especially
if the issue also involved Cyprus. One such issue was the meeting between Tayyip Erdoğan and
Angela Merkel, in which, according to coverage on BRT, Kıbrıs TV and Kanal T, Merkell was
expected to bring up the issue of Turkey opening its ports to the Republic of Cyprus.  These
channels also repeated claims that the Greek Cypriot administration, using the religious
institutions in Cyprus and Europe, was pressuring political parties and governments in Europe to
force Turkey to open its ports to the Republic of Cyprus.64 Though the three channels used nearly
the same text, BRT gave its source as an internet news portal, ʻAPʼ, while the other two gave no
source. 
The decision by EU member states not to put Turkey on the map of Europe that appeared on
the new Euro coins was also regarded as newsworthy by Kanal T and Kıbrıs TV. The latter
reported on the statement of the spokesperson for EU Commissioner on Economic and Monetary
Affairs, Joaquin Almunia.65 Kanal T, on the other hand, with the addition of background music,
dramatized the issue. Referring to the new design for the Euro coins, the channel high lighted that
ʻon the map, in which Turkey doesnʼt appear, Cyprus is brought closer to Greeceʼ.66
Reports of video footage on the internet showing famous Greek Cypriot tennis player Marcos
Baghdatis taking part in an anti-Turk demonstration was another topic that was well covered in
the press. The broadcast footage showed Baghdatis shouting, while some channels added the
caption, ʻ Turks out of Cyprusʼ. ART and Kıbrıs TV aired the story using similar captions: ʻ The racist
behaviour of the Greek Cypriot tennis playerʼ.67 Both channels treated Baghdatisʼs behaviour as
an insult to ʻusʼ. Later the tennis player explained in a press confer ence that by ʻTurks  ʼhe meant
the Turkish army on the island not Turkish Cypriots. Yet the Turkish Cypriot mediaʼs presentation
of the story reveals that separation of Turkish Cypriots and Turks as two nations was irrelevant
when the ʻus  ʼgroup was constructed in relation to Greek Cypriots.  
The European Union
The EU was treated in the television news just the same as in the print media, i.e., positively or
negatively depending on the issue. Its role as a source of financial aid for project development
was welcomed, while its interference in the Cyprus Problem was not. Overall, the EU was covered
only if the story involved Cyprus, otherwise interest in it was minimal. One such example was a
report on Slovenia, which had the rotating presidency of the EU Council, issuing Greece and the
Republc of Cyprus a warning concerning their political attitude towards the independence of
Kosovo.68 According to the television channels that broadcast the story these two countries feared
that the recognition of Kosovo might encourage recognition of the TRNC.
The EU as a Source of Financial Aid
One of the main representations of the EU was as a source of financial aid. In the period included
in the study, the EU was reported to have prepared and presented its report on the financial aid
62 Genc TV, item 6, 25.9.2007.
63 The announcement of the visit to the TRNC by the head of Turkeyʼs Grand Assembly: BRT, item 5, 7.9.2007; Genc TV, item 5, 7.9.2007.
64 BRT, item 1, 20.1.2008; Kanal T, item 3, 20.1.2008; Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 20.1.2008.
65 Kıbrıs TV, item 15, 25.9.2007.
66 Kanal T, item 13, 25.9.2007.
67 ART, item 4, 19.1.2008; Kıbrıs TV, item 7, 18.1.2008. 
68 ART, item 5, 19.1.2008; Kanal T, item 1, 19.1.2008; Kıbrıs TV, item 4, 19.1.2008.
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regulation to north Cyprus to advance the social-economic conditions in the country. Related
stories were included in BRT and Kanal Tʼs main evening news bulletins.69 Using a similar text,
both channels highlighted in their lead stories that success of the regulation was linked to both an
improvement in the relations between two communities and the progress in talks for a settlement
within the framework of the UN. Kanal T, in the intro duc tion to the story, stressed that 9.5 million
Euro of the aid would be used to bring Turkish Cypriots closer to the EU, which enhanced the
perception of the organisation as a positive one. The film reports on both channels showed some
buildings with European flags in front of them, which the audience could only guess as being the
EU offices.
The EU also had a project to improve traffic safety in the country, as announced by ART and
Kıbrıs TV. This was a problem that Kıbrıs TV described as ʻa bleeding wound of our countryʼ,70
and ART as ʻruining familiesʼ.71 In this context, the news discourse related to the EU was positive:
The newsreader on Kıbrıs TV announced the project was expected to bring EU norms to the
country while the caption on ART pointed at the EUʼs role in the process; ʻthe EUʼs solution to the
traffic problemʼ.
The EUʼs Involvement in the Cyprus Solution
Unlike the newspapers, the television news did not comment on the EUʼs involvement in the
Cyprus Problem, but instead repeated statements of political figures on the issue. The analysis of
the news bulletins showed various EU representatives stressing the importance of a solution in
Cyprus and stating that the EU was ready to help with the solution. The EU related stories
appeared more frequently on BRT than any other channel. For example, a statement of support
by Slovenia, the EUʼs rotating presidency at the time, to the UN-initiated process known as the
Gambari agreement, and the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barrosoʼs,
statement that the EU was ready to help negotiate a solution to the Cyprus Problem were reported
on BRT.72 The same statement, whose source was an article in a Greek Cypriot daily, Politis, also
appeared on Genç TV as ʻCyprus could be effective in the EU only after a solutionʼ.73
In addition to EU representatives  ʼ interest in the solution of the Cyprus Problem receiving
negative reports, not so positive views of Turkish Cypriot politicians on the issue were also reported.
A statement by Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer, emphasizing that the Talat- Papadopoulos
meeting once again confirmed that a solution could be found within the umbrella of the UN, was
broadcast on some television channels.74 At a later date, ART and BRT reported TRNC Minister
Avcıʼs criticisms of the UN and the EU for not keeping their promises to Turkish Cypriots, while at
the same time they quoted the Turkish Minister Ali Babacanʼs remark that a framework for a
solution in Cyprus would be found with the UN.75 On ART, Turkish Minister Babacanʼs words that
ʻthe place for the solution will be the UNʼ, were given in a sound-bite and repeated as a full-screen
text graphic. 
Internal Politics: Political Parties and the Government
Policies and actions of the government and political parties were the subject of many news items
on television bulletins. The government was one of the main sources of information for the news
media, which not only helped to regulate the information environment but also served to promote
its policies and actions. At the same time, many news items that reflected civil society organisationsʼ
criticisms of the government were also included in the television news. 
69 BRT, item 4, 24.9.2007; Kanal T, item 5, 25.9.2007.
70 Kıbrıs TV, item 7, 20.1.2008.
71 ART, item 10, 20.1.2008.
72 BRT, item 2, 20.1.2008.
73 Genç TV, item 1, 19.1.2008. Cyprus here refers to the Republic of Cyprus.
74 BRT, item 2, 6.9.2007; Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 6.9.2007. 
75 BRT, item 8, 17.1.2008; ART, item 4, 17.1.2008. 
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The Government
The government received wide coverage in the television news, with all channels informing their
audiences of the cabinetʼs new decisions, actions of various ministers, and criticisms directed at
them. The activities and announcements of government ministers were seen as especially
newsworthy. For example, a joint press conference between the Finance Minister, Ahmet Uzun,
and the Agriculture Minister, Önder Sennaroğlu, was covered on all the channels in great detail.76
Also deemed newsworthy were ministers  ʼvisits—whether to a school, road building sites, etc. 
Even visits of various civil society organisations to government ministers were treated as
newsworthy. Such stories, which most of the time have no news value, are a common feature of
the Turkish Cypriot news media. Turning such an incident into a news story not only gives these
groups a way to publicise a problem or an important issue but also gives government repre -
sentatives the opportunity to promote their policies or views. For instance, when representatives
of the Black Sea Culture Association (Karadeniz Kültür Derneği) visited Prime Minister Soyer in
his office to invite him to their festival, it was reported on both BRT and Kanal T, even though the
story had no public interest.77 Labour and Social Security Minister Sonay Ademʼs meeting with
the representatives of the Union of Employers (İşverenler Sendikası) was also covered by Kıbrıs
TV and Genç TV,78 essentially allowing the minister to publicise his proposal— an amnesty in
social security payments, which was probably discussed or would be discussed during the meeting. 
Opposition to the Government
Despite the government being the main source of news, criticism directed at it was also frequently
reported on the television news. Popular news topics included disapproval of the trade unions
concerning the minimum wage, education and price increases. All channels included the
criticisms that the civil organisations directed at the government and broadcast such stories
together with stories that promoted their actions. For example, the news programmes included on
the same day both a positive and a negative news items. The first was a report on two ministers
promoting the actions and policies of their ministries, while the second was about a trade union,
Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants Trade Union (Kıbrıs Türk Amme Memurları Sendikası - KTAMS),
taking the government to court for not consulting the union on a matter that by law it was required
to.79 Interestingly in BRT, the state-owned broadcasting corporation, the KTAMS story preceded
the ministers  ʼaforementioned press conference.80 The news of the trade union filing a court case
against the government was the second item in the bulletin whereas the ministers  ʼ press
conference appeared as the fourth and fifth items. On all other channels, the court case followed
the ministers  ʼpublic announcements.
Demonstrations against government decisions were also reported. The Electric Workers Union
(Kıbrıs Türk Elektrik Kurumu Çalışanları Sendikası - El-Sen) and the Cyprus Turkish Unions
Federation (Türk-Sen) organised a rally to protest Finance Minister Ahmet Uzunʼs accusatory
statements directed at the electricity board workers, and this event received wide coverage on the
television channels.  Most reports used sound-bites that showed the union representatives first
and then the minister - as it actually happened. But Genç TV changed the order and aired the
ministerʼs pronouncement before the trade unionsʼ, thus prioritising the official voice.81 Unlike the
other channels, ART prepared an exclusive story to reflect the publicʼs reaction. Using eight vox
pops that consisted of only men, the channel reproduced ʻcitizens  ʼviews  ʼthat called this practice
ʻdiscriminating and unfairʼ.82
76 BRT, items 4, 5, 25.9.2007; Kanal T, item 3, 25.9.2007; ART, item 4, 25.9.2007; Kıbrıs TV, item 2, 25.9.2007; Genç TV, item 2, 25.9.2007.
77 BRT, item 19, 7.9.2007; Kanal T, item 13, 7.9.2007.
78 Kıbrıs TV, item 9, 18.1.2008; Genç TV, item 6, 18.1.2008.
79 BRT, item 2, 25.9.2007; Kanal T, item 8, 25.9.2007; ART, item 6, 25.9.2007; Kıbrıs Tv, item 5, 25.9.2007; Genç TV, item 4, 25.9.2007.
80 BRT, item 2, 25.9.2007.
81 Genç TV, item 14, 18.1.2008.
82 ART, item 5, 18.1.2008.
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Political Parties
The colourful language that came with political biases of the newspapers was not so common in
the television news. The TV news language was mostly limited to who said what and did not
include journalist observations as in the print media. Nevertheless, political biases were still
observable in the news selection. For example, within the period the analysis was carried out,
there were more news items reflecting the views of the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi -
UBP) on Kanal T than any other channel. Only Kanal T covered the UBP representa tives  ʼvisit to
Turkey83 or UBPʼs criticism of the government for high price increases84 or the dinner party UBP
organised for its supporters.85 Similarly, news items concerning the activities of the Freedom and
Justice Party (Özgürlük ve Reform Partisi - ÖRP) received more coverage on Genç TV; e.g., the
opening of ÖRPʼs new party offices in various villages and ÖRPʼs womenʼs group launching a
blood donation campaign.86 In contrast, the story of the Peopleʼs Party (Halk Partisi - HP)
establishing a branch office in a village several months later did not appear on Genç TV.87 Overall,
UBP appeared more frequently on TV screens than any other party, whether expressing its
opinion on the dayʼs issues or because of its activities, while TDP was the least visible. CTP-BG,
on the other hand, featured less in the news, and was mainly covered when their opinions were
sought on a certain topic such as the leaders  ʼmeeting. Like UBP, ÖRP was the other political party
that regularly benefited from television news to announce its activities to the public. 
Both the amount and the type of coverage the various political parties received in the broadcast
media were different. For instance, the four parties represented in the assembly appeared in the
news more frequently than those that were not, and of those represented, the larger parties were
more visible. For example, while BRT reported on the views of the four party representatives on
the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting, Kıbrıs TV chose to report only the views of CTP and UBP, the
larger party of the coalition government and the main opposition party.88 On Kanal T, on the other
hand, only UBPʼs views were included in the news.
The DP party was given the widest media coverage when its six MPs resigned from their seats
in the assembly. Apart from Kanal T, all channels used this event as their lead story. Kanal T,
instead, chose to broadcast a heated debate between the CTP-BG General Secretary Ömer
Kalyoncu and Nicosia Turkish Mayor Cemal Bulutoğluları, which had taken place in one of its
television programmes broadcast earlier in the day. Unlike the other channels, there was no
mention of the DP MPs  ʼ resignation in the main evening news of Kanal T, which could be
explained by its close ties with UBP.89 ART and Genç TV highlighted the impact of the resignations
on local politics: ʻPolitical arena shook with the resignation of DP MPsʼ,90 and ʻ….DP MPs decided
to resign from the assembly, the politics is mixed up (became confusing)ʼ.91 The choice and
sequence of news items on these two channels reveal how little importance was assigned to the
time factor; both led off with events of the day,before, rather than that dayʼs news. That is to say,
they first informed their audience of the events in the DP party assembly meeting that had
happened a day before the transmission and then reported that days  ʼevents.92 Kıbrıs TV and
BRT, on the other hand, began their bulletins with the story of the MPs submitting their letters of
resignation. It is possible that they did this because they had both already covered the issue in
their late night news bulletins the previous day. Both highlighted ʻpolitical interference  ʼ in the
83 Kanal T, item 7, 26.9.2007.
84 Kanal T, item 10, 26.9.2007.
85 Kanal T, item 7, 7.9.2007.
86 Genç TV, item 14, 6.9.2007; item 12, 7.9.2007; Genç TV, item 11, 19.1.2008. The news on the blood donation campaign appeared on the BRT
news bulletin as well but a day later.
87 Kıbrıs TV, item 5, 17.1.2008.
88 Kıbrıs TV, item 4, 6.9.2007.
89 Kanal T, item 1, 17.1.2008.
90 Genç TV, item 1, 17.1.2008.
91 ART, item 1, 17.1.2008.
92 Genç TV, items 1, 2, 17.1.2008; ART, items 1, 2, 17.1.2008.
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introduction of their stories as the cause of the MPs  ʼresignation, but they gave no further information,
on either the ʻinterference  ʼor where was it coming from.93 Like the print media, they also assumed
their audience had background knowledge of the issue. 
ARTʼs report on the DP MPs  ʼresignation resembled its coverage in Kıbrıslı newspaper. ARTʼs
caption reminded one of Kıbrıslıʼs headline on the topic: ʻ DP severed the ties [DP ipleri  kopardı]ʼ.94
A claim made by Cemal Bulutoğluları, Turkish mayor of Nicosia and a member of DP, during his
speech in the party assembly that ÖRP had offered him some money to transfer to that party, also
appeared only in Kıbrıslı and ART.95
Conclusion
The television news examined here showed many similarities to the news in the press, indicating
that the processes of information gathering and writing were not so different from print journalism
even though the medium of television would require different processes. Many times both media
shared the same news texts that were externally produced, such as a news agency dispatch or
a press release. Adopting these texts without editing them for television not only led to pictures
clashing with scripts but also to the use of long and complex sentences unsuitable for television.
Both resulted in loss of clarity, so that the television news was often difficult to follow or understand.
Picture quality was likewise unsatisfactory; many film reports in the bulletins consisted of shaky,
badly lit or poorly composed shots. In some stories audiences kept seeing the same shots over
and over, which gave the impression that the pictures were not always used to complement the
script but to fulfil the requirements of the medium.
All five television channels included in the study used graphics, these mainly in the form of
captions. Only ART integrated full-screen text graphics into its film reports that not only summarised
the main points but in some cases also communicated its commentary. Music was mainly used
by Kanal T, and specifically by one reporter probably to dramatise the issues he was covering. 
Television news items concerning the Cyprus Issue were mainly dominated by the official
discourse. That was partly because it was accepted as the norm and partly because, apart from
live reporting, most of the information in the news concerning the leaders  ʼmeeting originated from
the statements of state and government representatives such as the Speaker of the Assembly,
the President, the Prime Minister, etc. As a result of the common journalistic practice of reporting
who said what, the discourse of these institutions was integrated in the news. Therefore, there
were no challenging views or views different to the official line. Criticism was mostly within the
framework of internal politics or was directed at the ʻother  ʼrather than ʻusʼ. The blame for lack of
achievement in the talks was shifted to the ʻotherʼ, that is to say, to the Greek Cypriot side. On
other issues, the news was framed to show that Greek Cypriots were working against the interests
of Turkish Cypriots.  Meanwhile, there was very limited news from the Greek Cypriot community.
For example, the reaction to the leaders  ʼmeeting within the Greek Cypriot community was limited
to its reflection in the Greek Cypriot media. 
Most news coverage of Turkey was in relation to Cyprus. That is not to say that important
developments in Turkey were not reported, for they were. For example, all the Turkish Cypriot
channels reported on the confidence vote the new Turkish government received from the Turkish
assembly. The framing of Turkey stressed good relations, cooperation and a shared interest
between two states. Furthermore, when an incident that was against Turkeyʼs interest took place,
the television channels reacted in disapproval as if it had been directed at ʻusʼ. 
Looking at the Turkish Cypriot television news one would assume that the EU did not interest
the audience (or the media), as it rarely appeared in the news. Only its involvement in issues
93 BRT, item 1, 17.1.2008; Kıbrıs TV, item 1, 17.1.2008.
94 Kıbrıslı, item 1, 17.1.2008.
95 ART, item 1, 17.1.2008.
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about Cyprus was reported, such as financial aid it offered to improve social and economic
standards in the country or its interest in a solution to the Cyprus Problem.
Overall, the government received more advantageous treatment than any other institution.
Coverage of some activities of the government and its ministers that lacked any newswor thiness
indicated a certain amount of bias towards this political power. On the other hand, while the
governmentʼs policies and actions were frequently reported, criticisms directed at it were also
included in news coverage. 
Like the newspapers, the television channels  ʼpolitical alliances were obvious. Headlines, which
can reflect the opinion of a newspaper and give an indication of its political position, in the
broadcast media were in the form of captions accompanying the filmed reports.  However, ART
integrated a commentary into the story introduction and displayed this in the form of full-screen
text graphics. Apart from language, biases were observable in story selection and treatment of the
news concerning political parties; certain parties were favoured more in some channels while
others were ignored. 
The overall analysis of television news revealed a journalistic culture of reporting who said what
to be the dominant approach. This was also true for the print media. Most news items derived from
organised media events, news agency dispatches or press releases.  There were no examples of
investigative journalism. In some cases, the news fell short of informing audience as they lacked
crucial information or background information that was required to understand the issue better.  
Sanem Şahin
NEW EFFORTS – CAUTIOUS HOPES 
FOR A SOLUTION
(30 June – 3 July 2008)
With the election of Demetris Christofias to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus inFebruary 2008, the two communities were now headed by leaders that manyconsidered as sharing similar values and ideas. The leaders  ʼfirst positive steps, the
opening of the Ledra street barricade and the setting up of technical committees, as well as an
agreed course that would lead to direct negotiations, revived hopes for a solution that would end
the division of the island. Their meeting on 1 July 2008 attracted media and the publicʼs attention;
ahead of the meeting the Turkish Cypriot side had expressed the hope that a date to begin direct
talks could be set during that encounter; the Greek Cypriot side felt that more work needed to be
done by the technical committees before full-fledged direct talks could start.
The difficulties the two leaders have faced from the beginning clearly demonstrate that a
solution to the protracted Cyprus Problem needs more than good will and intensive efforts. Along
with the leaders  ʼcommitment, citizens and the media have a role, too. Thus, an examination of
media coverage of issues related to the meeting should reveal, to some extent, the role they play. 
The decision to include a data analysis from the period after Christofiasʼs election enabled a
comparison of three largely different periods related to the latest efforts for a solution of the Cyprus
Problem. Extensive coverage of the leaders  ʼmeeting provided a considerable volume of data,
relatively sufficient for analysis. However, the short data collection period— four days only—
limited the range and depth of issues that could be studied in comparison to the previous periods.
Nonetheless, useful conclusions derive from this study.




Technical and expert committees began working in April 2008, with the task of preparing the ground
for talks between the two community leaders, Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat. Full-
fledged talks were to start after sufficient progress had been recorded. The Greek Cypriot side did
not anticipate that a date for the beginning of talks would be set at the meeting of 1 July 2008. 
The Data
We continue with the analysis of six newspapers, Phileleftheros, Politis, Simerini, Machi/Tharros,
Haravgi and Alithia, based on data drawn from 30 June to 3 July 2008.
The main news story
The 1 July 2008 meeting between President Demetris Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leader
Mehmet Ali Talat, at the residence of the UN Secretary Generalʼs Special Representative in Cyprus,
was widely covered by the media. The study of the relevant material revealed the dailies  ʼviews
and representations; it also enabled us to see any changes in attitudes, views, and repre sentations
from the earlier periods analysed.
Media Practices
The practices recorded in the previous part on the Greek Cypriot press under Media Practices
seem to have remained unchanged in the present period. Phileleftheros and Politis continued
their effort to provide exclusive data; both papers published pieces with extra information derived
either from their employees in Cyprus or their correspondents. They also appeared to have been
consistent in attempting to avoid the use of copy-paste texts. 
Conversely, the dailies with party or ideological affiliations or links, as well as those with low
circulation relied on externally produced texts. This material frequently originated from KYPE,
press conferences and press releases and it was often published exactly as provided, with no
editing, a trend also noticed in the past. 
One more similarity with the previous period of study is the attempt at objectivity. All newspapers,
even those with party or ideological links, tried to present several events as neutrally as possible,
or at least they gave this impression. Another practice which all the dailies continued to employ
was the use of numbers.
Different Discourses and Media Practices
The Form of Solution
In this part of the research, the focus is on the ideologies of the press regarding the acceptable
settlement of the Cyprus Problem and not on the journalistic practices. The information available
was not sufficient to reveal the different strategies used by the media to project their stances. 
The meeting between President Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat,
triggered the exposure of the varying opinions on the solution. Coverage of this news story
revealed whether the newspapers promoted the official, government position or whether they
projected their own views on the issue. It also shows whether they hoped for and supported an
end to the deadlock. The editorials provided the key source from which conclusions were drawn
concerning both the solution of the Cyprus Problem and the prospects to achieve it. 
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In 2002, the Annan Plan was the main discourse concerning the settlement sought. For the
period we examined in 2007-2008, there were the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution, the July
8 process also known as the Gambari agreement, and the Annan Plan around which the press
shaped its positions regarding the form of solution. Over the four days analyzed in this section,
the matter of single sovereignty and citizenship in a united Cyprus was at the heart of public
debate. This subject was often referred to as the basis of the solution, the settlement or the
negotiations. The President of the Republic of Cyprus wished to confirm that the Turkish Cypriot
leader agreed on this issue and none of the dailies opposed his goal. The level of optimism,
however, as to the possibility of ending the stalemate in the country was not the same in every
newspaper. The fact that most were hopeful that in the future the two leaders might find the path
towards peace perhaps shows that there was a slight shift in the way some saw the subject of the
settlement. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this change might have been incidental and could
be attributed to the fact that the specific meeting was fruitful. 
Supporting single sovereignty and citizenship
Phileleftherosʼs editorial on 30 June stated that ʻwe aim for a solution which will be based on the
federal model, one state, a single sovereignty, and one citizenship and international
representationʼ.1 Simerini appears to have backed the same form of settlement: On 2 July its
editorial argued that the basis of the solution was one of the essential matters left unclarified
during the meeting between Christofias and Talat.2 The fact that this subject was viewed as
important perhaps indicates that this newspaper was not set against it. On the same day the cover
story of Haravgi revealed that this daily continued to support AKEL on this issue. Its headline was,
ʻAn important stepʼ, while one of the points stressed under the title was that the two leaders
agreed on the principle of single sovereignty and citizenship.3 Reporting the outcome as a
success signals the newspaperʼs support for these principles. In the main story (το Θέμα) of
Machi the notions of single sovereignty and citizenship were characterized as basic and the fact
that Christofias and Talat discussed these issues was described as a positive step.4
Consequently, it appears that this daily also supported this arrangement. This preference can
perhaps be attributed to the fact that DISY, the party favored by Machi, also backed this form of
solution. Similarly, Alithia appeared to adopt the stance of DISY regarding the key features of an
acceptable settlement. In its editorial on 1July it suggested that during the meeting  the Turkish
Cypriot side would be required to answer with a simple yes or no to a ʻpreconditioned adjustmentʼ,
this being the acceptance of ʻa single sovereignty, a single international repre sentation, a single
citizenship…ʼ.5 Politis was the only daily that did not reveal its views on the matter, contenting
itself to simply reporting the results of the meeting. Nevertheless, nothing indicated that this
newspaper followed a different line from the rest of the dailies, as it did not object to the official
position.6 Therefore, our analysis indicates that none of the newspapers opposed the idea of a
single sovereignty and citizenship by projecting another form of arrangement.  
While the newspapers seemed to be unanimous in their opinion regarding the form of a
solution, this was not the case for their views on the likelihood of a settlement. 
There appears to have been a change in attitude since the last period of study, for although
some newspapers remained pessimistic about the two sides reaching an agreement, there were
a number that now appeared hopeful over such an outcome. In the previous period of study, all
1
ʻΝα ξεκαθαρίσει στη συνάντηση [To be made clear in the meeting]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 30.6.2008:4; see also, ʻΘα εξαρτηθούν πολλά [A lot will
depend on (the meeting)]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:6.
2
ʻΠάρε-δώσε υπό αίρεση [Give-and-take under revision]ʼ, Simerini, 2.7.2008:3. 
3 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣημαντικό βήμα [An important step]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:1. 
4 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΙκανοποιημένος δηλώνει ο Δ. Χριστόφιας, ενημερώνει σήμερα το Εθνικό Συμβούλιο: Στο τραπέζι των
απʼευθείας διαπραγματεύσεων το θέμα της κυριαρχίας και της ιθαγένειας [D. Christofias declares that he is content, he briefs the
National Council today: The subject of a single sovereignty and citizenship is on the table of the direct negotiations]ʼ, Machi, 2.7.2008:18. 
5
ʻΗ κοινή βάση για κοινή δράση [The common basis for a common action]ʼ, Alithia, 1.7.2008:2. 
6 Lefteris Adilinis, ʻΠρεμιέρα απευθείας παρουσία Ντάουνερ: Χριστόφιας και Ταλάτ συμφώνησαν για συνομιλίες το Σεπτέμβριο
[Premiere for the direct (negotiations) in the presence of Downer: Christofias and Talat agreed for talks in September]ʼ, Politis, 2.7.2008:1.
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the dailies concluded that the results of the meeting between Papadopoulos and Talat were
unsatisfactory; four even suggested that the official encounter had reached a dead end. 
On 2 July, Machi positively reported the outcome of the meeting and stressed that for the first
time the Turkish Cypriots agreed to discuss the matter of sovereignty and citizenship.7 Under the
title, ʻImportant step for the framework of the solutionʼ,8 Haravgi also highlighted in its cover story
that the meeting produced results that would be beneficial for the resolution of the conflict.
Similarly, Politis was hopeful that a settlement could be reached in the future, stating in its editorial
that the two leaders were proceeding with the aim of finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem.9
Alithia reported that ʻEverything shows that the path to direct negotiations has openedʼ,10 noting
that there were signs of progress towards a political settlement. The following day its editorial
titled, ʻA positive resultʼ,11 repeated this view and also stressed that a new positive approach on
the subject of the solution was possible.
Simerini and Phileleftheros, in contrast, ran editorials that described the outcome of the
meeting in gloomy colors. Subsequently, as in the past, they promoted the idea that the future of
the solution was not bright. For example, Simerini on 2 July reported that the official encounter
ʻdid not give answers to substantial matters. The basis was not clarified, and a common language
was not found,ʼ 12 and the next day highlighted that there was ʻno convergence of views  ʼbetween
the involved parties.13 Phileleftheros reported that the meeting between the two leaders confirmed
that there were still differences on basic issues between the two sides,14 repeating this notion the
following day in its cover story headlined, ʻThe gap is still largeʼ.15
The Government and the Parties
Journalistic practices and the newspapers  ʼviews and positions on the government and political
parties are examined in this section, looking at and analysing various news stories. 
The newspapers seem to have continued giving favorable coverage to the political parties they
supported or had affiliations with, as noted in previous periods of study. Haravgi continued to favor
AKEL, while Alithia and Machi supported DISY. This was evidenced in the fact that these dailies
overrepresented the party of their preference and emphasized its opinions— practices that had
also been noted in the past. 
Wider coverage and highlighting
Alithia, Machi and Haravgi appear to have dedicated more space to a certain party and also to
have emphasized its views. These ends were achieved by means of four different methods. 
The most frequently used tactic of overrepresentation was to report only the comments or
opinions of the favored party. On 2 July, both Alithia and Machi published a news story about infla -
tion. In both reports the only opinion included was that of the DISY deputy, Averof Neophytou.16
7 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΙκανοποιημένος δηλώνει ο Δ. Χριστόφιας, ενημερώνει σήμερα το Εθνικό Συμβούλιο: Στο τραπέζι των
απʼευθείας διαπραγματεύσεων το θέμα της κυριαρχίας και της ιθαγένειας [D. Christofias declares that he is content, he briefs the
National Council today: The subject of a single sovereignty and citizenship is on the table of the direct negotiations]ʼ, Machi, 2.7.2008:18. 
8 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣημαντικό βήμα [An important step]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:1.
9 Politis, ʻΑς σκεφτούμε επιτέλους για το Κυπριακό [Letʼs finally think about the Cyprus Problem]ʼ, Politis, 2.7.2008:12.
10 Nikos Prokommenos, ʻ Και τώρα απευθείας συνομιλίες: Χριστόφιας και Ταλάτ συμφώνησαν στα συμφωνηθέντα για τη βάση της λύσης [And
now direct negotiations: Christofias and Talat agreed on what was already agreed about the basis of the solution]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:1. 
11 Alithia, ʻΘετική κατάληξη [A positive result], Alithia, 3.7.2008:2.
12 Simerini, ʻΠάρε – δώσε υπό αίρεση [Give-and-take under uncertain conditions]ʼ, Simerini, 2.7.2008:3. 
13 Kornilios Hadjicostas, ʻΖητούν εσωτερική ιθαγένεια: Ο Ταλάτ έθεσε θέμα στη συνάντηση του με το Χριστόφια [They ask for internal
citizenship: Talat mooted this question during his meeting with Christofias]ʼ, Simerini, 3.7.2008:4. 
14 Phileleftheros, ʻΕπιβεβαίωση διαφορών [Confirmation of the differences]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 2.7.2008:6. 
15 Costas Venizelos, ʻΠαραμένει βαθύ χάσμα: Χριστόφιας: Βήμα προς τα εμπρός το κοινό ανακοινωθέν [The gap remains big: Christofias:
The joint statement is a step forward]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 3.7.2008:1.
16 No author, ʻ Τεράστια απειλή η εκτίναξη του πληθωρισμού: Αβέρωφ Νεοφύτου: Η κυβέρνηση να αφήσει τις ωραιολογίες και να αντιμετωπίσει
την ωμή πραγματικότητα [The inflation blow is a huge threat: Averof Neophytou: The government should stop the idle talk and deal with the
crude reality]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:23; No author, ʻΠανί με Πανί ελέω πληθωρισμού: Για απάθεια και απραξία κατηγορεί ο ΔΗΣΥ την
κυβέρνηση [Flat-broke due to inflation: DISY blames the government for apathy and idleness]ʼ, Machi, 2.7.2008:42. 
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Another strategy indicating a paperʼs favoritism towards a party was to report its positions on
a matter first, followed afterwards with the other parties  ʼviews. Thus, Alithia and Machi led with
DISYʼs reaction to the meeting outcome,17 while Haravgi began with statements of the governing
party, AKEL.18
There was another technique employed by these three dailies to promote a specific political
group and of course to project their own positions—to highlight information about this party in a
news story. Reporting on the political parties  ʼstatements regarding the leaders  ʼmeeting, Alithia
wrote that DISY awaited the National Councilʼs briefing.19 Just below Haravgiʼs cover headline on
the meeting was the following sentence: ʻPresident Christofias and AKEL expressed their
satisfaction.ʼ 20 On 3 July Machi published an article on the rent benefit given by the government,
highlighting the stance of a DISY deputy: ʻThe rent benefit is “peanuts”: DISYʼs deputy, Lefteris
Christophorou points out that the displaced persons are not beggarsʼ.21 The first and the third
examples reveal that DISY was favoured by Alithia and Machi, while the second shows Haravgiʼs
bonds with AKEL. 
A final means of offering favourable coverage to a party was to highlight the remarks of its
members. At times, these statements were put in a box with a sharp outline, a lead-grey
background or even a bold type headline, as to catch the eye of the reader. In a report on
Greeceʼs assistance to Cyprus during the drought-induced water shortage, Alithia highlighted
DISYʼs position by placing their views in a separate frame with bold outline.22 An article in Haravgi
reporting on the Christofias-Talat meeting included a grey-colored box headlined, ʻThe President
is satisfied.ʼ 23 In the past this newspaper had never pointed out the statements of the then-
President; rather, it had consistently stressed the positions of AKEL. 
This analysis reveals that Haravgiʼs stance towards the government changed with the election
of the leader of AKEL, Demetris Christofias, as President of the Republic of Cyprus. Contrary to
the previous period of study, now Haravgi promoted the views of the government while it also
positively represented it. The distinctive placement in an article of statements by members of the
government was just one trend reflecting the shift in this dailyʼs coverage of the government.
Highlighting the positions of the members of the government, including those of the President,
was another trend noted in Haravgi during the period analyzed in this section. Their stances and
actions made the headlines, while sometimes they were even placed as a highlighted sentence
above or under the main title of an article or within a piece. Beneath the headline of its cover story
on 2 July, it was stated that, ʻPresident Christofias and AKEL expressed their satisfactionʼ.24
Positive and negative representations of the government, the parties and their members
Just as Haravgi no longer negatively described the actions and statements of the government, we
also noted a new practice of positive representation. On 30 June, the paper headlined an article,
ʻThe Presidentʼs solutions for the water (shortage) are effectiveʼ.25 Alithia did not cover this topic
in the same way; it appeared unhappy with the governmentʼs handling of the water shortage and
it was the only daily to suggest that Christofiasʼs government should take responsibility in this
matter. In its front page headline, a former Minister of Agriculture, Costas Themistocleous, was
17 Nikos Prokommenos, ʻΑντιδράσεις για όλα τα …γούστα: Τα πρώτα σχόλια των κομμάτων για τη συνάντηση [Reactions for every taste:
The first comments of the parties on the meeting]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:4; No author, ʻ Πανί με Πανί ελέω πληθωρισμού: Για απάθεια και απραξία
κατηγορεί ο ΔΗΣΥ την κυβέρνηση [Flat-broke due to inflation: DISY blames the government for apathy and idleness]ʼ, Machi, 2.7.2008:42. 
18 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣημαντικό βήμα [An important step]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:1.
19 Nikos Prokommenos, ʻΑντιδράσεις για όλα τα …γούστα: Τα πρώτα σχόλια των κομμάτων για τη συνάντηση [Reactions for every taste:
The first comments of the parties on the meeting]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:4.
20 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣημαντικό βήμα [An important step]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:1.
21 Eleni Charalambous, ʻ«Ψίχουλα» το επίδομα ενοικίου: Δεν είναι επαίτες οι πρόσφυγες τονίζει ο βουλευτής ΔΗΣΥ Λευτέρης
Χριστοφόρου [The rent benefit is “peanuts”: DISYʼs deputy Lefteris Christophorou points out that the displaced persons are not beggars]ʼ,
Machi, 3.7.2008:10.
22 No author, ʻΔΗΣΥ: Η χθεσινή ημέρα δεν προσφέρεται για πανηγυρισμούς [Yesterday was not a day for celebrations]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:11.
23 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣημαντικό βήμα για το πλαίσιο λύσης [Important step for the framework of the solution]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:3.
24 Niki Koulermou, ʻΣημαντικό βήμα [Important step]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:1.
25 No author, ʻΑποτελεσματικές λύσεις του Προέδρου για το υδατικό: Φτάνει σήμερα το πρώτο φορτίο νερού από την Ελλάδα [The
Presidentʼs solutions for the water (shortage) are effective: The first shipment of water arrives today from Greece]ʼ, Haravgi, 30.6.2008:7.
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quoted reacting to the government celebrations at the arrival of the first water shipment from
Greece: ʻThey should all be in jailʼ.26 In an interview for the newspaper, Mr. Themistocleous blamed
the government for the ʻtragic  ʼposition in which the Republic of Cyprus was placed because of its
failure to address the water problem. This piece, however, was the only case in which the
government was, even indirectly,27 criticized by the newspaper. Machi published an article in
which it stated that the governmentʼs increased rent benefit for displaced persons was ʻpatheticʼ.28
Haravgi, on the contrary, presented this news positively: ʻSatisfaction with the benefit increase for
those who sufferʼ. Below this headline, which was written in large, bold font, was a second sentence,
in smaller typeface, stating, ʻDissatisfaction with the rent benefits for displaced personsʼ.29 So
although it did note some dissatisfaction with the government actions, Haravgi strongly pointed
out the positive aspects of this news story, and flatteringly depicted Christofiasʼs government. 
We noted the negative representation of DIKO and Tassos Papadoloulos, the former President
of the Republic of Cyprus, in two newspapers, Alithia and Politis, which both portrayed him as the
ʻotherʼ. On its cover page Alithia blamed DIKO for not allowing Christofiasʼs gov ern ment to give
permanent jobs to temporary employees, stating, ʻThey find everything unconsti t ut ional regarding
the non-permanent employees: The revenge of DIKOʼ.30 Additionally, the former President was
held responsible for not dealing effectively with the Cyprus Problem, and Alithia stated clearly in
an editorial that it was a happy day when the presidency of Papadopoulos ended. This sentence
clarified, beyond any doubt, this newspaperʼs stance towards Papadopoulos. Politis, in its own
editorial on the meeting between Christofias and Talat, stressed that those who support the policy
of the former President wish for the ʻcontinuation of the existing status quoʼ.31
The European Union
News stories related to the EU were regularly published by the press, an indication that develop -
ments regarding the Union were still viewed as important. Phileleftheros and Politis even employed
correspondents in Brussels in order to keep their readers up to date on European issues. Contrary
to the previous phase of study, we found no news stories in which the EU appeared as either an
ally or an enemy of the Greek Cypriots. 
The dailies were not set against the EU. Politis, for example, published an article about the
EUʼs renewed social agenda, stressing that one of its most interesting points was a directive
proposing cross-border healthcare.32 This same development was also positively represented by
Machi,33 Haravgi,34 Simerini 35 and Phileleftheros.36 Haravgi was the only newspaper that published
a news story related to the EU that can be considered negative. In an article published on 3 July,
this daily unflatteringly described the efforts of DISYʼs leader to defend the Treaty of Lisbon.37
26 Anna Maria Eftihiou, ʻΘα έπρεπε να ήταν όλοι φυλακή: Ο Κώστας Θεμιστοκλέους για το υδατικό πρόβλημα [They should all be in jail:
Costas Themistocleous on the water problem]ʼ, Alithia, 30.6.2008:1. 
27 The word ʻindirectlyʼ is used because the government was criticized by Costas Themistocleous and not by Alithia. The fact, however, that this
newspaper published this interview and ran it at the top of its front page, might indicate that this daily also judged the government on this issue. 
28 Eleni Charalambous, ʻ«Ψίχουλα» το επίδομα ενοικίου: Δεν είναι επαίτες οι πρόσφυγες τονίζει ο βουλευτής ΔΗΣΥ Λευτέρης
Χριστοφόρου [The rent benefit is “peanuts”: DISYʼs deputy Lefteris Christophorou points out that the displaced persons are not beggars]ʼ,
Machi, 3.7.2008:10.
29 Neophytos Neophytou, ʻΙκανοποίηση για τις αυξήσεις σε παθόντες: Δυσφορία για τα επιδόματα ενοικίου σε πρόσφυγες [Satisfaction with
the benefit increase for those who suffer: Dissatisfaction with the rent benefits for displaced persons]ʼ, Haravgi, 3.7.2008:8.
30 Takis Agathocleous, ʻΓια τους εκτάκτους τα βρίσκουν όλα αντισυνταγματικά: Η εκδίκηση του ΔΗΚΟ [They find everything unconstitutional
regarding the non-permanent employees: The revenge of DIKO]ʼ, Alithia, 1.7.2008:1.
31 Politis, ʻΗ Συνάντηση Χριστόφια – Ταλάτ [Christofias – Talat meeting]ʼ, Politis, 1.7.2008:12.
32 Vaggelis Vasiliou, ʻΝέα ατζέντα για τον 21ο αιώνα: Οδηγία για τη Διασυνοριακή Περίθαλψη Ευρωπαίων Πολιτών [New agenda for the 21st
century: Directive on cross-border healthcare]ʼ, Politis, 3.7.2008:41.
33 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΜε την «Ανανεωμένη Κοινωνική Ατζέντα» της ΕΕ: Υλοποιούνται οι στόχοι για διασυνοριακή υγειονομική
περίθαλψη και καταπολέμηση της φτώχιας [With the “Renewed Social Agenda” of the EU: The aims for cross-border healthcare and poverty
elimination are spelled out]ʼ, Machi, 3.7.2008:10.
34 No author, ʻΠερισσότερες επιλογές για τους ασθενείς: Πρόταση-Οδηγία του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για την εφαρμογή των
δικαιωμάτων των ασθενών στη διασυνοριακή υγειονομική περίθαλψη [More choices for patients: European Parliamentʼs directive
proposal for the implementation of the patients  ʼrights on cross-border healthcare]ʼ, Haravgi, 3.7.2008:13.
35 No author, ʻΒελτιώνεται η διασυνοριακή περίθαλψη: Πρόταση οδηγίας της Ε. Επιτροπής [The cross-border healthcare is being improved:
The European Commissionʼs directive proposal]ʼ, Simerini, 3.7.2008:31.
36 No author, ʻΚαινοτομία οι πρόνοιες για διασυνοριακή περίθαλψη εντός της ΕΕ [Breakthrough provisions for the EU cross-border
healthcare]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 3.7.2008:31.
37 No author, ʻΚαι πολιτικές ηγεσίες δεν γνωρίζουν τη Συνθήκη [Political leaderships are also ignorant about the treaty]ʼ, Haravgi, 3.7.2008:9. 
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Alithia also ran an article on AKEL and DISYʼs disagreement on this issue, but it did not reveal its
own stance.38
ʻUs  ʼand the ʻother sideʼ
This part of the research reveals who the press considered to be ʻus  ʼor ʻour side  ʼand who they
saw as the ʻothersʼ, as well as the image projected for each category. The ideologies of the dailies
and the practices used to promote them are presented together. 
A bond between Cyprus and Greece
Greeks or the Greek Cypriots continued to be viewed as ʻour sideʼ. Machi/Tharros seems to have
continued emphasizing the connection between the Greek Cypriots and Greece. On the cover
page of Tharros on 30 June, a bold headline under a big picture of a Greek ship that had struck
a reef while traveling to Chios read, ʻTerror at sea in Greece: The 478 passengers (of the ship)
were savedʼ.39 While this incident was not given such wide or important coverage in the other
dailies, it appears that Tharros still considered this event in Greece to be newsworthy. There was
also evidence that both Alithia and Phileleftheros took for granted the existence of nationality
bonds between Cyprus and Greece. They re-published a report taken from the high-profile Greek
newspaper ʻΤο Vima  ʼ[Το Βήμα] in which a person from Cyprus was characterized as Greek.40
Neither Alithia nor Phileleftheros changed the wording of this piece, which probably means that
they adopted this idea. If they did not agree with this notion, probably they would have edited this
sentence as they did with many taken from the Turkish Cypriot press. Phileleftheros, in one of its
editorials, even used the expression the ʻHellenic Cypriot side  ʼinstead of the Greek Cypriot side,
indicating in this way Cyprusʼs connection with Greece.41
The above three newspapers continued having special sections or whole pages dedicated to
news stories from Greece, while the others published some articles about this country. This shows
that, as in the previous period of study, the dailies continued highlighting that the Republic of
Cyprus had strong bonds with Greece.
The ʻother sideʼ
The ʻother side  ʼis divided into sub-categories that are interconnected in order to be thoroughly
examined. 
Once more, thumbs up for the Turkish Cypriots
Several newspapers, Alithia, Politis and Haravgi, which covered matters related to the Turkish
Cypriots, published articles and news stories focused on issues of rapprochement and reunification.
For example, Alithia published the views of a young man who believed that the workers could help
in the reunification of Cyprus,42 and also reported on the renovation of a building to host events
aiming to encourage ʻthe cooperation between the G/Cs and the T/Csʼ.43 Politis, maintaining its
loyalty to the Turkish Cypriot community, more than any other newspaper highlighted that the
Turkish Cypriots were not the enemy. In fact, in an editorial it characterized as Cypriots those who
38 Costas Constantinou, ʻΣτη φόρα η διαφωνία ΔΗΣΥ-ΑΚΕΛ για τη Λισαβόνα: Ανοικτή συζήτηση του ΟΠΕΚ για τη μεταρρυθμιστική
συνθήκη [The disagreement of DISY-AKEL on the (Treaty of) Lisbon was given away: Open discussion (organized by) the Association for
Social Reform (ΟΠΕΚ) on the Reform Treaty]ʼ, Alithia, 3.7.2008:7. 
39 No author, ʻΤρόμος εν πλω στην Ελλάδα: Σώοι οι 478 επιβάτες [Terror at sea in Greece: The 478 passengers (of the ship) were saved]ʼ,
Tharros, 30.6.2008:1.
40 See, N. Hasapopoulos, ʻΠέντε Κύπριοι πίσω από τον Ομπάμα: Είτε θα τον φέρουν στην Κύπρο είτε θα στείλουν τον Χριστόφια στο
Λευκό Οίκο [Five Cypriots behind Obama: They will either bring him to Cyprus or they will send Christofias to the White House]ʼ, Alithia,
30.6.2008:6.
41 Phileleftheros, ʻΝα ξεκαθαρίσει στη συνάντηση [To be clarified in the meeting]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 30.6.2008:4.
42 P. Hadjidimitriou, ʻΜουσταφάς: Πατρίδα μου είναι η Ελλάδα: Νεαρός, μέλος της μειονότητας από την Κομοτηνή, υποστηρίζει: Αγώνα
για την επανένωση της Κύπρου με πρωταγωνιστές τους εργάτες [Moustafa: My country is Greece: A young man, a member of the minority
group in Komotini, suggests: The workers could play the leading role in the struggle for reunification]ʼ, Alithia, 30.6.2008:16. 
43 Katerina Iliadi, ʻ Σπίτι για τη συνεργασία Ε/Κ και Τ/Κ: Ζωντανεύει η νεκρή ζώνη [Home for the cooperation of the G/Cs and the T/Cs]ʼ, Alithia,
2.7.2008:6. 
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lived on both sides of the barricade.44 It also continued publishing a regular column by a Turkish
Cypriot journalist.45 In a show of support for a united Cyprus, both Politis and Haravgi positively
covered a news story about a bi-communal camp.46
The Turkish Cypriot leadership
The leadership of the Turkish Cypriots was negatively characterized by some dailies. Mehmet Ali
Talat was repeatedly called ʻthe occupation leaderʼ by Phileleftheros,47 and this same negative
epithet was repeated in an editorial in Simerini.48 Machi called Talat a ʻpseudo-leaderʼ.49
These two newspapers remained consistent in their views about Mehmet Ali Talat, as they
frequently pictured him as someone who obstructed the solution of the Cyprus Problem. In their
coverage of the two leaders  ʼmeeting, both papers were much more vocal in expressing their
disapproval of Talat than any other paper. Phileleftheros stressed that the Turkish Cypriot leader
was dismissive and uncooperative during the meeting. Its cover story headline on 1 July read:
ʻTalat is offside again: He rejected the formula of the UN, he does not want any reference to (the
matter of) a single sovereigntyʼ.50 Simerini pointed out that the Turkish Cypriot leader was trying
to block the path to a settlement, while in an editorial it argued that, ʻThe discussion of the details
about the implementation of a single sovereignty and a single citizenship gives Talat endless
opportunities to lead the subject to a dead-end and endless talksʼ.51 Additionally, Simerini pictured
the Turkish Cypriot leader as Turkeyʼs bondservant, as the ʻwillingness and flexibility of Mehmet
Ali Talat…depends on Ankaraʼs plans and intentionsʼ.52 In its own editorial, Alithia considered that
the Turkish Cypriot leadership was responsible for the continuation of the conflict, since the
demands of the ʻTurkish Cypriot side…broaden the chasmʼ separating the two communities.53
Politis stated in an editorial that ʻwith regards to the guarantees and the chapter on security,
unfortunately, Mr.Talat is not in a position to negotiate with usʼ.54 The reluctance of the Turkish
Cypriot leader to agree on issues that were important for the Greek Cypriots was stressed again
the following day: ʻIt took more than four hours to convince Mr. Talatʼ.55 Machi also highlighted
Talatʼs supposed intransigence: ʻThe Turkish Cypriots insist (that): The direct (negotiations) will be
discussed during todayʼs meetingʼ.56 But the next day Machi positively portrayed the Turkish
Cypriots because they agreed for the first time to discuss the subjects of a single sovereignty and
citizenship, and suggested that this could mean that they significantly changed their positions. In
both pieces, of course, Machi was not referring to the Turkish Cypriots in general, but to their
leadership. Unlike the other papers, in the second report Machi did not accuse Talat of hindering
the solution — probably due to the positive outcome of the meeting between the two leaders.
Nevertheless, in the same news story Talat was characterized as a ʻpseudo-leaderʼ. Haravgi was
the only newspaper that did not reveal any particular stance toward Talat in the period studied. 
44
Ας σκεφτούμε επιτέλους για το Κυπριακό [Lets finally think about the Cyprus Problem]ʼ, Politis, 2.7.2008:12.
45 See an example of Sener Leventʼs column in Politis, 30.6.2008:6. 
46 Costas Nanos, ʻ«Μαζί όλα είναι πιθανά»: Δικοινοτική κατασκήνωση [“Together everything is possible”: Bi-communal camp]ʼ, Politis,
1.7.2008:65; Argyro Tittoni, ʻΜαζί όλα είναι πιθανά: Ελληνοκύπριοι και Τουρκοκύπριοι φοιτητές ξανά μαζί σε δικοινοτική κατασκήνωση
στην Πάφο [Together everything is possible: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot students together again at a bi-communal camp in Pafos]ʼ,
Haravgi, 1.7.2008:40. 
47 Phileleftheros, ʻΘα εξαρτηθούν πολλά [A lot will depend on (the meeting)]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:6.
48 Simerini, ʻΠάρε – δώσε υπό αίρεση [Give and take under revision]ʼ, Simerini, 2.7.2008:3. 
49 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΙκανοποιημένος δηλώνει ο Δ, Χριστόφιας, ενημερώνει σήμερα το Εθνικό Συμβούλιο: Στο τραπέζι των απʼ
ευθείας διαπραγματεύσεων το θέμα της κυριαρχίας και της ιθαγένειας [D. Christofias declares that he is content, he briefs the National
Council today: The subject of a single sovereignty and citizenship is on the table of the direct negotiations]ʼ, Machi, 2.7.2008:18.
50 Costas Venizelos, ʻΟφσάιντ πάλι οΤαλάτ: Απέρριψε φόρμουλα του ΟΗΕ, δεν θέλει αναφορά σε μια κυριαρχία [Talat is off-side again:
He rejected the UN formula, he does not want a reference to a single sovereighty]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:1.
51 Simerini, ʻΠάρε – δώσε υπό αίρεση [Give and take under revision]ʼ, Simerini, 2.7.2008:3. 
52 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΧαμηλές προσδοκίες: Ενώπιος ενωπίω σήμερα Χριστόφιας-Ταλατ [Low expectations: Today Christofias-Talat
(will meet) face to face]ʼ, Simerini, 1.7.2008:5; See also: Simerini, ʻΥπό την σκιάν της τουρκικής κρίσης [Under the shadow of the Turkish
crisis]ʼ, Simerini, 3.7.2008:3.
53 Alithia, ʻΗ κοινή βάση για κοινή δράση [The common basis for common action]ʼ, Alithia, 1.7.2008:2.
54 Politis, ʻΗ συνάντηση Χριστόφια-Ταλάτ [Christofias-Talat meeting]ʼ, Politis, 1.7.2008:12.
55 Lefteris Adilinis, ʻΣυνομιλίες το Σεπτέμβριο: Χριστόφιας και Ταλάτ συμφώνησαν στη βάση και στις απευθείας [Talks in September:
Christofias and Talat agreed on the basis (of the solution) and on the direct (negotiations)]ʼ, Politis, 2.7.2008:4.
56 No author, ʻΟι απευθείας θα συζητηθούν στη σημερινή συνάντηση: Επιμένουν οι Τ/Κ [The Turkish Cypriots insist (that): The direct
(negotiations) will be discussed during todayʼs meeting:]ʼ, Machi, 1.7.2008:11. 
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Overall, apart from Machi, the dailies did not represent the Turkish Cypriot leader any differently
than they had in the past. Most still pointed out that he had fixed positions and that somehow he
was responsible for the deadlock on the island.
Turkey still pictured as a hostile country
The newspapers continued to negatively represent Turkey, with some projecting the view that this
countryʼs objectives collided with those of the Greek Cypriots. Simerini, whose portrayal of Turkey
was the darkest, depicted Turkey as the Greek Cypriots  ʼenemy. In an editorial it claimed that ʻthe
Turks steadily declare their unchangeable positions aiming: First, to the destruction of the
Republic of Cyprus, second, to the subordination…of Cyprus…to the Turkish armyʼ.  Furthermore,
Simerini characterized the Turkish policy as ʻrelentlessly offensiveʼ,57 and argued in an editorial
that it was Ankara that had the ʻkey to the solution of the Cyprus Problemʼ.58 Alithia stressed that
Turkey wished to resolve the Cyprus Problem in a way that was unacceptable to the Greek
Cypriots, that is, ʻpartitionʼ.59 Phileleftheros reported that ʻthe Turkish diplomacyʼ after ʻintensiveʼ
efforts convinced the Organization of the Islamic Conference to adopt a resolution asking the
ʻGreek side to recognize the pseudo-stateʼ.60 This was a sensitive subject for Greek Cypriots, who
believed that if the areas in the northern part of the island were recognized, then Cyprus would
be separated in two different states. 
Turkey was negatively portrayed not only because of its stance on the Cyprus Problem, but
also as an undemocratic country. Phileleftheros highlighted in bold letters the words of persons
working for the President of France, who maintained that Turkey ʻhas never been a democratic
countryʼ.61 On the previous day, Politis published an article detailing how a member of Turkeyʼs
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) interrupted the speech of a
writer who was criticizing AKP. The sentence above the headline of this piece was, ʻThey forced
her into silence because she criticized AKPʼ.62 In the present period of study, neither Machi nor
Haravgi ran any stories that projected Turkey as the enemy.
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots sometimes viewed as one and the same
Occasionally, some dailies used the expression the ʻTurkish sideʼ to refer not only to Turkey, but
to the Turkish Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriot leadership as well. In the past, Machi and Simerini
repeatedly presented the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as being one and the same, while in this
period of analysis Simerini and Phileleftheros were found to make use of this identification. This
perhaps reveals their notion of identity, but also the idea that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had
the same stances and goals. 
Simerini published the statements of ʻthe so-called Minister of Foreign Affairsʼ, Turgay Avcı,
about a ʻtwo-state solutionʼ, and characterized this ʻapproachʼ as ʻTurkishʼ.63 In the following dayʼs
editorial, Mr. Talat and the officials of the ʻoccupied pseudo-stateʼ were named ʻthe Turkish sideʼ.64
On the same day, Phileleftheros pointed out in its editorial that the procedure for the settlement
should be decided by the two communities. In the next sentence, however, the Turkish Cypriot
side was referred to as the ʻTurkish sideʼ.65 One cover story in Phileleftheros stated, ʻthe G/C side
57 Simerini, ʻΣυνομιλίες με νέες εκπτώσεις [Talks with new concessions]ʼ, Simerini, 1.7.2008:3.
58 Simerini, Υπό την σκιάν της τουρκικής κρίσης [Under the shadow of the Turkish crisis]ʼ, Simerini, 3.7.2008:3.
59 No author, ʻΘέμα εμπιστοσύνης λένε στην Τουρκία [It is a matter of trust, they say in Turkey]ʼ, Alihtia, 1July 2008:4. 
60 No author, ʻΒήματα από ΟΙΔ για αναγνώριση: Δυναμική παρέμβαση Μπαμπατζάν στη σύνοδο της Ισλαμικής Διάσκεψης [Steps of
recognition by the OIC: Dynamic intervention by Babacan in the meeting of the (Organization) of the Islamic Conference]ʼ. Phileleftheros,
30.6.2008:4.
61 Pavlos Xanthoulis, ʻ Χάνει πόνους η Τουρκία: Πηγές της γαλλικής Προεδρίας υποστηρίζουν ότι «απομακρύνεται η προοπτική ένταξης»
[Turkey loses points: Sources of the French Presidency believe that “the prospect of its accession fades away]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 2.7.2008:6.
62 Anna Andreou, ʻ«Να, πάρε ελευθερία»!: Την ανάγκασαν να σωπάσει γιατί άσκησε κριτική [“So much for freedom (of speech)”!: They
forced her into silence for being critical]ʼ, Politis, 1.7.2008:11. 
63 Michalis Hadjistylianou, ʻΕνώπιον των ασαφειών: Ξεκαθάρισμα της μορφής της λύσης του Κυπριακού θα επιδιώξει ο Χριστόφιας
[Before the obscurities: Christofias will aim to clarify the form of the solution of the Cyprus Problem]ʼ, Simerini, 30.6.2008:4. 
64 Simerini, ʻΣυνομιλίες με νέες εκπτώσεις [Talks with new derogations]ʼ, Simerini, 1.7.2008:3.
65 Phileleftheros, ʻΘα εξαρτηθούν πολλά [ A lot will depend on (the meeting)]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:6.
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considers that the basis of the negotiations is clarified by yesterdayʼs statement…while the
Turkish (side), interprets the matters of the sovereignty and citizenship based on the relevant
provisions of the Annan Planʼ. In the same article the expression the ʻTurkish Cypriot sideʼ was
also used.66
The ʻothers  ʼin relation to ʻusʼ
Two dailies, Phileleftheros and Simerini, emphasized that the Greek Cypriot leadership held the
correct positions on the solution sought and had acted appropriately before the meeting of
Christofias with Talat. Conversely, they implied or projected the notion that the ʻother sideʼ, which
was thought to be Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, obstructed the course of settlement.
Phileleftheros maintained that the President of the Republic of Cyprus ʻrightfullyʼ insisted that the
procedure of the settlement could be advanced and carried out only with the reconfirmation of a
common basis for the negotiations.67 The use of the word ʻrightfullyʼ indicates that Phileleftheros
believed that the Greek Cypriots had just demands. On the next day, however, it pointed out that
Talat rejected the formula suggested by the UN and that he furthermore did not want any
reference to the subject of a single sovereignty, which, according to the Greek Cypriots, was the
basis of the negotiations. The Greek Cypriot leadership was therefore pictured positively while the
Turkish Cypriot leadership was portrayed in a negative light. This was also evident in Simerini,
which reported that Christofias would attend the official meeting in order to clarify the nebulous
situation concerning the basis of the solution of the Cyprus Problem, although the Turkish Cypriot
side ʻdid not allow for any progressʼ to be achieved.68 On the following day, once again the Greek
Cypriots were flatteringly portrayed, while the ʻothers  ʼwere pictured as the villain. Another article
in Simerini related to the two leaders  ʼmeeting argued that Nicosia followed ʻa low-profile tactic,
avoiding internal debates as far as possible, and reaction[s] to the Turkish provocations.ʼ The
article continued, however, to say that ʻthe games of tension and dispute are a known tactic of the
Turkish side, used when it tries to impose its own rulesʼ.69
As validation that the Greek Cypriots  ʼaims and stances were just, all the newspapers pointed
out that the G/C positions were backed by important organizations such as the PARIS MoU
(Memorandum of Understanding)70 and the British House of Commons. This practice was also
used to show that the Greek Cypriot side had just demands while the ʻothers  ʼwere simply wrong,
as in the following example. Two different news stories, originally from KYPE, were published in
Phileleftheros and Haravgi. Phileleftherosʼs headline was, ʻThe accession [of Turkey to the EU] is
impossible because of the Cyprus Problem: [This] is stressed in a report of the Committee of the
British House of Commonsʼ; 71 Haravgi used an identical title.72 In the same report it was
mentioned that the PARIS MoU rejected Turkeyʼs application for EU membership because of
Ankaraʼs refusal to accept ships sailing under the Cypriot flag in its ports. It introduced this
development with the following headline: ʻDiscriminations…cost to Turkeyʼ.73 The headline in
Simerini referring to this same issue was, ʻAnother “NO” to Turkey: From the PARIS MoU for
66 Costas Venizelos, ʻΟ κύβος ερρίφθη: Αρχίζουν απευθείας, ξεκαθάρισμα βάσης διαπραγμάτευσης βλέπει η Λευκωσία [The die is cast:
The direct (negotiations) begin, Nicosia sees clarification of the basis of the negotiation]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 2.7.2008:1.
67 Ibid.
68 Michalis Hadjistylianou, ʻΕνώπιον των ασαφειών: Ξεκαθάρισμα της μορφής της λύσης του Κυπριακού θα επιδιώξει ο Χριστόφιας
[Before the obscurities: Christofias will aim to clarify the form of the solution of the Cyprus Problem]ʼ, Simerini, 30.6.2008:4.
69 Marios Manousopoulos, ʻΧαμηλές προσδοκίες: Ενώπιος ενωπίω σήμερα Χριστόφιας-Ταλατ [Low expectations: Today Christofias-Talat
(will meet) face to face]ʼ, Simerini, 1.7.2008:5.
70 This is an official document “in which the 27 participating Maritime Authorities agree to implement a harmonized system of Port control. See,
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (No date), The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) [online]. Available from:
http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU/Organisation/Memorandum+of+Understanding/xp/menu.3945/default.aspx [Accessed 15 October 2008]. 
71 No author, ʻΑδύνατη η ένταξη λόγω Κυπριακού: Τονίζεται σε έκθεση της Επιτροπής της βρετανικής Βουλής των Κοινοτήτων [The
accession (of Turkey to the EU) is impossible because of the Cyprus Problem: (This) is stressed in a report of the Committee of the British
House of Commons]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:4. 
72 Machi and Alithia also published this news story. 
73 No author, ʻΑδύνατη η ένταξη λόγω Κυπριακού: Τονίζεται σε έκθεση της Επιτροπής της βρετανικής Βουλής των Κοινοτήτων [The
accession (of Turkey to the EU) is impossible because of the Cyprus Problem: (This is) stressed in a report of the Committee of the British
House of Commons]ʼ, Haravgi, 1.7.2008:6. 
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shipsʼ.74 Machi ran a similar headline: ʻNo to Turkey from the PARIS MoU: Because of the embargo
on the ships [that sail] under the Cypriot flagʼ.75 Politis reported that, ʻPARIS MoU “closes the door”
on Turkey: It cannot join the MoU for ship control because of the discriminations against Cyprusʼ.76
The title of Alithia was similar: ʻTurkey in front of a “closed door”: PARIS MoU for ship control.ʼ 77
The above-noted examples lead to the conclusion that Turkey was punished because it
wrongfully banned from its ports ships sailing under the flag of the Republic of Cyprus. 
The areas in the north
All the dailies continued to proclaim that they did not accept the legitimacy of the territory in the
north of the island, and used the same semantical tactics as in the previous period of study. They
repeatedly referred to the north as the ʻoccupied areasʼ,78 attached the word ʻpseudoʼ79 to many
words such as state, prime minister, etc., placed inverted commas80 around any word or phrase
that could denote authority to the ʻother side  ʼand used the expression ʻthe so-calledʼ81 to show
that the ʻothers  ʼillegally ruled the territory in the north. 
A vivid example of this is found in Alithia, which stated in an editorial that the northern part of
Cyprus belonged to the Greek Cypriots, who could no longer be tortured ʻby the view of their
occupied properties and territoryʼ.82
This belief in the Greek Cypriot rights to the land was not so outrightly stated in all the
newspapers; yet they all still widely covered news stories that were related to actions of indirect
political recognition of the areas ruled by Talat, or published reports on the efforts of the ʻothersʼ
to develop the northern part of the island. This tendency might reflect the Greek Cypriots  ʼfear of
losing forever a territory they considered as their own. 
An article in Machi reporting on land development in the north reveals its stance on ownership
of the land: ʻThey will build a new huge hotel in occupied Karavas: The aim is to draw tourists from
the free areasʼ.83 On the following day, Politis published an article related to the efforts of the
Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi - CTP) to change from an observer to a
consultative member of Socialist International.84 This news story85 also appeared in Haravgi,
Phileleftheros and Simerini, which might have thought that if the status of this political party in the
north were upgraded, then this would constitute indirect recognition of the regime. 
74 No author, ʻΆλλο ένα «όχι» στην Τουρκία: Από το Μνημόνιο των Παρισίων για τα πλοία [Another “NO” to Turkey: From the PARIS MoU
for ships]ʼ, Simerini, 1.7.2008:17. 
75 No author, ʻΌχι στην Τουρκία από το PARIS MoU: Εξαιτίας του εμπάργκο στα υπό κυπριακή σημαία πλοία [No to Turkey from the PARIS
MoU: Because of the embargo on the ships (that sail) under the Cypriot flag]ʼ, Machi, 1.7.2008:11.
76 Miranda Lysandrou, ʻ«Πόρτα» στην Τουρκία από το Paris MoU: Δεν μπαίνει στο Μνημόνιο για έλεγχο των Πλοίων, λόγω των
διακρίσεων κατά της Κύπρου [PARIS MoU “closes the door” to Turkey: It cannot join the MoU for ship control because of the discriminations
against Cyprus]ʼ, Politis, 1.7.2008:70. 
77 No author, ʻ«Έφαγε πόρτα και πάλι η Τουρκία: Μνημόνιο των Παρισίων για τον έλεγχο των πλοίων [Turkey in front of a “closed door”:
PARIS MoU for ship control]ʼ, Alithia, 1.7.2008:6.
78 No author, ʻΡΤΚ: Διαπραγματεύσεις στις αρχές Σεπτεμβρίου [CTP: Negotiations at the beginning of September]ʼ, Haravgi, 3.7.2008:6.
79 See ʻpseudo-leaderʼ: Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΙκανοποιημένος δηλώνει ο Δ. Χριστόφιας, ενημερώνει σήμερα το Εθνικό Συμβούλιο: Στο
τραπέζι των απ  ʼευθείας διαπραγματεύσεων το θέμα της κυριαρχίας και της ιθαγένειας [D. Christofias declares that he is content, he briefs
the National Council today: The subject of a single sovereignty and citizenship is on the table of the direct negotiations]ʼ, Machi, 2.7.2008:18;
See, ʻpseudo-stateʼ: George Michailides, ʻΑπαράδεκτος ο Μπαμπατζάν [Babacan is unacceptable]ʼ, Simerini, 3.7.2008:3.
80 See, for example: No author, ʻΣυντεχνίες κατά «κυβέρνησης»: Στους δρόμους και πάλι οι Τ/Κ εργαζόμενοι για θέματα οικονομίας [Unions
against the “government”: The T/C workers back on the streets for economic matters]ʼ, Politis, 1.7.2008:6. 
81 See for example: No author, ʻ Και τα σχόλια καλά κρατούν… [Prolonged comments…]ʼ, Alithia, 3.7.2008:5; See also: No author, ʻ Εγείρουν θέμα
εκπροσώπησης Τ/Κ στο Ευρωκοινοβούλιο: Πληροφορίες για εισήγηση της Ομάδας Επαφής προς Πέτεριγκ [They raise the issue of the
Turkish Cypriots  ʼ representation in the European Parliament: Information regarding the proposal of the Contact Group towards Pettering]ʼ,
Phileleftheros, 30.6.2008:4. 
82 Alithia, ʻΤα νέα δεδομένα και το συγκριτικό πλεονέκτημα [The new facts and the relative advantage]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:2. 
83 Athanasios Alistratlis, ʻΝέο ξενοδοχείο μαμούθ θα κτίσουν στον κατεχόμενο Καραβά: Με στόχο την προσέλκυση τουρισμού από την
ελεύθερη περιοχή [They will build a new huge hotel in occupied Karavas: The aim is to draw tourists from the free areas]ʼ, Machi, 1.7.2008:5. 
84
ʻSocialist International is the worldwide organization of social democratic, socialist and labour parties. It currently brings together 170 political
parties and organizations from all continentsʼ. See, Socialist International (No date), Progressive politics for a fairer world [online]. Available
from: http://www.socialistinternational.org/about.cfm [Accessed 20 November 2008]. 
85 See, Katerina Zorpa, ʻΚληρώνει για το ΡΤΚ: Ξεκαθαρίζει το καθεστώς του στη Σοσιαλιστική Διεθνή [Come what may for CTP: Its status
in Socialist International will be clarified]ʼ, Politis, 2.7.2008:6; No author, ʻΑναβάθμιση στη ΣΔ με αναγνώριση της Κύπρου [Status
improvement in the SI with the recognition of Cyprus: EDEKʼs reaction stopped the consultative membership of CTP]ʼ, Haravgi, 2.7.2008:8; No
author, ʻΠρώτα αναγνώριση Κ.Δ. και μετά ένταξη: Το ΡΤΚ δεν έγινε δεκτό στους Σοσιαλιστές [Recognition of the Republic of Cyprus
first and then accession: CTP was not accepted by the Socialists]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:4; No author, ʻΑπορρίφθηκε αίτημα του τ/κ
Ρεπουμπλικανικού κόμματος ʻ[The request of the T/C Republican Party has been rejected]ʼ, Simerini, 1.7.2008:4.
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Information drawn from the press of the ʻother sideʼ
The newspapers continued to show an interest in news stories related to the ʻ other sideʼ, and often
these were still taken from the Turkish Cypriot or the Turkish press. The most common subject of
these reports was the attempts of the ʻothers  ʼat indirect recognition of the northern part of the
island, a trend also noticed in the previous period of study. 
Alithia, Politis and Phileleftheros concentrated on this issue via one main news item, ferry
services from Famagusta to Latakia (in Syria), and the subsequent potential tourist flow to the
north. An article on this subject was published in the Turkish Cypriot daily Kıbrıs, and the above-
noted three newspapers re-reported on these matters in their first few pages.86
Another similarity with the previous period of study was that some dailies published pieces from
the Turkish Cypriot or the Turkish press, after making some semantical changes to the original
statements or texts. Phileleftheros, for example, reported on statements by ʻthe so-called Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Turgay Avcıʼ. It quoted him as having ʻstatedʼ that the proce dures for the
opening of the office which would accommodate the ʻpseudo-stateʼs delegationʼ, were being
completed.87 Avcı would not have used the phrase ʻpseudo-stateʼ, so we can assume that
Phileleftheros made the change. Alithia quoted the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet as having
reported that the Greek Cypriots had rejected a proposal made by the “TRNC”.88 The inverted
commas around the word ʻʻTRNCʼ  ʼwere clearly added by Alithia, indicating that it did not accept
the authority of that entity. In another example, Simerini reported that the TMT association
ʻmentionedʼ in an announcement that it was impossible for Turkey to abandon the ʻpseudo-
stateʼ,89 where clearly the term ʻpseudo-stateʼ had replaced the original wording used in the
Turkish language text.  
Conclusion  
Our analysis of the material in this period reveals that the tactics used by the Greek Cypriot press
in the previous part of our research and described under the heading, Media Practices, have
remained unchanged. There were, however, a few differences; most notably that four dailies,
Machi, Haravgi, Politis and Alithia, appeared to believe that the two leaders could reach an
agreement. This optimism, which was not evident in the past, can be attributed to the fact that the
meeting between Christofias and Talat was fruitful, contrary to that of Papadopoulos with Talat in
2007. We made one more observation, related to the solution sought:  None of the newspapers
opposed the official stance that any settlement must be based on a single sovereignty and
citizenship.
Haravgi, Alithia and Machi continued to offer favorable coverage to specific parties. They did this
by dedicating more space to AKEL (Haravgi) or DISY (Machi and Alithia) and by highlighting the
respective partyʼs views. These practices were also employed by Haravgi in order to project the
stances of the government, which it represented positively. In the previous period of study, the
newspaper hardly referred to Papadopoulosʼs government unless it was to criticize its members for
their opinions or actions. Its position towards the government changed after the leader of AKEL,
Demetris Christofias, became the new President of the Republic of Cyprus. In general, there were
not many news stories opposing Christofiasʼs government as was the case during Papadopoulosʼs
presidency. Alithia and Politis continued criticizing the former President and his supporters. 
News stories published about the EU offered no evidence of the EU being viewed either as an
ally or as an enemy of the Greek Cypriots. 
86 No author, ʻΕπανήρχισαν τα δρομολόγια με τη Συρία [The (ferry) services with Syria have started again]ʼ, Alithia, 1.7.2008:1; No author, ʻΚαι
τώρα τουρίστες [And now tourists]ʼ, Politis, 1.7.2008:6; Spyros Athanasiades, ʻΕπανήρχισαν τα δρομολόγια Αμμοχώστου και Λατάκειας:
Στόχος η μεταφορά 2.000 Σύρων τουριστών [The (ferry) services between Famagusta and Latakia have started again: The target is to
transport 2.000 Syrian tourists]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 1.7.2008:6. 
87 Spyros Athanasiades, ʻΣύντομα ανοίγει «γραφείο» στο Ισραήλ το ψευδοκράτος: Εξαγγελίες του Αβτζί για «διπλωματική επίθεση» [The
pseudo-state will soon be opening an “office” in Israel: Avcıʼs declarations for “diplomatic attack”]ʼ, Phileleftheros, 2.7.2008:6.
88 No author, ʻΧουριέτ: Πεθαίνω αλλά δεν πίνω τουρκικό νερό [Hurriyet: I prefer to die than drink water from Turkey]ʼ, Alithia, 2.7.2008:11. 
89 George Michailides, ʻΑπαράδεκτος ο Μπαμπατζάν [Babacan is unacceptable]ʼ, Simerini, 3.7.2008:3.
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With reference to Greece, Machi/Tharros continued to point out a connection between the
Greek Cypriots and Greece. Additionally, Alithia and Phileleftheros projected a bond of ethnic
origin between Cyprus and Greece. 
Alithia, Politis and Haravgi, the only papers that referred to the Turkish Cypriots, did not view
them as the enemy. Conversely, their leadership was negatively depicted, with Phileleftheros and
Simerini naming Mehmet Ali Talat, ʻoccupation leaderʼ, while Machi characterized him as a
ʻpseudo-leaderʼ. Most newspapers emphasized that he had fixed positions and that he was
responsible for the deadlock on the island. Haravgiʼs stances toward Talat could not be
ascertained, while Machi published one report claiming that the Turkish Cypriots (meaning their
leadership) showed positive behaviour with regards to the solution sought. 
Turkey was still portrayed as a hostile country and, as in the past, Simerini painted a darker
picture of this country than the other papers. This newspaper, along with Alithia and Phileleftheros,
projected a negative image of Turkey by stressing that her objectives collided with those of the
Greek Cypriots. Additionally, Phileleftheros and Politis published articles in which Turkey appeared
undemocratic. 
Simerini and Phileleftheros occasionally used the expression the ʻTurkish sideʼ when they
referred not only to Turkey, but also to the Turkish Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This
indicates their views on identity and reveals that the two papers considered Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots to have the same stances and goals. They also projected the view that the Greek
Cypriot leadership had the correct position on the solution to the Cyprus Problem and stressed
that it acted appropriately before the meeting between Christofias and Talat. In contrast, they
implied or even emphasized that the ʻother sideʼ—Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership—
obstructed the course of the settlement. 
All the newspapers validated the correctness of the Greek Cypriot aims and opinions on
political matters by pointing out that these were also backed by important organizations. This
practice showed that the Greek Cypriot side had just demands while the goals of the ʻothers  ʼwere
unfair and unfounded. 
All the dailies continued to proclaim that they did not accept the legitimacy of the territory in the
north, employing the same semantic practices used in the previous period of study. The
newspapers widely covered stories related to indirect political recognition of the northern areas
and/or the development of the land in the north. This trend indicates the Greek Cypriots  ʼfear of
losing forever a territory they considered as their own. The subject of de facto recognition was also
the most common subject of Turkish Cypriot or Turkish press reports republished by Alithia, Politis
and Phileleftheros. This practice was also observed in the previous period of study. Another trend
was the change in the wording of articles reproducing texts or statements from Turkish sources.
Three dailies, Phileleftheros, Alithia and Simerini, engaged in this tactic to match what was said
or written with their own beliefs and stances. 
Synthia Pavlou




As before, the five national free-to-air television channels are studied in this part of the paper. The
data from RIK, Mega, ANT1, Sigma and Plus TV were drawn from their main evening news
bulletins of 30 June to 3 July 2008.  
The main news story and what it will reveal
The 1 July 2008 meeting between President Demetris Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leader
Mehmet Ali Talat and their subsequent joint statement were widely covered by the stations. The
television coverage of this story as well as other issues provided the material for our analysis,
which aimed to clarify:  
a) The stances of each TV channel regarding the solution sought, the government / the parties,
the European Union and the ʻother sideʼ; 
b) The means employed to put forward these positions.
Media Practices
The television stations, by and large, used the same methods as in the previous period of analysis,
both to inform their audiences as objectively as possible and to remain competitive. Additionally,
their resources and party or ideological links and affiliations continued to affect the way some
stations represented certain news items. 
Different Discourses and Media Practices
The Form of Solution 
The leaders  ʼmeeting is used as a reference point to reveal the stations  ʼideologies related to the
settlement of the Cyprus Problem. A stationʼs coverage of this event reveals whether it promoted
the official government position, or instead projected its own stance; more importantly, it shows if
the station still hoped that the deadlock in the country would end. The stations  ʼpositions regarding
the settlement are outlined in relation to their positions in the previous period of study and in
comparison to their coverage of the Papadopoulos—Talat meeting on 5 September 2007. 
The main similarity in the stations  ʼ coverage of the meetings of Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr.
Christofias with Mehmet Ali Talat was that all stations appeared to have adopted the official stance
on the parameters of the desired solution. During the meeting between Christofias and Talat, the
President of the Republic of Cyprus sought agreement on the issue of single sovereignty and
citizenship. This seems to have also been the position adopted by the stations and was viewed
by the Greek Cypriots as the basis for negotiations. 
ANT1 reported that the matter of ʻthe basis of the negotiations is, at least in principle, closedʼ.1
The use of the phrase ʻat leastʼ probably indicates that the station was relieved that there had
been agreement between the two leaders. Mega broadcast a news story in which the outcome of
1 ANT1, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
2 Mega, item 2, 1.7.2008. 
3 Plus TV, item 1d, 1.7.2008. 
4 RIK, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
5 Sigma, item 10, 3.7.2008. 
6 RIK, item 2, 30.6.2008. 
7 Mega, item 4, 30.6.2008. 
8 Sigma, item 3, 30.6.2008. 
9 Sigma, item 4, 30.6.2008.
10 Sigma, item 5, 30.6.2008.
11 ANT1 item 3, 30.6.2008.
12 ANT1, news bulletinʼs introduction, 1.7.2008. 
13 Mega, item 1.7.2008. 
14 RIK, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
15 Plus TV, item 1d, 1.7.2008. 
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the meeting was positively described, and followed the report with a live debate on the subject
between the stationʼs presenter and two journalists.  Megaʼs newscaster said that ʻ one could claim
that the common basis [for the negotiations] has been found, this being a single sovereignty and
citizenshipʼ.2 The optimistic way of reporting this event could quite possibly indicate approval of
this feature of the solution. Plus TVʼs presenter said that the fact that the single sovereignty and
citizenship were discussed during the meeting was positive,3 which signals a position in favour of
this arrangement. RIKʼs cue read, ʻPresident Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat discussed… the
issue of single sovereignty and citizenship and agreed in principle on these subjectsʼ.4 RIK
appears to have found the specific development to be significant since these words were heard
during the introduction to RIKʼs top news story. On 3 July a Sigma journalist reported that Talatʼs
reference to a single sovereignty and citizenship was a step forward.5
The stations appeared to have remained consistent in their support of the government position
on the settlement. Their degree of optimism at the possibility of a solution to the Cyprus Problem,
however, increased since the previous period of study, as the hopes for an agreement between
the two leaders were raised. The stations appeared to believe that in time Christofias and Talat
might actually find the path to peace, in contrast to the way the meeting of Tassos Papadopoulos
with the Turkish Cypriot leader was reported. 
However, pessimistic messages were spotted in many news stories on the eve of the 1 July
meeting, with all stations, excluding Plus TV, making gloomy predictions about the forthcoming
meeting. 
In RIKʼs cue on this subject, it was stressed that the two leaders set different priorities for their
meeting.6 This matter was also pointed out in Megaʼs report, which used the caption, ʻChristofias-
Talat: They go to tomorrowʼs meeting with different agendasʼ.7 The same words were used by
Sigma,8 whose negativity regarding the results of the following day was also projected by a survey,
presented with the caption, ʻThe people are pessimistic regarding devel op ments on the Cyprus
Problemʼ.9 Sigmaʼs next report, on a meeting between the Presidential commissioner, George
Iacovou, and Talatʼs advisor, Ozdil Nami, carried the headline, ʻThey did not manage to speak the
same languageʼ.10 This distrust of a positive outcome was also projected by ANT1, which broadcast
an opinion poll about the meeting, highlighting that, ʻThe majority does not expect that important
decisions will be takenʼ.11
The next dayʼs reports revealed that the dire predictions had not occurred, and moreover, they
even expressed some optimism about the future. On 1 July, ANT1 introduced its news bulletin
with the words, ʻWe go straight ahead to direct negotiations between Christofias and Talat for the
settlement of the Cyprus Problem. Todayʼs meeting…opened the door to the second phase of
developmentsʼ.12 Mega stated, ʻthe meeting was particularly important for the overall future of the
new effortʼ,13 while RIK mentioned that a ʻfew steps forward  ʼwere made.14 Plus TV, meanwhile,
commented on the results of the meeting between the two leaders and recapitulated by saying, ʻwe
are now in a good positionʼ.15 Sigma was the only station that presented the meeting outcome with
caution: while during the cue it stressed that there was agreement on the issue of single sovereignty
141Greek Cypriot Television in June-July 2008
and citizenship, which was reported in the joint statement, it added that, nevertheless, the details
for the implementation of these issues would be deferred to the direct phase of the negotiations.16
The Government and the Parties
The examples given below derive solely from two stations, RIK and Plus TV, because these were
the only stations for which we could safely draw conclusions based on the material available for
this section. Besides, the other channels revealed no noteworthy change in their depiction of the
Christofias government in relation to the Papadopoulos government. 
RIK appeared to continue providing favorable coverage to the government. However, because
the government had changed, it would appear that RIK highlights and positively represents issues
related to the government, regardless of the government stance or which party or parties form the
government. 
Plus TV, on the other hand, appeared to have completely shifted its position towards the
government from the moment the leader of AKEL was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus.
Still wider coverage for one party
Sometimes a stationʼs broadcast focused solely on the actions or views of one particular person
or party.
Plus TV most frequently overrepresented a specific party, since it often broadcast news stories,
which no other station aired, related exclusively to AKEL. 
For example, for three days in July Plus TV reported on events related to two concerts organized
by EDON, the youth section of AKEL.17 No other channel broadcast these stories, which indicates
Plus TV ʼs favouritism toward AKEL. The station widely covered the positions of AKEL. On 1 July
it aired a live telephone conversation between the presenter of Plus TV and the Press Spokesman
of AKEL, Andros Kyprianou, in which the politician was asked his opinion of the Christofias—Talat
meeting.18 The view of no other party representative was heard with regard to this matter, a
practice also noted during the previous period of study. 
The views and actions of the government
Plus TV not only overrepresented the positions of AKEL, it also emphasized the stances of the
Christofias government using other methods, some of which are illustrated below. RIK, too,
promoted the governmentʼs views, and often used similar methods.  
It appears that favorable coverage to the government was offered by highlighting the views,
actions, or stances of an individual representing the government. This was often achieved by
describing these views or actions in the cue of a news story as well as in one of the introductory
themes which were announced by the newscaster before the beginning of a news bulletin. This
promotion technique was also detected during the previous period of study and was most often
used by RIK and Plus TV. 
For example, in this period of analysis Plus TV aired a piece on the increasing number of fires
in Cyprus, stating in the cue, ʻIn the following report the measures taken by the government will
be presentedʼ.19 In the previous period of study, when the Papadopoulos government was in
power, this station rarely included any reference to the government in its cues unless these were
negative statements.
Similarly, in the present timeframe, RIK broadcast a news story about the rising inflation in the
Eurozone and the measures proposed by labour union SEK to face this challenge; at the end of
the cue the presenter said, ʻIn the following report, how the Minister of Finance answers [will be
presented]ʼ.20 As in the earlier period analysed, RIK referred to the government stance during the
cue. So now, although a shift in power had occurred, RIK continued to favour the government. 
16 Sigma, item 1, 1.7.2008.
17 Plus TV, item 14, 1 and 2.7.2008; Plus TV, item 16, 3.7.2008.
18 Plus TV, item 1d, 1.7.2008.
19 Plus TV, item 11, 1.7.2008. 
20 RIK, item 11, 30.6.2008. 
142 Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem
Positive representation of the government
RIK and Plus TV not only seemed to highlight the views and actions of the government, but they
have also depicted it in a flattering way.
Plus TV, on 6 July, aired a news story about the rising price of oil, and stated in the cue, ʻThe
Minister of Finance stressed that they will continue offering economic benefits [to the people]ʼ,21
clearly emphasizing the positive efforts of the government to protect the public.
RIK, also on 6 July, noted in its cue that the government would protect the public from record-
high fuel prices: ʻthe Ministry of Commerce attempts to protect the Cypriot consumerʼ.22
Moreover, these two channels tended to highlight the positive aspects of any government-
related topic with little or no mention of the negative points. In a story reporting on the rent benefit
increase, Plus TV noted first that the refugee parliamentary committee was content with the
increase; not until later in the story was the audience informed that the President of the committee
was not pleased with the rent benefit.23 RIK, on the other hand, did refer to this fact in its cue and
at the beginning of its coverage of the event, but still chose to begin with the positive reactions.
The presenter said, ʻSatisfaction with the increase in the benefits [given to] those who suffered
and dissatisfaction at the proposed increase in the refugees  ʼrent benefitʼ.24 In this way, the bright
side of the developments was stressed, and perhaps indirectly the actions of the government
were praised. 
During the previous dates studied, with Papadopoulos in power, Plus TV did not offer favorable
coverage to the government; instead, it overrepresented and flatteringly depicted AKEL and its
leader. Conversely, in both periods of study, RIK stressed the view of the govern ment, while it
positively described its actions and its representatives. The fact that a new government had been
formed appears to have been irrelevant.  
The analysis of the data offered no evidence that the rest of the stations clearly positioned
themselves in favor of or against a specific party or the government. 
The European Union
EU issues continued to be viewed by the channels as significant, and Mega and ANT1 employed
correspondents in Brussels to report on any EU developments.25 RIK broadcast the most news
stories related to the EU and Plus TV aired the fewest.26
In the collected data we found no evidence that the EU was depicted either as an ally or as an
enemy of the Republic of Cyprus. Two channels, however ANT1 and Sigma, aired alarming stories
about the efforts of the European Central Bank to curb inflation by raising its benchmark interest
rate to 4.25%. In these reports it was stressed that this measure might slow down the Eurozone
economy and adversely affect both households and borrowers.27 It seems that both stations were
not only worried about the EUʼs decision but also did not fully approve it. 
Us and the ʻother sideʼ
The issue of who exactly was considered to be ʻus  ʼand who was considered as the ʻotherʼ, as well
as the image projected for each category, are discussed next. The ideologies of the stations regarding
these two groups and the practices they used to put them forward are presented simultaneously. 
21 Plus TV, item 4, 30.6.2008.
22 RIK, item 12, 30.6.2008.
23 Plus TV, item 9, 2.7.2008. 
24 RIK, item 19, 2.7.2008. 
25 One of the news stories covered by Megaʼs correspondent was related to the fact that from 1.7.2008  France would hold the rotating EU
presidency.  See, Mega, item 11, 30.6.2008. On the same day, the correspondent of ANT1 informed the public about the inflation rate in the
Eurozone.  See, ANT1, item 12, 30.6.2008. 
26 RIK aired eight reports related to the EU and a journalist reported live on events related to the Treaty of Lisbon.  See, RIK, item 11, 30.6.2008;
items 4 and 15, 1.7.2008; items 5-7, 2.7.2008 and items 1, 2 and 6, 3.7.2008. Plus TV aired only two EU-linked stories and included in its
newscast a telephone communication with a journalist who reported on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the parliament of the Republic
of Cyprus.  See, Plus TV, item 16, 1.7.2008 and items 12 and 13, 3.7.2008. ANT1 broadcast seven news stories linked to the EU, while events
related to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty were broadcast live.  See, ANT1, item 12, 30.6.2008; items 12-13, 1.7.2008; item 15, 2.7.2008
and items 1-2, 5 and 10, 3.7.2008.  Sigma also aired seven reports referring to the EU, while one of its journalists in the news room reported
the developments on the Lisbon Treaty.  See, Sigma, item 13, 30.6.2008; items 18-19, 1.7.2008; item 13, 2.7.2008 and items 3-4, 6 and 8,
3.7.2008. Although Mega employed a correspondent to cover EU- related issues, the station only broadcast three reports concerning the EU
during this period of analysis.  See, Mega, item 11, 30.6.2008; item 12, 1.7.2008 and item 2, 3.7.2008. 
27 Sigma, item 8, 3.7.2008; ANT1, item 5, 3.7.2008.
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Is Greece still viewed as part of ʻusʼ?
All the television channels maintained their relationship with Greece through their continued
collaboration with certain Greek television stations. They also continued re-broadcasting various
reports from Greek channels.28 The re-broadcasts referred either to news from other countries or
to the current affairs of Greece. Four stations aired news stories on a Greek politicianʼs visit to
Cyprus and/or the comments of the spokesperson from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
the Cyprus Problem.29
Two stations appeared to project special bonds between Cyprus and Greece. RIK, for example,
re-broadcast a report from Greeceʼs ERT, but added that the leader of PASOK sent a ʻmessage
of hope and support to the President of the Republic, Demetris Christofias, and the Turkish
Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat..ʼ 30 Similar examples were noted in the previous period of study.
On another occasion, RIK broadcast a report on the visit to Cyprus by the leader of the Greek
party, ʻSynaspismosʼ, and used the caption, ʻSynaspismos stands with Cyprusʼ.31 In this period,
therefore, we can see that RIK remained consistent in promoting the view that Greece cared
about the island and that there was a strong connection between the two countries. 
Sigma, too, projected this same idea, as it had also done in the previous period studied. In a
report on a statement made by the spokesperson of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
regarding Cyprus, Sigmaʼs caption read, ʻKoumoutsakos, The crisis in Turkey should not affect
the [settlement of the] Cyprus Problemʼ. 32 Sigma also aired a report on a huge Greek flag that
Cypriot youngsters had made out of stones.33 No other station broadcast this story and the fact
that Sigma aired a news story about a strong symbol of identity could indicate its ideology with
regard to the bond between Cyprus and Greece.  
The other side
In this part of the analysis we will again divide the ʻother  ʼinto sub-categories for a more thorough
examination. These groups, which were depicted by the stations as the ʻotherʼ, were,
a) The Turkish Cypriot community;
b) The Turkish Cypriot leadership; 
c) Turkey.
The Turkish Cypriots are not the enemy
The analysis for this period did not reveal any significant change in the way the Turkish Cypriots
were pictured in relation to the previous period of study. The stations continued to air news stories
about this community, indicating that the Turkish Cypriots  ʼ views and current affairs were still
viewed as important. 
Both Sigma34 and Plus TV broadcast reports on a music event related to reunification, and the
cue of the latter began with the following words: ʻThe continuation of the rapprochement efforts
…was observed during a multicultural event held last night at the Ledra Palaceʼ.35 The choice of
the word ʻcontinuation  ʼshows that Plus TV projected the event as part of an ongoing effort for
rapprochement. 
ANT1 aired an opinion poll that included the views of both communities on the Christofias -
Talat meeting.36 The fact that the views of the Turkish Cypriots were not excluded could mean that
this group was perceived as a community whose stance was valued. 
28 See for example, RIK, item 16, 30.6.2008; Plus TV, items 9, 17, 19 and 21, 30.6.2008; Mega, items 9, 14, 17, 30.6.2008; ANT1 items 13, 23,
30.6.2008; Sigma, item 26, 30.6.2008. 
28 Plus TV, items 6-7, 3.7.2008; ANT1, item 18, 3.7.2008; Sigma, items 10 and 15, 3.7.2008; RIK, item 18, 3.7.2008. 
30 RIK, item 16, 30.6.2008. 
31 RIK, item 18, 3.7.2008. 
32 Sigma, item 10, 3.7.2008. 
33 Sigma. item 11, 2.7.2008. 
34 Sigma, item 21, 30.6.2008.
35 Plus TV, item 18, 30.6.2008. 
36 ANT1, item 2, 2.7.2008. 
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On the same day, RIK broadcast a news story about a Turkish Cypriot reporter who won an
award in journalism. The first sentence of the voice-over showed Turkish Cypriots not as the ʻotherʼ
but simply as Cypriots: ʻFor the first time Cyprus gets the prize of courage in journalism…ʼ.37
Only Mega did not air any reports linked to the Turkish Cypriot community in the period
examined, so it cannot be determined whether this station remained loyal to its past stance on this
community.  
How the Turkish Cypriot leadership was portrayed 
Compared to the previous period of study, there was a slight change in the way Mehmet Ali Talat
was represented by some channels. On some occasions, and on some channels, he was no
longer depicted as a person who hindered the solution of the Cyprus Problem. For example, Plus
TV, reporting on the meeting between the two leaders, stated that they ʻagreed in principle on the
issues of single sovereignty and citizenshipʼ.38 Several days later it reported that diplomats
characterized this development as an important step for the elucidation of the basis of the solution
of the Cyprus Problem.39 These reports painted Talat in a positive light. We also found that RIK
had changed its portrayal, as when it declared that ʻthe important thing is that the two leaders
meet and that they at least find some solutions and some points to report in the joint statementsʼ,40
perhaps indicating that the station believed that Talat did not object to Christofiasʼs objectives. In
Megaʼs story on the leaders  ʼmeeting, the reporter announced that the two men had found the
ʻgolden meanʼ,41 revealing that the station felt Talat was a person who compromised. 
ANT1ʼs coverage was slightly different than that of RIK, Plus TV and Mega. Its report intimated
that both leaders appeared to have made concessions,42 but the next dayʼs story reported that
Talat wanted internal citizenship, a point that was highlighted in a caption.43 The station also
presented Talatʼs compliance during the meeting as unexpected, as the irony behind the following
words cannot be concealed: ʻSuddenly, Talat appeared as the defender of a unified state with
single sovereignty and citizenshipʼ. The first sentence of this news story reveals a lack of trust in
the Turkish Cypriot leader: ʻBluff or clarification?ʼ.44 Thus, although ANT1 did not portray Talat in
gloomy colors, nor did they depict him positively or as someone to be trusted.  
Sigma was also doubtful whether the Turkish Cypriot leader was in agreement with the Greek
Cypriot positions. A Sigma journalist commenting on Talatʼs statements about the ʻsovereignty of
the new stateʼ said that these were ʻsubject to multiple interpretationsʼ. Nonetheless, the reporter
concluded by stressing that the Turkish Cypriot leaderʼs reference to single sovereignty and
citizenship was ʻa step forwardʼ.45 Another report, however, presented Talat as an oppor tunist,
because despite being a political friend of Tayip Erdoğan, he had no problem in allying with the
Turkish Prime-Ministerʼs political rivals.46
The above examples reveal that Talat was depicted by some channels in a more positive way
than in the past, at least regarding his efforts for the solution to the Cyprus Problem. 
Was Turkey still the villain?
Some developments in Turkey in the period studied here were covered by all the channels, as for
example, the crisis from a lawsuit that challenged the legitimacy of the governing party.47
37 RIK, item 20, 2.7.2008. 
38 Plus TV, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
39 Plus TV, item 1, 3.7.2008. 
40 RIK, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
41 Mega, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
42 ANT1, item 1, 1.7.2008. 
43 ANT1, item 1, 2.7.2008. 
44 ANT1, item 3, 3.7.2008.
45 Sigma, item 10, 3.7.2008. 
46 Sigma, item 13, 30.6.2008.
47 See, Mega , item 10, 30.6.2008; item 3, 1.7.2008; item 11, 2.7.2008 and item 11, 3.7.2008; RIK, item 3, 1.7.2008; item 4, 2.7.2008 and item
13, 3.7.2008, Plus TV, item 15, 1.7.2008; item 3, 2.7.2008 and Plus TV, item 19, 3.7.2008; ANT1, item 3, 1.7.2008 and item 4, 2.7.2008; Sigma,
item 13, 30.6.2008; item 17, 1.7.2008 and item 9, 3.7.2008. 
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Sometimes these reports were broadcast at the beginning of the stations  ʼnewscasts,48 and this
reveals that the stations believed that the political situation in Turkey could subsequently affect
Cyprus. Sigma aired a caption quoting the spokesperson of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
that supports this hypothesis: ʻKoumoutsakos, The crisis in Turkey should not affect the [settlement
of the] Cyprus Problemʼ.49 Sigma also reported certain events and developments in Turkey to
show that this country did not belong in the EU: ʻNationalist zealots were preparing a coup d  ʼétat.
They were planning acts of terrorism and murdersʼ. After reading these sentences, we can see
that the caption for this news story was quite sarcastic: ʻIn the European Turkeyʼ.50
ANT1 also broadcast a news story in which it was implied that Turkey was not fit to become an
EU member state. The beginning of this reportʼs cue was: ʻToday, diplomatic circles have
expressed doubts about Turkeyʼs ability to accede to the EUʼ.51 This is not new, as pointing out
Turkeyʼs deficiencies was found regularly in the previous period of analysis. 
The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were not called the Turkish side
In this part of the research it appeared that a clear distinction was made between Turkish Cypriots,
their leadership and Turkey. There were no occurrences where Turkish Cypriots and Turks or
Turkey were presented as one and the same, an indication that the common Turkish identity of
the ʻothersʼ, occasionally called, ʻthe Turkish sideʼ, was not emphasized.  
The ʻother  ʼin relation to ʻusʼ
Two stations, ANT1 and Plus TV, validated the correctness of the Greek Cypriot aims and stances
by pointing out that these were supported by important organizations, including the United Nations
and the PARIS MoU (Memorandum of Understanding). Each channel broadcast a news story in
which it was implied that the Republic of Cyprus, unlike the ʻother sideʼ, had justified demands.
ANT1ʼs story referred to the Paris MoUʼs criticism of Turkey: ʻAnkara was once more criticized
because of its refusal to accept in its ports, ships [sailing] under the Cypriot flag. The PARIS MoU
has rejected its application to become a member of the organizationʼ.52 Plus TVʼs  story insinuated
that the Greek Cypriots had the right on their side when Christofias would meet Talat ʻarmed with
the agreed principles for the solution of the Cyprus Problem, as these are defined in the
resolutions of the United Nations and the high level agreementsʼ.53 Here we see the position of
the President of the Republic of Cyprus backed by the UN. In their emphasis on the Greek
Cypriots having right on their side, both stations substantiated their view by pointing out that they
were supported by recognized organizations. This was also noted on all channels in the previous
period of study. 
In the present period, the notion that only the Greek Cypriots were willing to end the stalemate
in the country was not put forward. Only Sigma aired a story where it was stressed that, ʻTurkish
Cypriot organizations and partiesʼ were infuriated with Talat for accepting single sovereignty and
citizenship. It also reported that they featured Talat as ʻincapable of handling the Cyprus Problem
while the fascist TMT threaten[ed] to rouse the Turkish Cypriots to revolt if he dare[d] sign the
demise of the pseudo-stateʼ.54 None of the other stations broadcast reactions to the outcome of
the meeting so negatively, emphasizing that many people living in the northern part of the country
did not wish a settlement as desired by the Greek Cypriots. 
48 Mega, item 3, 1.7.2008; RIK, item 3, 1.7.2008 and item 4, 2.7.2008; Plus TV, item 3, 2.7.2008; ANT1, item 3, 1.7.2008 and item 4, 2.7.2008; 
49 Sigma, item 10, 3.7.2008. 
50 Sigma, sixth introductory headline, 3.7.2008. 
51 ANT1, item 13, 1.7.2008. 
52 ANT1, item 15, 30.6.2008.
53 Plus TV, item 3, 30.6.2008. 
54 Sigma, item 11, 3.7.2008. 
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The ʻoccupied areasʼ
The north was represented in the same way as in the previous period of study. The same
semantics were used to refer to the northern territory of the island, as we see in a Sigma news
story that used the term ʻpseudo-stateʼ.55 In another Sigma report the northern part of the island
was characterized as, ʻthe occupied areasʼ.56 Two days later, the same term was used by ANT1,57
as was also the case on Mega,58 Plus TV 59 and RIK 60  on 3 July. Thus, the stations continued to
use the adjective ʻoccupied  ʼin order to proclaim that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership
had no legitimate power over the northern part of the country. 
In addition to the above, the expression ʻso-calledʼ61 was also used to preface anything that
could assign authority to the north. In the material analysed, we noted ANT1 using this expression
when a report described Ferdi Sabit Soyer as the ʻso-called Prime-Minister of the occupation
regimeʼ.62
The notion that the ʻother  ʼhad no lawful rights over the northern part of the island was also
emphasized in another ANT1 report, which stated in the cue that the ʻillegalʼ ferry services
between the port of Famagusta and Latakia had re-started.63 The term ʻillegal  ʼindicates the lack
of international recognition of those who undertook the specific activity. 
While ANT1 and Sigma appeared consistent in the use of this phraseology when they referred
to the northern areas of the island, the limited amount of data studied did not reveal the practices
by the other channels. 
The images
In addition to words, images also carried their own underlying messages.  Reporting on the
Turkish Cypriot journalist who had been awarded a journalism prize, RIK broadcast black and
white shots of women who were running to save their lives.64 These images could have awakened
the viewers  ʼ memories about the tragic events of 1974 and perhaps even caused resentful
feelings towards the country the Greek Cypriots view as responsible for the catastrophic
occurrences of the past.  Negative reactions to the ʻother side  ʼcould have also arisen from the
final image of this news story—a shot of the Turkish and the ʻTRNC  ʼ flags on the occupied
Pentadaktylos Mountains. A similar shot was seen in one of ANT1ʼs news stories covering the
meeting between Christofias and Talat.65 This can be viewed as a constant reminder that the
ʻother  ʼstill remains in a territory that the Greek Cypriots consider as their own, while at the same
time, the position of the flag is thought to be provocative.
Sigma also showed images of the Turkish and/or the ʻTRNC  ʼflags in a report on the meeting
of the two leaders. During references to the positions of the ʻTurkish Cypriot sideʼ, three out of four
images of the northern part of the island showed the two flags. The Turkish and the ʻTRNC  ʼflags
also appeared on Plus TV in a news story about the meeting, while referring to the ʻoccupied
areasʼ.66 In the previous period of study the Turkish and the TRNC flags were the most common
shot included in reports about the ʻother sideʼ. In the present period, Mega was the only channel
that did not use any images of the flags.
55 Sigma, item 11, 3.7.2008.
56 Sigma, item 13, 30.6.2008. 
57 ANT1, item 3, 2.7.2008. 
58 Mega, item 4, 3.7.2008.
59 Plus TV, item 1, 3.7.2008.
60 RIK, item 2, 3.7.2008. 
61 This practice was also employed in the past.
62 ANT1, item 3, 2.7.2008. 
63 ANT1, item 16, 30.6.2008. 
64 RIK, item 20, 2.7.2008. 
65 ANT1, item 3, 3.7.2008. 
66 Plus TV, item 1, 3.7.2008.
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Conclusion
Our analysis for this time period indicates that the TV channels remained consistent - since the
earlier time period studied - in terms of the practices they employed to remain competitive,
achieve market dominance and project their stances to their viewers. The stations  ʼpractices in
news selection and content, as well as their ideological framework also remained consistent. 
All the stations projected the Republic of Cyprus government stance on the basic parameters
of the solution sought, independent of their personal politics. It also appeared that, in both the
previous and the present timeframe, they all approved a settlement based on single sovereignty
and citizenship. This finding was consistent for the two time periods analysed. There were also
some differences—primarily, that the stations were positive about the prospects of progress
towards a resolution of the conflict; pessimistic stances were evident only prior to the meeting of
Christofias with Talat. Sigma was the only station that used caution in reporting the outcome of
the official encounter; all the other channels suggested that in time the two politicians might find
the path towards peace. 
The data analysis indicated that two stations underwent noteworthy changes in their depiction
and coverage of the government. RIK continued to offer the government favorable coverage, even
though there was a shift in power since the previous period of study. On the other hand, Plus TV
completely altered its stance and offered full support to the government from the moment the
leader of AKEL was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Issues related to the EU were still considered important. In contrast to the previous period of
study, no evidence was found to suggest that the EU was depicted either as an ally or as an
enemy of the Republic of Cyprus.
All television stations continued their collaboration with Greek channels. While there was no
evidence of any change in the other channels  ʼstance, only RIK and Sigma broadcast news stories
attesting to their belief in a strong bond between Greece and Cyprus. This was evident in the
previous timeframe on all channels.
The representation of Turkish Cypriots was also consistent with the other two periods of study.
Throughout the various timeframes, all stations projected the idea that this community was not the
Greek Cypriots  ʼenemy. A slight difference was however noted in the way Mehmet Ali Talat was
represented by most of the channels. Unlike in the previous period, Plus TV and RIK did not portray
the Turkish Cypriot leader as someone who hindered the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Only
ANT1 and Sigma continued picturing Talat in gloomy colors. These two channels also continued to
illustrate Turkey negatively, even insinuating that the country was not fit to enter into the EU.  
This time there was no data that presented the Turks as being one and the same as the Turkish
Cypriots or their leadership, as had occurred in the past. The term, ʻthe Turkish sideʼ, used in the
previous set of data, which emphasized the Turkish identity of the ʻother sideʼ, was not present in
the latest time period. However, this does not mean that this practice was abandoned.
In examining the image of the ʻother  ʼwe found that ANT1 and Plus TV promoted the idea that,
in contrast to the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey, the Greek Cypriots had reasonable
demands and justified goals. This was achieved by pointing out that their views and aims were
supported by important organizations, a practice noted also in the previous periods of study.
However, most stations did not promote the notion that only the Greek Cypriots were willing to end
the stalemate in the country. 
The north was represented much as it had been in the earlier period. The channels continued
using the same semantics when they referred to the northern territory of the island, with ANT1 and
Sigma being more consistent in their phraseology. Through the use of specific terms, they pointed
out that the ʻothers  ʼhad no lawful rights over the north of the island. 
The examination of the images revealed their hidden messages and eventual impact. RIK seems
to have capitalized on the power of memories in its picture selection; certain images that were used
could provoke negative feelings toward the ʻothersʼ. Similarly, all stations except Mega used images
of the ʻTRNC  ʼand the Turkish flags, which could also easily arouse resentment against those who,
according to the Greek Cypriots, were illegally occupying the northern part of the island. 
Synthia Pavlou




Unlike the two previous sections of our research, which examined media on randomly chosen
dates, this section focuses on a specific time period—the dates just surrounding the Talat-
Christofias meeting on 1 July 2008. Focusing on this event will not only provide a comparison of
the media presentation of the Talat-Papadopoulos and Talat-Christofias meetings, it will also allow
us to observe any shifts in the representation of the issues studied in the previous periods.
The Data
The methodology adopted in this part of the research is no different than that used in the previous
sections. Twelve daily newspapers, Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen, Vatan, Kıbrıslı, Ortam, Güneş,
Demokrat Bakış, Sözcü, Kıbrıs Star, Yeni Volkan and Afrika have been examined for their
coverage of the Cyprus Problem, the image of the EU, internal politics, the repre sentation of ʻusʼ
and the ʻother  ʼ (in other words, Greek Cypriots), and also the portrayal of Turkey. The only
difference in this part of the research is the length of the examined timeframe, which here is only
four days, 30 June to 3 July 2008, shorter than any other periods covered in the research. 
The Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
Neither journalistic practices nor the structure of the news showed much dissimilarity to those
observed in the previous research. Because most newspapers relied heavily on externally
produced texts such as news agency dispatches and press releases, the content of newspapers
was very similar. Interestingly, this time it was not only texts that were alike, but photographs as
well. Pictures that accompanied the news article on a trade union demonstration against the
governmentʼs proposal to amend the Sliding Scale System were the same in nearly all the
newspapers. The newspapers chose to publish the same four shots that showed demonstrators
carrying placards, or making speeches with a loudspeaker in their hands.1 There were numerous
other examples of this practice all throughout the period studied. This can perhaps be explained
by the lack of resources (even journalists) or interest, which led the newspapers to use the
material provided by the TAK agency. 
Some newspapers chose an interesting way to express their criticism or opposition to a political
figure or party, playing on words in names. Ortam changed the first name of the Prime Minister
Ferdi Sabit Soyer to ʻFreddie  ʼto evoke Freddie Krueger, a character in the horror film, ʻA Nightmare
on Elm Streetʼ, and to therefore make people think of the similarity between their actions. Its claim
was that ʻFerdiʼs government has turned peopleʼs lives into a nightmare: Freddieʼs nightmareʼ.2
Güneş, the publication of UBP also did the same and changed the name of ÖRP to ʻÖP  ʼwhich
means ʻkiss  ʼin Turkish. The constant use of ʻÖP  ʼinstead of ÖRP was an indication that this spelling
was not a simple typing mistake but an intentional use to insult the party.3
1 It was only Demokrat Bakış that did not use any photograph for the story. Demokrat Bakış,1.7.2008:10. Yenidüzen used different photographs
from the other newspapers. Yenidüzen,1.7.2008:15.
2 No author, ʻFrediʼnin kabusu [Fredieʼs nightmare]ʼ, Ortam, 30.6.2008:1, 6.
3 No author, ʻCTP-ÖP eliyle çevre felaketi [Environmental disaster at the hands of CTP-ÖP]ʼ, Güneş, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻCTP-ÖP rüşvet
iddiaları gündemde [Claims of CTP-ÖP bribery on the agenda]ʼ, Güneş, 2.7.2008:2.
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Certain techniques of reporting were also evident in some newspapers during this part of the
analysis. As before, Yenidüzen reported some events in ʻnotesʼ, the title heading these features,
which consisted of reporters  ʼobservations presented either as short texts in bullet points or photos
with captions.4 There is a similar example in Kıbrıs Star, where the journalistʼs observations were
titled as ʻnotes from the meetingʼ.5
Presenting the news as questions rather than reporting it as objective facts is another common
practice within the Turkish Cypriot press. Journalists pose questions to a specific individual or
group through newspapers rather than contacting them directly to find out the answer and report
it. Within the period investigated, the practice was employed especially by Yeni Volkan, which, for
example, directed four questions to the Economy and Tourism Minister about the launch of an
advertising campaign promoting tourism in the TRNC.6 Claiming that it had not received any
response to its enquiry, the newspaper repeated the same questions the following day.7 The
Tourism Minister was not the only target of such questioning, as the headline of the main story on
30 June was also a question directed to President Mehmet Ali Talat. Stating that the Cyprus Mail
had quoted Christofias saying that Talat had accepted the concept of ʻsingle sovereignty and
citizenshipʼ, Yeni Volkan enquired: ʻIs it true?ʼ 8
Kıbrıs Star even made a story out of the two leaders  ʼbody language as they emerged from the
meeting hall.  Based on one of its journalistʼs observation, the story recounted how, as they came
out of the meeting, Christofias rubbed his hands while Talat gulped. According to the journalist
these gestures were signs of how the meeting went. The photo caption of the story was ʻTalat was
thoughtful, Christofias was happyʼ.9 The newspaper regarded these body gestures as so
important that the editor of the paper and another columnist also wrote about this issue in their
columns: ʻWhy did Christofias rub his hands.ʼ10
Discourse and Representation
The Cyprus Issue
The main topic related to the Cyprus Issue within the timeframe studied was the two leadersʼ
meeting. In general, the Turkish Cypriot press reflected an expectation that a date for the launch
of negotiations could be decided at the meting. On the day of the meeting the newspapers simply
announced that the leaders were getting together but did not elaborate on the issue further. The
same brief text detailing that the leaders were meeting under the 21 March accord, with the aim
of launching comprehensive talks, appeared in Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Vatan, Kıbrıslı, Afrika, Yeni
Volkan, Ortam, Güneş and Demokrat Bakış.11 Yet, each newspaper ran different headlines, which
highlighted an aspect that the specific newspaper deemed important. Yenidüzen noted on its front
page that the two leaders would discuss the ʻfuture of the Cyprus Problem and the work done until
todayʼ. Therefore, it was ʻa critical dayʼ.12 Halkın Sesi voiced an expectation in its headline with a
question: ʻWill the talks startʼ?13 According to the paper, ʻeyes are on the decision that will come
4 Meltem Sonay, ʻEylemden notlar [Notes from the demonstration]ʼ,Yenidüzen,1.7.2008:15; Meryem Ekinci, ʻGörüşmeden notlar [Notes from the
meeting]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2008:9.
5 Metin Ziya Güngör, ʻGörüşmeden notlar [Notes from the meeting]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 2.7.2009:7.
6 No author, ʻŞanlıdağ susmaya devam ediyor [Şanlıdağ is continuing to keep quiet]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 30.6.2008:1.
7 No author, ʻŞanlıdağ susmaya devam ediyor [Şanlıdağ is continuing to keep quiet]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 1.7.2008:1. 
8 No author, ʻŞimdi de 1 Temmuz endişesi [Worries now about 1 July]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 30.6.2008:1.
9 No author, ʻHristofyasʼın elleri [Christofiasʼs hands]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 3.7.2008:7.
10 Artun Çaga, ʻHristofyas Ellerini Niye Ovuşturdu [Why did Christofias rub his hands?]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 3.7.2008:1,7; also, Mehmet Davulcu, ʻEllerini
Ovuşturup Birbirine Çarptı [He rubbed his hands and clapped]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 3.7.2008:7.
11 No author, ʻTalat ile Hristofyas zemini görüşecek [Talat and Christofias will discuss the basis]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 1.7.2008:1; No author, ʻİmaj savaşı devam
ediyor: Bugün yeniden [Image war continues: Once again todayʼ]ʼ, Vatan, 1.7.2008:1; No author, ʻYa tamam ya devam [It either ends or
continues]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 1.7.2008:1; No author, ʻTalat –Hristofyas bugün görüşüyor [Talat-Christofias are meeting today]ʼ, Afrika, 1.7.2008:1; No
author, ʻ21 Mart çerçevesinde görüşecekler [They will meet under the 21 March accord]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 1.7.2008:2; No author, ʻTalat ve
Hristofyas bugün buluşuyorlar [Talat and Christofias are meeting today]ʼ, Ortam, 1.7.2008:1; No author, ʻÖylesine bir görüşme [Just an ordinary
meeting]ʼ, Güneş, 1.7.2008:1, 7; No author, ʻTalat –Hristofyas görüşmesi bugün [Talat-Christofias meeting is today]ʼ, Demokrat Bakış,
1.7.2008:1.
12 No author, ʻKritik gün [A critical day]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 1.7.2008:1.
13 No author, ʻGörüşmeler başlayacak mı [Will the talks start]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:1.
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out of the leaders  ʼsummit whether talks will start or notʼ. Although the newspaper did not specify
whose ʻeyes  ʼor attention it was referring to, it can be guessed that it was talking on behalf of the
general public. Kıbrıslı viewed the two menʼs meeting as a step that would determine the future
of the negotiation process: ʻIt either ends or continuesʼ, was its headline.14 It announced that the
leaders would try to overcome the tension that had emerged after 23 May, and also noted that
finding a common language would determine the future of the talks. Offering no explanation of
what it meant by ʻtensionʼ, the newspaper relied on whatever background information its readers
might have on the issue. The situation was no different in Vatan, which described the meeting as
an ʻimage warʼ: ʻImage war continues. Once again todayʼ.15 Yet, like Kıbrıslı, it provided no
clarification as to why it described the leaders  ʼmeeting as an ʻimage warʼ. It left the interpretation
to its readers. Vatanʼs coverage of the event leads one to assume that the paper did not believe
that the meeting would produce any serious outcome apart from working for improvement of the
images of the two community leaders. 
Despite the headlines, which revealed diverse opinions of the meeting, the content of majority
of the texts on the topic were either the same or very similar. All the newspapers informed their
readers that after the approximately four and a half hour long meeting, both community leaders
had agreed in principle on the concept of single sovereignty and single citizenship. They included
the joint statement of the two leaders, announced the date of the next meeting as 25 July and
provided the readers with the details of the meeting such as the leaders  ʼarrival time and length
of the meeting. While the headlines of Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen and Afrika focused on the issue of ʻsingle
sovereignty and single citizenshipʼ, those of Yeni Volkan, Ortam, Kıbrıslı, Halkın Sesi and Güneş
reflected their dissatisfaction and disappointment with the outcome of the meeting.16
The widest coverage on the topic was in Yenidüzen, whose front page was devoted exclu sively
to the talks. As well as publishing the text of the joint statement issued by the two leaders on its
front page, the newspaper also included a statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan
expressing how Turkey wished for the start of the comprehensive negotiations with the aim of
finding a solution in Cyprus. The third story on its front page was that CTP-BG did not find the
meeting satisfactory, as a date for the start of full-fledged talks was not set.17
Some papers  ʼ reaction to the outcome of the summit was mainly dissatisfaction: Kıbrıslı
dismissed the agreement on single citizenship and sovereignty, saying that ʻnot reaching an
agreement on every issue meant there was no agreement on any issueʼ.18 It also reported that a
crisis had been postponed. According to the paper, ʻafter a 4.5 hour long meeting the leaders  ʼonly
achievement was to postpone a crisisʼ.19 Kıbrıslı blamed Christofias for a failed meeting and
reported that it was due solely to Talatʼs efforts that a ʻcrisis  ʼwas avoided. However, what kind of
ʻcrisis  ʼ it meant, the newspaper did not explain. Ortam also defined the meeting as resulting in
nothing: ʻAdd zero to zero, it is zeroʼ, which meant ʻall this work has been for nothingʼ.20 In Ortamʼs
view the leaders could go no further than the issue of single sovereignty and citizenship. Güneş
was also dissatisfied with the result and described the process as ʻjust a meetingʼ.21 Halkın Sesi
voiced dissatisfaction that no specific date was set for the start of the leaders  ʼtalks: ʻNo date for
14 No author, ʻYa tamam ya devam [It either ends or continues]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 1.7.2008: 1, 4.
15 No author, ʻİmaj savaşı devam ediyor: Bugün yeniden [Image war continues: Once again todayʼ]ʼ, Vatan, 1.7.2008:1.
16 No author, ʻVatandaşlık ve egemenlik pazarlığı [Bargaining on citizenship and sovereignty]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻTek vatandaşlık tek
egemenlik [Single citizenship single sovereignty]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻTek vatandaşlık tek egemenlik [Single citizenship single
sovereignty]ʼ, Afrika, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻÖylesine bir görüşme [Just a meeting]ʼ, Güneş, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻBu zilleti reddediyoruz [We
are rejecting this humiliation]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻSıfıra sıfır elde var “0” [Add zero to zero, it is zero]ʼ, Ortam, 2.7.2008:1; No
author, ʻKriz ertelendi [The crisis has been averted]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻGörüşme tarihi yine yok [No date for the talks once again]ʼ,
Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:1. 
17 No author, ʻTek vatandaşlık tek egemenlik [Single citizenship single sovereignty]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2009:1; No author, ʻCTP-BG çözüm için
müzakere tarihi istedi [CTP-BG demands for date for solution talks]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2009:1; No author, ʻBabacan:  we want the start of the
comprehensive negotiations with the aim of finding a solution]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2009:1.  
18 Doğan Harman, Her konuda anlaşmaya varılmadıkça hiçbir konuda anlaşmaya varılmış sayılmaz [Not reaching an agreement on every issue
meant there was no agreement on any issue]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1.  
19 No author, ʻKriz ertelendi Tthe crisis has been averted]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1.
20 No author, ʻSıfıra sıfır elde var “0” [Add zero to zero, it is zero]ʼ, Ortam, 2.7.2008:1.  
21 No author, ʻÖylesine bir görüşme [Just a meeting]ʼ, Güneş, 2.7.2008:1.
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the talks once againʼ.22 Among all the newspapers, Yeni Volkan was the one to react most strongly
to the outcome of the meeting. Unlike the others that criticised both leaders for failing to produce
a fruitful result, it directed its condemnation at Talat: ʻTalat succumbed to Christofias and accepted
single sovereignty and single citizenship under the roof of the “Republic of Cyprus”: we reject this
humiliationʼ.23 Continuing with its angry tone, Yeni Volkan wrote: ʻTalat has violated his oath and
the constitution. Therefore he is not representing the Turkish Cypriot people. The things he accepted
do not bind our people. We reject this humiliationʼ.24
The newspapers also reported politicians  ʼreactions to the outcome of the meeting. Halkın Sesi,
as well as highlighting the oppositionʼs protest in its main headline, also reported that the Prime
Minister blamed the Greek Cypriot leader for the result: ʻChristofias has become a slave of DIKO
and EDEKʼ.25 Kıbrıs Starʼs headline also quoted the Prime Minister accusing the Greek Cypriot
leader of running away.26 For Kıbrıslı responses were ʻdiverseʼ,27 while for Yeni Volkan they were
united: ʻThe people rebelledʼ.28 Güneş, Demokrat Bakış  and Ortam—newspapers affiliated with
political parties— reported the party views on their front pages. Both Güneş and Demokrat Bakış
used the same headline that communicated UBP and DPʼs views: ʻOsmosisʼ.  
In all these texts the newspapers frequently referred to both Talat and Christofias with their
status as ʻthe leaders  ʼrather than emphasizing their titles as Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot.
Yet, whenever they did use their titles and names, all the newspapers described Christofias as the
ʻleader of the Greek Cypriot Administration  ʼrather than the ʻPresident of the Republic of Cyprusʼ,
and they called Talat ʻTRNC Presidentʼ.
ʻUs  ʼand ʻThemʼ
Distinction based on positive self-representation and negative ʻother  ʼportrayal was clearly visible
in some newspapers, e.g., Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıslı and Yeni Volkan. For example, while the Turkish
Cypriot side was portrayed as keen to find a solution, the Greek Cypriot side was shown as the
side dragging its feet before the leaders  ʼmeeting. The day before the meeting three out of six
headlines in Halkın Sesi showed the Greek Cypriot side in a negative way: ʻMore than 30 kg
cocaine seized on the Greek Cypriot sideʼ; ʻGreek Cypriots are far from direct talksʼ; and ʻthe
Greek Cypriot side is trying to impose its willʼ.29 On the day of the meeting, the paper quoted an
unidentified source saying that Greek Cypriots were laying down conditions30 that implied
hindrance. According to the paper, the negotiations that were supposed to com mence on 21 June
could not because the Greek Cypriot side delayed the process. Reporting that ʻGreek Cypriots are
dragging their feetʼ,31 Halkın Sesi also commented that ʻbefore the summit the Greek Cypriot side
has adopted a negative mannerʼ.32 Highlighting contradictory statements of both Turkish Cypriot
and Greek Cypriot representatives, the paper cast the latter with a negative attitude but portrayed
the Turkish Cypriot as being constructive: ʻWhile the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Markos
Kyprianou spoke in a pessimistic way about the direct talks, Talatʼs spokesperson Hasan Erçakıca
noted that “they (Turkish Cypriot side) want to start full negotiations”ʼ.33 It integrated a short
account of Kyprianouʼs statement into its main story under a sub-headline that said, ʻhe showed
22 No author, ʻGörüşe tarihi yine yok [No date for the talks once again]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:1.  
23 No author, ʻBu zilleti reddediyoruz [We are rejecting this humiliation]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 2.7.2008:1.
24 Ibid.
25 No author, ʻHristofyas esir oldu [Christofias becomes a slave]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 3.7.2008:1.
26 No author, ʻMinderden kaçıyorlar [They are running from the fight]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 3.7.2008:1.
27 No author, ʻTepkiler muhtelif [Reactions are diverse]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 3.7.2008:1.
28 No author, ʻHalk ayaklandı [The people rebelled]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 3.7.2008:1.
29 No author, ʻRum tarafında 30 kilodan fazla kokain ele geçirildi [More than 30 kg cocaine seized on the Greek Cypriot side]ʼ, Halkın Sesi,
30.6.2008:1; No author, ʻRumlar doğrudan müzakerelere uzak [Greek Cypriots are long way off from direct talks]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 30.6.2008:1;
No author, ʻ“Rum tarafı dayatma peşinde” [The Greek Cypriot side is trying to impose its will]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 30.6.2008:1.
30 No author, ʻGörüşmeler başlayacak mı [Will the talks start]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:1.
31 No author, ʻRumlar ayak sürüyor [Greek Cypriots are dragging their feet]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:4.
32 Ibid.
33 No author, ʻGörüşmeler başlayacak mı [Will the talks start]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:1, 4.
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Turkey as the targetʼ.34 Yeni Volkan, on the other hand, stressed a different aspect of his words:
ʻTwo separate states cannot be acceptableʼ.35
Presidential spokesperson Hasan Erçakıcaʼs statement accusing the Greek Cypriot
Administration of damaging the negotiations by trying to impose its will through the Greek Cypriot
press received coverage in the papers. Halkın Sesi quoted the spokesperson in the headline
saying, ʻ Greek Cypriot side is trying to impose its willʼ,36 while Vatan wrote, ʻ reaction against Greek
Cypriot impositionʼ.37 Kıbrıslı repeated Presidential spokesperson Erçakıcaʼs remarks that ʻthe
process is being damagedʼ.38 Kıbrısʼs report on the spokespersonʼs accusations reflected its
agreement with his statement: ʻThe Presidentʼs spokesperson Erçakıca reacted to the Greek
Cypriot Administration who tried to impose its will using the Greek Cypriot pressʼ.39 Rather than
quoting the spokesperson, the newspaper implied that it was a fact that the Greek Cypriot
Administration had really tried to do that. 
Following the meeting, the negative portrayal of the Greek Cypriot side continued in the
newspapers that were already critical of it. In particular, Kıbrıslı reported on its front page that
Christofias continued to show reluctance for comprehensive talks and tried to gain time by
postponing the meetings indeterminately.40 In Kıbrıslıʼs view, it was clear from Christofiasʼs attitude
that the Greek Cypriot leader had ʻtendencies against the 21 March Agreementʼ. According to the
paper, some observers, who were unidentified in the text, stated that Christofias had a similar
unwillingness as Papadopoulos to reach an agreement. Reporting the details of the meeting,
Kıbrıslı also wrote, ʻGreek Cypriot stubbornness could not be overcomeʼ.41
Representation of the Turkish Cypriot side in these papers was the opposite. Kıbrıslı wrote that
when the meeting came to a breaking point it was with Talatʼs efforts that the crisis was overcome.42
It also reported that when Christofias wanted to delay the negotiations until September, Talat
rejected the idea.43 Halkın Sesi announced that there was no date for the launch of negotiations
but also reminded its readers that the Turkish Cypriot side had aimed to initiate the start of the
comprehensive talks in this meeting.44 In a way, it indirectly shifted the responsibility for lack of
success in the meeting to the Greek Cypriot side. 
Turkey in the News
Discourse and representation of Turkey were no different than during the other timeframes
studied. In the short period analysed, news coverage of Turkey focused mainly on three topics:
The first was about the ongoing Ergenekon investigation in Turkey; the second was when Turkish
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan expressed his support for Talat in the negotiations; the third was
when the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister announced that there would be no more
financial aid from Turkey. The news discourse in these reports was similar in all the newspapers.
For the first incident the newspapers used expressions such as ʻshocking arrestsʼ,45 ʻarrests that
shook Turkeyʼ,46 ʻArrests that shocked Turkeyʼ,47 ʻErgenekon earth quakeʼ 48 and ʻErgenekon arrest
34 No author, ʻRumlar ayak sürüyor [Greek Cypriots are dragging their feet]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:4.
35 No author, ʻRum Dışişleri Kiprianu: İki ayrı devlet kabul edilemez [Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister: Two separate states cannot be acceptable]ʼ,
Yeni Volkan, 1.7.2008:2.
36 No author, ʻ“Rum tarafı dayatma peşinde” [The Greek Cypriot side is trying to impose its will]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 30.6.2008:1, 2.
37 No author, ʻRum dayatmasına tepki [Reaction against Greek Cypriot imposition]ʼ, Vatan, 30.6.2008:2.
38 No author, ʻSürece zarar veriliyor [The process is being damaged]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 30.6.2008:1, 14.
39 No author, ʻGörüşmelerin konusu tam teşeküllü çözüm müzakerelerini başlatmak [The aim of the meetings is to start comprehensive
negotiations]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 30.6.2008:5.
40 No author, ʻKriz ertelendi [The crisis has been averted]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1.  
41 No author, ʻRum inadı kırılamadı [Greek Cypriot stubbornness could not be overcome]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:4.
42 No author, ʻKriz ertelendi [The crisis has been averted]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1.
43 Ibid.
44 No author, ʻGörüşme tarihi yine yok [No date for the talks once again]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:1.  
45 No author, ʻErgenekonʼda şok gözaltılar [Shocking arrests in Ergenekon]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1.
46 No author, ʻTürkiyeʼyi sarsan gözaltılar [Arrests that shook Turkey]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 2.7.2008:1.
47 No author, ʻTürkiyeʼyi şok eden gözaltılar [Arrests that shocked Turkey]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:1.
48 No author, ʻErgenekon depremi [Ergenekon earthquake]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 2.7.2008:1.
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earthquakeʼ.49 News accounts of Babacanʼs statement were also very similar in the newspapers:
ʻAnkara trusts Talatʼ,50 ʻSupport for the TRNC and Talat from the Turkish Foreign Ministryʼ,51
ʻBabacan: our trust in Talat is totalʼ,52 ʻFull support for a solution and Talatʼ,53 ʻweʼre behind himʼ 54
and ʻBabacan: our wish is the start of full-fledged negotiations with the aim of finding a solutionʼ.55
These headlines indicated Turkeyʼs support for the Turkish Cypriot leader Talat during the
negotiations and that Turkey wanted a solution in Cyprus. 
Turkey also appeared in the headlines in relation to Prime Minister Soyerʼs and Financial
Minister Uzunʼs joint press conference on the latest measures taken to tackle economic difficulties
in the country. The papers that reported the ministers  ʼconference highlighted that Turkey would
not give any more financial aid to north Cyprus: ʻTurkey gave whatever it canʼ,56 ʻno more money
from Turkeyʼ 57 were some of the headlines. 
Invisible EU
It was difficult to evaluate if there was any shift in the attitude towards the EU as there was little
coverage of the EU in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers during the period analysed. The name of
the EU was only mentioned when Jean Asselborn, the Luxembourg Deputy Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Immigration, was reported in Kıbrıs saying that ʻeveryone in the EU must
help in the solution of the Cyprus Problem  ʼfollowing his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali
Babacan.58 Even though the text mostly focused on the relations between Luxembourg and
Turkey, the newspaper chose to highlight the part that was about Cyprus. The title of the same
article in Ortam was, ʻfull support from Luxembourg for the EUʼ, while the text explained that the
Turkish Foreign Minister thanked Luxembourgʼs Minister for supporting Turkeyʼs attempts to join
the EU.59 It was again only these two newspapers, Kıbrıs and Ortam, that reported a change in
the rotating presidency of the EU Council from Slovenia to France.60
The second time the EU was a news topic was the coverage of a meeting organised to
announce the changes that would affect the welfare of EU citizens. The newspapers that included
this story used the same text and photo to report it.61 Overall, the coverage of these events did
not provide sufficient data to examine if there was any shift in the media towards the EU. 
The Government
The stories involving the government showed very little divergence in the press. For example, a
trade union protest against the governmentʼs attempt to amend the bi-monthly system of linking
public workers  ʼsalaries to the cost of living index, which is called the Sliding Scale System (eşel
mobil in Turkish), was reported with identical texts and titles. All the newspapers stated that
the unions were going to protest against the government for its latest decision on the Sliding
Scale System: ʻTrade unions are taking to the streetsʼ,62 ʻsliding scale demon stration by the trade
49 No author, ʻErgenekonʼda gözaltı depremi [Ergenekon arrest earthquake]ʼ, Afrika, 2.7.2008:1.
50 No author, ʻAnkara Talatʼa güveniyor [Ankara trusts Talat]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:1.
51 No author, ʻTC Dışişleriʼnden KKTC ve Talatʼa tam destek [Full support for the TRNC and Talat from the Turkish Foreign Ministry]ʼ, Vatan,
2.7.2008:7.
52 No author, ʻBabacan: Talatʼa güvenimiz tam [Babacan: our confidence in Talat is complete]ʼ, Ortam, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻBabacan: Talatʼa
güvenimiz tam [Babacan: our confidence in Talat is complete]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 2.7.2008:6.
53 No author, ʻÇözüme ve Talatʼa tam destek [Full support for a solution and Talatʼ]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1.
54 No author, ʻArkasındayız [Weʼre behind him]ʼ, Sözcü, 2.7.2008:1.
55 No author, ʻBabacan: Kapsamlı müzakerelerin çözüme ulaşmak amacıyla en kısa zamanda başlamasını istiyoruz [Babacan: We want the start
of the comprehensive negotiations with the aim of finding a solution]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2008:1.
56 No author, ʻKendi kendimizle yüzleşme zamanı [Itʼs face ourselves]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 3 July 2008:1; No author, ʻTürkiye vereceğini verdi [Turkey
gave whatever it can ]ʼ, Kıbrslı, 3 July 2008:1; No author,  ʻ“Türkiye vereceğimi verdim” dedi [Turkey said “I gave whatever I can”]ʼ, Halkın Sesi,
3 July 2008:1.
57 No author, ʻTürkiyeʼden başka para yok [No more money from Turkey]ʼ, Afrika, 3.7.2008:1.
58 No author, ʻAsselborn: AB içinde herkes Kıbrıs sorunun çözümüne yardım etmeli [Asselborn: everyone in the EU must help in the solution of
the Cyprus Problem ]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 1.7.2008:6.
59 No author, ʻLüksemburgʼdan AB için tam destek [Full support from Luxembourg for the EU (membership)]ʼ, Ortam, 1.7.2008:12.
60 No author, ʻ AB dönem başkanı şimdi Fransa [The EUʼs president is now France]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 2.7.2008:1, 40; No author, ʻ ABʼnin yeni dönem başkanı
Fransa [The EUʼs new president is France]ʼ, Ortam, 1.7.2008:14.
61 These newspapers are Kıbrıs Star, 3.7.2008:4; Kıbrıslı, 3.7.2008:14; Ortam, 3.7.2008:9; Kıbrıs, 3.7.2008:12; Yenidüzen, 3.7.2008:27.
62 No author, ʻSendikalar sokağa iniyor [Trade unions are taking to the streets]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 30.6.2008:6.
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unionsʼ,63 ʻthey will walk to the parliament over the sliding scaleʼ,64 ʻthere is a demonstration in
front of the parliament: the trade unions are walking to the parliamentʼ,65 ʻToday 5 trade unions are
in front of the parliament againʼ.66 The most creative headlines on this issue appeared in Afrika
and Ortam: Linking the demonstration news with the warning the Meteorology Office had issued
against staying in the sun for too long, Afrika wrote, ʻthe authorities in the Meteorology Office say
“donʼt stay in the sun more than 10 minutes” but defending the wrongful seizure of workerʼs rights
means not listening to the sun: To the parliament in 45 degrees (Celsius)ʼ.67 Ortam, on the other
hand, as mentioned before, personalised the government in the image of the Prime Minister Ferdi
Sabit Soyer, and wrote that ʻFerdiʼs government has become the peopleʼs nightmare  ʼand that the
ʻCTP government and its Prime Minister Ferdi have turned into “Freddieʼs nightmare” for the
peopleʼ.68 Ortam used this image to accuse the government of being partisan and fascist.
Furthermore, the paper transformed the text that appeared in all the newspapers so that it read
ʻCTP govern ment  ʼ rather than ʻthe government  ʼ which was the case in the other papers.69
Interestingly, while criticising the government, Ortam referred it as the ʻCTP government  ʼtotally
ignoring the coalition party, ÖRP. 
Stories on this demonstration offer good examples of how the discourse of a source, in this
case the trade unions, was adopted and integrated into reports. Many newspapers quoted the
slogans of the demonstrators in their headlines, thus echoing their anger: Kıbrıs wrote ʻSliding
Scale frustrationʼ,70 Halkın Sesi, ʻthere is no fear, but resistanceʼ,71 Kıbrslı and Yeni Volkan, ʻbreak
the hands that will touch on the Sliding Scaleʼ,72 and Yenidüzen and Güneş, ʻcontinue our struggle
until the endʼ.73 The other papers also ran stories announcing that trade unions had staged a
protest demonstration against the governmentʼs decision on the Sliding Scale System. 
All the newspapers reported the warning that a group of trade unions gave to the government
against certain policies, and most put the story on their front page. All employed the same text,
which consisted of the statements of both Prime Minister Soyer and a repre sentative of the
unions. Even the headlines were similar: Halkın Sesiʻs ʻWarning to the government,ʼ74 Ortamʼs
ʻwarning like a slap in the faceʼ,75 Güneş  ʼ ʻwarning to the CTP-ÖP govern mentʼ 76 and Afrikaʼs
ʻWarning from the unions to Soyer: Resignʼ.77 Yenidüzen and Kıbrıslı treated the story differently,
as unlike the other newspapers that gave priority to the unions, these two newspapers treated the
Prime Ministerʼs response to it with equal weight. According to Kıbrıslı,78 the Prime Minister
expressed his opinion in scathing terms. Yenidüzen, on the other hand, published the statements
of the unions and the Prime Ministers separately but next to each other rather than combining
them in one article as did all the other newspapers.79
63 No author, ʻSendikalardan eşel mobil eylemi [Sliding scale demonstration by the trade unions]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 30.6.2008:2; No author, ʻSendikalar
bugün eylem yapıyor [Trade unions are demonstrating today]ʼ, Güneş, 30.6.2008: 1; No author, ʻSendikalardan eşel mobil eylemi [Sliding scale
demonstration by the trade unions]ʼ, Güneş, 30.6.2008: 3.
64 No author, ʻEşel mobil için meclise yürüyecekler [They will walk to the parliament over the sliding scale]ʼ, Kıbrıs , 30.6.2008:1.
65 No author, ʻSendikalar meclise yürüyecek [The trade unions are walking to the parliament]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 30.6.2008:1.
66 No author, ʻ5 Sendika bugün yine meclis önünde [Today 5 trade unions are in front of the parliament again]ʼ, Vatan, 30.6.2008:1.
67 No author, ʼ45 derecede meclis kapısına [To the parliament in 45 degrees (Celsius)]ʼ, Afrika, 30.6.2008:1.
68 No author, ʻFrediʼnin kabusu [Freddieʼs nightmare]ʼ, Ortam, 30.6.2008:1.
69 Ibid.
70 No author, ʻEşel mobil öfkesi [Sliding Scale frustration]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 1.7.2008:1.
71 No author , ʻYılgınlık yok direniş var [There is no fear, but resistance]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:1.
72 No author , ʻEşel mobile uzanan eller kırılsın [Break the hands of those that will touch the Sliding Scale]ʼ, Kıbrslı, 1.7.2008:1; No author , ʻ“Eşel-
mobilʼe uzanan elleri kırarız” [“We break the hands touching the Sliding Scale”]ʼ,Yeni Volkan, 1.7.2008:1.
73 No author, ʻSendikalar: sonuna kadar mücadeleye kararlıyız [Trade unions: we are determined to continue our struggle until the end]ʼ,
Yenidüzen, 1.7.2008:1; No author, ʻSonuna kadar mücadele [Struggle until the end]ʼ, Güneş, 1.7.2008:1.
74 No author, ʻHükümete muhtıra [Warning to the government]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 3.7.2008:1.
75 No author, ʻŞamar gibi muhtıra [Warning like a slap in the face]ʼ, Ortam, 3.7.2008:1.
76 No author, ʻCTP-ÖP hükümetine muhtıra [Warning to the CTP-ÖP government]ʼ, Güneş, 3.7.2008:1.
77 No author, ʻSendikalardan Soyerʼe muhtıra: istifa edin [ʻWarning from the unions to Soyer: Resign]ʼ, Afrika, 3.7.2008:1.
78 No author, ʻÖrgütler muhtıra verdi başbakan rest çekti [Organisations gave a warning, the Prime Minister draws a line]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 3.7.2008:1.
79 No author, ʻSoyer: Anamdan başbakan doğmadım, Elçil: ʻSözün bittiği yerdeyiz [Soyer: I wasnʼt born a Prime Minister; Elçil: we are where the
words end]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 3.7.2008:1. The other two front page stories of Yenidüzen were also based on statements of the Prime Minister on
different issues. 
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Political Parties
Within the studied timeframe, political parties were the focus of news articles on two main issues:
The Talat-Christofias meeting and CTPʼs80 application to Socialist International. The practice of
giving priority to the news concerning the party with which the newspaper was affiliated or sympa -
thised was noticeable again. For example, CTP-BGʼs press release express ing its dissatisfaction
with the leaders  ʼmeeting appeared on the front page of Yenidüzen.81 In the same way, articles
involving TDP received front-page coverage in Ortam; UBP was favoured in Güneş and Vatan,
and DP was featured in Demokrat Bakış. In most cases, the opposition parties  ʼstatements that
were critical of government actions and policies were given advantageous treatment in the
newspapers that sympathised with them. 
Political parties  ʼ reactions to the two leaders  ʼ meeting were reflected as a forewarning to
President Talat. Especially noticeable were UBP leader Tahsin Ertuğruloğluʼs press announce -
ments, in which he was reported to have warned Talat. According to the newspapers ʻUBP leader
asked Talat to be careful once more before the 1 July meeting: the situation is not goodʼ,82 there
were ʻPre-summit warnings from UBP to Talatʼ,83 UBP invited Talat to ʻbehave like the TRNC
Presidentʼ 84 and ʻtake UBPʼs realistic thoughts on a solution into considerationʼ85 as well as
expressing the partyʼs concern for the 1 July meeting.86 Kıbrslıʼs headline, ʻCall from Tahsin to
Talat  ʼhad a belittling tone towards the UBP leader as it referred to him by his first name in contrast
to using Talatʼs last name.87 UBP was not the only party to issue a warning to the President, as
Halk Party (Peopleʼs Party) leader Raşit Pertev was reported as giving advice to Talat to change
his tactic in the negotiations.88
There were differences in the media coverage of parties  ʼreactions. CTP-BGʼs dissatisfaction
that a date for the launch of negotiations had not been set found space in most of the
newspapers,89 while DPʼs protest against the ʻsingle sovereignty and single citizenship  ʼdecision
and Politics for the People Partyʼs (Halk İçin Siyaset - HİS) demand for an explanation from the
President about whether he made a secret agreement with Christofias did not. Only two
newspapers, Halkın Sesi and Yeni Volkan, found these last two statements newsworthy.90
Views of the political parties attracted the mediaʼs attention following a meeting they had with
President Talat to discuss the latest developments in the Cyprus Issue. Reporting the event, the
papers used a TAK article, but some papers transformed it by changing the order of the
statements of the party leaders in the text. According to Kıbrslı, the UBP leader was the first to
make a statement followed by the leaders of DP, CTP-BG, ÖRP and TDP,91 while in Kıbrıs and
Yenidüzen, the order was CTP-BG, ÖRP, TDP, UBP and DP.92 Yeni Volkan and Demokrat Bakış
80 In related stories ʻCTP  ʼwas used rather than ʻCTP-BGʼ.
81 No author, ʻCTP-BG çözüm için müzakere tarihi istedi [CTP-BG demanded a date for solution negotiations]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2008:1.
82 No author, ʻDurum iyi değil [The situation is not good]ʼ, Vatan, 30.6.2008:1; No author, ʻTalatʼa çağrı [Call to Talat]ʼ, Vatan, 30.6.2008:3.
83 No author, ʻUBPʼden Talatʼa zirve öncesi uyarı [Warning to Talat before the summit]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 30.6.2.008:1.
84 No author, ʻEgemenlikten asla taviz verilemez [Concession cannot be made from sovereignty]ʼ, Güneş, 30.7.2008:1; No author, ʻKKTC
Cumhurbaşkanı gibi davran [Behave as the TRNC President]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 30.6.2008:5.
85 Ibid; No author, ʻErtuğruloğlu Cumhurbaşkanı Talatʼı “UBPʼnin çözümle ilgili gerçekçi düşüncelerini dikkate almaya” çağırdı [Ertuğruloğlu called
on Talat “to take UBPʼs realistic thoughts on a solution into consideration”]ʼ, Bakış, 30.7.2008:7; No author, ʻTahsin Ertuğruloğlu: Talat
önerilerimizi dikkate alsın [Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu: Talat should take our suggestions into consideration]ʼ, Afrika, 30.7.2008:8.
86 No author, ʻTalat Rumların bizi istedikleri zemine sürüklemelerine izin verdi [Talat allowed Greek Cypriots to drag us where they wanted]ʼ, Yeni
Volkan, 30.6.2008:1.
87 No author, ʻTahsinʼden Talatʼa çağrı [Call from Tahsin to Talat]ʼ, Kıbrslı, 30.6.2008:12.
88 The newspapers that reported this story are Yenidüzen, 1.7.2008:9; Yeni Volkan, 1.7.2008:7; Kıbrıs Star, 1.7.2008:7; Vatan, 1.7.2008:1; Kıbrıs,
1.7.2008:5; Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:4.
89 No author, ʻKriz ertelendi [The crisis has been averted]ʼ, Kıbrıslı, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻCTP-BG çözüm için müzakere tarihi istedi [CTP-BG
wanted a date for solution negotiations]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 2.7.2009:1; No author,ʼCTP MYK: “Görüşme tatmin edici değil” [CTP MYK: the meeting
is not satisfying]ʼ, Ortam, 2.7.2008:6; No author, ʻTalat-Hristofyas görüşmesi CTPʼyi tatmin etmedi [Talat-Christofias meeting did not satisfy
CTP]ʼ, Güneş, 2.7.2008:7; No author, ʻGörüsme tatmin edici değil [The meeting is not satisfying]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 2.7.2008:4; No author, ʻRumlar
müzakereleri geciktiriyor [Greek Cypriots are delaying the negotiations]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:3.
90 No author, ʻ Yönlüer: Talat açıklama yapmalı [Yönlüer: Talat should explain]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:4; No author, ʻ Talat Hristofyasʼla gizli anlaşma
yaptı mı [Did Talat make a secret agreement with Christofias]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 2.7.2008:1.
91 No author, ʻTepkiler muhtelif [Reactions are diverse]ʼ, Kıbrslı, 3.7.2008:12.
92 No author, ʻPartiler bilgilendirildi [Parties informed]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 3.7.2008: 10-11; No author, ʻCumhurbaşkanı siyasi partileri bilgilendirdi [The
President informed political parties]ʼ, Yenidüzen, 3.7.2008: 23.
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reported only the UBP and DP leaders  ʼcomments93 while Güneş covered only those of the UBP
leader.94 Halkın Sesi gave each leaderʼs statement separately,95  while Afrika and Kıbrıs Star did
not include the story at all. 
CTPʼs application to Socialist International (SI) was another topic that nearly all the news -
papers reported. However their coverage of the story was more confusing than informative.
Initially, Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Kıbrıslı, Vatan, Halkın Sesi and Afrika informed readers that ʻCTPʼs
membership in Socialist International has been approvedʼ.96 Basing its report on a Greek Cypriot
daily, Ortam was the only paper to report that EDEK, a Greek Cypriot political party, voted against
CTP becoming a consultative member of the organisation.97 The next day contra dicting reports
appeared in the print media. According to some newspapers, CTPʼs membership was accepted
but needed the approval of George Papandreou, President of SI and Louis Ayala, the General
Secretary. These newspapers based their information on a statement given by the CTP-BG
Representative Kutlay Erk to TAK and repeated his claims that the partyʼs membership was
accepted but needed endorsement.98 In contrast, other newspapers using the information they
received from the Greek Cypriot press announced that CTPʼs application for membership was
rejected and that the party could only be a member if it recognised the Republic of Cyprus.99 Vatan
and Afrika published these two contradictory articles100 but, rather than merging or positioning
them together, they put them on separate pages which probably confused their readers more. On
the other hand, it was only Afrika, pointing a finger at CTP, that raised questions about the
existence of conflicting information on the issue: ʻWhy did CTP deceive society?  ʼ and ʻthey
deceived the people saying that CTPʼs membership was acceptedʼ.101 The following day only
Kıbrıs Star, Kıbrıs and Afrika published articles based on the Greek Cypriot press.102
Conclusion
The analysis reveals that since the previous timeframe there has not been much change in the
Turkish Cypriot press in terms of journalistic culture. Reliance on other sources for information,
and propaganda disguised in the form of news still dominated the content of the print media.
Maybe because of lack of resources or the existing journalistic culture, neither newsgathering nor
journalistic processing of information was very evident within the Turkish Cypriot media.
Therefore, the content of the majority of the newspapers was generally the same and sources
were powerful actors in determining the shape and style of texts that appear in them. 
93 No author, Talat devleti ortadan kaldırmaya hevesli bir kişi [Talat is someone keen to abolish the state]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 3.7.2008: 3; No author,
ʻOsmosis [Osmosis]ʼ, Bakış, 3.7.2008:6; No author, ʻLiderler bilgilendirildi [Leaders informed]ʼ, Bakış, 3.7.2008: 6.
94 No author, ʻOsmosise doğru! [Towards osmosis!]ʼ, Güneş, 3.7.2008:1.
95 No author, ʻMuhalefet Talatʼa yüklendi [Opposition attack on Talat]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 3.7.2008:6, 7.
96 No author, ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist Enternasyonal üyeliği onaylandı [CTPʼs membership in Socialist International has been approved]ʼ, Vatan,
1.7.2008:18; No author, ʻCTP Sosyalist Enternayonalʼe üye oldu [CTP becomes a member of Socialist International]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 1.7.2008:5;
No author, ʻCTP Sosyalist Enternasyonalʼe üye oldu [CTP becomes a member of Socialist International]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 1.7.2008:1; No author, Afrika
, 1.7.2008; No author, ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist Enternasyonal üyeliği onaylandı [CTPʼs membership in Socialist International has been approved]ʼ,
Yenidüzen, 1.7.2008:5.
97 No author, ʻEDEKʼten CTPʼye itiraz [Objection from EDEK to CTP]ʼ, Ortam, 1.7.2008:8.
98 No author, ʻ“CTPʼnin üyeliğine onay gerekiyor” [CTPʼs membership needs approval]ʼ, Halkın Sesi, 2.7.2008:7; No author, ʻÜyelik bugün kesinlik
kazanacak [the membership to be confirmed today]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 2.7.2008:5; No author, ʻErk: Üyelik kabul gördü ancak Başkan ve Genel Sekreterʼin
onayı gerekiyor [Erk: Membership has been accepted but needs the approval of the President and the General Secretary]ʼ, Yenidüzen,
2.7.2008:11; No author, ʻCTPʼnin üyeliği Papandreuʼnun elinde [CTPʼs membership is in Papandreuʼs hands]ʼ, Kıbrslı, 2.7.2008:3.
99 No author, ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist Enternsyonal üeliğine ret [Objection to CTPʼs Socialist International membership]ʼ, Ortam, 2.7.2008:8; No author,
ʻEDEKʼten CTPʼye çelme [EDEK trips-up CTP]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 2.7.2008:1; No author, ʻCTP Rum yönetimini tanıyacak mı [Will CTP recognize the
Greek Cypriot administration]ʼ, Yeni Volkan, 2.7.2008:4; No author, ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist Enternsyonal üeliğine red [Objection to CTPʼs Socialist
International membership]ʼ, Güneş, 2.7.2008:11.
100 No author, ʻ CTPʼnin Sosyalist Enternsyonal üeliğine ret [Objection to CTPʼs Socialist International membership]ʼ, Vatan, 2.7.2008:13; No author,
ʻErk: Üyelik kabul gördü ancak Başkan ve Genel Sekreterʼin onayı gerekiyor [Erk: Membership has been accepted but needs the approval of
the President and the General Secretary]ʼ, Vatan, 2.7.2008:19; No author, ʻ CTPʼnin üyeliği kabul edildi diyerek toplumu yanıltılar [They deceived
the people by saying that CTPʼs membership was accepted]ʼ, Afrika, 2.7.2008:9; No author, ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist Enternsyonal üeliğine ret
[Objection to CTPʼs Socialist International membership]ʼ, Afrika, 2.7.2008:11.
101 Ibid. Also see, Niyazi Öküten, ʻSosyalist Enternasyonal yalanı [Socialist International Lie]ʼ, Afrika, 2.7.2008:9.
102 No author, ʻSosyalist Enternasyonal üyeliğinde top CTPʼde [It is CTPʼs move over Socialist International]ʼ, Kıbrıs Star, 3.7.2008:18; No author,
ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist enternasyonalʼe üyeliği ʻsöz hakkına sahip ziyaretçiʼimiş [CTP apparently has membership in Socialist International as a
guest with the right to speak]ʼ, Kıbrıs, 3.7.2008:9; No author, ʻCTPʼnin Sosyalist enternasyonalʼe üyeliği askıda [CTPʼs membership in Socialist
International is on hold]ʼ, Afrika, 3.7.2008:11.
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The representation of the Cyprus Issue, which was reflected in the Talat-Christofias meeting,
was slightly different in comparison to the meeting between Talat and Papadopoulos. The majority
of the newspapers simply reported on the process of the Talat-Christofias meeting and its
outcome rather than speculating and combining their comments with the facts, as they did with
the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting. In a way, they kept the same distance from both leaders and
treated them equally. Yet, they still referred to Demetris Christofias as ʻthe Greek Cypriot
Administration leader  ʼand Talat as the ʻTRNC Presidentʼ. Another difference was the expectation
of a result from the Talat-Christofias meeting in terms of a date for the launch of negotiations.
Therefore, when the outcome was not as they had hoped, the print media communicated their
dissatisfaction. The newspapers had expressed no such expectation from the Talat-
Papadopoulos meeting; on the contrary, even before the leaders  ʼsummit took place they had
published articles that reflected their lack of faith in the process. 
Only a few of the newspapers adopted an ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼdiscourse in their reports on the Talat-
Christofias meeting and pinned the responsibility for lack of an outcome in the form of a
negotiation date on the Greek Cypriot side. Accusations directed at the Greek Cypriot leader—
such as unwillingness, dragging his feet, delaying the process— were noticeable especially in
Kıbrıslı, Halkın Sesi and Yeni Volkan. These newspapers not only criticised the Greek Cypriot
administration for not being sincere but also portrayed the Turkish Cypriot side as the one being
genuine in its attempts. Other newspapers focused their reports on the outcome of the meeting
rather than blaming the ʻotherʼ.  
Unlike the earlier parts of this research, any representation of Turkey and the EU was very
limited.  This could be because of the length of the timeframe for this part of the research rather
than an indication of lack of interest. Turkeyʼs appearance in the media was in the form of its
Foreign Minister expressing his countryʼs belief in and support for solution attempts in Cyprus; in
other words, it was positive. The ongoing Ergenekon investigation, which occupied the media in
Turkey, was also reported as an important event by the Turkish Cypriot press. Meanwhile, the
representation of the EU in the print media was even less than Turkeyʼs. In other words, the EU
was invisible for the Turkish Cypriot audience during this period. 
Criticisms and protests against the government appeared frequently in the press. The
newspapers gave especially wide coverage to a trade union demonstration protesting the
governmentʼs decision to amend the Sliding Scale System — even the papers that sympathised
with the government such as Yenidüzen, the newspaper linked to CTP-BG, the main party in the
government. However, it balanced the appearance of such stories on its front page with articles
that reflected the government actions and policies in a positive way. 
Newspapers continued to give advantageous treatment to events involving the political party
representatives they sympathised with. Statements or events related to the big parties such as
CTP-BG and UBP were considered important and were reported by most newspapers; in
contrast, smaller parties received very limited coverage, and only in the newspapers that
sympathised with them. CTPʼs application for membership to SI was found newsworthy by most
of the print media. Yet, apart from one newspaper, Afrika, none questioned the conflicting
information about it and published only one side of the development. In that sense, the
newspapers failed to provide accurate and balanced information to their readers. 
Sanem Şahin




The study of the main evening news bulletins of five television channels, BRT, Kıbrıs TV, Genç
TV, Kanal T and ART focused— as in the case of the press— on 30 June to 3 July 2008. The TV
coverage of the Talat-Christofias meeting was not very different from that of the press. Analysis of
material on the leaders  ʼmeeting revealed that all channels used the same stories and even the
same texts as the print media. The idea that television news requires different processes of
construction and reception, as a visual- and audio-based medium, does not seem to have applied. 
Although this part of the research mainly focused on the presentation of the leaders  ʼmeeting
in the television news, it also examines the representation of other topics such as the government,
political parties, Turkey and the EU, as was done for the two previous chapters. 
Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
The structure of the news during this period was the same as in the previous period; that is, the
news mainly consisted of the presentation of an issue by a newsreader, followed by a film part
that included a voice report and images on the topic. Sound-bites in some of these news items
allowed the audience to see and hear a source speaking, but otherwise what was said was mostly
paraphrased and integrated into a script that was read over related pictures. In some cases the
reporter of a story was identified by the newsreader, but generally reporters remained
anonymous.1 The images of journalists were limited to showing them holding sound recording
instruments to their interviewees. Like the news structure, bulletins were also very similar to those
of the previous timeframes, consisting of similar topics with almost no exclusive news items. 
The quality of images that accompanied reports was poor, as problems such as lighting,
framing and camera movement continued to occur. Some visuals were used over and over, which
meant that audiences saw the same sequence of pictures not only in the same report but also in
the same bulletin for different stories. Images from the Talat-Christofias meeting were one such
example, as they were utilised in any news story that referred to the leaders  ʼsummit. Use of still
photography instead of video footage continued, and thus became estab lished as a common
practice.2 Apart from captions highlighting the important aspects of stories, like headlines in the
press, graphics were limited. Again, it was only ART that used full-frame graphics to reflect the
gist of a story as well as the channelʼs commentary on it. 
Scripts of television news that were based on news agency dispatches were more suitable to the
print media news. Despite this, they were used without being adapted to television, which only
reduced the effectiveness and clarity of the news. As text and pictures did not always match, in many
instances the identity of the person or the place shown on screen was not clear, which meant that
the audience had to rely on its own background knowledge to understand the issue. For example,
Genç TV, in its account of the Nationalist Justice Partyʻs (Milliyetçi Adalet Partisi - MAP) views on
the leaders  ʼmeeting, showed a photo of the partyʼs leader without naming him in the script.3
1 During the period studied, only on Genç TV did the reporter present a piece before the camera and was seen interviewing people; Genç TV,
item 13, 3.7.2008.
2 For example, Kıbrıs TV used photographs for two stories in its bulletin; Kıbrıs TV items 7, 9, 3.7.2008.
3 Genç TV, item 5, 3.7.2008.
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Some accounts of events were far from informative. One such example was the reports on the
Fishermen Unionʼs protest rally at Kyrenia harbour. The film part of the news on Kanal T consisted
of a video recording during the rally which showed unidentified people getting involved in a heated
debate but included no script to give further information.4 On Kıbrıs TV and ART the images that
accompanied the same report were general shots of Kyrenia harbour and fishermen, and did not
include any pictures from the event.5 All these reports lacked the most crucial information, i.e.,
what was the reason for the protest. Only BRT informed its audience that the demonstrators
ended their protest on the same day after discussing their problems with the Public Works and
Transportation Minister, who had gone down to the harbour and promised to solve their problems.6
Discourse Analysis
The Cyprus Issue
News bulletins were arranged according to topic, which meant that all the television channels
gave priority to the Cyprus Issue. The day before the leaders  ʼmeeting and the day it took place,
the leading stories were about this summit and relevant statements by political figures. Other
stories, such as a trade union protest rally against the government, followed the items on the
Cyprus Issue in the programme. 
Facts given in the reports on the leaders  ʼmeeting were a repetition of official information. For
example, the day before the meeting, all the channels highlighted that the aim of Talatʼs and
Christofiasʼs meeting was to launch full-fledged negotiations. This was based on the information
Presidential spokesperson Hasan Erçakıca had given the day before. 
The day the meeting took place, all the channels focused on the outcome of the meeting. Intros
of their leading stories informed their audience that after four and a half hours of nego tiation both
leaders had agreed in principle on the idea of single sovereignty and citizenship and to meet again
on 25 July to review the work of the technical committees and working groups. The news scripts
also repeated the content of the joint statement read by the UN Special Representative Taye
Brooke Zerihoun at the end of the meeting on behalf of both presidents. The film reports showed
the leaders arriving at the meeting place, which was Zerihounʼs residence in the UN-controlled
buffer zone, and shaking hands after the summit. Overall, reports on the event were all similar and
this similarity was also noted in stories related to the topic. For example, the bulletins on both
Kıbrıs TV and BRT included a statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan expressing
Turkeyʼs wish to start full-fledged negotiations to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem.7 ART and
Genç TV, on the other hand, aired an announce ment by Christofias that the end of 2008 was not
a deadline for the Greek Cypriot side.8
It was the next dayʼs news that communicated opinions of various groups on the issue.
According to these reports many political figures, such as the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the
Parliament and political party representatives, found the meeting unsatisfying and unfruitful. While
some explained this dissatisfaction was with the slow progress and specifically with lack of a start
date for the negotiations, others expressed their disagreement with the agreed issues such as
single sovereignty and citizenship. BRT reflected the widest range of opinions on the topic as it
reported on the views of the Speaker of the Parliament, political party representatives and groups
such as the Turkish Defence Organisation (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı - TMT) and the Cyprus
Turkish National Council.9 In contrast, ART reported the least, limiting its coverage to the
statements of the Prime Minister, CTP-BG, DP and the Cyprus Turkish National Council.10
4 Kanal T, item 7, 30.6.2008.
5 Kıbrıs TV, item 5, 30.6.2008; ART, item 7, 30.6.2008.
6 BRT, item 7, 30.6.2008.
7 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 1.7.2008;  BRT, item 2, 1.7.2008.
8 ART, item 2, 1.7.2008 and Genç TV, item 2, 1.7.2008.
9 BRT, items  1, 2, 3 and 4, 2.7.2008.
10 ART, items 1, 2 and 3, 2.7.2008.
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Talatʼs statement two days after the summit that ʻif a united Cyprus is going to be established,
it is definite that there is going to be single sovereignty and single citizenship  ʼbecame the leading
story on all the channels apart from ART. His remarks on the issue of single sovereignty and
citizenship received similar treatment on all channels; this involved repeating his words and using
some sound-bites. On ART the story was not only the fifth item in the bulletin but its discourse
was a sign of its disapproval of the leader: ʻTalat once more proved that he has not given up the
dream of a united Cyprusʼ and ʻhe has not given up his insistence on single sovereignty and
citizenshipʼ.11 ARTʼs previous four items consisted of stories critical of his decision. 
Reporting the Greek Cypriot Side
Interest in the Greek Cypriot side was no different than in the previous periods studied and the
news from the south continued to be included in the bulletins. Information for such stories came
mainly from the news agency that compiled them from the Greek Cypriot media. Reflections of
the leaders  ʼ meeting on the Greek Cypriot side,12 the statement issued by the Greek Cypriot
government spokesperson Stefanos Stefanou13 and Christofias  ʼmeeting with National Council14
were instances of such stories. Apart from political issues, the water shortage, which also affects
the north, was found newsworthy, and the delivery of water from Greece with tanker boats to
overcome the water shortage was reported on four channels— Kıbrıs TV, Genç TV, ART and
Kanal T.15 It was only ART that linked the story to the north. But rather than drawing attention to
the similarities, their coverage enhanced stereotyping the Greek Cypriot side as opposing
everything the Turkish Cypriot side offered: ʻThe Greek Cypriot side continues to oppose any joint
initiative despite the TRNCʼs good intentionsʼ.16 In this statement the word ʻcontinues  ʼimplies that
this negative behaviour is a trait of the Greek Cypriot side. It also cast the Turkish Cypriot side as
acting with ʻgood intentionsʼ, the opposite of the Greek Cypriot side.
It was very noticeable that ART frequently employed a strategy of positive representation of
Turkish Cypriots and negative portrayal of Greek Cypriots, highlighting an ʻus  ʼ versus ʻthemʼ
discourse. Pointing to an agreement between the UK and the ROC, ART claimed that Turkish
Cypriot sideʼs trust towards the latter diminished.17 To reinforce its claim it included a day-old
report on TRNC Presidential spokesperson Hasan Erçakıcaʼs statement accusing the Greek
Cypriot administration of damaging the negotiation process. The caption in the film, ʻPresidentʼs
Office: Greek Cypriots are damaging the negotiation processʼ,18 supported the scriptʼs message
that the spokesperson reacted angrily to the Greek Cypriot side. It was again ART that described
the Greek Cypriot leader Christofiasʼs assertion that the end of 2008 was not a deadline for the
negotiations as ʻinsolentʼ.19 The channel repeated the same accusation in its lead story in the
following dayʼs bulletin: ʻPrime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer commented on Christofiasʼs insolent
statements in the press prior to the meetingʼ.20
Turkey in the TV News
Just like in the press, Turkey was in the TV news mainly regarding developments in the Ergenekon
investigation. Nearly all the channels included reports on detentions of well-known military and
political figures in Turkey. Some regarded the Turkish Military Chief of Staffʼs statement concerning
11 ART, item 5, 3.7.2008.
12 Genç TV, item 7, 2.7.2008.
13 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 30.6.2008; Genç TV, item 4, 30.6.2008 and Kanal T, item 4, 30.6.2008.
14 Kıbrıs TV, item  2, 3.7.2008; Genç TV, item  7, 3.7.2008 and BRT, item  2, 3.7.2008.
15 Kıbrıs TV, item 12, 1.7.2008; Genç TV, item 17, 1.7.2008; Kanal T, item 11, 1.7.2008; ART, item 4, 1.7.2008.
16 ART, item 4, 1.7.2008.
17 ART, item 1, 30.6.2008.
18 ART, item 2, 30.6.2008.
19 ART, item 2, 1.7.2008.
20 ART, 2.7.2008, item 1.
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the arrests and house search of some high-ranking military officers as newsworthy.21 In these
reports it was only Kanal T that described Turkey as the ʻmotherlandʼ.22
Turkeyʼs expression of support for a solution in Cyprus was also a news topic. BRT and Kıbrıs
TV reported on Turkeyʼs Foreign Minister Ali Babacan statements stressing Turkeyʼs support for
Talat in the negotiations.23 Another example was in a speech the Turkish Ambassador to Lefkoşa
Türkekul Kurttekin delivered during the annual gratitude events organised by various veteran
organisations. According to BRT (similar reports appeared on other channels as well), Kurttekin
said that the solution supported by the Turkish Cypriot people and backed by Turkey was the one
that would protect political equality and consist of two equal constituent states.24
The EU
The EU was invisible from the television news during this period. The only time it became an issue
was when there was a change in the rotating presidency of the EU Council from Slovenia to
France. Four channels, Kanal T, BRT, Kıbrıs TV and Genç TV, reported the occasion.25  The news
stories mainly consisted of French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressing his view on Franceʼs
role in the EU presidency. Other than this, no topic related to the EU was included in the TV
bulletins.
The Government
During the four-day period examined the government was frequently a topic in the news— not
only with accounts of its actions and policies, but also with reports of protests staged against it. In
fact, while criticisms or demonstrations against the government were reported on all the television
news channels, stories reflecting its decisions and activities were not. For example, a trade union
protest rally against the governmentʼs decision to amend the Sliding Scale System26 was covered
by all the channels. Later, when 13 trade unions jointly warned the government about the amend -
ments27 and threatened a general strike,28 it was again reported on all stations. All the channels
also considered the Fishermenʼs Union demonstration in Kyrenia harbour as important.29 In
contrast, a joint press conference organised by the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister to
announce measures taken to tackle the economic crisis in the country was not reported on ART. 
All the stations reported stories concerning the government in a very similar way and also
framed issues in the same way, especially when their scripts derived from TAK texts. For example,
reports on the union demonstration against the government were one such example, with
similarities extending to pictures and sound-bites. Even the views included— in this case, those
of a UBP representative, then the main opposition party— were very similar.30 In a way, using
TAK, the state-owned news agency, set the framework for a story. As a result the governmentʼs
representation in the news, whether it was to promote its actions or report on a protest against it,
was fairly standard and offered little diversity of opinion.
Government announcements and actions were also frequently reported. For example, the joint
press conference organised by Prime Minister Soyer and Finance Minister Uzun received
coverage on Kıbrıs TV, Genç TV, Kanal T and BRT. Yet, the importance the channels attributed
to it differed: While Kıbrıs TV broadcast it as the second item in its bulletin, BRT ran it as the sixth;
on Genç TV and Kanal T the story appeared in the middle of the bulletins.31 The visits of various
21 Kıbrıs TV, item 12, 2.7.2008; Genç TV, item 10, 1.7.2008; Kanal T, item 13, 2.7.2008.
22 Kanal T, item 2, 1.7.2008.
23 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 1.7.2008; BRT, item 2, 1.7.2008.
24 BRT, item 11, 2.7.2008. 
25 Kanal T, BRT, Kıbrıs TV and Genç TV, 1.7.2008.
26 Kıbrıs TV, item 4, 30.6.2008; Genç TV, item 8, 30.6.2008; Kanal T, item 6, 30.6.2008; ART, item 5, 30.6.2008; BRT, item 5, 30.6.2008.
27 Kıbrıs TV, item 1, 2.7.2008; Genç TV, item 1, 2.7.2008; Kanal T, item 11, 2.7.2008; ART, item 5, 2.7.2008; BRT, item 5, 2.7.2008.
28 Kıbrıs TV, item 6, 3.7.2008;.Genç TV, item 9, 3.7.2008;.Kanal T, item 10, 3.7.2008;. ART, item 6, 3.7.2008; BRT, item 4, 3.7.2008.
29 Kıbrıs TV, item 5, 30.6.2008; Genç TV, item 14, 30.6.2008; Kanal T, item 7, 30.6.2008; ART, item 7, 30.6.2008; BRT, item 7, 30.6.2008.
30 Kıbrıs TV, item 4, 30.6.2008; Genç TV, item 8, 30.6.2008; Kanal T, item 6, 30.6.2008; ART, item 5, 30.6.2008; BRT, item 5, 30.6.2008.
31 Kıbrıs TV, item 2, 2.7.2008; Genç TV, item 11, 2.7.2008; Kanal T, item 9, 2.7.2008, 10 and BRT, item 6, 2.7.2008.
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groups and organisations to state officials and government ministers were also treated as
newsworthy. This type of story was most prevalent on BRT and Genç TV.
Political Parties
As seen in the press and the previous television analysis, political parties were the topic of many
news items. Their activities and views, especially on the Talat-Christofias meeting, were reported
on all the television bulletins. For example, on several occasions Turkish Cypriot leader Talat met
the political parties represented in the assembly to inform them of the latest developments on the
Cyprus Issue; all the channels covered at least one of these meetings.32 A close study of their
television coverage reveals how political biases — or lack of journalistic norms of being balanced,
fair and accurate— played a role in the construction of stories. For example, although all the
reports on the second meeting looked similar—party leaders talking to journalists following their
meeting with Talat— in fact the order of appearance of each party leader changed according to
the channel. While on BRT the leaders appeared according to the political hierarchy, that is to say,
first the Prime Minister, who is also the leader of CTP-BG, the main party in the coalition
government; then the deputy prime minister, who is also the leader of ÖRP, the small partner of
the coalition government; then followed the larger opposition party, UBP, and the smaller ones,
DP and TDP.33 In contrast, on Kanal T, the UBP leader was shown first followed by the DP and
TDP and then the ÖRP and CTP-BG leaders.34 As there was no script that went with the pictures,
there was no indication why Kanal T chose to show the leaders in that order. Genç TV, on the
other hand, included only CTP-BG leader Soyer, ÖRP leader Avcı and TDP leader Çakıcı in its
report. ART gave priority to the views of the UBP leader Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu and then reported the
views of CTP-BG and ÖRP.35
Having shown the party leaders talking to their cameras and giving their views on the leadersʼ
meeting, the television channels also chose to broadcast statements issued by CTP-BG, DP and
TDP separately.36 Among them, CTP-BGʼs was deemed the most newsworthy as it appeared on
all television bulletins; this can perhaps be explained by its being the main party in the coalition
government.37
Another example of political bias being apparent in story selection and treatment was Kanal Tʼs
reports on UBP. This was the only channel that reported UBP leader Tahsin Ertuğruloğluʼs call to
Talat to act like the TRNC President.38 Kanal T also reported on the partyʼs criticism of the
government concerning the Sliding Scale System, as did BRT.39 On the other hand, BRT was the
only channel to air statements of parties such as ÖRP and BKP regarding the leaders  ʼsummit.40
Meanwhile, more news related to DP was reported on ART than any other channel. ART
broadcast DPʼs protest of the leaders  ʼ decisions on single sovereignty and citizenship as the
second item in one of its news bulletins, and then covered CTP-BGʼs statement of dissatisfaction.41
Unlike the press, CTP-BGʼs membership in Socialist International did not receive much coverage
on the television news. BRT, Kıbrıs TV and Kanal T reported that the membership application to
the organization was approved and, apart from the Greek Cypriot party EDEK, everyone had
voted in favour of it.42 Kıbrıs TV also broadcast CTP-BG Representative Kutlay Erkʼs statement
32 The meeting of political parties with Talat before the leaders  ʼsummit was reported by Kıbrıs TV, Genç TV, Kanal T and BRT, 30.6.2008 but not
by ART. When the parties met the president after the leaders  ʼmeeting it was only BRT and Kanal T that reported the incident on the actual
day while ART and Genç TV included it in their next dayʼs bulletin. BRT, item 1, 2.7.2008 and Kanal T, item 2, 2.7.2008. 
33 BRT, item 1, 2.7.2008.
34 Kanal T, item 2, 2.7.2008.
35 ART, items 2, 3, 3.7.2008.
36 Kanal T, items 4, 5 and 6, 2.7.2008.
37 BRT, item 6, 1.7.2008 and Genç TV, item 4, 2.7.2008; ART, item 3, 2.7.2008; Kanal T, item 4, 2.7.2008.
38 Kanal T, item 3, 30.6.2008.
39 Kanal T, item 6, 1.7.2008and BRT, item 8, 1.7.2008.
40 For ÖRP, see BRT, item 2, 30.6.2008; for BKP see BRT, item 3, 2.7.2008.
41 ART, items 2, 3, 2.7.2008.
42 BRT, item 8, 30.6.2008; Kıbrıs TV, item 8, 30.6.2008. Kanal T reported the story a day later, in item 3, 1.7.2008.
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on the issue.43 Otherwise no information, even contradictory as appeared in the press, was provided
on the television news. As a result, television audiences were not informed that CTP-BGʼs
membership was actually not approved. 
Conclusion
The Cyprus Issue or, in this case, the Talat-Christofias meeting, was the most important topic and
generally led the television bulletins. Framing of the issue did not show much variance among the
five television channels. That is to say, they all adopted and repeated the official discourse in their
news coverage. 
In the television news, attitudes towards this meeting were slightly different than for the Talat-
Papadopoulos meeting. First of all, there was the expectation of a positive result in the Talat-
Christofias meeting. The September 2007 meeting lacked any optimism for a positive outcome
and was viewed as nothing more than a propaganda move on the part of the Greek Cypriot leader.
In the Talat-Christofias meeting, on the other hand, the media reflected an expectation that a start
date for negotiations could be established.
Reaction to the outcome of these two meetings was also different. While it surprised no one
that the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting failed to produce any positive outcome, there was a clear
dissatisfaction that no decision to pursue negotiations was reached in the Talat-Christofias
meeting. This meeting resulted in disappointment either because of a lack of a start date for peace
negotiations or because of the agreement on single sovereignty and citizenship.
The television coverage also reflected different attitudes towards the leaders. The advanta -
geous treatment given to the Turkish Cypriot leader in the Talat-Papadopoulos meeting was still
apparent in the coverage of the latest summit, but was not stressed as strongly. However, rather
than pointing to an attitude change it could be because of the difference in the outcome and the
way of announcing the outcome to the media. Talat and Papadopoulos had organised separate
press conferences to give information on the meeting. In these conferences, giving their versions
of the event, each put the blame to the other. Communicating these events, the media integrated
nationalistic discourses into their reports and generally held the ʻother  ʼside responsible for the
failure. Talat and Christofias, on the other hand, announced the outcome of their meeting with a
joint declaration. This limited the mediaʼs coverage to this statement. The divergence of ʻus  ʼand
ʻthem  ʼwas still there but not emphasised. The ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼdiscourse was most obvious on ART,
which usually cast the Greek Cypriots as the ʻ otherʼ. They were represented as continually rejecting
Turkish Cypriots  ʼ offers of cooperation and their leaders were accused of making ʻinsolentʼ
announcements. In contrast, Turkish Cypriots were portrayed as the side with ʻgood intentionsʼ. 
Turkeyʼs representation did not show much change either. Important developments in Turkey
as well as remarks on Turkeyʼs policy on Cyprus were found newsworthy by the Turkish Cypriot
channels. While the interest in Turkeyʼs internal and Cyprus affairs continued, it seems that there
was a lack of interest in the developments in the EU as there was rarely any story about it in this
part of the study. This could also be attributed to the fact that the data chosen for this part of the
study was insufficient to evaluate the media attitude towards the institution. 
Government-related news continued to feature prominently in the news bulletins. Its ministersʼ
actions and decisions as well as government visits of various individuals and groups were treated
as newsworthy. Coverage of such activities of the government ministers that lacked any news
value indicated an advantageous treatment towards them. Yet criticisms and protests staged
against the government were also reported. In fact, all the channels reported the news on
demonstrations in opposition to the government. The only difference between reports on the
protest rallies and those on government announcements was that the reports on the latter
included more information as they benefited from the news agency texts. In some television
reports the coverage of the demonstrations was confusing and lacked certain crucial information. 
43 Kıbrıs TV, item 3, 1.7.2008.
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The television channels  ʼbias in relation to political parties did not show much divergence from
the previous times examined. Although the political biases of the television channels were not as
clear as in the press, the frequency and the length of the stories favouring a specific party
indicated certain political partialities.  The treatment of news stories, and especially in terms of
using comments of party leaders, was also an indication of such biases. 
Sanem Şahin
CONCLUSIONS
GREEK CYPRIOT MEDIA CONCLUSIONS
Synthia Pavlou
The Annan Plan was the most popular topic reported by the media in 2002. ThePapadopoulos-Talat meeting and the presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus werethe most widely covered subjects in the time period 2007-2008. The meeting between
President Demetris Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat on 1 July was the
prevailing discourse during the four days studied in 2008. These news stories, along with others,
revealed certain trends that cannot be considered coincidental. The study of the daily newspapers
and TV channels showed that many of their practices and discourses remained constant
throughout the time periods examined for this report. 
There were two practices of the press that remained unchanged over the three time periods;
these concerned the amount of information offered to the readers and the sources from which the
dailies drew their information. It seems that Politis and Phileleftheros fought for exclusivity by
publishing front-page stories based on their own sources and by employing correspondents both
in Cyprus and abroad. Conversely, the newspapers that were affiliated with political parties, and
those facing the challenges of low circulation figures and limited funds re-published material which
originated mainly from KYPE. Even so, they often changed the headlines of these externally
produced texts to harmonize them with their own views and beliefs. These trends appear to have
remained constant over the three time periods although during the last two there was a slight
divergence from this trend as a stronger effort for objectivity was observed. 
The analysis of the press also revealed that, in 2002, the Annan Plan was at the heart of the
public debate and the main news discourse concerned the form of solution to the Cyprus Problem.
In 2007-2008, the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution, the July 8 process also known as the
Gambari agreement and, once again, the Annan Plan, were the key news topics. In 2008, the
newspapers widely covered the matter of single sovereignty and citizenship.
In 2002 the dailies expressed, more profoundly than other time period studied, their stance on
the issue of the proposed settlement. All the dailies, apart from Alithia, projected directly or
indirectly that it was against the national interest to accept the Annan Plan. Machi and Simerini
rejected it ʻmore loudly  ʼthan the others. Machi, Simerini and Alithia employed two practices that
promoted their political positions: they devoted more space to news stories that backed their own
opinions; they emphasised the viewpoints of important people, persons of authority, experts or
groups who agreed with their stance on the UN Plan. In the remaining two time periods, Haravgi,
Alithia and Phileleftheros seemed to link their stance on the solution to their support of a specific
party or the government. Therefore, in the 2007-2008 time period, Haravgi echoed AKELʼs
position that the federal solution could bring an end to the Cyprus Problem and supported the
Gambari agreement which had been linked to the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution; during
the four days analyzed in 2008 it continued backing AKELʼs view and backed the single
sovereignty and citizenship. In 2007-2008, Alithia aligned itself with DISYʼs opinions on the bi-
zonal, bi-communal type of settlement, promoting the view that it was a suitable form of solution,
while in 2008 it too backed single sovereignty and citizenship. Phileleftheros, which was always
careful not to oppose the positions of the government, also supported a solution based on the
federal model, a single sovereignty and citizenship as well as the July 8 although in 2007-2008 it
did not explicitly state its pro-Gambari agreement stance and in an editorial appeared suspicious
of the federal solution. Over the two time periods, Politis did not openly reveal its position on the
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above mentioned forms of settlement; it was clear, though, that it did not oppose them. In the
2007-2008 time period, Machi did not expose its stance on the federal solution but it did point out
that the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots disagreed on many topics related to the
settlement. In 2008, however, it too supported the single sovereignty and citizenship following the
views of DISY, which was the party it favored the most,; thus Machi did not oppose the official
position of the government. In 2007-2008 Simerini did not back the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal
solution, but in 2008 took up the official stance of the government by supporting single sovereignty
and citizenship. 
The study of the press landscape during the two first time periods revealed that the newspapers
had little hope for a resolution of the Cyprus problem; this was not the case in 2008. Over this last
time period analyzed most newspapers showed some optimism about the two sides reaching an
agreement. Simerini and Phileleftheros were the only dailies that remained constant throughout
the three time periods in their gloomy predictions for the future of the solution. 
The dailies were consistent in their positions vis a vis the settlement as well as in their uneven
coverage of certain politicians, parties and the government. Over the three time periods, Haravgi
consistently served as the mouthpiece of AKEL, Machi and Alithia seemed to support DISY,
Phileleftheros was cautious in its depiction of the government and its positions, while Politis during
the two final time periods appeared set against Tassos Papadopoulos. It was primarily two
practices that revealed these views— the wider coverage and/or the highlighting of the stances of
a certain party/the government and the negative or positive representation of a particular party/the
government. In this latter case the party/the government was represented as ʻthe otherʼ, and
pictured almost as the ʻenemyʼ. Before the presidential elections in the 2007-2008 time period the
dailies implemented more elaborate strategies for promoting specific candidates to their readers,
for example, they quoted flattering statements that influential people made about their preferred
candidate. 
Over the three periods analyzed, none of the dailies, apart from Haravgi, maintained consistent
views regarding the EU.. However, there was one continuous practice among all the dailies with
regard to the EU, this being that each newspaper altered its representation according to its stance
on matters related to political issues that concerned the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, in the same
time period we find newspapers depicting the EU as the foe of the Greek-Cypriots or their savor/ally,
depending on the way the Greek Cypriots perceived its specific position or decision In 2007-2008
there were numerous examples of this phenomenon; within a few months, Phileleftheros, Alithia,
Machi and Haravgi depicted the European Union as first being on the Greek-Cypriots  ʼside and
then against them. Phileleftheros even ran  two different news stories on the same day, where in
one story the  EU was presented as Cyprusʼs ally and in the other as an enemy of the Republic
of Cyprus. 
This report also examined the discourses and practices the newspapers used to picture what
they considered to be ʻour side  ʼor the ʻothersʼ. The study of these representations revealed that
throughout the three time periods there were many unaltered elements. 
In 2002 there was a duality in the concept of ʻour sideʼ. While all the dailies appeared to  view
the Greek Cypriots and Greece as ʻtheir sideʼ, in 2002, Simerini and Alithia also seemed to
consider members of their ʻown  ʼteam all those like-minded people who objected or accepted the
Annan plan according to the paperʼs stance. 
Simerini and Machi were the newspapers that most emphasized an identity connection
between the Greek Cypriots and Greece. They seemed to regard the Greek Cypriots as an
integral part of Hellenism, and so characterized the Greeks as their ʻbrothersʼ. These notions were
expressed more emphatically in 2002 although they were observed throughout the three time
periods of this report; in 2008 however, there were no data to reveal Simeriniʼs repre sentations.
Haravgi was the only daily that never referred to the Hellenic identity of the Greek Cypriots, and
never used the expression the ʻGreek sideʼ; instead, it repeatedly stressed the bond between the
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, all the newspapers seem to have felt that
there was a strong tie between Cyprus and Greece. This was apparent in the choice of certain
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news stories or in the fact that they often included in their reports the statements of Greek
politicians. Over the last two time periods most newspapers even had sections or whole pages
where they only published stories related to Greece. 
The dailies did not regard the Turkish Cypriot community as the ʻother  ʼor the enemy. Haravgi,
Politis and Alithia seem to have a more positive stance than other newspapers, with Haravgi and
Politis appearing as stronger supporters of rapprochement than Alithia. Apart from their choice of
news stories, Haravgi repeatedly stressed that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots were
one people, while Politis collaborated regularly with a Turkish Cypriot journalist. The Turkish
Cypriots were not seen as the foe of the Greek Cypriots, whose enemy /ʻotherʼ, was always
Turkey and those who executed its orders such as its troops or the Turkish Cypriot leadership.
None of the newspapers portrayed Rauf Denktaş and, later, Mehmet Ali Talat positively, often
describing them with unflattering epithets. For the time periods we analyzed, Phileleftheros and
Simerini, for example, referred to them as the ʻoccupation leaderʼ. In 2002, all the dailies
emphasized that Denktaş had fixed claims, while during the two other time periods they also
projected Talat as Turkeyʼs bondservant and responsible for the deadlock on the island, since his
unjust demands obstructed the solution. Haravgi was the only newspaper that, over the four days
studied in 2008, did not take a position on Talat although the analysis of the news stories did not
indicate that there was any change in the way he was regarded. 
The settlers, another group of ʻothersʼ, were consistently depicted in dark colors. Turkey was
blamed for bringing them from Anatolia in order to change the demographic composition of
Cyprus. Over the four days studied in 2008 there were no news stories about them but during the
first two time periods, all the dailies stressed this idea; in 2002, Simerini more than any other
newspaper expressed disapproval of this group, describing it as the ʻthird Attilaʼ or referring to it
as the ʻgangreneʼ of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Turkey was the main category of the ʻother  ʼ that was negatively represented. Not only was
Turkey held responsible for bringing the settlers into the Republic of Cyprus but, throughout the
time periods examined, she was depicted by several dailies as their ultimate enemy, since by her
unwillingness to negotiate she had  led the country into a deadlock. Simerini used strong language
to portray Turkey as a wrong doer and a threat to the safety of Greek Cypriots. Machi, which over
the two first time periods was also strongly set against Turkey, concurred in this portrayal. 
There were occasions in 2002 when Phileleftheros, Alithia, Machi and Simerini fused together
the Turkish Cypriot leadership or the Turkish Cypriots with the Turks, referring to them simply as
the ʻTurkish sideʼ, perhaps revealing their stance on identity. Simerini identified Turkish Cypriots
with Turkey throughout the three time periods, while it was observed that Machi did so during the
first two periods and Phileleftheros over the first and last. The ʻTurkish sideʼ was always depicted
negatively while ʻour side  ʼwas seen positively and although, as mentioned above, the Turkish
Cypriots were not regarded as the foe of the Greek Cypriots, in this case, if they were indeed
considered as part of the ʻTurkish sideʼ, they were represented unflatteringly. 
The ʻwe  ʼand ʻthey  ʼdichotomy with ʻour side  ʼbeing the goodies and the ʻother side  ʼthe baddies
was most stressed by Phileleftheros and Simerini. Nevertheless, all the dailies portrayed the
Greek Cypriots as those in the right and the victims of the conflict. In 2002 the newspapers
presented the situation as one where the Greek Cypriots wished and strived for a settlement while
ʻthe others  ʼplaced obstacles in the path to peace; over the last two time periods Phileleftheros
and Simerini continued putting forward this notion. In 2008 all the newspapers reported that
important organisations supported the Greek Cypriot positions on various issues, in a way
emphasizing that their demands were just ones. One of these positions was related to the land in
the north of the island. Throughout the three time periods, all the papers used the same
semantical tactics to proclaim that ʻthe other side  ʼdid not have legitimate power over the northern
part of the island. They repeatedly referred to it as the ʻoccupied areasʼ, attached the word
ʻpseudo  ʼ to other words, placed inverted commas around phrases or words that could denote
authority to ʻthe others  ʼor replaced them with the expression the ʻso calledʼ. In 2002 Machi clearly
stated that ʻthe others  ʼillegally ruled the northern part of the country and that the land belonged
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to the Greek Cypriots. The concept of the ʻrightful ownership  ʼwas also stressed by Simerini during
the following time period; throughout 2007-2008 and during the four days analyzed in 2008, all
newspapers indirectly put forward the same notion as they repeatedly reported the efforts of ʻthe
other sideʼ for the indirect recognition of the north. Additionally, in 2002 Machi and Phileleftheros,
followed by Haravgi and Simerini in the next time period, seemed to have personified the land as
one of their foes since they depicted the northern territory of the island as a source of crime or
troubles for the Greek Cypriots. It seems that the latter daily was the one that pictured ʻthe other
sideʼ, Turkey, the settlers and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in gloomier colors than the rest. 
The way the newspapers viewed ʻthe others  ʼwas also revealed by studying which news stories
from the Turkish Cypriot press were selected for re-publication and by examining how these were
modified. In 2002, all the dailies apart from Alithia, seem to have chosen stories that were suitable
for negatively representing ʻthe other sideʼ. During the last two time periods of our analysis,
Phileleftheros, Haravgi and Politis focused more on subjects drawn from the Turkish or Turkish
Cypriot press than they had in 2002, by adding new sections that reported developments in
Turkey or the northern part of Cyprus. Throughout these time periods the newspapers also chose
news stories where the efforts of ʻthe others  ʼto achieve political recognition were described.  One
more practice which remained constant over the three time periods was the change in the
semantics used in the original Turkish or Turkish Cypriot texts. The dailies intertwined commentary
and facts, employing the same semantical tactics described above; thus, the words and
expressions of the original texts were tailored to ʻfit  ʼthe newspapers  ʼown beliefs. 
This report was not confined to the analysis of the press, but also included analysis of the TV
channels. As with the press, we aimed to reveal the practices, stances, representations and
strategies the stations followed to put forward their views. 
We could only examine the TV media for the last two time periods due to availability of data.
Our analysis shows that, by and large, all the channels employed the same methods/strategies
to remain competitive, draw the attention of large audiences and inform the public. Moreover, it
appeared that their sources of income as well as their party or ideological affiliations affected the
selection of news items and the way these were represented to the viewers. 
Throughout the two last time periods the channels vied for audience loyalty with computer-
generated effects and music. They also tried to keep their audience informed on the latest
developments by offering wide coverage of important events and by the timely reporting of these
events; thus, they aired different reports for the same news story and used live broad casting and
correspondents for ʻon the spot  ʼcoverage. The stations strived to get ʻscoops  ʼand extra information,
and most covered several topics as neutrally and accurately as possible by airing opposing
opinions or different actions in the same news story and by using numbers. These methods
helped them to earn the trust of the viewers. Nevertheless, there were channels such as Mega
and RIK whose news reports were influenced by their funding resources. 
Examination of the television news coverage revealed the stations  ʼviews on the solution. In
2007-2008 the channels appeared to consider  the Gambari agreement as an acceptable form of
settlement, and so they did not explicitly oppose the official government stance. This was true for
the following time period, too, as they did not object to the government position on single
sovereignty and citizenship. The main difference between the two time periods was the level of
optimism at the possibility of a settlement; during the four days studied in 2008 hopes were
revived for a settlement.  
While they did not have noticeable differences on the above issue, the stations took different
positions vis-a-vis the politicians and the political parties; this was especially noticeable in the.2007-
2008 time period, where data show that ANT1 and RIK offered favorable coverage to Tassos
Papadopoulos while Plus TV favoured Demetris Christofias. It seems that Sigma remained neutral
while Mega did not flatteringly depict AKEL. Over the four days examined in 2008 only Plus TV and
RIK clearly revealed their stances. They both used similar practices to offer favorable coverage to
the party or politicians they supported: these were over-representation, positive depiction or
highlighting of the views/actions of that party, its supporters, or of the government. 
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In 2007-2008, issues related to the European Union were widely covered by all the channels
except Plus TV; furthermore, for the four days examined in 2008, Plus TV reported the fewest EU-
related stories. In 2007-2008 the channels reported on the EU in relation to its stance on political
issues concerning the Republic of Cyprus; thus, not only the press but also the TV channels
depicted the Union either as an ally or as an enemy of the Greek Cypriots. While this was not
observed in 2008, it does not necessarily mean that there was a change in the way the EU was
regarded: over the four days studied there were no news stories that would reveal whether this
practice was still used. 
Similar to the press, the TV stations seem to have had close ties with Greece; they collaborated
with Greek TV channels and often re-broadcast stories carried by Greek stations. A connection
and the existence of an identity bond between the two countries were highlighted by widely
covering topics that concerned Greece. The deadly fires that broke out in Greece revealed the
effort of the Greek Cypriot stations to emphasize that Cyprus stood by Greece in troubled times.
In 2008, RIK and Sigma, more than any other channel, presented the notion that there was a
close relationship between Cyprus and Greece, which was regarded as being part of ʻour sideʼ.
The Turkish Cypriots seemed to be somewhere in between ʻour side  ʼand ʻthe other side  ʼin the
news stories reporting this communityʼs views and current affairs. The Turkish Cypriots were
depicted positively by all channels, especially by Plus TV, which followed the stance of AKEL and
endorsed rapprochement. In 2008 only Megaʼs represen tations were not revealed, but in general,
all stations treated this community favourably, even if they did not explicitly declare that the Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were one people. During the 2007-2008 time period, however, the
channels sometimes identified the Turkish Cypriots with the Turks and the Turkish Cypriot
leadership; in this case they regarded them as ʻthe others  ʼor as part of the ʻTurkish sideʼ and
depicted them unflatteringly. Sigma TV, more than any other channel did not clarify to which group
it referred when reporting on ʻthe othersʼ, giving the impression that it perceived Turkish Cypriots
and Turks as being one and the same. Yet all the stations, except Plus TV, did this mix up at least
once. In July 2008 this did not occur, perhaps as a result of the hopeful outcome of the Christofias-
Talat meeting. 
As was the case in the press, the Turkish Cypriot leader was clearly considered as part of ʻthe
othersʼ. In 2008 he was pictured negatively, characterized by most channels as the ʻoccupation
leaderʼ who followed Ankaraʼs policies and hindered the solution. RIK, ANT1 and Sigma were the
stations that projected this the most strongly, while sometimes they also represented him as
obediently following Turkeyʼs orders. In 2008, however, there was a slight change: Plus TV, Mega
and RIK did not depict him as a person who obstructed settlement, possibly because of his
positive meeting with Christofias. ANT1 and Sigma remained doubtful whether the positions or
attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leader had actually changed, while they also portrayed Turkey more
negatively than the rest. Over the 2007-2008 time period, all channels represented Turkey and its
soldiers as their primary enemies. They held Turkey responsible for bringing settlers from Anatolia
in order to change the demography of Cyprus and thus ensuring her dominance in the north.
Additionally, RIK, Plus TV, Sigma and Mega put forward the notion that Turkey fought to legalize
the regime in the northern part of Cyprus.  ANT1 and Sigma reported that Turkish troops posed
a grave threat to the Greek Cypriots  ʼsafety, and along with Mega associated Turkey with danger
by often connecting her with illegal activities. In 2008 once again, ANT1 and Sigma reported news
stories which implied that Turkey was not fit to become a member of the European Union. It
seems that the latter station pictured ʻthe othersʼ, Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the
settlers, in gloomier colors than the rest, followed by ANT1 and RIK. 
In 2007-2008 the TV channels used the same practices as the press to project that the Greek
Cypriots had justified demands while ʻthe others  ʼ were wrong concerning important political
matters. The stations validated the correctness of the Greek Cypriots  ʼ aims and wishes by
emphasizing that significant people, organizations or counties agreed with them. In 2008, ANT1
and Plus TV continued to uphold this claim. Additionally, the use of memories helped in the
representation of the Greek Cypriots as the victims of the conflict, reinforcing the image of the ʻthe
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others  ʼas the instigators. Although Sigma TV was the channel that most used this representation,
nevertheless, all the stations claimed that the Greek Cypriots were in the right and longed for a
solution while Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and generally the ʻother side  ʼtried to obstruct
it. These notions were not spotted over the four days analyzed in 2008. It seems that during the
last time period the channels represented the ʻother side  ʼas being more willing to compromise. 
In both the 2007-2008 and 2008 time periods, the stations used the same semantical practices
as the press to proclaim that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership had no legitimate power
over the land in the north. In 2007-2008, this was also stressed by reporting the efforts of ʻthe
others  ʼto achieve political recognition. In 2008, ANT1 and Sigma continued projecting that Turkey
and the Turkish Cypriot leadership had no right to rule the northern part of the country. In 2007-
2008, like some newspapers during the same time period, RIK, ANT1 and Sigma depicted the
north as a source of troubles for the Republic of Cyprus. The territory in the north, the settlers and
the ʻpseudo-stateʼ, over the two last time periods, were often defined by the image of the Turkish
and the ʻTRNCʼ flags. This symbol, which can carry underlying messages, had the power to evoke
strong emotions in the viewers. Music could have the same effect, depending on the selection,
and this tactic was most often used in 2007-2008 by RIK and ANT1.
Our analysis of the media landscape reveals that there were no noticeable differences between
the press and the TV channels with regard to the discourses and practices. The only deviation
was perhaps in the way they represented ʻthe othersʼ. It appears that in 2008, the Turkish Cypriot
leadership and sometimes even Turkey were described in a milder way than before, as the
Christofias-Talat meeting shed a ray of hope over the possibility for a solution. The optimism for
a brighter future appears to have led a few stations and newspapers to avoid representing ʻthe
others  ʼas those who did not want reunification or peace. 
Synthia Pavlou
TURKISH CYPRIOT MEDIA CONCLUSIONS
Sanem Şahin
Our analysis of the Turkish Cypriot dailies and television has revealed the existingjournalistic culture that determines the news output. Repetitive occurrence of certainjournalistic practices and discourses over the selected periods in this research indicates
that they are features of the Turkish Cypriot media rather than coincidental. 
The Turkish Cypriot media relied heavily—almost exclusively, even —on articles originating
from news agency dispatches and press releases. Thus, an almost identical news output
prevented presentation of diverse views and frameworks on the topic reported. The practice also
raised questions on the role of journalists in news production. If news reports sourced from news
agencies and the information provided in press releases are used word-for-word without being
edited, then what are journalists for? The contradiction in the number of media organisations and
lack of diversity in news reports strengthened the idea that the main purpose of the media was to
propagate political opinion rather than inform the public. Yet for the media to function as it should,
it is important that media organizations benefit from their reporters and encourage them to
produce news items instead of using readily provided texts. Or even if they do use such sources,
that they approach them critically rather than taking them for granted. This would provide the
public with a diversity of information and enable them to make more informed decisions. It would
also limit the power of the sources in manipulating the content of the news. 
Another widespread practice in the Turkish Cypriot media was to give advantageous treatment
to political figures and groups that a media organization sympathized with. Representation of
events was mostly shaped in line with opinion and policies of these political parties, sometimes
resulting in distortion. For the media (TV stations and/or newspapers) affiliated with political
parties this was not surprising, but this phenomenon also applied to those that had no such
affiliation. In either case, professional norms of journalism, being fair, accurate and balanced,
tended to be sacrificed for political gains, turning the media into an instrument of propaganda
rather than a platform for debate and dissemination of information.
Nationalist discourses were another common feature of the Turkish Cypriot media, especially
on issues related to the Cyprus Problem. Based on an ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼdichotomy, which was not
fixed but changed depending on topic and the media, these discourses were integrated into the
news. For example, while some media outlets represented the Annan Plan as being against the
national interest, others represented it as the opposite; however, they all presented their
arguments in terms of ʻour  ʼnational interest. A comparison of news coverage of the Annan Plan
and the two community leaders  ʼ meetings revealed how the ʻus  ʼ and ʻthem  ʼ groups were
differentiated and how these groups included and excluded different actors in their reflec tion of
events concerning the Cyprus Problem. Reports on the Annan Plan were influenced by intra-
national differences and political orientations and, therefore, categorisation of the ʻothers  ʼvaried
depending on whether the media institution supported the plan or not. In the leaders  ʼmeetings,
the ʻus  ʼand ʻthem  ʼdifferentiation was clearer as the news reports were constructed as the Turkish
Cypriot vs the Greek Cypriot side. The stories, employing the image of a homoge nous nation, also
depicted the Turkish Cypriot side as united against the Greek Cypriots. These stories were also
dominated by official discourses. Integrating the official announce ments into the news reports not
only presented them as reality but, in the absence of any challenge, set themselves as the norm
and the framework in which to understand the events.
In the periods analysed, there was rarely a report that gave voice to members of the Greek
Cypriot community. Even though events in the south were reported by the media in the north,
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these reports were generally colored by northern viewpoints—journalists in the north very rarely
included any Greek Cypriots  ʼviews in their reports. In general, Greek Cypriots were portrayed as
the ʻotherʼ, and the actions and statements of their state representatives and politicians
concerning Turkish Cypriots were generalised to the whole community.
The image of the EU did not change much throughout the periods studied. It became a news
topic only when it concerned Cyprus or Turkish Cypriots. That is to say, as a source of funding to
improve social and economic standards its interest in the country was welcomed but its
involvement in the Cyprus Problem was not. The EUʼs image was utilised in the news reports
frequently during the time when the Annan Plan was debated. While its depiction was positive in
the pro-Plan media, it was the opposite in the others. However, stories concerning the EU nearly
disappeared in the other periods studied as if not being a member had also diminished the interest
in it. As a result, the EU became nearly invisible for the Turkish Cypriot audience. 
The research focused on representation of Turkey as a country, excluding other stories on
Turkish origin citizens, immigrants, students, etc. Turkeyʼs image in the media did not show
variation. In some cases it was referred to it as a separate state with good relations with the TRNC
and in others it was portrayed as part of ʻusʼ. For example, if the story concerned Greek Cypriots
as well then Turkey and the TRNC were depicted as united. However, if the story was on official
relations between these two countries then they were regarded as separate. There were few news
articles critical of Turkey and its affairs with Cyprus. Its representation did not show much
divergence from the official version and was similar throughout the media.
The mediaʼs coverage of politics did not alter much over the years either. The only change was
in the media organizations that supported the political power, but the strategy they used in
reporting the political power stayed the same. That is to say, when a party the media institution
sympathized with was in power it was cast in a positive light, but when that party became the
opposition, then a high level of criticism was directed towards the new power holders. Therefore,
the media can be criticized of not fulfilling their duties to the public because of their partisanship.
Sanem Şahin
DISCUSSION AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Christophoros Christophorou
The study of Greek and Turkish Cypriot media content from three different periods hasrevealed a number of standard features and values sustained over time independent oftheir respective general context. It is not an exaggeration to say that when they are
examined in parallel, each communityʼs media resemble the otherʼs in many ways, as they largely
follow similar practices and apply the same rules in their approaches and construction of their
respective mediated reality; the perspectives and positions may differ or oppose each other, but
each sideʼs media obey the same principles. The media in Cyprus have more similarities than
differences as revealed by the analysis offered in this study, which was an opportunity to better
assess and understand the way they work, their role and functions and the possible impact of their
activity. However, one should be very cautious not to generalise because broader and more in-
depth research is required to reach more accurate conclusions. In addition, interpretation of, and
inferences based on, media content may vary according to oneʼs point of view.
The critical concepts that determine the role and the functions of the media, as well as their
impact, are those related to ʻagenda-setting  ʼand ʻframing  ʼtheories. As McCombs suggests,1 the
power to set a nationʼs agenda and focus the publicʼs attention on a few issues ʻis an immense
and well documented influenceʼ of the news media. In our case, the Cyprus problem was the key
issue on the agenda set by the media; this was so when it was central in developments or when
it became the focal point of news through media choice. The main event might have had no
significant relationship to the Cyprus Problem, but any reference to it sufficed to shift attention
from the event itself and turn the focus to the Problem alone. Thus the agenda was influenced in
two ways: Significant issues were completely ignored or relegated to secondary positions;
conversely, events with the slightest reference or relation to the Cyprus Issue were upgraded and
turned into important news. Ultimately, the agenda in the islandʼs daily life had one major object,
its Problem.
The mediated reality brought to the attention of the public consisted of both real and ʻstagedʼ
events,2 with authorities, political and other actors playing primary, almost exclusive, roles. Given
that objects with a connection to the Cyprus Issue were highly rated in news selection, the dominant
discourse of all actors forcibly responded to this ʻrequirementʼ. This was done repeatedly and with
focus on specific aspects of the Problem.
In the present study, the main axes of discourse were the Annan Plan in the first period; the
September 2007 leaders  ʼmeeting, the Presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus and political
friction and disputes between Turkish Cypriot political parties in the second period; and for the third
period, the new leaders  ʼmeeting in July 2008. Other events mediated in the news, also referring
and connected to the authorities, political and other actors or institutions were also examined.
A crucial question is, who set the media agenda and how? It has been shown very clearly that
the shortage of resources, but also convenience and the search for easy solutions, led the media
to simply reproducing news items provided by external sources. Our research showed that the
Turkish Cypriot media set an agenda which was largely a subset of the agenda set by the official
news agency, TAK, while they also reproduced the structure and perspective already embedded
1 McCombs, 2001:1.
2 Staged events are comments, statements, news conferences and other organised activities aimed at attracting media attention.
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in these external news items. In the Greek Cypriot case, the search for exclusivity by some media
having at their disposal more resources created a more diversified agenda and differentiated
news structure and perspectives. More important, however, was the fact that in both cases the
selection of the news and the focus on specific aspects conformed to the official and elite
perspectives. It was through ʻinformation subsidiesʼ3 from the authorities that the media set the
agenda and reproduced their news items. Some media adopted or promoted the official selection
and interpretation of events; others chose those of different groups on the basis of affinities with
their own vision and beliefs. News agencies mediated the information provided by authorities as
well as by various sources (political and other actors); the latter might have also sent or delivered
their information subsidies directly to the media offices or to journalists. However, as already
processed information, news agency dispatches needed no additional work, as might have been
the case for press releases or statements, which prompted their publication unchanged.   
The impact of the above processes meant that the ʻpictures  ʼof mediated reality that reached
the minds of the public were largely constructed on the basis of the authorities  ʼor elites  ʼagendas.
Thus, to some audiences, this mediated reality could be perceived as the truth and the only
existing reality. 
Similarly, the media tended to promote those aspects or those topics that were raised by
authorities and other actors. This led to the projection of only partial views, covering limited and
specific aspects of a subject, and not necessarily discussing its substance. This research
distinguished two levels in the work of the media: On the first level there is the effect of favouring
specific people, institutions and views in the selection of sources and items-to-become-news; this
was enhanced by second-level actions through the use of tools and practices, such as the choice
of headlines, the use of language-specific verbs in reporting, embedding one mediaʼs views or
comments, overrepresentation, discrediting opponents, providing the mediaʼs own interpretations
and focus. Thus, in the first period, the mediated reality on the United Nations proposed Plan and
by extension the Cyprus Problem was a partial one, which reduced reactions to the Plan to one
or more specific angles. These aspects referred to the national interest, the eventual desire of the
two sides for a solution, the dangers perceived to come from the ʻotherʼ, the assumed
repercussions that a solution could have, the survival / extinction of the community or perceived
negative points of the Plan. It was difficult to find an overall picture or a passionless analysis of
the proposal and the challenges posed by either its acceptance or rejection. The main aspects
projected in the second period constrained the issue to the will or readiness of the sides to talk
and solve the Problem and to their approach and positions on the 8 July agreement. Thus, the
substance, e.g., the role and the reach of the agreement, the reasons for which the Problem
should be solved, as well as the aspects that needed to be addressed by the leaders, were not in
the picture. As a result, the need to resort to blame became a central point.
The change in the general climate following the election of Demetris Christofias and the
positive steps made by the two community leaders had some limited effect on media coverage
and stances. The focus of attention on the eve of the leaders  ʼmeeting on 1 July was mostly on
their differences; after the meeting it shifted to the ʻpositive outcome  ʼand glimpses of optimism for
some Greek Cypriot media and disappointment for the Turkish Cypriot media; suspicions
regarding the intentions of the other side, but also questioning of the outcome were also noted.
Most approaches lacked the perspective needed for an overall view of the Problem, as there was
no discussion of the steps required from each side in order to arrive at a solution. Moreover,, the
treatment of the other side by some media showed some positive or not so negative signs;
however, this might be due to circumstances rather than a change of behaviour.
3
“An information subsidy is an attempt to produce influence over the actions of others by controlling their access to and use of information
relevant to those actions”, Gandy, 1982:61.
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ʻUs  ʼand the ʻOther(s)ʼ
A very important aspect of the topics selected as news items by the media was that of defining
the ʻactorsʼ, those involved in any way in the news reports, and their attributes. With the media
engaged in acts of identification with, and differentiation from, certain people and groups, a
number of dichotomies and binary oppositions were formed; this led to various pairs of ʻus  ʼand
the ʻotherʼ, with each party portrayed in relation to specific aspects and attributes. In this process of
inclusion / exclusion, ʻself-proclamation  ʼwas a frequent phenomenon. By ʻself-proclamation  ʼwe
mean the claim by journalists and media of the role or status of the mouthpiece or repre sentative
of the nation, the people, a group, an organisation or an official. The media spoke on behalf of, or
as if they represented, these large groups. This was done in opposition or separation from the
ʻother(s)ʼ, and with each party bearing specific characteristics; the attribution of exclu sively
positive features to oneʼs own group and negative features to the ʻother  ʼhad a decisive effect: The
mediated reality promoted the idea that the real problem was the ʻotherʼ, since this ʻother  ʼhad
specific negative attributes. Thus, portraying the ʻother  ʼas the enemy, a threat, a wrong-doer with
inherently bad or evil intentions meant that no change in behaviour or positions could take place
and the problems would remain unsolved forever. 
In some cases what was portrayed as the ʻother  ʼwas not the other community, but a specific
group within the own and/or the other community, or a country or a leadership. Thus, some media
identified those who promoted rejection of the Annan Plan not in connection to their community,
but as belonging to one group, the one negating the solution of the Problem. This group was
composed of members from both communities. Conversely, one group could be identified with the
whole ʻother  ʼ community independently of the groupʼs size, where its (positive or negative)
characteristics were also extended to the community. A most interesting position with regard to
perceptions about the ʻother  ʼ was that of Greek Cypriot media not considering the other
community as an adversary. Indeed, they argued further that the Turkish Cypriots were also
victims of the situation. Instead, it was their leader or leaders, Turkey, the settlers and extremists
who posed a threat to Greek Cypriots. This might have two effects; it could broaden the group of
ʻus  ʼ– they suffered like ʻwe  ʼsuffered, so we all belong to one and the same group; it could also
remove any suspicion of Greek Cypriot wrong-doing to them or any bad intentions, thus
confirming the widespread view that the Problem was caused by foreign powers.
In many cases the media made no attempt to try to understand a personʼs position or
behaviour; nor did it engage in any kind of dialogue on a given subject. A common media tactic
was to label one side or group as good or evil, according to how it appeared in the opposition of
ʻus  ʼ to the ʻothersʼ. Reactions related to the EU clearly illustrate this view; when funds were
approved or the decisions were favourable to oneʼs side, the Union was labelled as a nice
institution; should the opposite occur it was portrayed as unjust. The object of the argument was
displaced from the specific event, position or decision to the personality or nature of the institution
itself. The judgement, based on one, single fact, became a criterion of a general and absolute
value, determining the (good or evil) character or nature of the institution. Similarly, statements or
moves by the Turkish Cypriot leaders or Turkey were interpreted by the Greek Cypriot media in
connection with a perception depicting them as bad or untrustworthy by nature.
Framing the Problem 
The media presented the basic issues and their specific aspects to the public in ways that put
them in a specific perspective that also determined the basis of the debate. The framing of issues
and their aspects not only determined how and from what angle they were viewed or should have
been viewed, it had also further repercussions. It defined the terms in which the public would
discuss the news subjects, be it the issues presented, the problems, the solutions sought, the
protagonists or all the actors involved. In this way, framing had an impact both on the overall
picture and on each of its component elements. Examples of framing that eventually had an impact
on the public at different levels related to the presentation of news stories, perceptions about the
Cyprus Issue and the way the media envisaged the solution.
4 See, Christophorou, 2005.
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A peculiarity of the framing in the case of out-sourced news items was that of the coexistence
of two different frames, one in the main body of the news item that was externally produced, and
one in the headlines that was internally produced. This contradiction offered a solution to the
media, which produced headlines that accommodated their framing needs when necessity forced
them to use external texts. Since shortages in resources limited their capacity to produce news
texts of their own, they eagerly used the officially produced news and embedded framing and
changed the headings of news so as to offer their own framing.
With reference to key issues, the Greek Cypriot media perception of the Cyprus Problem was
consistently framed in terms of a bad neighbour – Turkey, which had invaded and occupied part of
the island, colonised this part and followed a policy that formed an obstacle to any solution. The
framing in the Turkish Cypriot media, in particular in the nationalist newspapers and television
stations, focused on the Greek Cypriots  ʼpast wrong-doings and their persistent ill-will towards
Turkish Cypriots.
These diverging perceptions influenced efforts to find a commonly accepted definition of the
core of the Problem, since the Greek Cypriots saw no problem between them and the Turkish
Cypriots and they viewed Turkey as the real problem; yet Turkish Cypriots saw Turkey as their
protector from the Greek Cypriots, whose intentions constituted the core of the problem.
Passing to a different level, each sideʼs media envisaged a solution on different terms. Echoing
the views of a majority of Turkish Cypriots, some Turkish Cypriot media saw it as a means for
opening to the world, becoming masters of their own fate and for gaining other benefits, including
joining the European Union;4 in contrast, for conservatives this was an eventuality to avoid as it
would lead to the disbanding of their state, their subjugation to Greek Cypriot oppression and their
eventual extinction. Greek Cypriots spelled solution either as a necessity, albeit for some with
many negative points, or a dangerous development that would lead to their extinction. Interestingly some
subjects were seen in exactly the same perspective but from opposing directions; those opposing
the Plan in either community saw it as the product of a conspiracy and a threat to the survival of
their own community or political entity, serving only the interests of the enemy.
The above perceptions shaped the answer to the question: What kind of a solution and on what
terms? The fact that the media viewed or interpreted issues related, for example, directly or
indirectly to sovereignty and citizenship from opposing directions is another indication of the lack
of common ground, or, in other words, of each sideʼs different frame. The way the outcome of the
1 July meeting was received on each side illustrated these different perspectives. The Greek Cypriots
viewed it as a positive step, while Turkish Cypriots expressed their disappointment.
The portrayal of the two sides in terms of several dualities, namely ʻvictim vs perpetratorʼ,
ʻintransigent vs flexibleʼ, ʻwrong vs rightʼ, etc., meant that the real problem was the other and it
was the ʻotherʼsʼ obligation to conform to principles, international or other law, and make a move
to re-establish justice. This was deducted not only from the framing of news objects; it was also
explicitly projected by the media.
More importantly, this also framed the key problem as an issue of determining which party bore
responsibility, and so led to the need to resort to blame. Thus, blame has consistently been a
major feature of discourse in and by the media.
The phenomena just described in relation to the Cyprus Problem and the two communities
were also observed in connection to other issues, in the relations with authorities, between
political parties, different groups and political forces. The outcome of such approaches was the
denial of others, of their right to exist, not only of their views and beliefs. Their opponents were
symbolically eliminated from the mediated reality or they were annihilated through the kind of
(negative) portrayal reserved to them by the media.
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The role of the media in the road to peace
A crucial question in relation to the media agenda and their framing of the news was whether this
turned them into propaganda tools of the authorities and elite groups; therefore questions about
their role in general, as well as questions about how journalists did their job and influenced
perceptions and opinions also emerged. Because our interest centered on issues related to the
Cyprus Problem we will examine the questions above as they relate to the Cyprus Problem.
The fact that the dominant picture of reality mediated to the public largely originated in
constructions by the authorities and elite groups made this picture a reflection to some extent of
dominant political views and positions. Along with mediated pictures on specific aspects of the
Problem that appeared identical to the official ones or to those of parties or ideological trends,
there were also significant differentiations. The main ideas and features are summarized below in
a way that can help us assess the role and impact of these pictures.
Parts of the mediated reality might have created a negative influence and strengthened the
idea that no solution could be found and that conflict was not only inevitable, but also natural. This
related to the representation of the leaders  ʼcontacts and talks as a game, or to the prediction that
no possibility existed for a breakthrough; some went as far as to say or confirm that the exercise
was just a futile one and it was only a matter of time before it was necessary to accept this ʻrealityʼ.
These approaches, along with the portrayal of leaders as not believing in the efficiency of their
efforts or the procedure, could have an impact on the general atmo s phere. It could result in the
publicʼs disengagement, which could be of crucial importance for the success of the whole
enterprise for reaching a solution. 
Similarly, the tendency to add drama, to focus on or even exaggerate differences left out or
underrated common points of convergence on some issues. In any case, this meant that the
audience was not given a complete picture of the situation, and so it was impossible to assess it
accurately.
Focusing on oneʼs own sideʼs (noble) intentions and good will, and on the other sideʼs (bad)
actions and the harm they caused, a characteristic noted in literature on the subject in similar
situations,5 has a number of side effects. The focus on oneʼs own sideʼs intentions meant that there
was silence regarding its bad acts or that their positive aspect was shown or promoted. When
reference to oneʼs own sideʼs wrong doings was unavoidable, these were underrated or attributed
to marginal extremists. Conversely, when referring to the otherʼs acts and their effects, their
intentions were depicted or implied in a negative way. Thus, stereotypically positive and negative
pictures, generalised to include all members of the group, were disseminated, perpetuating the
gap, real and virtual, between people. 
We have also seen cases where the media did not follow the dominant line and views of their
respective community or as promoted through official channels. They defied negative portrayals
and avoided the blaming game, or, even better, they promoted common features or vision.
However, even in the case where the media promoted or supported views that one might consider
negative, this also had a positive effect since it prompted debate and could eventually help
elucidate questions. 
There were issues on which all media were unanimous through their support of the official
stance, even in cases where the expressed positions of a media were different. Thus, the subject
of status was considered of ultimate importance for each community and consequently the
institutions and officials of the other side were consistently placed below the status of own ones;
while for one  ʼ s own side the terms ʻgovernment  ʼ or ʻPresident  ʼwere used, for the other side,
ʻadministrationʼ, ʻleader  ʼ or whatever was inferior was chosen. On the basis of legitimating
foundations, the use by Greek Cypriot media of denominations such as ʻpseudo-ʼ, ʻso-called  ʼand
others, focused on the other sideʼs lack of international recognition. This pushed its conceptu alisation
to a complete denial or refusal of existence in any way. Conversely, all Turkish Cypriot media
5 Cited in Ross, 2006.
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referred to the ʻGreek Cypriot Administration  ʼand ʻthe Greek Cypriot leaderʼ, to show that they do
not recognise the authority of the Republic of Cyprus and its officials.
Views and positions on other decisive issues caused intra-community divisions, in some cases,
into more than two groups: One example was the issue of national identity on either side of the
dividing line, and relations with the perceived mother countries; to some the ʻ motherland countriesʼ
had precedence over Cyprus, to others local identity was prioritized, while a third group made
local identity an exclusive one, integrating both communities.
The fact that specific media projected a reality that reflected to a large degree the official or a
partyʼs or a groupʼs views raises the question of the influence of authorities or other institutions. We
saw that changes in power also led to changes in the relations between the media and office
holders or specific institutions. On most issues, however, orientations did not change and stability
and continuity seemed in force. National identity appeared to be the decisive factor determining
ideologies and orientations, as well as the dividing lines between groups. On specific issues,
identification with a group or institution might mean the dominance of the latter over the media,
such as the case of numerous newspapers which are party mouthpieces in the Turkish Cypriot
community. It appeared also that other media chose their line in response to the perceived needs
and expectations of specific groups.
All the above considerations raise the question, ʻcould the media escape from this logic and
transform reality beyond dominant perceptions and frameworksʼ? In other, simpler words—since the
reality of news was constructed on the basis of what was provided by agents in a specific context,
in which authorities and elite groups set the parameters, what was the margin for media to go
beyond this context? For example, since the official discourse was one that sustained antagonism
and conflict, could the media articulate a discourse that promoted peace as a superior good?
As is the case for other countries, Cyprus media are also subject to the constraints and
limitations set by political, financial, industry and other factors. Their size, selling figures and
resources that determine the extent to which they can sustain themselves and keep their
independence—all of which are directly connected to the size of the market— could make them
more dependent on official sources than their counterparts in bigger countries. The above,
however, did not prohibit them from having dissident or their own ideological and editorial line on
some issues, at least. The crucial question is whether this freedom of choice could extend to
matters fundamental for the community, in particular, the core of the Cyprus Problem. Researchers
have noted the role of a phenomenon described as ʻurge toward conformity  ʼ when there are
issues that are crucial for one group, which exerts pressure on persons and institutions, allowing
little margin for deviating positions.6 This might be stronger in small societies like Cyprus, where
social pressure can be felt more intensely than in larger societies.
Additional features, such as those related to history, language and the subsequent role of the
media in each community might have further implications. Since Greek and Turkish language
newspapers developed on the island in tandem with respective national consciences, their role as
implements of cohesion and consolidation for each community across ethnic lines cannot be
seriously contested. The language factor also has implications at various levels, as a criterion of
distinction and identity on the basis of ethnicity. This was a major point creating the dichotomy across
origin. Furthermore, language determined the public of the media, and conditioned their content. The
media became the forum of expression of the respective group speaking that language; they
aggregated and promoted the readers  ʼ and viewers  ʼ interests. The most significant effect of the
above was that members of one community could learn about the other only through their respective
media, since contacts were limited and most people cannot read the otherʼs language. 
Under the above conditions, the almost exclusive role of the media to inform about the ʻotherʼ
became decisive; the mediated reality had the potential to determine the picture of the other since
little or no possibility of alternative or supplementary information sources existed. Thus the
tendencies and phenomena reviewed in the previous paragraphs, where political and other
6 See Blanchard, 1992, cited in Ross, 2006:10
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differences between the communities were reported by the media on the basis of mainly official,
external sources, contributed to the maintenance of the gap. The positions of the two sides were
reproduced and the official line transcended each community. Along with this, perceptions about
the role of language seemed to limit its use to the expression of dominant views; a Greek or
Turkish language media could only express and support the respective communityʼs views and
concerns. An illustrative example of linking language and the views ʻallowed  ʼto be expressed was
that of the treatment of media and politicians after 2004, when Greek Cypriot politicians were
condemned for spelling out Ankaraʼs positions in the Greek language; such a reaction means that
the accusers believed that the Greek language is incompatible with the expression of certain
views, especially those deviating from official ones. On another occasion, a newspaper was labeled
ʻa Greek language Turkish newspaperʼ, meaning that although the paperʼs language was Greek, it
behaved like a Turkish newspaper, promoting the arguments and interests of the enemy.7 Deviation
from the official line was considered in connection to language and not the logic of the arguments.
In some cases the media even seemed as if they were part of the solution process, that they
were at the negotiation table, and negotiating on behalf of the community. As a result of such an
approach, they had to abide by the rules of the community; no views or opinions should weaken
the community positions.
How can things change? Can one expect journalists to assume the role of advocates for peace,
as some suggest, or is there another way to improve understanding and pave the road to peace?
The question could be formulated in a different way, which brings the issue back to the
fundamentals of the role of the media and of journalists; how can the media best respond to their
role of providing complete and unbiased information while allowing their audiences to shape their
own views on the basis of this information? A first and crucial step would be to separate facts from
comments. Then, we should proceed to more specific actions related to the selection of news and
the construction of a mediated reality that aims to be fair with people, facts, opinions and situations.
Such steps include reporting not only about the good intentions of oneʼs own community, but
also on the less good, or the violent acts and the harm that these acts caused to the ʻotherʼ. This
can gradually lead to the realisation that the stereotypical good-intentioned ʻ us  ʼand the wrong acts
of the ʻother  ʼ are not supported by reality. It could show that good and evil are not standard
attributes of any group of people defined by national, religious or other attributes. The human
aspect that transcends the above could make all of us aware of simple truths that we need to
accept. Journalists and people in general should treat all other people first and above all as
humans and not according to national, religious or other identity. This applies to journalists
themselves as well: The treatment they deserve and their rights, in particular freedom of
expression, must be safeguarded on the basis of universality, which extends these rights to all
human beings, independently of any other identity. Media and journalists have an obligation, by
defending human rights for all, to build bridges between people and link them together for a




BRIEF NOTES ON GREEK CYPRIOT MEDIA
Christophoros Christophorou
Newspapers
■ Alithia, Αλήθεια [Truth], belongs to Alithia Publishing Company, which also owns Alpha TV (pay TV) and Sports
Super FM radio channel. Founded in 1952 as a weekly newspaper, Alithia became a daily in 1982, two years
after it was acquired by its present owners. It is ideologically linked to right wing party DISY. Web portal:
http://eu.alitheiaportal.com.
■ Machi, Μάχη [Battle], was first published in 1960 by Nicos Sampson and ceased publication in 1980. In 1994
its publication was revived, with Tharros, Θάρρος [Courage] as a weekly edition. Sampsonʼs son and owner is
a DISY MP.
■ Politis, Πολίτης [The Citizen], is the youngest Greek Cypriot daily, first published in 1999. Politis is a
commercial newspaper with no party or ideological links. Website: www.politis.com.cy.
■ Simerini, Σημερινή [Today] was founded in 1976 by a group of journalists and later it was taken over by the
DIAS Publishing Company, also owners of SIGMA TV, Radio Proto and other radio stations. The company
owns or it is affiliated with  free of charge publications and several magazines. In 2009 the DIAS Group started
up a Web portal, www.sigmalive.com. Simerini is a conservative right wing newspaper.
■ Phileleftheros, Φιλελεύθερος [The Liberal] was founded in December 1955. Phileleftheros Public Company also
owns  the Cyprus Weekly and four magazines, SFERA FM and other radio channels. The Company is also
affiliated with several specialised magazines. Web portal: www.philenews.com. Phileleftheros is a commercial
daily with by far the largest circulation figures. 
■ Haravgi, Χαραυγή [Dawn] started circulation in 1956. It is the mouthpiece of left wing party AKEL. Website:
www.haravgi.com.cy.
Television Channels
■ The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (Ραδιοφωνικό Ίδρυμα Κύπρου, - RIK) is the public service broadcaster,
created by the British in 1953 when the first radio channel went on air, with a television channel starting in
1957. Its monopoly lasted until 1990 and 1992 when the first commercial radio and television stations started
operation. The Corporation has two television channels, RIK1, RIK2 and three radio channels. 
■ MEGA, first started as Λόγος, Logos [The Word]. It is owned and operated by the Church of Cyprus. It was the
first commercial television channel to go on the air, on 25 April 1992. Financial difficulties led its owners to lease
it to Mega TV – Greece, in September 1999. Following a court decision, control returned later to the owners,
with Mega TV participating in the channelʼs capital. Since 1999 it has broadcast as MEGA. 
■ Sigma started operation in 1995. It also has two cable channels, Sigma Sports 1 and 2. It belongs to the DIAS
Publishing House Ltd.. 
■ ANT1 started operation in June 1993. Antenna LTD also owns ANT1 FM radio (1998). Since it first started
operations the channel has cooperated with ANT1 in Greece. 
■ Plus TV went on the air in July 2006 as CNC (Cyprus New Channel) Plus TV. It is linked to left wing party AKEL.
APPENDIX II
BRIEF NOTES ON TURKISH CYPRIOT MEDIA
Sanem Şahin
Newspapers
■ Kıbrıs started publication in 1989. It is part of the Kıbrıs Media Group owned by Asil Nadir. Its policies have
changed over the years with the government. 
■ Website: http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com.
■ Yenidüzen was established in 1975 as the publication of CTP. In December 2008 it formed United Media
Group with Sim FM (radio), Kanal Sim (TV). 
Website: http://www.yeniduzen.com.
■ Halkın Sesi is the longest surviving Turkish Cypriot newspaper, having begun publication in 1942. 
It has a nationalist stance and supports conservative policies. 
Website: http://www.yeniduzen.com.
■ Vatan started its publication in 1991. Owned by Erten Kasımoğlu, the paper is managed and directed by his
sons, Ahmet and Mehmet Kasımoğlu. It backs nationalist views. Website: http://www.vatangazetesi.com/
■ Kıbrıslı has been published by Doğan Harman since 1999. It has changed its policy from a very nationalistic
stance to supporting the Annan Plan. 
Website: http://www.kibrisligazetesi.net
■ Ortam, established in 1980, was the publication of TKP and later of TDP, when the party joined with BDH to
form TDP. It mainly propagates the partyʼs views and actions. Website: http://www.ortamgazetesi.com.
■ Volkan, established in 2001,later changed to Yeni Volkan, following a legal action. It is an ultra nationalist
newspaper, supportive of former president Denktasʼs views. Website: http://www.volkangazetesi.net. 
■ Birlik, founded in 1980, was the publication of UBP. It propagated the policies of UBP and had a nationalist
stance. It closed down in 2004.
■ Afrika started as Avrupa but changed its name to Afrika in 2001, following a court case. It is a radical left-wing
paper supportive of the reunification of Cyprus.
Website: http://www.afrikagazetesi.net.
■ Güneş started publication after Birlik closed down in 2004. Itʼs the organ of UBP and publishes in line  with
UBPʼs policies. Website: http://www.gunesgazete.com.
■ Demokrat Bakış has been the newspaper of the DP since 2007. It promotes DPʼs policies and actions.
Website: http://www.demokratbakis.net.
■ Sözcü is ÖRPʼs publication, launched in 2007. Like other party newspapers, it publishes in line with the
partyʼs policies and actions.
■ Kıbrıs Star started publication in 2007 and is part of Star Media Group owned by Ali Özmen Safa. It is a
commercial tabloid newspaper. Website: http://www.starkibris.net.
Television Channels
■ Bayrak Radio Television Corporation (BRTK)ʼs foundation dates back to 1963. It is the official broadcasting
corporation of the TRNC and follows government policies. 
■ Kanal T, owned by Ersin Tatar (the Finance Minister in the UBP government in 2009), has been on the air
since 1997. It has a nationalist position in relation to the Cyprus Issue. 
■ Genç TV is part of Birinci Media Group and has been operating since 1997. It can be described as left of
centre.  
■ Avrasya TV (ART), owned by Mustafa Özbek, has been broadcasting since 2003. Some of its programmes
are produced in Turkey. It is supportive of nationalist policies.
■ Kıbrıs TV is part of Asil Nadirʼs Kıbrıs Media Group, which also owns Kıbrıs newspaper. 
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Media, politics and the Cyprus Problem are the 
main themes of the present study. Through  analy-
sis of Greek and Turkish Cypriot television news 
bulletins and newspaper editorials and leading arti-
cles, the study seeks to establish media approaches 
and positions on important issues so as to better 
understand their work, role and functions. The 
study analyses practices and positions related to the 
Cyprus Problem, the solution, matters of identity, 
the ‘others’ and the European Union, the authori-
ties and the political forces.  This attempt to ascer-
tain the underlying values that guide news selection 
and content will provide a clearer picture of how the 
media interacts with or influences society.
The study of sample data from late 2002, 2007 and 
July 2008 has revealed that, along with some dif-
ferences, the two communities’ media have com-
mon features and practices; these are sustained 
over time irrespective of the general context. While 
the media perspectives and positions of the two 
sides may differ, in many instances they all obey 
the same or similar principles. 
On most issues the media promote the official 
selection and interpretation of events or those of 
different elite groups, based on affinities with their 
own views and positions. High dependency on offi-
cial news sources, in particular of the Turkish Cyp-
riot media, leads to disseminating the content and 
structure of the official discourses. 
When reporting on core aspects of the Cyprus 
Problem and the status of the two sides there 
is little or no differentiation on either side; one-
sided legitimacy or status superiority, stereotypical 
positions of the own side’s good intentions and the 
other’s wrong doings dominate.
The mediated world is composed of various pairs 
of ‘us’ and the ‘other’, community or group in the 
other or the own community; there is an empha-
sis on dualities, with the ‘other’ being the prob-
lem because of its negative attributes. Most often, 
one side’s or a third party’s acts and decisions will 
be seen as simply connected to their good or evil 
nature, thus portraying it as an ally or as foe.
The framing of news and representations shows 
divergent perceptions of the core of the Cyprus 
Problem and consequently of how a solution can 
be reached. 
Changes in power or the general atmosphere have 
limited effect on media coverage and stances. On 
most issues media practices and positions feature 
stability and continuity. 
The question remains open; can the media articu-
late a discourse that deviates from the official or 
dominant discourses sustaining antagonism and 
conflict, in order to promote peace as a superior 
good?
The report can be ordered from:
PRIO Cyprus Centre, PO Box 25157
1307 Nicosia, Cyprus
The report can be downloaded from:
www.prio.no/cyprus
Media Narratives, 
Politics and the 
Cyprus Problem
Media Narratives, 





Synthia PavlouPeace Research Institute Oslo
Peace Research Institute Oslo
Instituttet for fredsforskning




litics and the C
yprus Pro
blem
2010
01
01 2010
design: w
w
w
.studiosju.no
